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Abstract 
"
 
The main contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that collective bargaining represents a 
fundamental source of flexibility and security for the labour market. This original finding 
emerges from a comparative analysis of bargaining arrangements in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector in three countries – Italy, Denmark, and the UK – with a detailed 
examination of arrangements at company level in two of these – Italy and Denmark. The 
sector chosen for the analysis is a solid manufacturing industry exposed to international 
competition and characterised by a long tradition of collaboration between the social partners. 
A focus on collective bargaining which is both multi-level and comparative enabled this 
research to establish: first, that sector level industrial relations institutions account for the 
degree of within-country homogeneity in the content of firm level agreements over issues of 
flexibility and security; and second, that the degree of cross-company heterogeneity is 
conditioned primarily by firm-level contingencies – both union density and organisational 
characteristics. This means that at company level both institutional structures and non- 
institutional variables play an important role. 
 
Significantly, the increasing attention paid at EU level to policies aimed at achieving greater 
flexibility while protecting the level of security for the workforce, and the ineffectiveness of 
the Member States to fully embrace such a policy paradigm, have required academic debate 
on flexicurity to look beyond public policies and legal regulation as sources of flexibility and 
security for the labour market. In line with this stream of research the thesis shows that sector 
level bargaining institutions act as beneficial constraints on company level negotiations over 
flexibility and security. In light of this it is argued that the flexicurity literature has not only 
overlooked the role of collective bargaining in shaping different regimes of flexibility and 
security, it has also ignored a further form of security: the procedural security that a well-
functioning multi-employer system provides to lower bargaining levels. Furthermore, by 
paying exclusive attention to collective bargaining institutions, the research responded to the 
challenge of offering a clearer account of the context within which the notion of flexicurity is 
deployed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Until the 2008 financial and economic crisis, academics and policy-makers across Europe 
had extensively debated the need for labour markets to become more flexible whilst also 
providing forms of security for the workforce (Wilthagen 1998, Wilthagen and Tros 
2004, Bekker, Wilthagen et al. 2008). However, most of their attention was focused on 
national level interventions which tended to neglect developments at both sector and 
company levels (Burroni and Keune 2011). 
 
Yet, over the course of the 2000s, issues of competitiveness, adaptability of firms, and 
employment security for the workforce have become increasingly prominent on the collective 
bargaining agenda. Therefore, this thesis explores the impact of collective bargaining on 
policies on flexibility and security at both sector and company level within chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, a major manufacturing industry that is highly exposed to international 
competition – and thus most likely to introduce changes in working practices (Heyes, 2001) – 
and characterised by a long history of collaboration between social partners.  
 
By focusing on collective bargaining in a single sector of economic activity across three 
different countries, this research makes a twofold contribution to present academic research. 
First, it sheds light on the role of sector and company level actors and institutions in shaping 
regimes of flexibility and security (Burroni and Keune, 2011) thereby enlarging the scope of 
comparative institutional analysis beyond national level institutions (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
Second, the countries selected for this study are Italy, Denmark, and the UK: they each 
possess different industrial relations frameworks. A cross-national comparison of these 
countries helps us to understand how various international trends – such as the search by 
employers for greater flexibility and collective bargaining decentralisation – are mediated by 
national and sector-specific institutional arrangements. 
 
Drawing on recent studies of collective bargaining and flexibility and security (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015) this comparative analysis looks at sector level 
institutions as the analytical starting point, assuming that companies and workers who belong 
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to the same industry experience similar technologies and market environments and, therefore, 
also similar demands for flexibility and security (Marginson and Sisson, 2006). In addition, 
its novel contribution consists of the choice of combining both the sector and the company 
foci, thereby widening the scope of the investigation to the actors and institutional 
configurations that frame local bargaining (Pulignano and Keune, 2015). 
 
The approach taken to address the above issues is based on comparative institutional theories 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Crouch and Streeck, 1997). In particular, by drawing on the 
perspective that institutions are embedded in complex social, historical, and political 
environments the theoretical lens that is applied to the present comparison is one of 
‘historical institutionalism’ (Steinmo et al., 1992; Locke and Thelen, 1995). As opposed to a 
more traditional approach to institutions, historical institutionalism transcends the national 
level to take into account additional contextual factors such as cooperation, trust, conflict, and 
power relations amongst actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Crucially, this actor-centred 
focus allows the thesis to supersede an overly deterministic explanation of the role of national 
institutions and thus to join the debate on the need to account for both cross-country and 
within-country diversity of outcomes (Scharpf, 1989). As Whitley suggests also, national 
systems are, in fact, characterised by relevant institutional and company level diversity 
(1999). 
 
In this light, the present research sets out to investigate the different forms of flexibility and 
security that enter onto the agenda of the sector level bargaining actors as a response to 
market and economic pressures, and that are conditioned by the institutional frameworks in 
which they are embedded. Moreover, it expands the debate to the implications that sector 
level arrangements have for the company level when social partners bargain over similar 
issues.  Finally, as institutions may enable and constrain policy choices, and yet never fully 
determine them, this research calls attention to the role of sub-sector contingencies and the 
way in which they interplay with the resources available to actors (Meardi et al., 2009)  
1.2 Flexibility and Security in Collective Bargaining  
 
For the past two decades, there has been a growing effort to overcome the polarisation 
between neo-liberal and neo-corporatist perspectives on the regulation of the labour market. 
Flexicurity is the research and policy framework that has attracted most attention from EU 
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academics and policy-makers. The underpinning idea is that it is possible to reconcile the 
need for labour market flexibility with different forms of security for the workforce (EU 
Commission, 2007; Bekker et al., 2008). Yet, due to its ambiguous theorisation and elusive 
policy agenda, during the four years in which this thesis has been conducted such a paradigm 
has become the increasing object of critiques (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009; Heyes, 2011).  
 
In particular, by observing the OECD’s employment protections indicators, Heyes (2011) 
found that, although strongly advocated by the EU Commission, the flexicurity agenda in 
Europe has at best been partially implemented. If governments have widened the degree of 
labour market flexibility through the liberalisation of non-standard arrangements and the 
reduction of statutory protections, far fewer resources have been invested in improving the 
dimension of security. Moreover, he shows that convergence amongst EU Member States has 
not headed in the direction of the ‘best practice’ flexicurity models of Denmark and the 
Netherlands. Instead, it is Denmark and the Netherlands that have started to look more like 
other Western European countries. With a similar focus on national interventions, Viebrock 
and Clasen (2009) also throw light on the ineffectiveness of the flexicurity policy agenda to 
provide equally for both of its dimensions, flexibility and security. They conclude that if the 
concept is not specified further for analytical purposes, it will soon be replaced by the next, 
more fashionable one (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). 
 
From another angle, Burroni and Keune (2011) suggest that the main limit of the flexicurity 
literature has been to engage almost exclusively with national level institutions, assuming that 
national labour markets have a high degree of homogeneity. To support their critique they 
argue that, within the same country, sectors and companies can respond in different ways to 
similar trends – for example, the international competition – since they may be equipped with 
different skills levels, institutions, and degrees of unionisation. It follows that the effects of 
national flexicurity arrangements are likely to vary within countries, by territory, sector, and 
enterprise (Burroni and Keune, 2011). In addition, they draw attention to the possibility that 
legal intervention and public policies may not be the only instruments for improving market 
flexibility and providing protection against uncertainty, other institutions may also play a 
similar role. Of these various lines of criticism, the latter is the one that is most relevant to 
this thesis because it establishes that the exclusive attention paid to national level 
interventions has obscured other sources of flexibility and security and thus severely 
restricted flexicurity research (Burroni and Keune, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
17"
"
 
Following this argument scholars have started to explore the possibility that other modes of 
governance, in addition to market regulation and legal regulation, are capable of meeting this 
particular objective (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015; Pulignano and 
Keune, 2015). Being the most formal industrial relations institutions and engaging with most 
of the agreements upon economic security (from procedures for dismissal to levels of 
income) as well as issues of productivity, collective bargaining has represented a viable 
alternative to explore.  
 
For example, by looking at the degree of negotiated flexibility and broad negotiation agendas 
in the Netherlands, Wilthagen (2004) determined that it was possible to analyse flexicurity 
policies as types of trade-offs. Drawing on this, Andersen and Mainland (2005) level 
collective bargaining in Denmark addresses issues that have actual and direct impact on 
flexibility and security. Such findings, coupled with increasing decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, have suggested that in other European countries actors and institutions framing 
local bargaining could also participate in this important function.  level collective bargaining 
in Denmark addresses issues that have actual and direct impact on flexibility and security. 
Such findings, coupled with increasing decentralisation of collective bargaining, have 
suggested that in other European countries actors and institutions framing local bargaining 
could also participate in this important function.   
 
The most original contribution can be found in two recent studies by Ibsen and Mailand 
(2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015), which both establish a clear link between 
collective bargaining and flexicurity (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011:165). In particular, their work 
explains how a key subnational mode of labour market governance – collective bargaining at 
sector level – in practice enhances flexibility and security across different countries and 
industries. However, while Marginson and Galetto (2015) pay exclusive attention to the role 
of institutional configurations – both enabling and constraining local level negotiations on 
these issues – Ibsen and Mailand (2011) extend the focus to the nature of the balances 
achieved and also to power relations amongst actors.  
 
Thus, assuming that the way in which issues of flexibility and security are tackled within 
companies is conditioned by the procedural provisions which govern the relationship between 
bargaining levels (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015), the present thesis 
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proposes a research framework that combines the analysis of both sector and company level 
institutions. There are at least three main reasons for academic literature and policy-makers to 
benefit from this particular approach. First, the focus on chemicals and pharmaceuticals sheds 
light on issues of flexibility and security outside the much researched metalworking sector. 
Second, the focus which is across countries that feature both multi and single-employer 
arrangements – Italy, Denmark, and the UK – allows the research to develop some 
expectations about the scope for flexibility and security at the company level. Third, the firm 
level focus enables the research, on the one hand, to corroborate the validity of such 
expectations and, on the other, to highlight those contextual factors (in addition to 
institutional resources) which may influence flexibility and security strategies across 
companies.  
 
In this regard, Pulignano and Keune (2015)  found that the degree to which company level 
actors can take advantage of institutional resources – such as collective bargaining – does 
indeed depend on micro-level contingencies. By conducting a study of large metalworking 
companies they identified the two principal factors that shaped negotiations over issues of 
flexibility and security across subsidiaries as the degree of international competition and the 
level of integration. However, these scholars only partially framed their analysis within the 
national and sectoral context within which managers and shop stewards interact. Given this, 
the present thesis extends their analytical framework to four chemical and pharmaceutical 
companies based in two countries, Denmark and Italy, featuring (similar) multi-employer 
bargaining arrangements. By doing so, it aims to investigate a) the relationship between 
institutional and non-institutional factors and b) the impact of such a relationship for the 
outcomes of company level bargaining over flexibility and security.   
1.3 Research Design and Questions 
 
The framework chosen for the comparative institutional analysis of collective bargaining 
institutions across Italy, Denmark, and the UK is the one presented by Visser (2009) as a 
synthesis of many attempts at classification within the variety of capitalism debate (Crouch, 
2005; Schmidt, 2006). Since it deviates from more deterministic models of cross national 
comparison (Hall and Soskice, 2011), the Visser’s classification (2009) has been widely used 
in recent research. The main advantages of this approach are that it identifies clusters of 
industrial relations systems that take into account different degrees and forms of 
institutionalisation (Bechter et al., 2012; Prosser, 2015), and that it reflects important 
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considerations of labour market governance and social welfare. Thus, in line with the 
theoretical underpinning of this thesis, Visser’s clusters (2009) enable comparative analysis 
to move beyond the national level to account for the scope of sector and firm level variations 
within different national systems. Significantly, Bechter et al. (2012) have established that 
there is sectoral diversity within countries and sectoral commonalities across countries. While 
it is true that the focus on one sector removes the issues of sectoral diversity, appealing to 
Visser’s classification involves the assumption that the sector concerned approximates the 
national type; and chemicals and pharmaceuticals can plausibly be claimed to do so.   
 
In light of its multi-level aspiration, the present study proceeds as follows. First, the 
comparative method of difference (Lijphard, 1971) will be applied to the analysis of the 
institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector across Italy, Denmark 
and the UK. The inclusion of a country where sector level bargaining institutions are not in 
place provides the opportunity to explore the role that less formal arrangements, such as 
social dialogue, play in addressing issues of flexibility and security. This permits further light 
to be thrown on the link between sector level collective bargaining and flexicurity.  
 
Given this, the first set of questions that the present thesis sets out to investigate is: 
 
o Q1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social 
dialogue in different countries address issues of flexibility and security?  
o Q1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different 
countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level 
bargaining agendas?  What are the implications for the actors involved? 
 
In order to address this level of analysis three research propositions will be examined in 
Chapter 7. In the country-by-country presentation of findings (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) such 
propositions are reframed to take account of the specific institutional context in which actors 
interact.     
 
The three main research propositions are: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
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security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining  and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
In a second step, the comparative method of similarity (Lijphart 1971) will be applied to the 
analysis of the outcomes of company level bargaining over issues of flexibility and security 
across Italy and Denmark. At this level it was not possible to also use the method of 
difference, because after 18 months of attempting to negotiate research access in the UK was 
ultimately denied. However, because they feature similar configurations, the collective 
bargaining systems in Italy and Denmark presented suitable contexts within which to observe 
the role of sector level institutions for the scope of firm level bargaining.  
 
Thus, the second set of questions this research sets out to investigate are:  
 
o Q2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements at 
the sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of 
security outcomes?  
o Q2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition 
and organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and of security outcomes? 
What are the implications in terms of the nature of negotiated trade-offs? 
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For undertaking the second level of analysis a series of expectations presented in Chapter 2 
and further developed in Chapters 7 and 8 will be examined. The first set of expectations 
sheds light on the role of institutions (Chapter 7), in particular, on the ways in which 
articulation mechanisms – at both interconfederal and sectoral level in Italy, and at sectoral 
level (only) in Denmark – allow categories of flexibility and security to enter onto the agenda 
of company level negotiators. The second set of expectations (Chapter 8) has to do with the 
ways in which non-institutional variables – in particular the degree of international 
competition and the cross-border organisational structure of the companies, all 
multinationals, under focus – influence the capability of company level actors to find 
compromises between different forms of flexibility and security and condition the nature of 
these compromises. 
 
Thus, the present study proceeds at different levels simultaneously. The sector level is framed 
within the national institutional context; the company level is framed both within the national 
and the sectoral contexts. Italy, Denmark and the UK will be the object of the cross-national 
comparison of sector level institutions; while the analysis of company level bargaining 
involves only Italy and Denmark.    
1.4 Research Methods 
  
Given the lines of enquiry pursued by the present comparative analysis a qualitative research 
method is called for. Such an approach allows the research to frame subnational institutions 
within the social, historical, and political environments in which they are embedded. By 
doing so it is possible to look at the constraining and enabling role of institutional structures, 
while also paying attention to issues of trust, conflict and power relations amongst actors. An 
in-depth qualitative method, therefore, reflects the primary objective of this study which is to 
shed light on the link between institutional rules and situational contingencies in order to 
address issues of heterogeneity within the boundaries of the same institutions and to account 
for different degrees of institutionalisation across and within countries.  
 
In order to achieve this, the present comparative analysis draws on a range of secondary 
sources such as academic literature, statutory provisions and legislation on collective 
bargaining, and formal regulation of non-standard employment contracts and employment 
security. Secondary data enable a broad understanding of the historical, institutional, and 
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legal context characterising the three countries under focus. In addition, empirical research is 
undertaken first at the sector level, and then at the company level in the form of case studies. 
According to Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy for the observation of ‘contemporary 
phenomena within some real-life context’ and when the research intent is ‘principally 
exploratory’ (Yin 2003:6). Both criteria apply to the present analysis aimed at illuminating 
the rationale behind actors’ decisions, observing the context in which these decisions are 
produced, and comparing patterns and outcomes across cases.  
 
Case studies are based on: 
 
1. Sector level data as a crucial element of the context in which company level negotiations 
take place: 
 
• In-depth semi-structured interviews with employers’ association and trade union 
officials in each country; 
• Sector level collective agreements signed between 2000-2013 in Italy and Denmark. 
 
2. Company level data: 
 
• In-depth semi-structured interviews with managers and shop stewards involved in 
actual negotiations;   
• Available company and plant level agreements up to 2015; 
• Annual reports, information briefings, press releases, minutes of meetings, and power 
point presentations have been collected during fieldwork and included as data sources.   
 
Data are analysed by applying the principles of qualitative content analysis. The choice of 
this particular method follows two main considerations. First, the stage of data collection 
concerned a large amount of narrative texts and formal documents, such as collective 
agreements, which needed to be thoroughly scrutinised. Second, one of the strengths of 
content analysis is that it uses specific analytic rules and step by step models that allow 
qualitative research to control the risk of not being scientific, or being arbitrary or subjective 
(Schilling, 2006).   
 
23"
"
Accordingly, five levels of observation (see Chapter 3) are undertaken: 1) from tapes via 
transcripts to raw data; 2) from raw data to condensed records; 3) from condensed to 
structured protocols (which helped separate the multiple levels of comparison – country, 
sector and company) and preliminary category systems; 4) from preliminary category 
systems to coded protocols; 5) analysis and interpretation (Schilling, 2006). Such a process 
has been enacted with the support of Nvivo computer software which was a helpful tool in 
managing, retrieving, and coding all ranges of data collected, from open-ended interviews to 
direct observation notes. 
 
With specific regard to the content analysis of collective agreements, this study applies the 
same categories examined by Ibsen and Mailand (2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015) to 
investigate issues of flexibility and security in sector level collective bargaining.  
 
The substantive categories are: 
 ! Pay ! Working-time, ! Job demarcation, ! Training, ! Social benefits and entitlements, ! Provision for atypical workers, ! Measures for employment. 
 
While following Wilthagen and Tros’ (2004) different forms of flexibility and security which 
will be described further in Chapter 2: 
 ! External Flexibility,                          - Job Security, ! Working time flexibility,                   - Employment Security, ! Functional Flexibility,                   - Income Security, ! Wage Flexibility,                                 - Combination Security. 
 
Categories are coded according to their contribution to flexibility and security, as in the 
following example:  
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Table 1.1 Coding of collective agreement provisions enhancing flexibility and security  
Categories of Flexibility and Security Potential Flexibility Dimension  Potential Security Dimension  
Pay Wage Flexibility Income Security 
Working-time Functional Flexibility Combination Security 
Job-demarcation Functional Flexibility Job-Security 
Training and Education Functional Flexibility Employment Security 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
Wage Flexibility Income Security 
Combination Security Provisions for atypical workers External Flexibility Employment Security 
Measures for employment External flexibility Employment security 
 
Moreover, when exploring the relationship between sector and company level bargaining 
arrangements and the influence that such a relationship exerts on the agenda of local actors 
over issues of flexibility and security new codes have emerged and been applied to the data. 
Chapter 3 describes such codes and each stage of the analysis in detail. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
After introducing the topic of this research, the second Chapter (Chapter 2) explores the 
labour market challenges that in past decades have prompted issues of flexibility and security 
to emerge. The neo-liberal and neo-corporatist paradigms are presented, as interpreted by 
traditional neo-institutional theories. Then, the notion of flexicurity is reviewed and proposed 
as an alternative take on the role of rigidities – Streeck’s idea of beneficial constraints (1987) 
– in promoting flexibility. The main objective of the chapter is to explain the reasons why 
this study is located within the literature on flexicurity. In this regard, it is argued that the 
academic debate has mainly looked at the role of national level institutions and policies in 
promoting flexibility and security and, as a result, it has neglected other potential sources of 
flexibility and security for the labour market (Burroni and Keune, 2011; Marginson and 
Galetto, 2015; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). By focusing on collective bargaining (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015) in one sector of economic activity and across 
three different countries, the main contribution of this study is to observe whether sub-
national institutions play a role too. In doing so it is possible to enlarge the scope of 
comparative institutional analysis beyond the national level and introduce the firm level into 
the flexibility and security debate. The research questions are then presented. The first 
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question stems from the literature on the role of sector level actors and institutions in 
addressing issues of flexibility and security and illuminates an area that has been only 
marginally explored: collective bargaining at the company level. The second question derives 
from the literature on the role of firm level contingencies in influencing the agenda of social 
partners within multinationals.    
 
The third chapter (Chapter 3) is divided into three main parts. The first part introduces the 
theoretical framework applied to this comparative analysis, where it is argued that within the 
neo-institutional paradigm, historical institutionalism represents the most appropriate 
theoretical lens for this thesis. The second presents the justification of the research design. 
This is based on a multi-level comparison involving the analysis of sector level institutional 
arrangements across three countries – Italy, Denmark and the UK – and the analysis of 
company level institutional arrangements in two of these – Italy and Denmark. The third and 
final part of Chapter 3 presents the rationale for a qualitative methodology based on both 
primary and secondary sources. Moreover, it elucidates the methods utilised in the analysis 
and the interpretation of the data and discusses issues of research ethics raised by the 
fieldwork which was undertaken.   
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 cover the sector level findings for the three countries respectively, each 
one following a similar structure. The characteristics of the national institutional context of 
the collective bargaining systems in Italy (Chapter 4), Denmark (Chapter 5) and the UK 
(Chapter 6) are first reviewed. The objective is to observe the extent to which such 
institutions influence actors’ interactions. Second, an account of the economic and 
institutional characteristics of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry in each country is 
provided. Attention is then moved to the collective bargaining arrangements – in Italy and 
Denmark – and informal social dialogue – in the UK – over issues of flexibility and security. 
The third section is dedicated to the findings which stem from examining the three research 
propositions outlined above. In each chapter (4, 5 and 6) the propositions are further specified 
in order to reflect the characteristics of the institutional context in which collective bargaining 
occurs within each of the three countries. 
 
Following the country-by-country framework of analysis (4, 5 and 6), Chapter 7 addresses 
the first research question set forth by the present comparative analysis.  The institutional 
context in which Italy, Denmark, and the UK are embedded is described in light of the 
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clusters they each represent, namely, the Southern, Nordic, and Western European clusters. 
The objective is to allow cross-national differences in their collective bargaining systems to 
emerge. The second part introduces the rationale for comparing Italy and Denmark on the one 
hand, and the UK on the other. The final section of this chapter presents the findings 
according to the propositions shaped in Chapter 3 and reflects the country-by-country 
framework of analysis. In order to undertake the first level of comparison (Q1a) involving 
Italy, Denmark, and the UK the following issues are investigated: a) the role of sector level 
institutional arrangements in shaping the scope of the social partners’ agendas over issues of 
flexibility and security across the three countries; b) the role of collective bargaining and 
social dialogue activities in shaping the social partners’ perceptions around issues of 
flexibility and security; c) the role of national institutions, such as labour law and social 
welfare, for the scope of the social partners’ agendas. The second level of comparison (Q1b) 
involves Italy and Denmark exclusively, and the main issue investigated is the role of 
coordination mechanisms for the scope of the firm level agenda on issues of flexibility and 
security. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a description of the settings within which the four case studies have been 
carried out. The characteristics of the four multinationals that are the object of this study are 
reviewed. In addition the chapter covers both the economic and institutional features framing 
collective bargaining in each of the manufacturing plants investigated: Impresa 1, Impresa 2 
– within Italy – and Firma 1 and Firma 2 – within Denmark.  The main findings on the role 
of collective bargaining in addressing issues of flexibility and security are then presented.   
 
Chapter 9 addresses the second research question. Based on the expectations developed from 
the literature (Chapter 2), the analysis of the empirical findings (Chapter 7 and 8) is used to 
identify similarities and differences across companies.  This objective is pursued in two 
complementary steps. First, as proposed by Marginson and Galetto (2015),  and predicted in 
Chapter 7, the research observes whether sector level institutions play an enabling role for 
company level bargaining on issues of flexibility and security (Q2a). Second, as suggested by 
Pulignano and Keune (2015) and predicted in Chapter 8, the research investigates whether a 
relationship between firm-specific contingencies and the outcomes of company level 
negotiations over flexibility and security exists in practice (Q2b)  
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Chapter 10 provides the final conclusions, syntheses the empirical and theoretical findings of 
the thesis, and assesses its contribution to the literature. In particular, by showing that sector 
level bargaining arrangements act as beneficial constraints for company level negotiations, 
this thesis contributes to the old debate on flexibility and provides empirical evidence to 
support Streeck’s argument (1988). In keeping with his work it is contended that the 
flexicurity literature has not only overlooked the role of collective bargaining in shaping 
different regimes of flexibility and security, it has also ignored a further form of security: the 
procedural security that a well-functioning multi-employer system provides to lower 
bargaining levels (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). Furthermore, by paying exclusive attention 
to collective bargaining institutions, the research responds to the challenge of offering a 
clearer account of the context within which the notion of flexicurity is deployed and develops 
an analytical approach which is based on Walton and McKersie’s (1965) and Pulignano et 
al.’s work (2015). Accordingly, a series of policy and practice implications are drawn and 
these are followed by some suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter explores the labour market challenges that, in recent years, have 
prompted issues of flexibility and security to emerge. In order to highlight the relationship 
between such issues and the actors and institutions of collective bargaining this chapter is 
structured as follows. First, the neo-liberal and neo-corporatist paradigms are presented as 
interpreted by traditional neo-institutionalism which depicts them as alternative, and 
potentially, irreconcilable theoretical standpoints (Pollert, 1991). Second, the notion of 
flexicurity is introduced and proposed as an alternative take on the role of rigidities – 
Streeck’s idea of ‘beneficial constraints’ (1987) – in promoting flexibility.  
 
Once a general framework has been established for understanding the context within which 
the notion of flexicurity has flourished, the concept is then thoroughly reviewed and its 
strengths and weaknesses highlighted. Although commencing with a discussion of the 
implications of flexicurity at policymaking level (European Commission, 2007; Heyes, 
2013), the main concern of this literature review is to present the fundamental reasons why 
the present research should be located within the debate on flexicurity and to establish the 
theoretical underpinnings of the thesis.  
 
By drawing on Burroni and Keune (2011) the next section of the chapter not only focuses on 
flexicurity as a purely analytical tool, but also discusses the theoretical advantages that such 
an approach is likely to bring. The first and most important advantage is to move attention 
away from the policy debate on the role of national level interventions and towards collective 
bargaining as a potential source of flexibility and security trade-offs. In particular, flexicurity 
is depicted as a multidimensional concept that can be deployed to disentangle the interplay 
between different combinations of flexibility and security injected through collective 
bargaining and, at the same time, can be used to assess their nature. Accordingly, this chapter 
presents a comprehensive analytical framework that is underpinned by the work of Walton 
and McKersie (1965) and Pulignano et al. (2015). 
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The research questions emerging from this analysis are then presented.  In order to do so, two 
different streams of literature are taken into account with the explicit objective of 
emphasising their elements of interaction. In one stream, the literature on the role of sector 
level actors and institutions in addressing flexibility and security is reviewed in order to 
explore an area that comparative analysis has, as yet, only marginally touched upon: the role 
of collective bargaining at the company level. In the other stream, the literature on the role of 
company level variables in influencing the agenda of social partners within multinational 
firms is reviewed to show that it is not only institutions that matter. The way in which 
companies are organised and structured is also likely to influence the role and the outcomes 
of local negotiations and, by implication, flexibility and security as well.  
2.2 The ‘Old’ Debate on Flexibility 
  
Issues of ‘flexibility’ emerged in the 1980s, when changing economic, technological and 
political circumstances started to exert increasing pressures on the ‘standard’ form of labour 
contract. Specifically, this arrangement defines a full-time, non-temporary employment 
relationship which entails, on one hand, a high level of subordination and disciplinary control 
on the part of the employer and, on the other, a high level of stability, welfare insurance 
compensation and guarantees for the employee (Supiot and Meadows, 2001).  
 
Generally, scholars agree that the standard – full-time – employment relationship served the 
Fordist business model, characterised by a community of predominantly semi-skilled 
workers, contributing to a single economic activity under the supervision of a single-
employer (Pollert, 1991).  For many years this model was supported by conditions of stable 
and growing sellers’ markets for industrial mass production, mature largely standardised 
technology, and a pluralist world economy fostering national Keynesian economic policies in 
a beneficial way for both employers and employees (Streeck, 1992; Crouch and Streeck, 
1997; Supiot and Meadows, 2001). However, in the past few decades, acceptable trade-offs 
between subordination and stability have become harder to negotiate, making the standard 
labour contract ‘economically intolerable’ (Streeck, 1987:284; Heyes, 2001). Employers are 
constantly asked to face an unprecedented degree of economic uncertainty and, therefore, are 
keen to avoid any permanent commitment (Streeck, 1992,) 
 
Supiot (2000) identifies three major developments responsible for the present volatility of the 
market and the erosion of the traditional employment relationship: 
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• increasing pressure of competition in more open and inter-dependent markets, and the 
speedier evolution of technical progress, especially in the areas of information and 
communication; 
• rising levels of skills and qualifications and the consequent increase in the level of 
professional autonomy enjoyed by workers, irrespective of their contractual 
subordination; 
• a new labour force demanding some degree of flexibility. 
 
Given these circumstances, the notion of flexibility has become one of the most recurrent 
arguments against labour market ‘rigidities’, understood by both academics and policymakers 
as the result of central and standardized systems of regulation (Streeck, 1987). In particular, 
while the feasibility of policies based on ‘flexibility’ made economies more reactive, the 
versatility of such a concept enabled a new trend toward decentralisation of negotiations and 
decisions (Streeck, 1988; Pollert, 1991). As a consequence, ‘flexibility’ began to exert a 
strong ideological influence exaggerating the need for a custom-made organisation of work to 
the detriment of general and uniform legal entitlements (Pollert, 1991). Moreover, as many 
attempts were made to condense a variety of interests and views into a single expression, it 
has been subjected to different – and sometimes conflicting interpretations (Elger, 1987).  
 
At a theoretical level, scholars concluded that the notion of flexibility was ‘confused, 
diffused, and contradictory’ (Pollert, 1991:xix) and, towards the end of the 1980s, called for a 
more rigorous analysis of the phenomenon. They argued, in particular, that important 
dynamics of change and continuity – which occurred in the spheres of employment and work 
organisation – had been obscured by an overly long speculation about a ‘blanket term’ 
(Pollert, 1991:3). The main contribution of these scholars was to uncover, and tackle, each of 
the different – and potentially opposing – dimensions of ‘flexibility’ (Streeck, 1987; Pollert, 
1991).  
 
First, Pollert (1991) emphasised that ‘research should free itself from unhelpful conceptual 
convention and explore the relationships of similarity and difference in institutional 
backgrounds, social structures and current lines of development in economic and labour 
arrangements’ (Pollert, 1991:8). In addition, Streeck argued that the employers’ quest for 
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flexibility was far from a fashionable – and purely ideological – trend enacted in a period of 
crisis. On the contrary, he observed: ‘the particular experience of the 80s seems to have given 
rise to a widely shared expectation that strong turbulence and uncertainties will become a 
permanent feature of economic life for the foreseeable future’ (Streeck, 1987:290).  
 
Thus, having established that ‘flexibility’ was neither a value in itself, nor a maleficent tool to 
regain managerial prerogatives, Streeck (1987) proceeded with a closer analysis of the 
concept. Crucially, he defined and explored the different dimensions of flexibility in light of 
the apparent contrast between status and contract in employment relationships: 
 
Such flexibility is pursued both in the internal and in the external labour market. 
External flexibility consists basically of ‘numerical flexibility’ which refers to the ease 
with which the numbers of workers employed can be adapted to meet fluctuations in 
demand. But it may also be used for changing in qualificational structures through 
dismissals of workers whose skills are no longer needed and subsequent hiring of 
more suitable qualifications. External flexibility is achieved mainly by the 
introduction of ‘subordinate’ forms of employment as compared to the standard full-
time, open-ended contract, such as part-time, temporary, casual, subcontracted work. 
Internal flexibility is in part ‘functional flexibility’ referring to the ease with which the 
tasks carried out by employees can be adapted to changes in demand. Important 
aspects of this are redeployment and retraining, which require institutions and 
payment systems that motivate workers to take over new tasks, acquire new 
qualifications, and generally, accept continuous fast adjustments in the organisation 
of work. Internal flexibility also has quantitative aspects in that it facilitates, through 
overtime, shift-work or guaranteed working annual working-time arrangements, 
adjustments in the amount of labour utilised in accordance with cyclical or seasonal 
shifts (Streeck, 1987:290). 
 
In his analysis Streeck depicted industrial relations as the development – and enforcement – 
of a domain of social rights in employment (Streeck, 1987; Hyman, 1991). ‘Status rights have 
superimposed an element of stability on an otherwise exclusively contractual and commercial 
and, therefore, highly volatile employment relationship’ (Streeck, 1987:291). Nonetheless, 
while workers’ rights have been progressively codified, their obligations have assumed a 
primarily contractual nature. It is because of this asymmetry between status and contractual 
obligations that, in his opinion, ‘rigidities’ have emerged and employers’ intolerance of legal 
entitlement has increased. As a response, he added, the debate on labour market flexibility 
evolved into a growing polarisation between two different and apparently irreconcilable 
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viewpoints. On the one side, those encouraging a reconsideration of workers status rights to 
the advantage of market principles, and on the other, those pushing for maintenance of 
adequate levels of social protection and a sustainable degree of security for workers (Hyman, 
1991:280).  
 
These alternative approaches can be read through the lens of neo-liberal and neo-corporatist 
theories, which propose different models of market regulation promising firms feasible 
solutions to the problems of high levels of uncertainty and the need for adaptation (Streeck, 
1987). The neo-liberal standpoint promotes flexibility by liberating contractual arrangements 
from government intervention (Nolan, 1989). By minimizing workers’ legal entitlements and 
relying on individual contracts as the main tool to establish conditions of exchange between 
employer and employee, neo-liberalism invites companies to look at the external labour 
market and achieve higher internal and external flexibility (Streeck, 1988; Crouch, 1993). 
Employers’ rights and obligations are defined only by contract and in a climate where there is 
no state interference. Therefore, the employment relationship is based on temporary 
arrangements shaping ad hoc and heterogeneous practices which serve firms’ different 
purposes (Streeck, 1987; Streeck, 1988; Streeck, 1992; Supiot and Meadows, 2001). The key 
to this approach is the ‘predominance of contract over status’, hence, employees cannot be 
expected to give a contribution going above and beyond what they are formally obliged to; 
monetary incentives must be provided in a way that fosters a certain degree of performance 
without asking for voluntary commitment. Although flexible employment contracts may tend 
towards precarious and insecure working conditions, neo-liberal policymakers believe that 
the dynamics of the free-market, activated by the absence of legal constraints, offer 
individuals the option to move between different kinds of contractual arrangements, so that 
job flexibility is offered in exchange for employment security (Pollert, 1991).   
 
At the same time, other scholars observed that the perfect free labour market is more an 
aspiration than a viable option (Crouch, 1993; Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996; Crouch and 
Streeck, 1997). Moreover, while seeking short-term commitment from employees and ad hoc 
repertoires of skills to meet contingent business needs, organisations may want to 
simultaneously secure workers’ loyalty and adaptability in order to enhance technological 
innovation and competitive advantage. Given this, the neo-corporatist view proposes that 
non-market measures, concerning ideas of social security and labour market regulation, 
should be seen as beneficial (Streeck, 1988). For example, in a context of high job security – 
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guaranteed through statutory measures which reduce the elasticity of employment – the level 
of internal flexibility available to employers is likely to increase. In a well-known article on 
the limits of neo-liberalism in generating skilled employees and high quality products, 
Streeck (1988) demonstrates that internal flexibility plus external rigidity, on the basis of 
status-like employment, can be considered a functional equivalent of external flexibility, 
while still allowing for the maintenance of a long-term business perspective and employee 
development (1988). In his words ‘capitalism may just be too important to be left to the 
capitalists – who arguably are the least capable of protecting it from its self-destructive 
tendency to pursue cheap and easy short-term advantages’ (Streeck, 1988:421). 
 
In his opinion, the far too long discussion on the inherent contradictions between contract and 
status forms of flexibility has prevented scholars and policymakers from formulating a 
consistent strategic approach to produce a more flexible system of labour relations (Streeck, 
1987). It is apparent that some forms of external flexibility preclude internal flexibility, 
whilst internal flexibility best develops in the presence of certain rigidities that are also the 
main obstacles to external flexibility (Buchele and Christiansen,1999; Heyes and Lewis, 
2014). This notwithstanding, Streeck suggests that the way in which strategic actors – at all 
levels – make use of status and contract to increase flexibility depends on a variety of 
conditions, primarily, industrial relations arrangements. Hence, he concludes:  
 
The growing divergence in industrial relations arrangements is in itself an important 
consequence of a period of realignment in which the micro-level of the individual 
enterprise has taken the lead over the macro-level of collective-associational politics. 
In the process, status and contract-based flexibility may not always and necessarily 
be mutually exclusive. The institutional polarisation of status and contract in the 
quest for flexibility through re-integration of industrial relations in corporate strategy 
– the de-differentiation, in other words, of the pluralist subsystem of industrial 
relations – may in fact give employers the best of the two worlds (Streeck, 1987:295).  
   
It follows that there may be institutional arrangements that, acting as ‘beneficial constraints’, 
provide employers and employees with the certainty (security) they need to adapt to 
increasingly unstable economic conditions (flexibility).  This complementary structure of 
status and contract flexibility fosters policies – defined as ‘collective goods’ – that are likely 
to benefit both employer and employee (Streeck, 1988:92). The primary objective of the 
current research is, therefore, to explore whether – and if so, how – the most formal of 
industrial relations institutions, namely collective bargaining, participates in such a function.   
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Streeck’s work at the end of the 1980s was central in shifting the terms of the academic 
debate for its contention that some ‘rigidities’ are beneficial as they foster other forms of 
flexibility. However, the policy debate remained fixated on the need to achieve primarily 
higher external/quantitative flexibility. The OECD’s influential 1994 Jobs Study was a 
benchmark in this respect, continuing to advocate greater numerical flexibility at the expense 
of employee protection and security (OECD, 1994). 
 
This notwithstanding, the theoretical attempt to bridge these potentially opposing labour 
market strategies has never ended. This thesis recasts some elements of the ‘old’ debate on 
flexibility – in particular, the idea of a (re)integration of industrial relations in corporate 
strategies (Streeck, 1987) – and observes how they have developed in practice. In order to do 
so, it draws upon the more recent notion of flexicurity.  This consists of a policy strategy 
which attempts to enhance flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour 
relations, as well as security, especially, in the forms of employment security and social 
security, (Bekker et al. 2008; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). It is argued that the flexicurity 
debate has largely overlooked a further form of security – namely the procedural security that 
well-functioning multi-employer agreements provide for subsequent company negotiations. 
Hence this will be an important focus of the present thesis. 
2.3 Towards a New Understanding of Flexicurity: State of The Art 
 
By attempting to reconcile strong demands for greater flexibility, due to competitiveness 
concerns, with equally strong demands for employee protection, the notion of flexicurity has 
stimulated a great deal of interest in both academia and the policy community.  The European 
Union has also embraced the formula and placed it at the core of the European Employment 
Strategy. Significantly, with a communication entitled ‘Towards Common Principles of 
Flexibility: More and better jobs through flexibility and security’ (European Commission, 
2007) the Commission identified four major flexicurity pathways to address flexibility and 
security in different national contexts: 
 
1. Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements: through modern labour laws, 
collective agreements and work organisation; 
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2. Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies: to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers, especially the more vulnerable; 
3. Effective active labour market policies: that help people cope with rapid change, 
reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; 
4. Modern social security systems: that provide adequate income support, encourage 
employment and facilitate labour market mobility. This includes the coverage of 
social protections provisions that help people to combine work and private life. 
 
All these flexicurity pathways rely upon the interplay between two fundamental sources of 
labour market regulation: labour law and social welfare (Heyes, 2013). The literature on 
flexicurity suggests that it is thanks to the reduction of legal protections that it is possible to 
promote labour mobility – both in the external and internal labour market – thereby 
contributing to this dimension of flexibility. Meanwhile, it is the social security system that 
provides compensatory safety nets for the unemployed, as well as active labour market 
policies, thereby contributing to this dimension of security (European Commission, 2007). It 
follows, first, that depending on the way in which national level institutions interact, different 
degrees of flexicurity may be reached in different countries (Bekker and Wilthagen, 2008). 
Second, the interface between labour law and welfare state is likely to shape the focus of 
another important source of labour market regulation – namely collective bargaining (see 
2.4).   
 
Because of their supportive and productive social dialogue between social partners and public 
authorities, some countries have been regarded as flexicurity models (European Commission, 
2009). Notably, the satisfactory economic and labour market performance of Denmark and 
the Netherlands seemed to suggest that labour markets can be made more dynamic without 
compromising social protections (Ibid.). However, the European Commission has refrained 
from indicating any best-way solution to achieve flexicurity (European Commission, 2007). 
Member States are encouraged to explore overlaps between policy fields and seek where 
possible balance between flexibility and security strategies and outcomes (Burroni and 
Keune, 2011). As a result, flexicurity has become a sort of ‘magic formula’ to indicate any 
attempt to reconcile market based strategies with policies of social solidarity (Pedersini, 
2009). 
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Scholars have recently demonstrated that this ‘vague’ (Rogowski, 2008), ‘ambiguous’ 
(Jørgensen and Madsen, 2007) and ‘elusive’ (Heyes, 2011) policy agenda has far from 
delivered what it promised.  In this regard, by observing the OECD’s employment protection 
indicators in different countries, Heyes (2011) draws three fundamental conclusions: 
 
1. First, there has not been a shift towards the pursuit of flexicurity. If on the one side, 
flexibility (as measured by the reduction in employment protections and the 
liberalisation of non-standard arrangements) has significantly increased, security on 
the other, has not improved. 
2. With regard to their labour market policies, EU Member States have not converged 
towards flexicurity models. Countries have not increased their spending in 
unemployment benefits to imitate either Denmark or the Netherlands. If anything, 
Denmark and the Netherlands have become more similar to other Western European 
countries. 
3. Despite a general weakening of security dimensions, cross-national differences persist 
in the strength of employment protections, labour market policies and support for the 
unemployed.   
 
With a similar focus on national level policy interventions, Viebrock and Clasen (2009) argue 
that the conceptual versatility of flexicurity has certainly contributed to making its paradigm 
acceptable to a large number of political actors. Policymakers, however, have neglected the 
fact that for the strategy to be successful, flexibility and security need to be simultaneously 
achieved.  They conclude that if the concept is not further specified for analytical purposes, it 
will be soon replaced by the ‘next fashionable and politically useful’ one (Viebrock and 
Clasen, 2009:325). 
 
Burroni and Keune (2011) share similar doubts. Nevertheless, they suggest that before being 
entirely dismissed, this concept may deserve further investigation. Crucial to the focus of the 
analysis in this thesis, Burroni and Keune observe that the academic debate on flexicurity has 
mainly dealt with national level institutions, supposing that national labour markets have a 
high degree of homogeneity. Critically, they show that within the boundaries of the same 
country, sectors or enterprises differ significantly in dimensions such as exposure to 
international competition, degree of unionisation, or skill levels. As a result, the effects of 
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national flexicurity arrangements are likely to vary within countries and ‘among sectors, 
occupational groups, types of enterprise and regions’ (Burroni and Keune, 2011:85). 
 
Furthermore, they observe that nation-states – via legal frameworks and public policy 
instruments – are not the only entities responsible for shaping regimes of market flexibility 
and protection against uncertainty. In their opinion, the virtually exclusive reliance on 
statutory provisions, which neglects other important sources of flexibility and security, has 
severely restricted flexicurity research:  
 
The flexicurity approach should extend its scope to others factors that influence 
flexibility and security as well as the relationship between the two (Burroni and 
Keune, 2011:88).  
 
Following up this argument, scholars have recently looked at other types of regulation – in 
addition to legal regulation and market regulation – as potentially responsible for flexibility 
and security balances (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015; Pulignano and 
Keune, 2015). Accordingly, their attention has focused on the most formal industrial relations 
institution, collective bargaining. By covering an intermediate position between the prevalent 
modes of labour market governance – the law and the market – and engaging in agreements 
enhancing employment and competitiveness, collective bargaining certainly represents a 
promising alternative to explore. 
 
More specifically, this new stream of literature draws on Wilthagen (2004) who argues that 
flexicurity policies can be analysed as types of trade-offs (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bekker 
and Wilthagen, 2008). Andersen and Mailand (2005) provide corroboration for this view by 
showing that sector level collective bargaining in Denmark does regulate issues that have 
actual and direct impact on flexibility and security. Comparative institutional analysis has, 
therefore, extended its remit to collective bargaining as a way of exploring the development 
of the issues of flexibility and security.  
 
In this light, the most original contributions can be found in two recent studies by Ibsen and 
Mailand (2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015) respectively, who investigate the ‘missing 
link between collective bargaining and flexicurity’ (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011:165). Their 
work explores the extent and the way in which a key subnational mode of labour market 
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governance – collective bargaining at the sector level –  addresses issues of flexibility and 
security across different countries and industries. While Marginson and Galetto (2015) pay 
attention to the role of institutional configurations (which both enable and constrain local 
level negotiations on these issues) Ibsen and Mailand (2011) focus on the quality of 
flexicurity achieved and the power relations amongst actors.  
 
Ibsen and Mailand (2011) confirm that collective bargaining offers significant policy arenas 
within which flexibility and security ‘balances’ can occur (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bekker 
et al, 2008). According to these authors, sector level agreements go by the logic that potential 
trade-offs between flexibility and security are compensated by side payments. For example, 
unions might accept the removal of job demarcations in an agreement which increases 
functional flexibility, but lowers employment security for members. Yet, in return, they will 
expect side-payments on social benefits or rights to education. Moreover, bargaining actors 
are closer than politicians to the challenges faced by employers and employees. This 
increases the opportunity for broader bargaining topics and fosters exchanges, package deals 
and joint problem-solving. They conclude that through social dialogue and collective 
bargaining social partners are likely to achieve flexibility and security simultaneously, as 
even faced with highly controversial issues, opposing each other they may identify an agenda 
in which both secure positive outcomes.  
 
In keeping with these findings, the present thesis looks at sector level collective bargaining as 
an analytical starting point, assuming that companies and workers belonging to the same 
industry experience similar technologies and markets and, as a result, also similar demands 
for flexibility and  security. However, it enlarges the debate to also examine the role that 
national level institutions, namely, labour law and the welfare state, exert on sector level 
bargaining. At the same time, it explores the influence that sector level institutions exert at 
the company level, when social partners negotiate on similar issues. In doing so, it calls 
attention to the institutions and actors that frame both sector and company level bargaining, 
shedding light on an area of research hitherto only marginally explored.  
 
It is argued that negotiations at company level are further evidence of the link between 
collective bargaining and issues of flexibility and security. If policy frameworks at sector 
level set guidelines and provide incentives towards economic and social targets, it is 
nevertheless at the company level that the employment relationship is found and many of the 
39"
"
policies implemented. Significantly, Pulignano and Keune (2015:3) demonstrate that it is at 
the company level that decisions involving many issues at the core of the flexicurity debate 
are made: ‘whether to train workers and in what skills; to hire and fire and to use open-ended 
or flexible contracts; to rotate personnel; to use a variable pay-system; to make use of flexible 
working-time schedule’. Given this, it is important to investigate whether company level 
actors may exert a similar role. First and foremost, companies can be seen as a space in which 
actors engage in ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ and ‘recombinant governance’ and where the 
agenda of managers and employees’ representatives is influenced by their bargaining power 
and their ability/willingness to find a common ground for compromising (Crouch, 2005; 
Pulignano and Keune, 2015).   
 
Thus, by investigating company level institutions within their national and sectoral level 
frameworks across two different countries, the primary aim of this study is to shed further 
light on the links between flexibility, security and collective bargaining.  In particular, the 
intent is to explore the implications of Marginson and Galetto’s findings (2015) on the 
coordinating role of sector level institutional arrangements for company level bargaining. In 
addition, this analysis goes beyond firm level institutions to encompass actors. In so doing, it 
offers a more thorough account of the choices behind the variety of combinations of 
flexibility and security achieved through collective bargaining in different national contexts.  
 
Moreover, drawing on Pulignano and Keune’s research over flexicurity practices within 
multinationals (2015), this study focuses on the role that structural variables – in particular, 
the structure of production and the level of market competition – exert on firm level decision-
making over flexibility and security. Specifically, Pulignano et al. suggest that the interplay 
between production structures and micro-level institutional arrangements shape the extent of 
social partners’ autonomy and their capability to leverage local resources (2015). However, 
although sharing a similar purpose – that is to complement the macro-institutional perspective 
dominating the flexicurity literature with a micro-institutional perspective – Pulignano and 
colleagues (2015) focus empirically on the metalworking sector, while the present analysis is 
set within the chemical and pharmaceutical sector. Further, in Pulignano and colleagues’ 
work (2015) the role of the institutional framework provided by the sector level agreement is 
only marginally assessed. In contrast, this study investigates the link between sector level and 
company level institutions and explores the implications of such a relationship in terms of 
flexibility and security trade-offs.  
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Finally, engaging in the observation of how actors and institutions within companies 
introduce diversities in the ways in which items of flexibility and security are balanced-out, 
this research covers another key-focus of both comparative institutional analysis and 
flexicurity literature: multinationals (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Edwards, 2011; 
Pulignano and Keune, 2015). 
2.4 Flexicurity as analytical tool 
 
For the last decade, responses from the EU to the increasing level of economic pressure 
affecting the labour market have revolved around the notion of ‘flexicurity’. Moreover, 
while the versatility of the term ‘flexicurity’ has contributed to its speculative success it has 
also opened up the possibility that a vast spectrum of different – and potentially opposing – 
labour market policies may fit the paradigm (Pulignano et al., 2015). One could conclude 
that in the literature there is a manifest lack of a universally accepted definition (Burroni and 
Keune, 2011). Meanwhile, at policy-making level, flexicurity is simply understood as a 
labour market condition in which flexibility and security do not oppose each other. 
 
Due to  this  conceptual  ambiguity,  current  research  increasingly  argues  for  a  clearer 
account of the context in which the notion of flexicurity is deployed (Viebrock and 
Clasen, 2009). In this regard, the distinction between the analytical and the programmatic 
definitions put forward by Burroni and Keune (2011) is significant: 
 
…the flexicurity approach can be presented as an instrument to map and compare the 
state of play in specific cases by describing the occurrence and weight of the various 
types of flexibility and security and by disentangling their interplay. In programmatic 
terms, more clarity is required to reduce the ambivalence of the concept and to allow 
higher-quality policy debate. This requires that the ambitions of the flexicurity 
approach are downscaled and that its aspiration to be a guiding principle for the 
reform of any type of labour market situation should be abandoned (Burroni and 
Keune, 2011:87).  
 
Sharing their methodological concern, this study has chosen to deploy flexicurity as a purely 
analytical tool that can be used to observe how issues of flexibility and security have 
developed (Madsen, P.K in Bieńkowski et al., 2008; Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). In so doing, 
it moves attention from the policy debate on labour markets, welfare state and their 
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interactions, to a different source of flexibility and security, namely, collective bargaining 
(Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
In particular, this research adopts the analytical framework proposed by Madsen (2008) who 
depicts flexibility and security as multi-dimensional concepts. With reference to Wilthagen 
and Tros (2004), Madsen identifies four different forms of flexibility: 
 
• External flexibility: the possibility of hiring and firing workers and the use of 
flexible forms of labour contracts. 
• Working-time flexibility: the times and the shifts according to which employees 
begin and finish their working day and includes both overtime and part time work. 
• Wage flexibility: the ability to introduce variable pay based on performance or 
results. 
• Functional flexibility: the option to adapt the tasks carried out by employees to 
changes in demand, and is achieved through consistent investments in training. 
 
Turning to security, he identifies: 
 
• Job security: the ability to retain a job with the same employer until retirement. 
• Employment security: the possibility to find employment as a result of policies that 
enhance employability directly, such as active labour market policies, in-work 
training, and skills development. 
• Income security: the certainty of receiving adequate and stable levels of income 
during transition in and out of employment status. 
• Combination security: the ability of workers to combine work with other phases of 
life such as parenthood, education or care-taking. 
 
According to Madsen (2008), these particular forms of flexibility and security can be linked 
to each other, allowing for sixteen potential combinations to occur. Such combinations go 
beyond an interpretation of flexicurity as a mere synthesis of potentially conflicting interests. 
Instead, the focus is on the possibility that a variety of flexibility and security combinations 
can be pursued in a coordinated way, that is through social dialogue and negotiations at 
different bargaining levels (Wilthagen, 1998). As observed by Wilthegen and Tros (2004): 
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Flexicurity is (1) a degree of job, employment, income and ‘combination’ security that 
facilitates the labour market career and biographics of workers with a relatively weak 
position and allows the enduring and high quality labour market participation and 
social inclusion, while at the same time providing (2) a degree of numerical (both 
external and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labour markets’ 
(and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions 
in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and productivity (Wilthagen and 
Tros, 2004:170). 
 
Collecting evidence of the degree of negotiated flexibility and the broad negotiation agendas 
that characterise the Netherlands and Denmark, Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue that 
flexicurity policies can be analysed as types of trade-offs. According to them, the effective 
balance between flexibility and security achieved in these countries suggests that a link 
between collective bargaining and flexicurity may well exist. Thus, by extending the scope of 
collective bargaining, social partners would automatically increase the range of flexibility and 
security combinations to draw upon: 
 
By negotiating not only about wages and working hours, security for employees need 
no longer be exclusively sought in income or job security, but also in the maintenance 
of a good position in the internal and external labour market (e.g. in terms of 
training, employability, flexible organisation of work, etc.). Adding the flexibilisation 
strategies of employers to the bargaining agenda and discussing them in an 
integrated manner along with security for the employees results in an increase in the 
acceptance of flexibilisation among employees. This encourages ‘positive 
coordination’, ‘integrative bargaining’, positive-sum games’, and negotiated 
flexibility’, enabling mutual gains to be achieved and a more optimal way of dealing 
with the double requirement of flexibility and security’ (Wilthagen and Tros, 
2004:179). 
 
Scholars have extensively debated the possibility that such flexibility and security trade-offs 
may neither signify nor contribute to flexicurity (Leschke et al., 2006; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). It is apparent that the idea of trade-offs is subjected to a double 
interpretation. This is also consistent with Walton and McKersie’s (1965) notion of 
‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining. Indeed, the first focuses on the fact that, if 
flexibility is to be traded for security – and vice-versa – the positive contribution of one must 
come at the expense of the other (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011:165); for example, where 
severance payments – income security – are provided in exchange for higher external 
43"
"
flexibility. Ibsen and Mailand interpret this kind of trade-off in zero-sum terms – higher 
flexibility against lower security – which, in their opinion, is ‘logically not flexicurity’ 
(2011:165).  Critically,  the  second  interpretation stresses  the  fact  that  flexibility  is  no 
longer perceived as necessarily detrimental to employees’ protections thus, trade-offs 
between flexibility and security ‘can also reflect a mutually supportive or complementary 
relationship’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Madsen in Bieńkowski et al., 2008:37). 
 
As Leschke (2006:3) effectively points out: 
 
…there is not only a trade-off between flexibility and security. The flexibility gains of 
employers do not necessarily mean a loss of security among employees; similarly, 
security gains of employees do not necessarily have to go along with flexibility losses 
among employers. Therefore, the talk about a balance between flexibility and security 
– usually thought as a compromise between employers and employees – does unduly 
simplify the nexus. 
 
Representing fundamental attempts to deploy the notion of flexicurity for analytical 
purposes, the mentioned studies can be used to develop a more integrated and systematic 
account of the factors that enable flexibility and security trade-offs to occur and, as a result, 
assess their nature (Pulignano et al., 2015). A potential way to do so is, first, to look back at 
Burroni and Keune’s (2011) definition of flexicurity and disentangle the interplay between 
the different types of flexibility and security injected through collective bargaining. The 
second step is to observe the whole spectrum of issues that are likely to influence the varying 
nature of flexibility and security trade-offs at different bargaining levels.  
 
Hence, being interested in the variety of flexibility and security combinations produced by 
collective bargaining actors and institutions in different national context – more than the 
quality of flexicurity achieved – the present research proposes an analytical approach that 
encompasses both notions of ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’ trade-offs. This approach is 
drawn from the findings of Pulignano et al. (2015), suggesting that the character of interplay 
between issues of flexibility and security largely depends on specific circumstances, such as 
the strength of the social actors involved in the trading process; their understanding around 
these issues; as well as the market conditions in which actors interact. 
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In the main, the present study suggests that it is possible to identify two general categories of 
trade-offs: 
 
1. Balanced: if as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security 
both social partners gain – and/or lose – in equal measure; or if the share solution 
takes the form of a high benefit-low sacrifice compromise. 
2. Unbalanced: if as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security 
one social partner’s gains exceed those of the other party.  
 
The distinction between balanced and unbalanced trade-offs recalls Walton and McKersie’s 
classical definitions of integrative and distributive concession bargaining (1965) according 
to which the outcomes of negotiations can either take the form of positive sum-games (win-
win situations) or zero-sum game (win-lose situations). This framework has been recently 
adopted by Teague and Roche (2015) to examine the circumstances that influence the 
adoption of one mode of concession bargaining rather than another. Their findings suggest 
that institutional arrangements and micro-level patterns both constrain and facilitate the 
postures and the strategies of employers – and, at the same time, influence unions’ 
bargaining power – in responding to the pressures of economic crisis.  Moreover, in line with 
the theoretical lens applied to this thesis, Walton and McKersie’s work reflects the main 
assumptions of actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997:36; Campbell, 2004).   
 
In their famous book ‘A Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotiations’ (1956:5-6) they argue: 
 
a) Distributive bargaining is a hypothetical construct referring to the complex system 
of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party’s goals when they are in basic 
conflict with those of the other party…’’… fixed sum-games are the  situations we 
have in mind: one person’s gain is a loss of the other; 
b) Integrative bargaining refers to the system of activities which is instrumental to the 
attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other 
party…’’… integrative potential exists when the nature of the problem permits 
solutions which benefits both parties, or at least when the gains of one party do not 
represent equal sacrifices by the other. 
 
More importantly, when analysing the agenda items of integrative bargaining, these authors 
add (1965:127): 
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c) the concept [of integrative bargaining] covers more than the situation in which 
gains available to one necessarily allow corresponding and equal gains by the other. 
It is applied to situations in which the total payoff is varying sum in a significant way, 
even though both parties may not share equally in the joint gain, and indeed one may 
even suffer minor inconveniences in order to provide substantial gains for the other. 
Presumably, when the direct results of a problem solution are high benefit-low 
sacrifice, the slight inconvenienced party can receive some side payment or 
reciprocal treatment in another problem area. 
 
The relevance of their framework to the conceptualisation of  the notion of ‘unbalanced’ and 
‘balanced’ trade-offs – both as a result of negotiations on individual items and package deals 
– is apparent and increases when it is applied to the outcomes of negotiations on issues of 
flexibility and security. By involving rights and obligations concerning both sides, it is 
exactly in items such as ‘individual job security’ and ‘management flexibility’ that Walton 
and McKersie (1965) identify inherent integrative potential.  These are qualitative items that 
contain the possibility that management and unions’ interests may be coincidental and, as a 
result, a variable amount of value may be distributed in an integrative fashion – as for 
balanced trade-offs. More importantly, according to Walton and McKersie (1965:121) the 
extent to which social partners translate such potential into win-win and/or win-lose 
bargaining outcomes depends on a) the ‘institutional framework’, and b) the ‘actual 
situation’ in which negotiations take place.  
 
With regard to the former, Ibsen and Mailand (2011) observe that institutional differences in 
sector level bargaining arrangements are likely to result in cross-country variation in the 
extent and the way in which items of flexibility and security feature in the bargaining 
agenda. Furthermore, they show that by setting limits on downward pressures on wages – 
income security – and allowing for upward variations – wage flexibility – sector level 
collective bargaining is able to produce advantages for employers and employees alike. 
Similarly, negotiations on training are likely to boost functional flexibility for employers 
while increasing the value of employees in the labour market – employment security. 
Negotiations on social benefits and entitlements provide security for employees in exchange 
for different forms of flexibility, in particular, working-time flexibility. Further, Ibsen and 
Mailand (2011) argue that compromises between flexibility and security can also involve 
more than one single item, turning the collective agreement into a package deal. By 
implication, the present study suggests that any time that ‘losses of either flexibility or 
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security are compensated with endowments of flexibility and security’ – within the same 
agreement – a balanced trade-off may occur.  
 
With regard to the ‘actual situation’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965) in which negotiations 
take place, Pulignano et al. (2015:8) confirm that there are other factors, in addition to 
institutions, that are likely to influence the nature of flexibility and security trade-offs. With 
an exclusive focus on the bargaining scenario within multinationals, they explain variations 
in collective bargaining outcomes over flexibility and security through the following 
variables: a) the ‘intensity of market competition’ that companies face and, b) their ‘level of 
vertical integration’. They propose, in particular, that there may be a correlation between 
firm-specific structural (non-institutional) factors and unions’ capability to compensate 
management’s demands for flexibility with long-term security. Relevant to the focus of the 
present analysis, these factors are shown to influence the nature of flexibility and security 
trade-offs in four different ways: 
 
1. In the presence of relatively low market competition and high vertical integration – 
either in case of a homogenous product and low skills or in the case of differentiated 
products and high skills – companies are likely to undergo significant relocation 
threats. As a response, social partners at the local level use collective bargaining to 
exchange flexibility with long-term job security. The outcome may be a balanced 
trade-off between flexibility and security because even in the face of highly 
controversial matters, by negotiating, both parties are able to secure positive 
outcomes.  
2. In the presence of high levels of market competition and high vertical integration, 
unions are able to establish forms of transnational coordination both at European and 
global level which provide them with the strength to negotiate a variety of protections 
for the overall workforce. These protections are often the result of ‘concession 
bargaining’ (Walton and McKersie, 1965) involving, for example, the exchange of 
internal and external forms of flexibility against job security.  Hence the outcome 
may be a balanced trade-off as ‘flexibility (for the employer) comes along with an 
employment guarantee (job security) for the employees (Pulignano et al., 2015:19). 
3. In the presence of high levels of market competition and little vertical integration, 
companies involved with low-tech and homogeneous products are exposed to a great 
deal of uncertainty. Such uncertainty reduces unions’ bargaining power and impacts 
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on their ability to accommodate shocks in demands and protect jobs.  As a result, 
unions are forced into negotiations where flexibility is conceded with no guarantees 
of long-term job security from the company. The result may be an unbalanced trade-
off as management gains in flexibility exactly what employees lose in terms of 
security.  
4. In the presence of relatively low levels of market competition and a low level of 
vertical integration, companies that differentiate their products and require highly-
skilled employees are less subject to benchmarking and relocation threats. The 
context in which negotiations take place allows unions to leverage their bargaining 
power and to provide security independently of management’s demands for 
flexibility. This situation may lead to an unbalanced trade-off as employees’ 
contributions come at the ‘price’ of the employer accepting a negative outcome.  
 
In Pulignano et al. (2015) different examples of balanced and unbalanced trade-offs at the 
company level can be found.  Balanced trade-offs can occur when in exchange for long shifts 
on weekends – working-time flexibility – and/or job rotation – functional flexibility – 
employers offer career development schemes and strong training programmes – job security 
and employment security – to their employees (Pulignano et al., 2015). Conversely, 
unbalanced trade-offs are likely to occur when firm level bargaining on pay ends up with 
union representatives accepting wage cuts – wage flexibility – as a measure to protect 
workers from temporary plant closures – short-term job security. A similar rationale may 
apply to negotiations on atypical work if the number of temporary employees – numerical 
flexibility – is increased to protect the level of job security and income security of the core 
employees. Also in these cases, negotiations lead to a ‘compromise’ between signatory 
actors. However, employers are likely to benefit from a higher share of the total payoff than 
the unions.  
 
In conclusion, recent studies have thrown some light on the ‘institutional framework’ 
enabling/constraining flexibility and security trade-offs at the sector level (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015) as well as the ‘actual situation’ 
enabling/constraining flexibility and security trade-offs at firm level (Pulignano et al., 2015; 
Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Nevertheless, little is known about: a) the interaction between 
sector and company level actors and institutions; and b) the interaction between the 
institutional and the non-institutional dimensions and the role that these together play for the 
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agenda and outcomes of collective negotiations. Representing the core objectives of the 
present study, these two areas of investigation will be individually reviewed. 
 
2.5 The Role of Collective Bargaining Institutions and Actors 
 
Comparative institutional analysis has contributed to the debate on flexicurity by 
demonstrating that both the extent and the way in which items of flexibility and security enter 
into the bargaining agenda across countries does indeed depend on institutional arrangements 
(Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). As summarised in Figure 2.1 (p. 56), Marginson and Galetto 
(2015) argue that employers and  unions  are  more  likely  to  develop  shared  
understandings  of  what  flexibility  and security mean, and what forms of flexibility and 
security are appropriate to explore, where their relationship is more firmly institutionalised 
under the presence of sector level bargaining. Moreover, when coordinating mechanisms 
between the sector and the company level exist, first, issues of flexibility and security are 
more likely to be negotiated at the company level as social partners feel secure entering into 
them. Second, company level agreements tend to be characterised by a lower degree of 
heterogeneity as actors can only negotiate within the constraints provided by the sector. 
 
Specifically, their study shows that in countries with single-employer bargaining systems 
outcomes of negotiations are more oriented towards flexibility and less towards security than 
in countries with multi-employer bargaining systems. The main reason is that under single-
employer bargaining unions cannot rely on the protection of the sector level agreement and 
the outcomes of negotiations are likely to reflect local power (im)balances; generally, to the 
advantage of the employers. Secondly, Marginson and Galetto argue: ‘measures addressing 
security, such as training related to employability and social entitlements such as parental 
leave, typically pose a collective action problem for individual employers because of risks 
such as poaching of workers with general skills or incurring relative labour costs 
disadvantage’ (Marginson and Galetto, 2015:17). Thus, under single-employer bargaining the 
extent to which social partners benefit from letting security items into their bargaining 
agendas is revealed to be more limited than in multi-employer bargaining.  
 
In addition, differences can be anticipated amongst the company level arrangements found in 
different countries. These arise from the procedural rules governing the relationship between 
the sector and the company level (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2008). In this regard, 
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Marginson and Galetto’s (2015) study shows that the scope and breadth of bargaining topics 
over issues of flexibility and security is more extensive in the presence of articulation 
mechanisms that organise decentralisation through demarcation. In contrast to delegation, 
according to which the scope for negotiation at the company level is restricted or controlled 
primarily through the use of opening-clauses, demarcation occurs when sector and company 
level social partners act within different, yet coordinated, spheres of competences (Marginson 
and Galetto, 2015). Competency demarcation is typically set out by national and/or sector 
level social partners who are responsible for identifying both modes and scope of company 
level negotiations. With their findings, Marginson and Galetto (2015) confirm that effective 
articulation mechanisms, such as those provided through delegation or demarcation, exert 
pressures on sector level social partners to both address flexibility and security and enable – 
and constrain – company level negotiations. In particular, it is shown that under ‘centralised 
decentralisation’ (Due et al., 1994; Due and Madsen, 2008) sector level unions have agreed 
to devolve part of their bargaining competences – and established the procedures to do so – as 
a result of the two-way relationship that links the sector to the employee representatives at the 
company level. This relationship has evolved in a two-tier system according to which some 
areas are dealt with at the sectoral level while others become the object of local level 
negotiations.  
 
Further, while Marginson and Galetto (2015) have enriched the debate on the role of 
collective bargaining over flexibility and security by proving that sector level institutions – 
and the way in which they are articulated – matter, Ilsøe’s study (2012) suggests that other 
factors may be also relevant. Significantly, by analysing the concept of ‘centralised 
decentralisation’ in the Danish industrial sector, Ilsøe finds out that depth and scope of 
company level bargaining also depend on the extent to which the balance of power between 
local actors reflects sectoral dynamics, primarily, union density and trust between bargaining 
parties. In the main, she argues that the presence of shop stewards at the company level forms 
‘a local power base’ (2012:778) for union representatives to actually engage with the 
competences they have been delegated by the sector. By securing autonomy and empowering 
shop stewards, high union density at the local level has a twofold effect on the outcomes of 
negotiations. On the one hand it gives unions the confidence they need to both provide and 
accept delegation mechanisms. On the other hand, it avoids representation problems so that 
employers can expect their counterparts to take the lead in implementing the agreement. In 
this light, she concludes that ‘centralised decentralisation’, in Denmark, features a particular 
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combination of institutional resources and trust-based relationships that allow social partners 
to exploit integrative potential and conclude agreements that are likely to benefit both sides 
of the industry. Relevant to the focus of the present research, Ilsøe (2012) shows that amongst 
the items negotiated at the local level many are related to flexibility and security measures; 
for example, variable pay, flexitime, fringe benefits and training. This suggests that company 
level bargaining may also represent a significant policy arena for flexibility and security 
trade-offs to occur. Nevertheless, in addition to the literature on sector level bargaining, a 
comparative focus on company level institutional arrangements is likely to reveal variations 
and/or similarities of outcomes both across and within countries.  
 
Crucially, the first set of questions this thesis addresses is (Figure 2.1): 
 
o Q1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social 
dialogue in different countries address issues of flexibility and security?  
o Q1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different 
countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level 
bargaining agendas?  What are the implications for the actors involved? 
  
To conclude, scholars have demonstrated that sectoral institutions – and the way in which 
these are articulated across-levels – do indeed matter: they exert pressures on social partners 
to address flexibility and security through collective agreements and establish parameters on 
their scope (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). However, there is still a 
great deal of uncertainty about the impact that such agreements have at lower institutional 
levels when social partners bargain on similar issues. The next step is, therefore, to explore 
the outcomes of negotiations over issues of flexibility and security across companies.  
2.6 Flexibility and security at the company level  
 
By observing collective bargaining actors and institutions at the company level, many 
scholars have demonstrated that the scope of the bargaining agenda may vary depending on 
the size of the organisation (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001; Arrowsmith and Marginson 2006; 
Ilsøe 2012; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). For example, Ilsøe (2012) finds that in larger 
enterprises Danish social partners have significant resources available and, as a result, local 
agreements are likely to include a wider spectrum of bargaining items than in smaller 
enterprises. Crucially, this finding is in line with the literature on the role of collective 
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bargaining within multinationals which shows that such resources – both institutional and 
non-institutional – do indeed account for the varying extent of bargaining outcomes. Figure 
2.1 provides a representation of the different variables that are assumed to influence both 
agenda and outcomes of firm level negotiations.  
 
Thus, besides the institutions and actor-centred variables that have been hitherto reviewed – 
the bargaining system, articulating mechanisms between bargaining levels, union density, 
autonomy of local negotiators, and trust between parties – the literature on multinationals 
indicates that, in order to provide a comprehensive framework for company level 
comparisons, other factors need to be considered. These are: first, the extent of local actors’ 
autonomy from the global headquarters; and second, ‘socially constructed conventions’, as 
they are likely to influence social partners’ understandings around their respective role in 
negotiations (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006:246). According to Arrowsmith and 
Marginson (2006) these factors are dependent on the strength of industrial relations 
institutions – in particular sector level institutions – which, serving as political barriers, 
hinder global organisations’ attempt to leverage local (im)balances and undermine union 
representation. So, although it is global management that shapes both bargaining agendas and 
outcomes within multinationals (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Edwards, 2011), an 
‘implicit contract’ between local actors (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001:148) has been proven 
to set limits on the transfer of global human resources practices within companies. This 
contract is not a formal agreement between local management and shop stewards. 
Conversely, it is something that falls ‘into the category of a shared informal understanding’ 
around which local actors shape their roles and identities (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001:149). 
It follows that by digging into socially constructed conventions it may be possible to observe 
whether company level actors have developed an autonomous space through which to 
influence both the scope and outcomes of negotiations on issues of flexibility and security.  
 
As previously mentioned (section 2.4), Pulignano and Keune (2015) have already introduced 
the firm level into the flexicurity debate by observing company level negotiations and 
policies within and across multinationals. The first contribution of these authors is to show 
that cross-national differences in bargaining structures not only enable and constrain 
management and union choices, but also offer resources to local actors for shaping the 
content of collective bargaining in a strategic way. The second contribution, as anticipated in 
section 2.4, is to demonstrate that the nature of flexibility and security trade-offs depends on 
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firm-specific dynamics, in particular, the characteristics of the product market and the level 
of international competition faced by each company.  
 
In order to understand the framework within which their work is located it is, however, 
important to refer to some of the distinctive dimensions that the literature on multinationals 
has focused attention on (Marginson 1992; Ferner et al., 2006; Edwards, 2011). Indeed, as 
Marginson and Meardi argue: ‘The significance of MNCs as employers, their international 
organisation and management structures and their capacity to move production, jobs and 
workers across borders have important implications for the structure, agenda and outcomes of 
collective bargaining’ (Marginson and Meardi, 2012:1). Hence, multinationals have been 
shown to exert a considerable amount of pressure on local level management to reorient their 
bargaining agendas towards market-led considerations (Edwards, 2011) and, by implication, 
to engage with issues of flexibility. At the same time,  trade unions have developed 
increasing concerns over downward pressures on employee terms and conditions, bringing 
issues of security to the fore (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006).  
 
For these reasons multinationals are defined by Pulignano and Keune as ‘par excellence sites 
where micro-forces and their interactions with macro-institutions can be observed’ (2015:3) 
and, as a result, implications for flexibility and security assessed. According to these scholars, 
such micro-forces are likely to influence the extent of flexibility required by subsidiaries, and 
thus, to shape the extent of local actors’ autonomy in negotiating different forms of flexibility 
and security. The higher the level of flexibility that companies face, the lower the possibility 
for local actors to balance such flexibility with compensating forms of security. In particular, 
the structural variables (micro-forces) identified by Pulignano and Keune (2015) are: a) the 
degree of global competition; b) the level of international integration – vertical or horizontal; 
and c) the characteristics of the product market – standardised or differentiated. These are 
expected to reduce the scope for intra-site benchmarking within multinationals which, in turn, 
lowers internal competition for resources and enables each operation to maintain a strategic 
role towards human resources management. Thus, by influencing the level of autonomy 
available to subsidiaries these independent variables simultaneously shape the extent to 
which local actors participate in the definition of ‘acceptable’ flexibility and security trade-
offs.  
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The findings of Pulignano and Keune (2015) are in line with the literature on the significance 
of ‘internationalisation’ for collective bargaining actors and institutions at the company level 
(Marginson 1992; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001; Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; 
Edwards, 2011). For example, by reviewing the contingent (non-institutional) variables 
which encourage multinationals to develop human resource management policies at the 
international level, Edwards focuses on two relevant factors: 1) the choice of companies to 
pursue financial economies or synergistic linkages; and 2) issues of segmentation versus 
replication. Concerning the former, Edwards (2011) identifies product diversification as a 
source of financial economies which suggests that certain categories of companies benefit 
from managing business units that have little in common with one another. In this case, the 
optimal allocation of resources occurs if the multinational firm acts as if it is in ‘an internal 
capital market’ (Marginson, 1992), meaning that subsidiaries are treated as independent 
enterprises.  Consequently, each retains a significant degree of autonomy in shaping its own 
employment practices – collective bargaining included. The headquarters is, in fact, only 
interested in exerting pressure on business units to ensure satisfactory financial results, 
without having to develop ‘a standard approach to the organisation of work or a corporate 
code of conduct or agreement with their workforce’ (Edwards, 2011:488).  Conversely, other 
multinational firms integrate their operations by realising synergies across countries without 
differentiating their activities into unrelated areas.  Edwards (2011) found that these 
particular firms are more likely to pursue a common approach to human resource 
management across borders, as operations tend to develop similarities in their organisation of 
work that pushes global management to influence the nature of policies and practices at site 
level. As a result, they end up exerting a significant amount of pressure on local actors to 
shape the bargaining agenda in relation to market-led considerations. 
 
With regard to the second factor, Edwards (2011) observes that synergies across countries 
can be sought either through segmentation or through replication. Segmentation occurs when 
each subsidiary performs a specific role in the production process or provision of service in a 
vertically integrated chain. In so doing, multinational firms make the most of locational 
specialisation. Ghemawat (2013) gives examples of this approach to internationalisation 
amongst pharmaceutical companies, particularly within functions such as research and 
development. Traditionally these companies were located only in two geographic areas, 
North America and Europe. The effects of segmentation for local management – and by 
implication local unions as well – are very relevant to the present analysis. With reference to 
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Marginson (1992), Edwards (2011) observes that when multinational firms are vertically 
integrated ‘changes in production, or the adoption of a new technology, in one part of the 
company can have implications for employment, skills and the ways of working elsewhere in 
the company’ (Marginson, 1992:537). Therefore, to make sure that products and services can 
be effectively moved from one site to another, these firms develop significant incentives 
towards global human resource management practices (Edwards, 2011). He concludes that 
while segmented multinationals have little interest in setting common work patterns – given 
the diversified needs of skills and technologies across subsidiaries – they nonetheless develop 
a strong incentive for benchmarking and standard procedures. Following from this, Pulignano 
and Keune (2015) argue that vertically integrated production plants are often subject to 
relocation threats which, in turn, push local management to deal with flexibility demands by 
negotiating compensatory forms of security with unions. 
 
Further, Edwards (2011) observes that multinationals can also expand internationally through 
replication. This occurs when subsidiaries perform the same role in different geographical 
locations and where workers share similar profiles, perform similar tasks, and use similar 
technologies. Given this homogeneity of work organisation and strategies along the value 
chain, there is significant scope for the headquarters to set up a global approach to human 
resource management. However, multinationals that tailor their services to nationally specific 
factors – differentiating products and services – are likely to leave a certain amount of 
autonomy to local human resources managers with regard to the product and the way it is 
manufactured. Such autonomy can also be exerted by negotiating with the unions over a 
variety of flexibility and security issues (Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Whether companies 
can differentiate their product across replicated subsidiaries, however, is sector dependent, 
because it requires production processes to be subject to nationally distinctive regulations 
and/or consumer tastes. Conversely, multinationals that pursue a strategic approach based on 
standardisation across replicated plants have a strong incentive to apply global human 
resources practices, thereby limiting the scope for local managers to pursue their own 
bargaining agenda. In this regard, Pulignano et al. (2015) find that product standardisation 
increases the demands for flexibility faced by subsidiaries and negatively influences the 
trade-off between flexibility and security.    
 
Similarly, Marginson and Arrowsmith (2006) show that the degree to which product markets 
are international in scope and production sites are internationally integrated shape the 
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incentives which influence local human resources and industrial relations structures in 
multinational firms. They identify two groups of factors that provide an indication of the 
extent and nature of a firms’ internationalisation and their significance for collective 
bargaining. The first group relates to sector variables, such as technology and product; while 
the second group relates to firm level considerations, such as: 1) patterns of growth – external 
or internal development; 2) the nature of the product(s) – standardised or diversified; and 3) 
the level of integration – vertical or horizontal. Although looking at internationalisation from 
a different perspective to Edwards (2011) they come to the same conclusion: 
internationalisation of human resources structures produces strong pressures towards rigorous 
cross-border benchmarking, which pushes local human resources managers to control costs 
by implementing different forms of flexibility. By implication, the present study suggests that 
such international pressures may also reduce the scope for unions to negotiate compensatory 
forms of security.     
 
Finally, other scholars have demonstrated that firm-specific structural variables not only 
influence multinationals’ strategies towards the development of global human resources 
practices and benchmarking, but also the extent to which subsidiaries are exposed to 
relocation threats (Meardi et al., 2009). Meardi et al. (2009) show that relocation threats have 
pervasive effects on industrial relations at plant-level: they induce cost reduction and foster 
efficiency enhancing changes to the detriment of concession bargaining. They argue that 
across production plants there are certain contextual factors that help account for variations in 
the extent to which such a threat is both perceived and enacted. These factors are: 1) the 
nature and intensity of intra-site competition; 2) the degree of vertical integration; 3) the 
extent of product standardisation; 4) the geographical location of the multinational; and 5) the 
degree to which production sites can choose their location. Further, drawing on Anner et al. 
(2006) they confirm that union responses to managerial strategies are sector dependent. Yet 
they add that firm level structural variables also play a relevant role that affects both the local 
actors’ strategies and the power distribution between them. With this in mind, Pulignano and 
Keune (2015) propose that by exerting strong pressure on local management to control costs, 
the threat of relocation increases subsidiaries’ demands for flexibility and, at the same time, 
negatively influences workers’ structural power in the trade-off between flexibility and 
security. 
 
Thus, the second set of questions this research addresses is as follows (Figure 2.1): 
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o Q2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements at 
the sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of 
security outcomes?  
o Q2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition 
and organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and of security outcomes? 
What are the implications in terms of the nature of negotiated trade-offs? 
 
To conclude, it has been demonstrated that the literature on multinationals does indeed 
contribute to the debate on flexibility and security, as it reveals that firm-specific structural 
variables have a significant impact on the way in which these issues feature in the bargaining 
agenda across subsidiaries. However, this stream of research appears to be only marginally 
framed within the national and sectoral institutional context in which multinational firms lie.   
 
Figure 2.1: The variables assumed to influence both agenda and outcomes of firm level negotiations. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that for the last decade, responses to the increasing level of economic 
pressure affecting the labour market have revolved around the notion of ‘flexicurity’. 
However, both in academia and at a policy-making level, there is still a great deal of 
ambiguity about how the concept should be interpreted and deployed (Viebrock and Clasen, 
2009; Burroni, 2011; Heyes, 2011; Pulignano and Keune, 2015).  In order to provide a more 
clear and comprehensive framework for analysis, it is argued that academic research needs to 
RQ1 (Marginson and Galetto, 2015)  
Sector Level Collective Bargaining and the 
Relationship between Sector and Company Level 
Actors and Institutions  
RQ2 (Pulignano and Keune, 2013) 
Firm-Specific Structural Variables 
Agenda and Outcomes of 
Firm Level  Negotiations on 
Flexibility and Security  
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complement the focus on national level institutions and policies, with other potential sources 
of flexibility and security. Thus, this chapter explored a particular stream of literature that has 
recently looked at different types of regulations –  in addition to legal regulations and market 
regulations – as potentially responsible for flexibility and security balances (Ibsen and 
Miland, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Reviewing 
existent findings, it argued that collective bargaining represents a promising alternative for 
exploration.  
 
Specifically, the chapter draws on Wilthagen and Tros’ (2004) interpretation of flexicurity, 
according to which flexicurity policies can be analysed as types of trade-offs (Wilthagen and 
Tros, 2004; Bekker and Wilthagen, 2008). In addition, it reviews relevant comparative 
studies that have opened to collective bargaining as a means of exploring how issues of 
flexibility and security are developing (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 
2015). In this regard, the most original contribution is found in two recent studies, put 
forward by Ibsen and Mailand (2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015) respectively, which 
have investigated the ‘missing link between collective bargaining and flexicurity’ (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011:165). While confirming the fundamental role of sector level frameworks in 
setting guidelines and providing incentives for economic and social trade-offs, these scholars 
extended their analysis to include the company level, since in practice it is at this level that 
the employment relationship is found and many of these policies are implemented. In doing 
so, they call attention to the actors and the institutional arrangements framing company level 
bargaining, highlighting an area of research hitherto only marginally explored.  
 
Thus, by exploring Marginson and Galetto’s findings (2015) on the coordinating role of 
sector level institutional arrangements for company level bargaining over flexibility and 
security, this chapter, first, highlights the rationale for comparative institutional analysis to 
combine the sector and the company foci. Second, by moving exclusive attention to the 
company level it throws further light on the missing link between flexicurity and collective 
bargaining (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Ilsøe, 2012). 
 
Accordingly, the chapter draws on the work of scholars who have already established a link 
between firm level decision-making processes and flexicurity (Pulignano et al., 2015; 
Pulignano and Keune, 2015). In doing so, it sets the context for a multi-level study, in which 
companies are compared within their sectoral context and sectors within their national 
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contexts. The target is to observe the role of both sector and company level actors and 
institutions in enabling and/or constraining flexibility and security trade-offs. Finally, 
engaging in the observation of how actors and institutions within companies introduce 
diversities in the ways in which items of flexibility and security are balanced-out, the chapter 
reviews another, not insignificant, key-variable in the flexicurity debate: multinationals 
(Pulignano and Keune, 2015). 
 
As a synthesis, two primary sets of questions have been established: 
 
o Q1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social 
dialogue in different countries address issues of flexibility and security?  
o Q1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different 
countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level 
bargaining agendas?  What are the implications for the actors involved? 
 
o Q2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements at 
the sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of 
security outcomes?  
o Q2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition 
and organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and of security outcomes? 
What are the implications in terms of the nature of negotiated trade-offs? 
 
In the following chapter, the thesis will explore the methodology according to which these 
questions will be approached.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter presents the theoretical framework applied to the present 
comparative analysis. In line with the research questions which emerged from the literature 
(Chapter 2), neo-institutional theories are adopted as the main paradigm to explore how 
policies of flexibility and security are shaped by social actors in response to formal and 
informal rules (Djelic and Quack, 2003; Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) as well as 
the micro socio-economic environment within which they interact.  It is argued, in particular, 
that within the neo-institutional paradigm, historical institutionalism represents the most 
appropriate theoretical lens for this thesis. While sharing with both institutionalism and neo-
institutionalism the essential underlying assumption that actors do not behave in an 
‘institutional vacuum’ such a theoretical lens seeks to establish an alternative to their more 
rational material perspective (Godard, 2002:253). In particular, historical institutionalism 
draws attention to the fact that it is not only institutional rules that matter, but so too do the 
identities, interests, and resources of actors involved with them (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2010). Hence, rather than asking why employers or employers’ 
organisations seek rationally to achieve goals, the questions that historical institutionalists are 
primarily interested in are a) why do collective actors have the goals they seem to have?; b) 
what is the role of rules in shaping how one course of action is seen to be more 
rational/feasible than another?; c) what is understood as being rational in different 
institutional contexts? As previously shown (Chapter 2), this is exactly the line of enquiry 
chosen for the present study.  
 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the justification for the research design. This is 
based on a comparative methodology drawing on the idea that any analysis concerning 
macro-social similarities and differences is not truly comparative if does not grasp situational 
contingencies (Ragin, 1989). To this end, the research consists, first, of a comparative 
analysis of sector level institutional arrangements across three countries – Italy, Denmark, 
and the UK, and second, in a comparative analysis of company level institutional 
arrangements in two of the three countries – Italy and Denmark. The sector chosen is the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector, a major manufacturing industry that is highly exposed to 
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international competition and characterised by a long history of collaboration between social 
partners. The research design, therefore, reflects the multi-level nature of this study where 
sectors are compared within their national contexts and companies within their sectoral 
contexts.  
 
The original plan was also to cover company level arrangements in the UK, as well as to 
observe differences in bargaining outcomes on flexibility and security both in countries where 
sectoral agreements exist and have articulation mechanisms between the sector and the 
company levels (see Chapter 2) – as in the case of Italy and Denmark – and where they are no 
longer present – such as in the UK. However, whilst sector level interviews proved to be 
possible in the UK, after 18 months of negotiation, access for company case-studies was, 
ultimately, denied. For this reason, the company dimension of the analysis focuses only on 
two of the three countries – Italy and Denmark. Such an unexpected outcome represented an 
opportunity to re-consider the research design and, as a result, to underscore some of the 
methodological strengths of a multi-level comparative analysis.  
 
The last part of the chapter presents the rationale for a qualitative methodology involving 
both primary and secondary data sources. In addition, it elucidates how the data collected at 
the sector and the company levels have been analysed and interpreted (Yin, 2003; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). It also comprises issues of research ethics 
entailed by the fieldwork undertaken.    
3.2 Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 
The first step in the systematic comparison between phenomena is to choose a theoretical 
framework against which empirical systems can be described, analysed and contrasted 
(Crouch, 1993). By allowing a focus on the outcomes of collective bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security across different countries, in this thesis, neo-institutional theories play 
this role.  
 
The institutionalist perspective is based on the fundamental belief that human activities are 
framed within institutional environments that tend to be stable (Weber, 1978; Polanyi, 1944; 
Veblen, 1904; North, 1990). As argued by Djelic (2010), ‘there is an institutionalist 
temptation in most social science disciplines’ (2009:17) referring to the capability that these 
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theories offer to integrate complexity. Specifically, institutional theories have allowed social 
scientists to focus on those patterns of human action and relationship that persist and 
reproduce themselves over time to ensure predictability of behaviours and, as a result, 
address issues of trust (Jackson, 2010). According to Hechter, ‘demand for co-operative 
institutions arises from individuals’ desire to consume jointly produced public goods […] that 
cannot be obtained following individual strategies’ (Hechter in Crouch, 2005). This self-
sustained system of shared beliefs is built upon both formal and informal external rules as 
well as internalised ones, operating at widely varying levels (Giddens, 1976; Nicolini, 2012). 
 
The key concept of the institutionalist approach is embeddedness, according to which 
economic laws are contingent upon the particular historical, social, and institutional context 
in which economic actions occur (Weber, 1978; Djelic, 2010). Historically, the concept of 
embeddedness has been used in comparative research to link mechanisms that shape 
institutions to the institutional context in which they emerge. Despite playing a fundamental 
role in underscoring the importance of contingency and history, as well as of ‘a processual 
explanation of origins, growth and variations of institutions’ (Djelic, 2010:5), from the 
second quarter of the twentieth century, institutional theories became less attractive and were 
temporarily obscured by more universalising and context-free perspectives (Djelic, 2010).  
 
The revival of institutionalist theories started in different disciplines during the 1970s. The 
theoretical debate that followed gave origin to a new body of thought – known as neo-
institutionalism – which today includes at least three different analytical perspectives: the 
rational choice theory, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. The 
rational choice approach draws on the fundamental belief that institutions structure actions. In 
general, this approach assumes that actors have a fixated set of preferences (Hall and Taylor, 
1996) which they pursue in an entirely strategic way – this theoretical lens presumes 
extensive calculation and is not concerned with the choices of situated individuals. On the 
contrary, it is interested in what an utility maximising agent would do in a given situation 
(Hay and Wincott, 1998) and tends to see reality as a series of collective action dilemmas 
(Crouch, 2005). As described by Tsebelis (1990:19) ‘The rational choice approach focuses its 
attention on the constraints imposed on rational actors – by the institutions of a society. […] 
Individual action is assumed to be an optimal adaptation to an institutional environment, and 
the interaction between individuals is assumed to be an optimal response to one another. 
Therefore the prevailing institutions (rules of the games) determine the behaviours of actors, 
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which in turn produce political and social outcomes’. Crucially, according to rational choice 
theorists the process of institutionalisation is the result of actors’ voluntary commitment; and 
institutions survive so long as they provide agents with more benefits than other competing 
institutional forms could offer (Hall and Taylor, 1996). As argued by Sterling-Folker 
(2000:101) ‘a functional account of the historical development of institutions necessarily 
involves an evaluation of institutions according to their efficiency at obtaining a given interest 
in the given circumstances’. This theoretical approach has been particularly useful in social 
sciences to explain why institutions tend to reproduce themselves over time. However the 
rational choice approach has been increasingly criticised in comparative research for its 
deterministic approach with regard to actors and their strategies. For example, scholars have 
argued that by privileging the cross-national focus (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Goodin, 1998), 
this approach has paid only little attention to issues of national diversities (Campbell, 2010, 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005, Crouch 2005).  
 
The second approach is sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Hall, 2010) 
which in some ways is the mirror image of the rational choice perspective. Sociological 
institutionalists argue that actors’ preferences are neither pre-determined nor assimilated into 
societies for efficiency enhancing reasons. On the contrary, they are the result of a series of 
processes that are associated with the transmission of cultural practices (Hall and Taylor, 
1996:946). In a review of the literature on varieties of capitalism and pragmatic 
constructivism, Thelen (2010) argues that the main objective of the sociological approach is 
to explain why organisations embrace specific institutional arrangements, procedures and 
practices; and to shed light on how these practices may be transferred across organisational 
fields and countries. In addition, she highlights three important features distinguishing this 
particular institutional perspective. First, it defines institutions in broad terms as to 
encompass both formal and informal rules. For instance, Campbell describes structures 
simply as ‘frames of meaning guiding human action’ (in Hall and Taylor, 1996:947). Second, 
when exploring the relationship between institutions and actors, it assigns a prominent role to 
actors (Hall, 2010). According to this view actors not only react strategically to institutional 
constraints but they are also able to improvise and learn from other actors (Herrigel, 2007). 
Thus, borrowing ideas from social constructivisms, this theoretical lens contends that social 
interactions enable agents to both rethink their strategies and re-shape their role and identities 
(Jackson, 2010). As argued by Sabel (1994:138) ‘[through interaction] parties can reinterpret 
themselves and their relation to each other by elaborating a common understanding of the 
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world’. What is relevant of this approach is that it downplays national homogeneity and 
historical continuity in favour of ‘complexity, variety, process and recombinatory change 
over time within cases’ (Herrigel, 2007 in Thelen, 2010:50). It follows that sociological 
theories are helpful in explaining institutional reconfiguration and change (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005), whereby change is not interpreted as the result of efficiency considerations – 
as rational choice theorists would advocate – but as a reflection of ‘the social legitimacy of its 
participants (Hall and Taylor, 1996:949). In this regard, Campbell (1998) argues that 
institutional change follows the ‘logic of social appropriateness’ as opposed to the ‘logic of 
instrumentality’ (See Ch. 2 March and Olsen, 2010). None of this suggests that sociological 
institutionalists deny actors’ rationality. However, they propose that what agents perceive as 
rational is itself socially constituted and, as a result, it may vary according to situational 
contingencies. In Hall and Taylor words: ‘if rational choice theorists often posit a world of 
individuals seeking to maximise their material well-being, sociologists often posit a worlds of 
individuals seeking to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways 
(1996:949). The weaknesses of this approach are then the mirror image of those of the 
structuralist account. First, it overemphasises contingency and institutional fluidity; second, it 
overestimates the degrees of freedom that actor hold; and third, it sees institutions as overly 
malleable (Thelen, 2010, Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
 
Thus, as it covers an intermediate position between rational choice theories and sociological 
theories, the third theoretical perspective – historical institutionalism – is seen as the most 
appropriate lens for the present comparative analysis. In particular, it shares with sociological 
institutionalism the objective to move beyond the national level and compare the scope of 
sector and firm level variations within different national systems. According to these views, 
the ‘local’ is a critical environment – not simply a taken for granted reproduction of external 
definitions – where specific actors, through interactions, shape their perceived identities and 
interests (Hirsh, 1997). Both approaches contend that while institutions shape social and 
political life (Hall and Taylor, 1998) actors’ interests are not ‘out there’ waiting to be 
discovered, but they are ‘socially constructed’ (Wendt, 1987). However, similar to the 
rational choice perspective, historical institutionalism also assumes that it is institutionally 
defined situations that influence the interests and the identities of actors, and that these 
institutional rules ‘are defined in relation to stable configurations of actors with particular – 
institutionally defined – identities interests’ (Jackson, 2010:76).  
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Drawing on both rational and sociological perspective to institutions, historical 
institutionalism proposes that actors are essentially strategic as they are willing to achieve 
complex, contingent and often changing goals (Hay and Wincott, 1998). Furthermore, it 
suggests that agents interact in a hostile environment which tends to favour some specific 
strategies over others and where equal access to information is often denied. Thus, although 
considering the social context mainly in institutional terms ‘institutions are understood less as 
a functional means of reducing uncertainty, so much as structures whose functionality and 
dysfunctionality is an open – empirical and historical question ‘ (Hay and Wincott, 
1998:956). This also explains historical institutionalism’s interest on social institutions 
inefficiency, or on institutions as the subject and focus of political struggle, and on the 
contingent nature of these struggles that institutional pressures may only partially address 
(Hall and Thelen, 2009, Thelen, 2010). 
 
As perfectly described by Thelen and Steinmo: 
 
Institutional analysis…allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as 
objects of history. The institutions that are the centre of historical institutionalist 
analysis…can shape and constraint political strategies in important ways, but they are 
themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political conflict and of 
choice (Hay and Wincott 1998:955) 
 
While strategic interaction is particularly underscored in this view, individuals are assumed to 
possess knowledge and reflexivity so that they are capable of both assessing the 
consequences of their actions and judging the effectiveness of present institutions. Such 
assumption entails a dynamic understanding of the relationship between institutions and the 
actors who define them.  
 
A further advantage of historical institutionalism is that it focuses attention on dynamics of 
institutional experiments and renovation which may open the possibility to account for 
institutional change. However changes, unless exogenous or inevitable, are interpreted as 
slow and incremental, because the access to strategic resources and information are not 
equally distributed among individuals (or groups) which also explains their difficulties in 
making radical contributions. In this way, historical institutionalism has managed to explains 
dynamics of change within the ‘path-dependence’ paradigm (Mahoney 2000, Mahoney and 
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Thelen, 2010), which is paradoxically that specific concept used by rational choice theorists 
to account for institutional static.   
 
Path dependence is defined as a process in which ‘contingent events or decisions result in 
institutions being established that tend to persist over long period of time and constrain the 
option available to actors in the future, including the one that may be more efficient’ 
(Campbell, 2010:90). This explains comparative institutional theory’s interest for history, 
used as a primary means to analyse cross-countries social, economic or political outcomes. 
More simply, historical institutionalists contend that the order in which things happen affects 
how they happen (Hay and Wincott 1998; Thelen, 2010)."
"
Streeck and Thelen (2005) have contributed to the historical institutionalist perspective by 
formulating the notion of geographical specificity and suggested that there is a link between 
the mechanisms that shape institutions and the specific structures of the society within which 
they emerge (Streeck, 1992; Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Further, these scholars 
have applied the idea of embeddedness to the study of capitalist diversity, arguing that the 
different impact that similar developments have in different countries can be explained 
through an analysis of the alternative institutional arrangements found in the various nation-
states (Locke and Thelen, 1995; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
Finally, these authors have underscored the role of power relations and conflict and at the 
same time attempted to reconcile the structuring capacity of institutions with a space for 
individual agency and ‘conflictual encounters’ (Djelic, 2010:25). It is in their particular 
interpretation of institutions – thoroughly summarised by Djelic in the following passage – 
that this thesis finds its theoretical underpinning (Steinmo et al., 1992; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005): 
 
[Institutional patterns] become of real significance if they get anchored into localised 
territories, if they get appropriated by real actors and are in the process acted out, 
endogenised and indigenised. In other words, floating ideas are potential institutions. 
They won’t be real ones, though, in a concrete sense before they are acted upon and 
turned into rules of the game providing stability and meaning…institutions reflect the 
historical aggregation of multiple human actions. Still, at any point on time, they also 
frame and constrain individual agency. Institutions are the product of human action. 
But they are complex products built through time and through a long succession or 
processes that includes unanticipated developments…Actors are embedded at the very 
same time in multiple layers of institutional constraints. Institutional memories persist 
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and can be reinvented as actors move across multiple kinds of boundaries and cross 
over many different institutional spheres (Djelic, 2010:26). 
 
Thelen and Streeck’s (2005) view of institutions is particularly effective with regard to the 
present comparative analysis, as it helps to observe three countries – Italy, Denmark, and the 
UK – in relation to the institutional frameworks in which they are embedded. Consistent with 
their approach, this study transcends the national-level and contextualises the comparison at 
the sector and firm levels. In doing so it explores how various international trends, such as 
employers’ search for flexibility and collective bargaining decentralisation, are mediated by 
sector-specific and companies’ institutional arrangements, and then translated into policies in 
a way that may account for both similarity and diversity of outcomes (Thelen, 2010). Thus, 
for the reason that it takes into account not only ‘differences in the type of institutions, but 
also the degree of institutionalisation and corresponding level of organisational heterogeneity 
within the boundaries of an institution’ (Jackson, 2010:77), historical institutionalism is the 
theoretical lens applied to this comparative analysis. 
 
As distinguished from its antecedent structuralist and functionalist approaches (North, 1990; 
Scott, 1995; Goodin, 1998), historical institutionalism recognises the rationale for moving 
beyond the national level to compare the scope of sector and firm level variations within 
different national systems. According to this view, the ‘local’ is a critical environment – not 
simply a taken for granted reproduction of external definitions – where specific actors, 
through interactions, shape their perceived identities and interests (Hirsh, 1997). In this light, 
it is contended that while institutions shape social and political life (Hall and Taylor, 1998) 
actors’ interests are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but they are ‘socially 
constructed’ (Wendt, 1987). Institutionally defined situations influence the interests and the 
identities of actors, and, at the same time, these same institutional rules ‘are defined in 
relation to stable configurations of actors with particular – institutionally defined – identities 
interests’ (Jackson, 2010:76).  
 
Crucially, when exploring differences and similarities across countries, this study assumes 
that, not only do institutional rules matter but so too do the identities, interests, and resources 
of actors involved in them (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2010).  Actors 
may be socialised by institutions or purposely conform to them, nevertheless, they may also 
stray from or re-interpret institutions in a way that alter their foundations (Locke and Thelen, 
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1996; Crouch 2005, Campbell, 2009). This theoretical perspective allows a focus on 
‘institutionalisation as a dynamic and actor-centred social process’ (Hirsch, 1997; Jackson, 
2009:67) as well as acknowledging that actors and institutions may change over time in a 
recursive and dialectical fashion (Streeck, 2009; Thelen, 2009).  
 
In particular, Scharpf defines institutions as a ‘context for action’ in which actors constantly 
interact with each other (1989). During this process, first, institutions shape actors. This is 
true in the field of comparative industrial relations, where collective actors such as formal 
organisations, trade unions or employers’ associations, are often the main units of analysis. 
Collective actors do respond to institutional rules, such as the normative framework 
regulating the employment relationship. Second, institutions establish the terms of social 
interaction among those particular actors, delimiting the arena within which unions and 
employers shape their interests and develop ‘normative and strategic orientation actions vis-
à-vis to each other’ (Jackson, 2009:69). However, institutions alone never fully define agency 
identities, their understandings or their aims and inclinations, and consequently neither do 
they fully determine their actions.  
 
As a result, actors retain scope for choice within constraints or even impact on those 
constraints through their individual experiences and understandings about reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Crouch, 2005).  It is argued that these understandings and experiences help 
to address issues of institutional heterogeneity both across and within national boundaries. 
Thus, as institutional constraints explain only partially the empirical variance of policy 
outcomes across countries, the rest is dependent on contingent factors, such as, ‘differing 
conditions of the policy environment, differing interests and goals of policy-makers, and 
differing beliefs systems through which policy-makers are interpreting cause-and-effect and 
means-end relationships’ (Scharpf, 1989:150).   
3.3 Research Design 
 
In line with its theoretical underpinnings, the comparative methodology adopted by the 
present thesis is based on Ragin’s work. (1987). According to this scholar, historically 
oriented interpretative studies  need to be treated as ‘a type of empirical social science’ which 
attempts to account for specific historical outcomes – or set of processes –  in light  of their 
significance for current institutional arrangements or for social life in general (Ragin, 
1987:3). While reflecting Weber’s relativism, this definition makes some room for the 
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possibility that a certain amount of historical generalisation exists when looking at 
comparable cases.  However, for this to happen, it is important to go beyond an ideal-typical 
interpretation of case studies which treats boundaries as impenetrable and systems as closed. 
Instead, comparative work should proceed at two levels simultaneously: the level of systems 
– macro-social level – and within the systems themselves. This argument draws on the 
assumption that any analysis concerning macro-social similarities and differences is not truly 
comparative, if does not grasp situational contingencies. Given this, the present study is based 
on a cross-national comparison of sector level institutional arrangements, including collective 
bargaining, in three countries – Italy, Denmark, and the UK – as well as company level 
collective bargaining in two of these countries – Italy and Denmark. Research is carried out 
within a single sector of economic activity, specifically, the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector. The research design therefore reflects the multi-level nature of this study in which 
sectors are compared within their national contexts and companies within their sectoral 
contexts.  
 
Specifically, the framework chosen to classify and select the three countries is the one 
produced by Visser for the European Commission in 2009 as a synthesis of the many 
attempts at classification within the debate on capitalist diversity (Crouch, 1993; Crouch, 
2005; Schmidt, 2006; European Commission 2009). This debate is relevant here because it 
has enriched our understanding of the relationship between collective bargaining 
arrangements – and actors – and national institutional features. For instance, Crouch (1993) 
observed how nation-state traditions have influenced European industrial relations since the 
19th century. Traxler et al. (2001) shed light on the economic performance of different 
national industrial relations systems by empirically testing issues of path dependency. 
Moreover, while Barbier (2008) explored the link between national cultures and social and 
employment issues, Esping-Andersen (1990) identified different forms of social welfare 
systems which were found to condition both social and economic behaviours, and by 
implication, the industrial relations arena as well.  
 
A particularly fruitful stream of research on capitalist diversity was opened by Hall and 
Soskice’s classification (2001). Their clusters are based on the interaction between financial 
markets, company investments strategies, production of skills, social protections and wage 
policies which helps define two broad categories of countries: Coordinated Market 
Economies, such as Germany or Sweden, and Liberal Market Economies, such as the UK 
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(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Despite augmenting our knowledge of industrial relations, the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach has been primarily criticised for its tendency to 
overestimate complementarity and coherence within institutional types to the detriment of 
intra-cluster variation (Bechter et al., 2012; Crouch, 2005). It has been argued in particular 
that the VoC classification is ‘conceptually and theoretically under-equipped to grasp the 
dynamics of change within and across economies’ (Heyes et al. 2012:236)." The second 
critique relates to the fact that Hall and Soskice excluded the Sothern European countries 
from their operationalisation of coordinated market economies (Deeg and Jackson, 2007; 
Perraton and Clift, 2004; Heyes et al. 2012). In order to amend this, other scholars have since 
proposed a third grouping of countries defined in various ways as ‘Mixed Market’ economies 
(Molina and Rhodes, 2005), ‘Sothern European Capitalism’ (Amable, 2000), and ‘State 
Capitalist Model’ (Schmidt, 2002). While Schmidt (2002) and Amable’s (2000) 
conceptualisations focus on the role of the state in mediating all the economic and social 
activities of these countries– Molina and Rhodes (2005) draw on organisational stability and 
institutional complementarities, depicting Southern European countries as less coordinated 
and much more fragmented than coordinated market economies.    
 
Visser (2009) systematises the existent classifications around three emerging themes: 
employment regimes (Gallie, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1990, Amable, 2000); industrial 
relations regimes (Crouch, 2005; Schmidt, 2006, Molina and Rhodes, 2007); and production 
regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The objective set out to investigate is consistent with 
previous attempts; and it is to explore the interaction between public policies, collective 
bargaining, and social dialogue in relations to different state traditions, institutions and 
practices. However, in contrast to other classifications, Visser clusters’ offers a more nuanced 
comparative lens whereby diversity can be approached from different perspectives. For 
example, they help this thesis formulate a series of expectations not only on the relationship 
between international trends – such as employers’ search for flexibility and collective 
bargaining decentralisation – and institutions of industrial relations but also of economic and 
social coordination.  
 
Moreover, as it departs from a dualistic approach of institutional analysis (VoC) to embrace a 
governance approach – which relies on sociological and political science concepts of action 
(Crouch, 2005; Schmidt, 2006) – Visser’s (2009) classification is in line with the theoretical 
underpinning of this thesis. It draws on a body of theory that aims to explore how economic 
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action is governed and regulated while accounting for both structures and actors. Reflecting 
Crouch’s work, the classification proposed by Visser (2009) lies on the assumption that 
dealing with rule-makers does not necessarily mean that research needs to be concerned only 
with either formal rules or the restraint of economic actors (2005:44). Indeed, Visser’s 
clusters acknowledge that institutions can also be interpreted as open boundaries, and not 
only as constraining factors. The main advantage of this analytical approach is that it takes 
into account different forms of institutionalisation (Bechter et al, 2012; Procter, 2015) and 
that it reflects important consideration of labour market governance and social welfare 
(Traxler et al., 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1990) which are deemed relevant to the present 
comparison.  
 
Finally, scholars have argued that the significance of this classification is that it is 
empirical/descriptive (cluster analysis) and, at the same time, theoretical, as it is derived from 
theoretical typologies of production regimes, welfare states, and employment arrangements 
(Bechter et al., 2012). For example, Bechter and colleagues (2012) found it useful not only 
because it allows a focus on both national and sector level industrial relations institutions but 
also because it provides a more ‘fine-grained’ description of EU industrial relations than the 
traditional ones offer (2012:190). Even so, they highlighted that within-country variations are 
for the most part neglected in this analytical framework. Visser himself recognises that ‘the 
real world is messier than these typologies and the application to single countries is an 
approximation at best’ (Visser, 2009:50).  
 
In this regard, the present study compares three countries that, although belonging to different 
clusters – namely, Nordic, South, and West clusters – will be shown to share some important 
elements of similarity (Marginson and Sisson, 2006:42). Indeed, depending on the industrial 
relations features that researchers choose to draw attention to, as well as their particular focus 
of analysis –  national, sectoral, and local – institutional heterogeneity within country-groups 
can be so marked as to require such clusters to be (re)combined (Marginson and Sisson, 
2006). For example, Marginson and Sisson (2006) identify some specific industrial relations 
features that allow similarities between supposedly different institutional models to emerge 
(Ebbinghaus, 1999; Supiot, 2000). 
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3.3.1 Why Italy, Denmark, and the UK 
 
One of the primary strengths of Visser’s classification is to stress institutional variations 
across the selected countries for this comparative analysis (Visser, 2009). In line with the 
neo-institutionalist paradigm, these variations are argued to have a role in shaping the agenda 
of social partners, at different bargaining levels, on issues of flexibility and security (RQ1). 
Table 3.1 summarises the most relevant differences in the industrial relations systems 
characterising Italy, Denmark, and the UK.  
Italy 
Italy is clustered as a Southern European country due to the prominent role of the state in the 
market economy and the dualistic nature of both its welfare regime and labour market. 
Within this context, trade unions have managed to maintain a consultative role in the decision 
making system, but they have not developed the ability to participate in the distribution of 
welfare benefits – active labour market policies included. In terms of industrial relations 
arrangements Visser uses a similar terminology as Schmidt (2006) to define Italy as a sort of 
halfway-case between the ‘state-centred’ and the ‘corporatist’ models. Legal intervention in 
labour related matters is high and, even though state and social partners do attempt to act 
together, they are both weak (Schmidt, 2006). The dominant level of collective bargaining is 
still the sector. Coordination between the sector and the company level is in place and occurs 
both at the confederal and the sectoral level. In recent years, as a result of further bargaining 
decentralisation, there has been an increasing focus on the company level.  Crucial to the 
scope of the present study, management and employees are attempting to tackle specific 
problems outside the usual representative channels with impromptu experiments of territorial 
and company level concertation (Regalia, 2006). Social partners look for points of agreement 
at micro-level, in particular, when negotiations involve working-hours, job-placement, and 
training (ibid.). Yet, over a total bargaining coverage of 80 per cent, it is estimated that 
company bargaining covers only about 20-25 per cent of companies in the private sector, 
thereby posing a series of challenges to social actors when dealing with issues of flexibility 
and security (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011; Pedersini, 2013).  
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Denmark 
Denmark belongs to the Nordic European cluster of industrial relations (Visser, 2009) which, 
in terms of production regimes, embodies the coordinated-market economies. This country is 
characterised by a highly inclusive welfare system where participation in decision making by 
employers’ organisations and organised labour is strongly institutionalised. Trade unions take 
part in the distribution of welfare benefits and contribute to active labour market policies. 
Visser (2009) defines the Danish industrial relation regime as ‘organised-corporatism’ where 
collective bargaining is the primary source of labour market regulation and legal intervention 
is almost not existent. In contrast to many EU countries labour law plays a relatively minor 
role in setting the norms and conditions of the employment relationship as compared to that 
of collective bargaining (Gold and Weiss, 1999). This is, in turn, regulated by a sort of an 
overarching agreement known as the ‘basic agreement’ (hovedaftaler) that, besides providing 
a series of principles governing relations between employers and employees, serves as a 
guideline for the interpretation of the different industry-wide agreements. It follows, 
therefore, that the Danish collective bargaining systems is characterised by a multi-level 
structure providing a controlled decentralisation (Due et al., 1994; Visser, 2009). 
Coordination of bargaining competences occurs only at the sector level and, as a result, 
industry-wide agreements are used as comprehensive frameworks for negotiations taking 
place at company level (Jørgensen, 2014). The nature of the Danish industrial relations 
system, based on a consolidated multiple-employer bargaining tradition, exerts a strong 
influence on collective bargaining coverage. The degree of union involvement in negotiating 
employment terms and conditions is demonstrated by a coverage rate of 65 per cent which is 
still one of the highest amongst the EU Member States (Ibid.). Given the centrality of 
collective bargaining, Denmark represents a particularly interesting context in which to 
explore the role of collective actors and institutions in addressing issues of flexibility and 
security. It is worth mentioning that in recent times this country has captured scholars’ 
attention in light of its ability to reconcile some of the most neo-liberal elements with 
institutionalised negotiations and decision-making typical of Nordic-corporatist countries. 
Such ‘institutional complementarities’, based on heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, 
reflect what in the literature is referred to as the ‘flexicurity model’ (Campbell, 2007:307; 
Bekker et al., 2008; Due and Madsen, 2008).  
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The UK  
Finally, the UK is one of the most prominent examples of a liberal market economy and 
Visser clusters it as a ‘West-European Country’. Adopting Gallie’s typologies (Gallie, 2007) 
he defines its employment system as a ‘market-based regime’. Accordingly, employment 
levels and job rewards are ‘self-regulated’ and institutional controls by organised labour are 
considered as ‘negative rigidities’ (Gallie, 2007:18). The state acts in a very restricted sphere, 
and although increasing, legal regulations do not play a significant role in the socioeconomic 
domain (Schmidt, 2006; Dickens and Hall, 2010). The primary reason for the UK to be 
investigated is that, of all Western European countries, it has made the most radical break 
with corporatist tendencies (Streeck, 1988; Colling and Terry, 2010). Collective bargaining 
coverage and union density reached 29.2 and 26 per cent respectively in 2012 while 
membership composition is characterised by a significant segmentation in terms of sector of 
activity, occupational groups, and company size (Pedersini, 2010; Gamwell, 2014).  In 
addition, due to the largely decentralised nature of employment relations, the role of 
employers’ organisations is not particularly prominent (Gamwell, 2014). It declined notably 
during the 80s when many existing sectoral agreements ceased to function and companies 
began to negotiate with trade unions at lower bargaining levels.  Institutions at the sector 
level play an almost irrelevant role and single-employer bargaining is the predominant system 
of negotiations. In light of this fragmentation, the scope of infra-national and cross-national 
diversity of bargaining outcomes has potentially enlarged, and the British collective 
bargaining framework becomes a sort of extreme institutional context in which to explore 
how issues of flexibility and security have developed.   
 
Table 3.1: Industrial relation regimes or arrangements 
 Italy Denmark UK 
Production regime Statist market economy Coordinated market 
economy 
Liberal market 
economy 
Welfare regime Segmented Universalistic Residual 
Employment regime Dualistic Inclusive Liberal 
IR regime Both state-centred and 
corporatist 
Organised corporatism Liberal pluralism 
Principal Level of Bargaining Sector  Sector and company Company 
Coordination Confederal and sectoral Sectoral No coordination 
Role of SP in public policy Irregular/Politicised Institutionalised Rare/event-driven 
Employee representation 
coverage 
Sector-level high 
Company-level low 
Sector-level High 
Company-level High 
Company-level- low  
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Source: Industrial relation regimes or arrangements, adaptation of J. Visser 2009 (European Commission, Report).  
 
Cross-national differences notwithstanding, a comparative analysis between Italy, Denmark, 
and the UK, points to the fact that the intensity of variation across Visser’s clusters may not 
be necessarily the same for all countries. For example, despite being placed in different 
clusters, Italy and Denmark have developed an institutional configuration of collective 
bargaining that features important elements of similarity, such as a multi-employer 
bargaining system and coordinating mechanisms between bargaining levels. Paying attention 
to these particular similarities has two methodological implications. On the one side, it 
sharpens the difference between these two countries and the UK, where institutional 
mechanisms of this kind are no longer existent.  On the other, it portrays Italy and Denmark 
as more similar institutional contexts in which to explore differences in the role of sector 
level and company level bargaining arrangements – and the relationship between them – in 
addressing issues of flexibility and security (RQ2). Table 3.2 summarises the main 
similarities across countries 
 
Likewise, Marginson and Sisson’s approach to institutional clusters underpins the argument 
that, depending on the focus of analysis, there are more similarities between countries than 
appear at first sight (2006). According to these authors, for example, in both Italy and 
Denmark the state does not intervene in wage bargaining if not as conciliator. Similarly, in 
addition, their multi-employer agreements are binding for all the signatory organisations and 
their respective members. Moreover, if looking at the extent of employee workplace 
organisation Italy, Denmark and even the UK feature an important element of similarity: a 
single-channel structure of union representation.  
 
Table 3.2 Inter-cluster similarities  
 Italy Denmark UK 
Collective bargaining arrangements Multi-employer Multi-employer Single-employer 
Collective bargaining decentralisation Organised Organised Disorganised 
Coordinating Mechanisms across bargaining 
levels 
Existent Existent Not Existent 
Role of state in wage bargaining Conciliator Conciliator Non-intervention 
Status of collective agreements Binding Binding Non-binding 
Workplace representation Single-channel 
Unions 
Single-channel 
Unions 
Single-channel 
Unions 
Source: adaptation Visser, 2009; adaptation Marginson and Sisson, 2006 
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In synthesis, in a comparative analysis of collective bargaining arrangements across Italy, 
Denmark, and the UK national variations may provide a fundamental, but nonetheless, partial 
account of the way in which institutions enable and constrain actors’ interactions. When the 
focus is specifically on sector and company level actors and institutions – and the relationship 
between these – issues of cross-national homogeneity, as well as within country 
heterogeneity, are assumed to be as important and to require just as much attention (Crouch, 
2005; Marginson and Sisson, 2006; Becther et al., 2012). Thus, given the multi-level nature 
of this comparative study, both method of difference and method of similarity are 
simultaneously combined (Lijphart, 1971).  
 
Drawing on Visser’s clusters (2009) the method of difference (Lijphart, 1971) is applied to 
the study of sector level institutional arrangements across Italy and Denmark on the one side, 
versus the UK on the other.  In order to address this level of analysis three research 
propositions will be examined (Chapter 7). In the country-by-country presentation of findings 
(Chapters 4-5-6) such propositions are further specified to reflect the institutional framework 
characterising collective bargaining in each country. 
 
The main research propositions are: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
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dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
In contrast, the method of similarity (Lijphart, 1971) is applied to the study of Italy and 
Denmark only. By featuring a) a multi-employer bargaining system; b) coordinating 
mechanisms between bargaining levels; and c) a centralised decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, these two countries can be treated as fairly homogeneous institutional contexts 
across and within which to reveal (potential) variations of outcomes. By comparing Italy and 
Denmark it is possible to focus on the relationship between similar institutions at different 
bargaining levels and asses the role that this relationship plays in shaping the agenda of 
company level actors on flexibility and security. Once the nexus between institutions and 
bargaining outcomes has been established, it is then possible to shift attention to contingent 
factors and explore the role that these factors, in turn, play in determining bargaining 
outcomes.   
 
Thus, in order to conduct the second level of comparison two sets of expectations developed 
from the literature and further specified in Chapters 7 and 8 will be examined. The first one 
relates to the ways in which articulation mechanisms – at both interconfederal and sectoral 
level in Italy and at sectoral level only in Denmark – allow categories of flexibility and 
security to enter into the agenda of company level negotiators (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
The second set of expectations has to do with the ways in which non-institutional variables – 
in particular the degree of international competition and the cross-border organisational 
structure of the multinationals under focus –influence the capability of company level 
bargaining actors to find compromises between different forms of flexibility and security, and 
condition the nature of these compromises (Pulignano et al., 2015). 
3.4 Beyond the national level  
 
By demonstrating that industrial relations vary significantly across sectors, Bechter et al. 
argue that ‘we cannot derive the kind of industrial relations that affect a company, or a group 
or employees, simply by the country in which they are located; we must also know in what 
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sector they operate (2012:199). Sharing their methodological concern, the present 
comparative analysis adopts a sector-focus approach and assumes that employers and 
employees belonging to the same industry experience similar technologies and market 
environments, and therefore, also similar demands for flexibility and security (Crouch, 2005; 
Marginson and Sisson, 2006). Nevertheless, limiting the attention to a single sector of 
economic activity may represent both the main strength and limitation of the chosen 
methodology.  One the one hand, it avoids a too deterministic interpretation of the role of 
national institutions in shaping different – or similar – bargaining outcomes across countries. 
On the other hand, because of the significant degree of cross-sector heterogeneity within 
countries, it is not possible to generalise findings.    
 
The particular sector chosen for this comparative analysis is the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector. Qualities such as market stability, high skills and productivity levels (Heyes, 2001), as 
well as a long history of collaborative collective bargaining make it a good fit for the research 
focus (CO-Industri, 2012; Martin, 2013; Federchimica, 2014; Sanz de Miguel, 2014). First, 
while affected by the present economic crisis, this industry has remained relatively stable 
across geographic sectors. This represents an important condition in producing findings on 
issues of flexibility and security without including the economic crisis as a determinant 
variable. Second, across Italy, Denmark, and the UK, workforce composition reflects the 
reliance of the sector on market innovation and quality of products. This high-skill and high-
productivity environment has made flexibility and security prominent issues in the agenda of 
social partners. Third, chemicals and pharmaceuticals belong to a sector that is well 
organised on both sides, employers and unions, and collective bargaining at the company 
level covers smaller as well as larger employers. The comparison with chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies in Denmark – which are covered by industrial agreement and 
characterised by a relatively high level of union representation – was therefore meaningful 
and empirically possible. 
  
In the UK, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry does not have any formal sector level 
agreement in place. Single-employer bargaining is the only way in which collective 
bargaining occurs, while the main form of exchange between the employers’ organisation 
(CIA) and sector level trade-unions (Unite, GMB) is social dialogue. The choice of 
selecting an industry with no sector level institutional arrangement reflects one of the implicit 
aims of this study: to strengthen the link between collective bargaining and issues of 
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flexibility and security. Consistently holding conditions in markets and technologies constant 
by exploring one single sector of economic activity allows the research to pay exclusive 
attention to institutions and degrees of institutionalisation, and by implication, to observe 
whether – and how – these institutions influence social actors’ effectiveness across different 
countries (Marginson et al., 2006). 
 
Given the highly internationalised nature of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector, the 
selected companies for this comparative analysis are manufacturing plants of large 
multinational organisations. The literature review chapter (Chapter 2) demonstrated that 
flexibility is a highly strategic issue in these organisations as local management uses it as a 
means to deal with cost-effectiveness pressures coming from headquarters. At the same time, 
the sophistication of the production processes, as well as the technologies and skills required, 
have ensured a relatively high level of security for the workers. Moreover, company and/or 
site-level agreements are present in the companies that have been investigated in both Italy 
and Denmark.  
 
A comparative analysis of sector level collective bargaining in Italy, Denmark, and the UK, 
and of company level bargaining in Italy and Denmark, provide a series of significant 
advantages. First, it sheds light on the role of sector level actors and institutions in shaping 
regimes of flexibility and security. Second, it elucidates whether the existence of a sector 
level framework that steers local bargaining on issues of flexibility and security is a pre-
condition for these issues to be considered and addressed by social partners at the company 
level. Third, it reveals whether and how different combinations of flexibility and security 
occur at the company level – when countries share similar sectoral institutional arrangements 
– and helps in assessing their nature. Finally, it sheds light on the actors’ capability to 
develop flexibility and security strategies in response to the interpersonal network in which 
they are embedded and the meaning that these particular issues possess for their identities.  
 
To conclude, in order to contrast flexibility and security developments across and within 
countries, two company case studies have been conducted for each country.  The rationale for 
repeating the observation twice within each national context follows two main considerations. 
First, it explores whether common sector level institutional arrangements foster different 
patterns of behaviour across companies thereby underscoring variation within countries 
(Crouch, 2005; Marginson and Sisson, 2006; Bechter et al., 2012).  Second, it enables a 
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deeper understanding of the role of micro-level contingencies – non-institutional variables – 
in shaping the agenda of local-level negotiators over issues of flexibility and security 
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Edwards, 2011; Pulignano and Keune, 2015).  
 
3.5 Methodology   
 
As the present research sees institutions mainly as interacting with other institutions and 
embedded in complex social, historical and political environments, quantitative data are not 
applicable. Concepts such as cooperation, trust, conflict, and power are not easy to quantify 
as variables. Instead, institutions are interpreted according to the role they play in different 
social contexts, as well as for the meanings given to actions by the actors involved.    
 
An in-depth qualitative methods approach is best suited to the target of analysing institutions 
in an actor-centred fashion. First, it explains the reasons for the non-identical nature of those 
actors’ outcomes. Secondly, it addresses the fact that different institutions may be more or 
less constraining and, therefore, lead to different degrees of institutionalisation across and 
within societies over time (Scharpf, 1989). Consistent with the focus of the present research, 
qualitative methods helps to empirically explore ‘actors strategies toward institutions without 
merely comparing national averages from a static point of view, but rather looking at the 
extent of the variation around those means’ (Jackson, 2010:81). 
 
This multi-level comparative analysis draws on a range of secondary sources such as 
academic literature, statutory provisions and legislation on collective bargaining, and formal 
regulation on non-standard employment contracts and employment security. The use of 
secondary data enabled a broad understanding of the historical, institutional, and legal context 
in which Italy, Denmark, and the UK are found. This was a pivotal passage in exploring the 
way in which national institutions, such as social welfare and legal regulations, may influence 
the scope of collective bargaining over issues of flexibility and security and provide an 
independent account of the role of collective bargaining actors and institutions in addressing 
issues of flexibility and security across countries.  
 
In addition, empirical research was undertaken first at sector level, and then at company 
level, in the form of case studies. According to Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy for 
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the observation of ‘contemporary phenomena within some real-life context’ and when the 
research intent is ‘principally exploratory’ (Yin, 2003:6). Both criteria apply to the present 
analysis which is aimed at discovering the rationale behind actors’ decisions, observing the 
context in which these decisions are produced, and comparing patterns and outcomes across 
cases. Moreover, a case study approach offers the possibility to triangulate multiple sources 
of evidence. Accordingly, researchers are able to address a wide range of historical, 
attitudinal and behavioural issues, thereby strengthening both the validity and reliability of 
the qualitative analysis (Yin, 2006).  
3.5.1 Sector level data collection 
 
Besides representing a crucial element of the context in which company level negotiations 
take place, sector level data represents an institutional forum on its own where social partners  
engage with issues of flexibility and security (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and 
Galetto, 2015). They do so through collective bargaining, both in Italy and Denmark, and 
through social dialogue activities across all three countries, Italy, Denmark and the UK. 
Relevant to the scope of the present analysis (RQ1), this level of comparison required 
specific attention.  Thus, the first stage of the fieldwork involved 17 semi-structured 
interviews with the employer organisations and the trade-union representatives across Italy, 
Denmark, and the UK (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Interview respondents sector level 
 Italy  Denmark UK 
Employers’ side Federchimica: 
1.Director of IR 
1.Rep of IR Committee 
 
Farmindustria: 
1.Director of IR 
 
Dansk Industri: 
1.Deputy Director 
Chemical Industri Association (CIA): 
1.Employment Director  
Unions’ side Filctem – Cgil: 
2.National Secretary 
1.National Officer  
 
Femca- Cisl 
1. Research Director 
1. National Secretary 
 
Uilcem-Uil 
1. National Secretary 
Co-Industri: 
1. International Secretary 
 
HK-Privat 
1. National Secretary 
 
Dansk Metal 
1. General Secretary 
1. International Secretary  
Unite: 
1. Research Officer 
 
GMB: 
1. National Officer 
Tot. 9 5 3 
 
Interviews are a fundamental source of evidence as they allow ‘data collection that has depth 
is nuanced and that reveals the contested assumptions underpinning social processes and 
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social change’ (McLaughlin, 2006:46). Moreover, interviews provide the flexibility to 
explore additional information, to challenge contradiction and to take the line of inquiry in 
different ways as new issues emerge (Yin, 2003). 
 
All the participants, in the Italian and Danish cases have been personally involved in the 
processes of collective agreement renewal and have been seated at the actual negotiation 
table. To ensure consistency of the data gathered the same questions were asked of unions 
and employers’ representatives. In the UK, social partners were asked about social dialogue 
activities instead of collective bargaining, in order to take into account the specific 
institutional configuration featured in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry in this 
country. 
 
The interview questions were selected in such a way that the positions and bargaining 
resources of sector level social actors on issues of flexibility and security could be reflected.  
Actors were probed on two different grounds which can be broadly defined as ‘not-strictly 
institutional’ and ‘institutional’. Accordingly, the first set of questions explored the main 
challenges faced by chemicals and pharmaceuticals in the past decade, namely a) overall 
government regulation – i.e. the health and safety compact and liberalisation of generic 
drugs for pharmaceuticals, b) any relevant industry development, and c) issues linked to 
international competition. The second set of questions was more directly linked to the role of 
collective bargaining actors and institutions in addressing flexibility and security. Following 
the literature that underpins the research focus and questions, this matter has been distilled 
into the following five lines of enquiry:  
 
1) the parties involved, directly and indirectly, in negotiations at sector level and the 
nature of the relationship between these; 
2) any changes in the negotiating competences of the sector; 
3) evolution of bargaining over flexibility and security since the early 2000s in terms 
of both union/employer objectives and substantive content of sectoral agreements; 
4) bargaining at the company level and its relationship to the sector level, including 
the relationship between the union and company level representation, and the 
employers’ organisation and individual companies; 
5) evolution of substantive content of bargaining at the company level (in particular 
over the categories of flexibility and security identified in the literature)  
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Along with semi-structured interviews, all the sector level agreements signed in Italy and 
Denmark from 1998 to 2012 were collected. In the UK sector level bargaining is not in 
place, therefore, no agreements could be included.  In addition, all the documents that the 
sector level social partners used during the interviews to structure and/or corroborate their 
answers were included in the analysis. These are annual reports and power point 
presentations produced by the research offices of unions and employer organisations across 
the three countries and cover a) facts and numbers on sector performance; b) the agenda of 
social partners; c) the effects of measures introduced through collective bargaining for the 
sector, the labour market, and the employees (IT and DK); c) a series of initiatives promoted 
by the social partners to boost productivity and employment; d) data on the labour market 
conditions in each country.  
3.5.2 Company level data collection 
 
The second stage of fieldwork involved four large manufacturing plants of four different 
multinational companies, which, in order to protect their anonymity, have been given the 
following pseudonyms: Impresa 1, Impresa 2, and Firma 1, and Firma 2 two in Italy and two 
in Denmark respectively.  In the UK, negotiating access proved to be particularly difficult 
and, after 18 months of unfruitful efforts, it was suspended. As previously demonstrated 
(section 3.2), this unexpected outcome represented an opportunity to re-think the research 
design and, as a result, to underscore some of the methodological strengths of a multi-level 
comparative analysis.  
 
The case studies are based, first, on 14 semi-structured interviews conducted with key-
participants in local negotiations (Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4: Interview respondents company level 
 Employer’s side  Union’s side  Tot. 
Impresa 1(IT) 1.HR General Director 
1.Employee Relations Manager 
1.HR Plant director & ER Mng & HR Mng  
1. RSU Representatives (Uilcem) 
1. RSU Representative (Femca) 
5 
Impresa 2 (IT) 1.CEO  
1.HR General Director 
1. RSU Representative (Filctem) 
1. RSU Plant Rep (Filctem) 
4 
Firma 1(DK) 1.VP People Relations & Compliance 
 
 
1.Full-time shop steward and employee-elected 
 member of the ‘Board of Directors’ 
2 
Firma 2 (DK) 1.HR & ER director 
 
1.Shop-steward HK-Privat 
1.Shop-steward Dansk Metal 
3 
 
83"
"
In companies where more than one representative per side participates at the negotiating table 
– as often occurs for the unions – more than one respondent was interviewed at the same 
time. In total the study involved 16 participants who were asked exactly the same questions. 
In Italy, interviews were conducted in Italian, the researcher’s mother tongue and then 
translated; while in Denmark both interviewer and interviewees used English as their second 
language. In Denmark, the interviewer was aided by written questions and the support of a 
recorder which helped her focus exclusively on delivering a clear and understandable 
message. Notes and tapes have been subsequently reviewed and transcribed; email 
conversations followed up on any points from the interviews that were unclear. The 
interviewees were all able to respond in English. However, on two occasions where union 
representatives did not feel one hundred per cent confident in their second language 
arrangements were made to avoid any problems that this might cause. The interview with the 
General Secretary of Dansk Metal was witnessed by the International Secretary of Dansk 
Metal who acted as a translator. In one of the companies, two shop stewards belonging to the 
same klub asked to be interviewed simultaneously in order to validate each other’s answers 
and to ensure that these were both clear and reliable. Language issues, therefore, did not 
represent a barrier.  
 
As for the sector level, the interview questions were designed around the themes emerging 
from the literature on flexibility, security and collective bargaining, where the focus of the 
present research is located. Accordingly, in order to gain an overall understanding of what in 
Chapter 2 has been defined  as ‘firm-specific structural variables’ in the first part of the 
interview both managers and shop stewards were asked about: a) issues related to the 
international structure of the business; b) the impact of international competition and their 
perceptions; and c) the history of the organisation in terms of growth, productivity, changes 
of business strategy; and d) any internal developments they considered relevant to the scope 
of the research.  Once the ‘non-strictly institutional’ environment of each manufacturing plant 
had been determined, the second part of the interviews was aimed at grasping the space 
within which social partners act as collective negotiators.  
 
Respondents were probed along the following lines of enquiry: 
 
1) the parties involved, directly and indirectly, in negotiations at the company level and 
the nature of the relationship between them; 
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2) issues of collective bargaining decentralisation in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector; 
3) bargaining at the company level and its relationship to the sector, including the 
relationship between shop stewards and respective union branches, and individual 
companies and employers’ organisations; 
4) evolution of substantive content of bargaining at the company level; 
5) evolution of bargaining over flexibility and security since the early 2000s in terms of 
both unions’ (or management) objectives and substantive content of company 
agreements.  
 
Second, interview data have been gathered along with local level agreements. Organisations 
treated these documents as confidential information and they initially showed a reluctance to 
disclose them for research purposes. Nevertheless, in Italy, both Impresa 1 and Impresa 2, 
provided the researcher with a thematic and chronological collection of company and plant-
level agreements signed between 2000 and 2012. In this document – defined as ‘Single 
Register of Employment Terms and Conditions’ (Libro Unico) – norms regulating flexibility 
and security were already partly systematised facilitating data analysis. In Denmark, a key 
issue was language as local agreements were not accessible in English. Yet, managers and 
employee representatives, both in Firma 1 and Firma 2, agreed to help the researcher with 
the translation of agreements in force – and signed between 2000 and 2014 – whenever the 
categories of flexibility and security were involved. By repeating this exercise twice, with 
both sides of the negotiating table, the researcher could validate their respective answers and, 
as a result, secure the reliability of the material gathered.   
 
Finally, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the organisational structure of the four 
firms investigated, the nature of their product market, and the level of international 
competition faced, annual reports, information briefings, press releases, minutes of meetings, 
and power point presentations have been collected during fieldwork and included as data 
sources.   
3.5.3 Data Analysis 
 
Data have been analysed by applying the principles of qualitative content analysis. The 
choice of this particular method has followed two main considerations. First, this stage of 
85"
"
data collection concerned a large number of narrative texts and formal documents, such as 
collective agreements, which needed to be thoroughly scrutinised. Second, one of the 
strengths of content analysis is that it follows specific analytic rules and step by step models 
that allow qualitative research to control the risk of being unscientific, arbitrary or subjective 
(Schilling, 2006).   
 
Accordingly, five levels of observation have been undertaken: 1) from tapes via transcripts to 
raw data; 2) from raw data to condensed records; 3) from condensed to structured protocols 
(which helped separate the multiple levels of comparison – country, sector, company) to 
preliminary category systems; 4) from preliminary category systems to coded protocols; 5) 
analysis and interpretation (ibid.).  This process was carried out with the support of Nvivo 
computer software, a useful tool for managing, retrieving, and coding the range of data 
collected, from open-ended interviews to direct observation notes. 
3.5.3.1 Interviews Level 1-3  
 
Interviews were transcribed, translated, and each one summarised in a report. These reports 
were sent to the supervisors and comments acknowledged. Both transcripts and comments 
have been imported in Nvivo. 
3.5.3.2 Documents Level 1-3 
 
Collective agreements have been imported into Nvivo. The documents in Italian have not 
been translated, but first order coding has been carried out in English. 
3.5.3.3 Interviews & Documents Level 4  
 
In order to explore the different forms of flexibility and security addressed by collective 
bargaining across Italy, Denmark, and the UK – and potential trade-offs between these – both 
interviews transcripts and agreements have been coded applying the same categories tested 
by Ibsen and Mailand (2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015). Systematising the data 
according to the literature on the ‘missing link’ between flexicurity and collective bargaining 
provided continuity and consistency with existent findings.  
 
The categories applied are: 
 
• Pay 
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• Working-time 
• Job demarcation 
• Training 
• Social benefits and entitlements 
• Provision for atypical workers 
• Measures for employment 
 
The different forms of flexibility and security, based upon Wilthagen and Tros (2004), are: 
 
- External Flexibility                           - Job Security 
- Working time flexibility                   - Employment Security 
- Functional Flexibility                   - Income Security 
- Wage Flexibility                   - Combination Security 
 
Categories have been coded according to their contribution to flexibility and security, as in 
the following examples. Table 3.5 and 3.6 exemplify the analysis carried out at the sector 
level and the company level respectively 
 
Table 3.5 Coding of collective agreement provisions enhancing flexibility and security at the 
sector level  
Categories of Flexibility 
and Security  
Potential Collective Bargaining Provisions at the 
Sector Level 
Potential 
Flexibility 
Potential 
Security 
Pay [IT 2002]: Introduction of guaranteed payments in 
companies where no negotiations take place 
 
[DK] Minimum thresholds for company level 
bargaining 
Wage  
 
 
 
Income 
 
 
Income 
 
Training and Education [IT 2006]: Extra 1,5 days for training 
 
 
 
[DK 2004]: 2 weeks training for dismissed 
employees 
Functional 
 
 
 
Job (core) & 
Employment 
(temporary) 
 
Employment 
Working-Time [IT 1998]: over-time can be accumulated and used as 
personal time off 
 
[DK 2000] Working-time flexibility on a voluntary 
basis - involvement of shop-stewards needed 
Work-Time 
 
 
Work-Time 
Combination 
 
 
Combination 
Job-Demarcation [IT 2009]: 2009: Reform of Job Classification 
 
Functional Income  
Social Benefits [IT 2002]: Integrative Health Insurance 
 
[DK 2004]: Pension contribution white and blue 
collars alike 
 
 Combination 
 
Income – 
Combination  
Provisions for Atypical 
Workers 
[IT 2002]: To supplement the law 198/97 all clauses 
specifying circumstances, restrictions on use and 
quotas for temporary workers are set 
 Job  
Measures for 
Employment 
[IT 2006]: More flexible clauses to deploy atypical 
workers in the south of Italy 
 
[DK 2012] The period for gaining seniority 
entitlements (when re-entering employment) reduced 
from 9 to 6 months 
External  Employment 
 
 
Income - 
Combination 
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Table 3.6 Coding of collective agreement provisions enhancing flexibility and security at the 
sector level  
Categories of Flexibility 
and Security  
Potential Collective Bargaining Provisions at the 
Company Level 
Potential 
Flexibility 
Potential 
Security 
Pay [Impresa1] Company Short-Incentive Scheme  
 
[Firma2] Pay bargaining 
 
Wage  
 
Wage 
 
 
 
 
 
Training and Education [Impresa2] Introduction of new job profiles 
 
[Firma2] Vocational training provisions 
 
 
 
Functional 
 
 
 
Job  
 
Employment 
Working-Time [Impresa1] Extended scope for on-call work  
 
[Firma1] Multi-flexible production 
 
 
Work-Time 
 
Work-Time 
 
Combination 
 
Combination 
 
Job-Demarcation [Impresa 1] Introduction of new job profiles Functional Income  
Social Benefits [Impresa1] Company Welfare Fund (Faschim) 
 
[Firma1] Seniority Entitlements 
 
 Combination 
 
Income 
Provisions for Atypical 
Workers 
[Impresa 2] Use of agency workers for starting a new 
production line (2004) 
External Job (Core) 
Measures for 
Employment 
[Forma2] Job Transfer Centre: internal forms of 
ALPM including training and job placement 
 Job 
 
The contribution of the agreements towards trade-offs between flexibility and security was 
acknowledged when the agreements lead to a ‘balance’ or an ‘unbalance’ (Chapter 2). 
 
Moreover, when exploring the relationship between sector and company level bargaining 
arrangements in Italy and Denmark and the influence that such a relationship exerts on the 
agendas of local actors over issues of flexibility and security, new codes have emerged and 
been applied to the data: 
 
• Autonomy of company level social partners from sector level social partners 
• Autonomy of company level social partners from the headquarters 
• Manager-union relationship 
• Role of sector level collective agreements 
• Coordinating mechanisms between bargaining levels 
• Role of company level collective bargaining 
 
Finally, all annual reports, information briefings, press releases, minutes of meetings and 
power point presentations have been also imported into Nvivo and coded according to the 
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nodes below. Such nodes emerged by contrasting the literature on collective bargaining 
within multinationals with the lines of enquiry that structured the interview questions: 
 
• Business segment 
• Product market 
• Nature of production 
• Workers characteristics 
• Internationalisation 
• Integration 
• Nature of Capital 
• Degree of global competition 
• Competition within Europe 
• Nature of Buyers 
 
Each stage of coding has been followed by memos that helped systematise the findings 
around three broad comparative themes: 1) issues of flexibility and security at the sector 
level in Italy, Denmark, and the UK; 2) the role of collective bargaining actors and 
institutions – both at sector and company level – in shaping the agenda of local level 
negotiations over flexibility and security in Italy and Denmark; 3) the extent to which firm-
specific structural variables participate in the definition of outcomes. Memos enabled the 
researcher to record ideas, insights, interpretations or growing understanding of the research 
material and, at the same time, keep different stages of analysis separate from all the data 
available. Such memos have been pivotal during the ‘writing-up’ process as, first, they 
helped the researcher to capture relevant issues and exclude – but yet record – the irrelevant 
ones. Second, they allowed the researcher to keep in mind the significance of the codes for 
each chapter’s objectives.  
3.5.3.3 Interviews & Documents Level 5  
 
Once analysed, data have been triangulated to create a multiple case-study data-base and 
maintain a chain of evidence in line with the research objectives. The process of 
interpretation was based on the theoretical assumptions underpinning this comparative 
institutional analysis and presented at the beginning of the chapter.  In particular, the 
researcher probed whether different groups of cases appeared to share some types of 
similarities – and/or differences – that deserved to be treated as instances of the same type of 
general case (Yin, 2003). This cross-case synthesis covered interrelated issues and, as a 
result, reduced the risk of limiting the analysis on single features. In order to make sure that 
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all the evidence was attended to, and that the interpretation accounted for all such evidence, 
a series of security checks were undertaken (Yin, 2003): 
 
1. All major rival interpretations were considered. The external contribution of three 
supervisors was important in this respect. 
2. The most significant aspects emerged with the case studies, and linked to the research 
questions, were addressed. No relevant issue was left behind because of possibly 
negative/unexpected findings. 
3. New evidence has been included when available – such as new findings published by 
scholars on the matter and official documents produced by the social actors involved 
in the study. The researcher kept abreast of current thinking and discourses on the 
case-study topic and applied this knowledge in order to produce analysis of the 
highest quality.    
3.5.4 Research Ethics  
 
Given the sensitivity of the information required for this comparative analysis all potential 
respondents were sent a research statement outlining the objective of the interviews and 
typology of data required. The interview process started only after obtaining full consent to 
use both documents and interview data for the purpose of the research. When the consent 
covered only one of these two typologies of data access was considered denied. 
 
All interviews were conducted by the same researcher and in person. Except for the interview 
with the UK CIA representative - which was undertaken at WBS premises - all the other 
interviews were conducted at the respondents' offices. This ensured the same level of 
formality to each of the interviews independently from countries and/or companies. The 
researcher always acted and, possibly, was perceived as, an external observer. The 
interviewees never asked, during the time allocated, for her personal opinion on the matters 
discussed. 
 
Interviews were recorded only after the respondents' permission had been obtained. When 
asked, the researcher explained how interview data would be handled, and participants and 
companies anonymised. The interviews in Italy were conducted in Italian, typed up in Italian, 
and then translated by the interviewer so to minimise the risk of twisting words and changing 
their meaning. No issues of this kind emerged in Denmark where the interviews were 
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conducted in English. However, due to the fact that both interviewees and interviewer spoke 
in their second language, a series of follow up emails served as a way to validate the 
transcripts and avoiding any misinterpretations. If on the one hand conducting interviews in a 
second language was perceived as a weakness by the researcher, on the other, it actually 
turned out to represent an opportunity too. Participants, both in Denmark and the UK, 
welcomed any sort of clarification questions which, in fact, enabled her to gain a deeper 
understanding of the context – both institutional and non-institutional – in which data were 
being collected. The average length of the interviews (1.47 hours) can be interpreted as an 
evidence of this.   
Sector level  
 
During the interviews, the link between social partners and national political interests often 
emerged. In Italy, respondents were more prone than in Denmark and the UK to express their 
political affiliation and ideological views. It is not surprising that, in this country, there are 
three different unions within the same sector, each of them reflecting a traditional sphere of 
the Italian political spectrum. Given the nature of the research, interested in the meanings that 
issues of flexibility and security possess for social actors' identities across different national 
contexts, this was considered a positive outcome. It was not interpreted as a biased 
representation of reality, but as a way to uncover relevant power dynamics characterising the 
relationship between the unions and between the unions and the employers' organisations. 
"
Company level 
 
Given the particular sensitivity of the information required at the company level, access 
proved to be more difficult than at the sector level. In order to provide a clear account of the 
role of collective bargaining at plant level, companies needed to make available the collective 
agreements signed in the past 10 years and involving issues of flexibility and security. In 
addition, interviews both with HR managers and shop stewards were required. As noted 
above, in the UK such access could not be secured.  
 
In Italy access at the company level was secured by Federchimica – the employers’ 
organisations representing chemicals – while in Denmark, access at the company level was 
opened up by both the employers’ organisations – DI – and one of the trade unions – HK-
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Privat. Although it might be argued that such organisations held very positive attitudes 
towards the objectives of the research, companies were not chosen on this basis. The 
feasibility of the study depended on gaining HR managers’ consent; it may, therefore, be 
possible that the companies who agreed to participate in the study were seeking to draw 
attention to their best qualities. However, in order to control for this possibility, the employer 
side was always interviewed separately from the employee side. In addition, the documents 
provided – such as the actual collective agreements – were used to check the validity of the 
interviews.  The level of transparency in this regard, was so high that some of the company 
level collective agreements were downloadable directly from the unions’ websites. 
 
In Denmark, three different companies initially agreed to participate in the study, however, 
one of them was eventually excluded. After the interviews had already started, in one of the 
three companies, the HR department realised that shop stewards would have had problems 
conducting the meeting in their second language. The HR director offered to act as a 
translator, however, the researcher decided to withdraw from the field under the assumption 
that the presence of management at the meetings might have influenced shop stewards’ 
responses.    
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented the philosophical and methodological perspectives applied to this 
study. Specifically, first, the chapter elucidated the rationale for enlarging the scope of 
comparative institutional analysis beyond the national level and moving attention to sector 
and firm level variations within and across different national systems. Secondly, the chapter 
clarified the primary aim of this particular comparative analysis, that is, to shed further light 
on the role of collective bargaining actors and institutions in addressing issues of flexibility 
and security. In line with the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, it was argued that 
an in-depth qualitative methodology underpinned by historical institutionalism is the most 
appropriate theoretical lens. In addition, the chapter indicated the reasons for selecting Italy, 
Denmark, and the UK as institutional contexts for the analysis and justified the construction 
of the research design. The final section explained the criteria according to which data have 
been collected and analysed.  
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The next chapters will show how the described methodology has allowed this research to 
address the questions set out in Chapter 2. The first level of comparison involving sector level 
actors and institutions across Italy, Denmark, and the UK (Q1a/b) will be addressed by 
examining three different propositions (Chapter 7). In the chapters dedicated to the country-
by-country presentation of findings (Chapters 4-5-6) each proposition will be further 
specified to reflect the institutional framework within which collective bargaining occurs 
within the three countries. The second level of comparison will be based on the examination 
of a series of expectations derived from the literature (Chapter 2) and developed in Chapters 
7 and 8. The first set of expectations relate to the ways in which articulation mechanisms – at 
both interconfederal and sectoral level in Italy, and at sectoral level only in Denmark – allow 
categories of flexibility and security to enter into the agenda of company level negotiators. 
The second set of expectations concern the ways in which non-institutional variables – in 
particular the degree of international competition and the cross-border organisational 
structure of the multinationals under focus –influence the capability of company level 
bargaining actors to find viable compromises between different forms of flexibility and 
security towards the definition of balanced or unbalanced trade-offs.  
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Chapter 4: Collective Bargaining in Italy 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the institutional configuration framing collective bargaining in Italy. 
National level institutions are reviewed first, in order to shed light on the regulative 
framework within which the chemical and pharmaceutical sector is embedded. Legal and 
non-legal forms of regulations that are likely to influence the way in which items of 
flexibility and security enter into the collective bargaining agenda are taken into account. For 
similar reasons, the recent phenomenon of collective bargaining decentralisation is also 
considered. 
 
The second section of the chapter is exclusively devoted to the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry. First, collective bargaining actors and institutions are presented. Attention is then 
turned to the outcomes of collective bargaining over issues of flexibility and security. The 
analysis draws on a number of relevant factors that help account for these particular 
outcomes. They are: collective bargaining decentralisation, articulation mechanisms between 
bargaining levels, union density, employer-union relationships, and autonomy of sector level 
actors from the confederal level. 
 
The third and final section of the chapter deals with the findings. These are presented 
according to a country-by-country analytical framework which consists of the adaptation of 
the comparative hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 to the specific features of the Italian case. 
This particular framework helps to uncover three relevant issues: a) the agenda of sector level 
social partners on flexibility and security; b) the way in which flexibility and security is 
regulated by the sectoral-level agreements (1998-2012); and c) issues of procedural flexibility 
which shed light on the scope for flexibility and security in company level bargaining. It is 
concluded that in order to provide a clear account of the role of collective bargaining 
institutions in addressing issues of flexibility and security the top-down perspective needs to 
be complemented by a bottom-up one.  
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4.2 Industrial Relations at the National Level 
 
Industrial relations in Italy are characterised by a low level of institutionalisation (Burroni 
and Pedaci, 2011). Although the Constitution (Article 39) includes a formal mechanism 
allowing the legal extension of collective bargaining coverage, this has never been 
implemented (Cella, 1989). Inspired by the principle of trade union freedom, labour 
organisations have not accepted any State interference with the autonomous activities of 
social groups (Caruso and Zappalà, 2004). As a result, today collective bargaining is 
considered an expression of self-regulation of private individuals’ interests (Ballestrero, 
2012) and is thus regulated by the civil code. 
 
Despite the freedom of action of trade unions recognised by the Italian system, over the last 
thirty years a series of legislative interventions have compelled certain labour organisations – 
under the principle of ‘representativeness’ – to negotiate a particular type of collective 
agreement. These unions, through negotiation, can supplement, derogate from, or substitute 
existing regulations because certain aspects of industrial relations and/or the labour market 
are believed to be more effectively regulated by social actors than by the legislator (Caruso 
and Zappalà, 2004). The ambiguous nature of the term ‘representativeness’ used to select 
unions posed a series of problems both for those who make policy and those who have to 
interpret it.  In 2011 an interconfederal agreement, which was considered a ‘symbol of a new 
era’ in the Italian industrial relations (Colombo and Regalia, 2014:10), solved the dispute by 
establishing new measurement criteria. The deal provides that representativeness will be 
assessed by joint reference to the share of each trade union of total membership and to the 
number of votes received in the elections of a unitary union workplace structure (RSU) by 
each trade union, as a proportion of the votes cast (Pedersini, 2013). 
 
The delegating mechanisms contained in Italian law in favour of collective bargaining have 
not only empowered certain unions, but have also increased the role of the social partners in 
areas that are particularly relevant to the topic of this research. For example, the social 
partners can negotiate the criteria for choosing those workers who will qualify for mobility 
schemes and dismissal in the event of company restructuring involving staff reductions.  In 
addition, they can downgrade jobs and de-skill employees as provided by law no. 223/1991 
on collective dismissals. Finally, the social partners can inject a certain amount of flexibility 
into the legal framework regulating the standard labour contract as a result of a series of 
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reforms undertaken during the past two decades aimed at reducing the extent of labour 
market rigidity (1999, OECD). This is also known as ‘negotiated flexibility’ and involves 
part-time work, apprenticeships, and temporary agency work (Caruso and Zappalà, 2004). It 
can, therefore, be concluded that the relationship between collective bargaining and labour 
law in Italy is a complementary one.  
4.2.1 Legal and Regulative Context 
 
Consistent with a voluntaristic approach to industrial relations in Italy legally binding norms 
are rare and the autonomy of the social partners is high (Pedersini, 2014). This 
notwithstanding, an important piece of legislative regulation can be found in the Workers’ 
Statute (Statuto dei lavoratori, law 300, 1970), introduced in 1970 as a means of encouraging 
industrial democracy and promoting union effectiveness at the workplace level. The Workers 
Statute has not provided extension mechanisms but it has recognised fundamental union 
rights that strengthened and legitimated collective bargaining indirectly (Cella, 1989). 
 
Hence, collective agreements in Italy extend their reach beyond the employers and employees 
belonging to their respective trade organisations to also cover those who have no such 
membership (Colombo and Regalia 2014). Despite the lack of any legal framework, this 
arrangement has been enforced indirectly. First, an employer who belongs to an organisation 
that has signed a collective agreement finds it easier to apply the terms negotiated to the 
entire workforce whether or not they belong to a signatory union. Second,  for reasons of 
social equity ‘courts and legal experts have been induced to bend the logic and rules of civil 
law by means of interpretations’ (Caruso and Zappalà, 2004)  that, in practice, have 
contributed to a sort of a erga omnes effect of collective bargaining in the Italian system. As a 
result of the so called ‘master argument’ (Caruso and Zappalà, 2004) the negotiated salary 
provisions have been extended to any employee asking for them independently from her/his 
employer affiliation. The legal mechanism in support of this has been found in Article 36 of 
the Constitution which entitles workers to wages complying with the principles of 
proportionality (to the quality and the services supplied) and sufficiency (to provide workers 
and their families with free and respectable living standards), as well as in the Civil Code 
provision enabling judges to set salary thresholds on the basis of a fair assessment 
(Ballestrero, 2012). The pay levels agreed through collective bargaining have been 
considered as parameters of fairness and sufficiency and so applicable to all workers 
irrespective of their employers’ affiliation. Third, there are other mechanisms in the Italian 
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legislation which are in line with the rationale of the ‘master argument’ (Ballestrero, 2012). 
These can be found in the Article 36 of the Workers’ Statute that recognises financial 
incentives to contractors offering their services to the public administration only when they 
apply pay and employment conditions set by the relevant sectoral agreement (Caruso and 
Zappalà, 2004). The sense of the provision is that if an employer wants to take advantage of 
public funds, it has to respect the norms negotiated by the social partners.  Also the legislative 
decree 276/2003 includes a similar ‘extension mechanism’, as it specifies that temporary 
agency must ‘respect the obligations set forth by the national collective contract applying to 
labour supply agencies’ (Article 5 clause 2).  
 
Due to this favourable legal context, unions have gained legitimation, as well as the capacity 
to influence policy-making in both economic and social fields (Colombo e Regalia, 2014).  
The extent of this phenomenon is reflected in the coverage rate of sector level agreements 
that, in a country where no extension mechanisms actually exist, is estimated to be around 80 
per cent (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011; Pedersini, 2014). In this light, scholars have argued that 
labour market regulation in Italy has been characterised by a relatively strong role for social 
partners (Colombo and Regini, 2014). 
 
From a more strictly industrial relations perspective, a first attempt to formalise the rules 
governing collective bargaining was made by the Protocol of the 23 of July 1993 that is 
considered in the literature as a sort of ‘constitutional charter of industrial relations’ (Cella 
and Treu, 2009). Such a protocol, signed by the main interconfederal organisations – 
Confindustria for the employers and Cgil, Cisl, and Uil for the employees – and the 
government, has finally introduced a systematic institutional framework for income policy, 
restructured bargaining procedures, and modified forms of workplace union representation. 
Hence, Italy was provided with a two-tier bargaining structure according to which collective 
bargaining can take place at the sectoral-level and at the company level. In particular, the 
1993 tripartite agreement entitled the sector level to set minimum rights and standards for the 
whole workforce, which the company level was (only) allowed to improve. Moreover, it 
established that the relationship between the two bargaining levels had to be governed by the 
principles of (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011): 
 
a) Coordination on the basis that bargaining competences were set out both at 
interconfederal and sectoral level (demarcation); 
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b) Specialisation so that each bargaining level could act within its exclusive sphere of 
action: company level social partners regulating only issues that had not already been 
the object of sector level agreements; 
c) Derogations for the workers meaning that company level agreements could deviate 
from sector level provisions exclusively to the advantage of the employees. 
 
Based on these important principles, it was primarily the sector level that established terms 
and conditions for workers and enabled company level actors, first, to negotiate on residual 
issues and, second, to ameliorate industry-wide agreements. So, the 1993 interconfederal 
agreement indicated the sector both as the prominent bargaining level and the source of 
competences devolution. Therefore, it was at this particular level that the social partners 
established the modes and the scope of company level negotiations which, in turn, allowed no 
opt-out. The 1993 interconfederal agreement formalised a system of controlled and 
coordinated decentralisation where articulation occurred both at the interconfederal and 
sectoral level and was based on the principle of demarcation (Coletto and Pedersini, 2012).  
 
Finally, a further element of coordination was provided by two fundamental provisions: one 
identifying the actors who were allowed to bargain at decentralised levels and the other one 
indicating the procedures for local level – both territorial and company level – negotiations 
(Burroni and Pedaci, 2011; Ballestrero, 2012). Thus, by formalising and confirming the 
mandate given by the three main union confederations (Cgil, Cisl, and Uil) to a single 
representative body elected at workplace level (RSU), the 1993 protocol has de facto 
provided a model of single-channel representation (Cella and Treu, 2009; Colombo and 
Regalia, 2014). 
 
Given this institutional configuration, industry-wide bargaining has become the most 
widespread form of exchange between social partners in Italy. Crucial for the present 
analysis, scholars observed that sector level agreements have covered a variety of provisions 
that regulate the injection of flexibility and security into the labour market (Caruso and 
Zappalà, 2004). For example: 
 
• Staff organisation and classification on the basis of professional skills and seniority. 
Classification in some sectors (telecommunications, railways, metal, and mechanical 
workers) has been broaden to allow further functional flexibility. 
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• Wages. 
• The duration of employment as a result of a delegating mechanism included in the 
legislative decree 66/2003 according to which sector level social partners are entitled 
to derogate from most of the provisions provided by the decree itself. 
• ‘Flexible employment’, again, as a result of delegating mechanisms included in both 
decrees law 368/2001 and 276/2003 according to which non-standard employment 
relationships, such as part-time, fixed-term, intermittent, shared, agency work and 
telework, and apprenticeships, can be regulated by collective agreements. 
• On-going training and the right to study as a means of enhancing competitiveness for 
companies and employability for employees. 
• Rules for setting up and regulating supplementary social security funds. 
 
Finally, scholars have observed, that despite remaining at the primary bargaining level, the 
sector and its institutions have recently undergone significant changes (Burroni, 2014; 
Pedersini, 2014). Foremost amongst these, greater decentralisation has been pursued as an 
attempt to meet companies’ competitive needs and help employers cope with temporary 
economic difficulties (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011). As a consequence, the social partners have 
mobilised experiments of local ‘concertation’ and, at the same time, re-shaped the collective 
bargaining agenda at all levels – sector, territorial, and company (Regalia, 2006; Burroni, 
2014). 
 
The present study suggests that this decentralisation of collective bargaining may have had 
important implications for issues of flexibility and security and, therefore, requires specific 
attention. 
4.2.2 Collective Bargaining Decentralisation 
 
In response to the need for higher productivity, (in Italian firms productivity has historically 
been low) many scholars and policymakers have argued extensively that the company level 
should become a strategic context for collective negotiations (Pedersini, 2009). In line with a 
trend across Europe, the reconfiguration of overall bargaining structures and increasing 
decentralisation appears to be the most viable recipe to achieve this also in Italy. 
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The resulting pressure on the 1993 Protocol led to the ‘Framework Agreement for the Reform 
of the Collective Bargaining System’ (FARCB) which was signed in 2009 by the main union 
confederations – with the exception of Cgil – and a number of employers’ organisations, 
including Confindustria. During the negotiation process, the Berlusconi government played a 
fundamental role, first acting as a mediator between social partners, and then, signing the 
agreement as the public sector employer (Coletto and Pedersini, 2012). The primary change 
introduced by the FARCB is the recognition of opening-clauses allowing company level 
bargaining to amend sector level provisions as a way of coping with a ‘situation of economic 
crisis’ or promoting ‘economic and employment growth’ (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011:4). The 
FARCB provided local actors – both at territorial and company level – with a wide spectrum 
of possibilities for taking advantage of opening-clauses. For example, it did not introduce any 
explicit form of control over the decentralising provision that blurred the boundaries of 
competence demarcation and increased the divisions between the sector and the company 
level.  Thus, by removing the articulating mechanisms set in place by the 1993 Protocol 
which governed the relationship between different bargaining levels, the FARCB has 
(potentially) opened up the system to disorganised decentralisation. 
 
The trend towards further decentralisation was confirmed in 2011 when a series of important 
developments strengthened the role of company level bargaining, but also re-affirmed the 
centrality of the social partners in the field of industrial relations. On the 28 of June 2011 all 
the most representative unions and the employers’ organisations signed an interconfederal 
agreement aimed at rectifying some of the most controversial elements of the 2009 Protocol 
(FARCB) and as a result, ‘healing the rift’ which had occurred between Cgil and the other 
social partners (Sanz, 2012).  With regard to ‘opening’ or ‘hardship’ clauses, the agreement 
confirms that company level bargaining can introduce modifications to the rules set by the 
sector level. Nonetheless, these modifications can be a) only temporary and experimental; b) 
it is the relevant sector level agreement that establishes the limits within which derogations 
are considered valid; and c) if the relevant sector level agreement is silent on such limits, 
company level social partners are entitled to derogate only on issues related to work 
performance, working hours, and work organisation. 
 
The attempt to reintroduce coordinating mechanisms between the sector and the company 
level was soon interrupted by an (unusual) unilateral intervention by the government, which 
in August 2011 produced the highly contested decree law 138 (Treu, 2011; Meardi, 2012). 
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This decree law allowed company level agreements to modify in peius not only sector level 
provisions but also legal regulations and, at the same time, identified the criteria for their 
universal applicability (Pedersini, 2014). No limits or controls have been imposed on the use 
of opening-clauses and derogations which are considered to be designed to achieve a series 
of very broadly identified objectives: 1) increasing employment; 2) improving the quality of 
employment contracts; 3) increasing competitiveness and wages; and 4) managing company 
restructuring and employment reorganisation. As a result,  a variety of topics that affect 
issues of flexibility and security directly – including worker tasks, job classification, 
employment contracts, working-time, recruitment and individual dismissal procedures (Ibsen 
and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto 2015) – have become potential matters of 
company level negotiations.  
 
The response of the social actors to this government interference was a joint declaration 
signed in occasion of the 21st of September Interconfederal Agreement. This declaration 
includes the following statement: ‘the topics of industrial relations and collective bargaining 
are autonomously determined by the bargaining parties. As a consequence Confindustria, 
Cgil, Cisl, and Uil commit themselves to abide with [sic.] the Intersectoral Agreement of 28 
June, by fully implementing its provisions and ensuring that all their respective structures are 
applied at all levels’ (Sanz, 2012). This addendum was interpreted as a move to pass over the 
provisions of the degree law 138/2011 and re-affirm the full autonomy of social partners in 
labour related matters (Pedersini, 2014).   
 
Thus, although envisaged by both observers and policy-makers as a threat to real wages and 
employment conditions, the 2009 FARCB – and related decree law 138 – have not in practice 
represented a disruption to the previous bargaining system (Colombo and Regalia, 2014; 
Pedersini, 2014). The limited use of hardship-clauses, in accordance with the June and 
September 2011 interconfederal agreements, has demonstrated the willingness of the social 
partners to find compromises that are acceptable to all. In addition, it has shown their 
commitment to a bilateral approach to industrial relations, enabling actors to implement – or, 
rather, not to implement – the most controversial elements of the reform directly at sector 
and/or the company level. In doing so, the social partners have demonstrated their reciprocal 
obligation to a ‘traditional’ model of industrial relations, strengthened their mutual trust, and 
avoided the risk of a growing polarisation (Pedersini, 2014). 
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Since 2011 a series of bilateral agreements at the confederal level have been signed (2012-
2013-2014) to formalise the conditions within which company level actors can exercise their 
right to bargain. These agreements continue to set out the criteria for workplace 
representation and refine the rules for assessing the validity of hardship clauses and 
derogations. The social partners have been, therefore, reintroducing those controlling 
mechanisms between the sector and the company level that the new decree law (in 2011) had 
actually removed.  As a result, all  the sector level agreements – except for the metalworking 
industry in 2010 – signed in the aftermath of the 2009 reform have obtained the approval of 
the most representative sectoral unions, including Cgil.  As for the company level, only Fiat 
have been able to use the hardship clause and then only once before leaving the employers’ 
association all together.  
 
With regard to Cgil, the most representative labour organisation in Italy, it must be 
emphasised that it has always been reluctant to accept increasing decentralisation. Given the 
low coverage of company level bargaining in Italy, which is estimated to be around the 20-25 
per cent (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011), Cgil advocates the need for sector level bargaining to 
remain at the core of the bargaining system, thereby securing similar terms and conditions for 
all workers. For this reason, Cgil did not sign the 2009 reform of the 1993 Protocol and again, 
in 2012, refused to approve the interconfederal agreement that linked decentralised pay 
bargaining to measures intended to boost productivity, for example, work organisation 
(Pedersini, 2014). However, Cgil took part in the 31 May 2013 agreement and the Single 
Text on representation signed in 2014. These deals were defined by both sides of the 
negotiating table, and the external observers, as an historical step for overcoming divisions 
between the social partners which interrupted the practice of ‘separate agreement’ (Pedersini, 
2014). In particular the 2013 deal on union representativeness was described as (Pedersini, 
2013): 
 
An important turning point in the regulation of the relationship between the parties.  
(S. Camusso, Cgil) 
…In a difficult moment, this deal is a tangible sign of the cohesion among the parties 
to solve the problem of economic growth, which is an absolute imperative since only 
growth can produce new employment. 
(G. Squinzi, Confindustria) 
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…A prominent event for the country, not only for the signatory parties. It is an 
important and encouraging sign of a constructive willingness and social cohesion, 
and both are decisive elements for overcoming the difficulty and challenges that Italy 
is currently facing. 
  (Italy’s former President G. Napolitano) 
 
To conclude, the latest developments confirm, first, that social partners can rely on a long-
standing trust-based relationship that allows them to face external attacks and leverage the 
available institutional resources to influence labour related matter. Second, these 
developments show that, while it was the confederal level that initiated reform of the 
bargaining structure and redefined competences across levels, the sector has nonetheless 
maintained its exclusive domain of action; for example, it still functions as a means to protect 
real wages and set common economic and normative protections for all the workers alike. In 
addition, important elements of innovation have been introduced, such as the possibility to 
delegate performance and productivity-related competences to company level negotiators. 
Finally, opening-clauses and derogation have been provided, along with fundamental ‘rules’ 
of bargaining coordination, that operate at various levels, in particular, a new representation 
system that links national trade union organisations to local and workplace structures (2014 
agreement).  
 
The main national institutional features characterising the collective bargaining system in 
Italy are summarised below (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: National Institutional Framework  
Italy National Institutional Framework 
Collective Bargaining Arrangements Multi-employers 
Two-tier bargaining system 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Centrally controlled 
Open & Derogation clauses  
Articulation Mechanisms Demarcation: 
1. Law 
2. Interconfederal Agreements   
3. Sector-level Agreements 
High coordination between bargaining levels 
Bargaining Coverage No extension mechanisms provided – Indirect coverage (pay rates) is 80% 
Predominant Bargaining level Sector 
Employers-Union Relationship Cooperative 
Autonomy of Sector-Level Actors 
from the Confederal-Level 
Medium Autonomy  
 
 
4.3 The Welfare System in Italy 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive account of the context in which social actors in Italy 
interact it is fundamental to cover a further dimension – the welfare state – that has been 
shown to shape both social and economic behaviour, and by implication, the industrial 
relations arena as well (Esping-Andersen, 1990). According to Esping-Andersen’s classical 
distinction of welfare state regimes, Italy features amongst the conservative-corporatist 
countries (1990). It follows that the state is the main provider of social policies and that 
market efficiency has never been a prominent target. One of the core characteristics of this 
particular cluster is that rights have been historically attached to occupation class and status. 
As a result, social security has been highly occupationally segregated and its degree of 
institutional fragmentation is very high. There are different programs for private and public 
sector employees and almost no protection for the self-employed, with pronounced civil 
servant privileges. In addition, given the occupational nature of benefits, the redistributive 
effect of welfare has been limited. Family has functioned as a complementary form of 
welfare reducing the opportunities for young people and women to enter the labour market. 
The principle of ‘subsidiaries’ was borrowed by the Catholic tradition to emphasise that the 
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State interferes only when the family's capacity to service its membership is exhausted 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
 
Along with the traits of the conservative-corporative cluster, the Italian case has shown 
additional features that exemplify the so-called ‘southern model’ of welfare (Ferrera, 1996; 
Ferrera, 2005).  The first significant departure of this model from the conservative-
corporative one is the ‘dualistic almost polarised’ nature of the social protections offered 
(Ferrera, 1996:19).  While the core sectors – located within the ‘institutional’ labour market – 
benefit from relatively generous protections, the extent of financial support to those who are 
located in the ‘non-institutional’ market, such as the self-employed, contractors, temporary 
workers, and agency workers, is very weak (Ferrera 1996:19). Italy is one of the few 
countries where there is no national minimum income scheme for individuals and families 
with insufficient resources and for young people in search of first employment (Natali, 2009). 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that while unemployment benefits (for those who have 
entered the labour market) do not deviate from the EU average, only a relatively small 
percentage of workers are actually entitled to them (Ferrera, 1996). In other words ‘a person 
that is neither old nor invalid, who has no job, no contributory entitlements and no source of 
income’ is not covered at all by unemployment benefits (Ferrera, 1996:20). Moreover, ‘the 
particularistic-clientelistic model’ of welfare characterising this country may have functioned 
as a substitute for ‘serious’ unemployment insurance programs, active labour market policies, 
and ‘universalistic minimum  income schemes’ (Ferrera, 1996:29; Scharpf and Schmidt, 
2000:362). The weakness of state institutions, as well as the prominence of parties as main 
actors for the aggregation of social interests, have provided favourable ground for the use of 
welfare resources in exchange for personal or political favours (Ferrera, 1996). Such an 
informality in the distribution of social benefits has operated at extremely high levels of 
sophistication in the field of disability, but also of unemployment insurance and social 
assistance subsidies at the territorial level (Scharpft and Schmidt, 2000; Ferrera, 2005).  
 
Some relevant implications of this particular model of welfare are summarised below: 
 
• Incomes are secured by granting relatively high level of legal protection against 
individual dismissal for public servants, white-collar workers, and private wage 
earners of medium and large enterprises working on full-time contracts.    
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• Young people are forced to rely on their families during transition between education 
and first employment.  
• Women struggle to enter and exit the labour market as a result of insufficient family-
oriented programs.  
• No incentives to exit jobs for up-skilling, vocational training, family care are 
provided. 
• There is de facto ineffectiveness of active labour market policies.  
4.3.1 The 2012 Labour Market Reform 
 
It has been argued that two intertwined characteristics of the Italian welfare state have been 
the absence of a universalistic unemployment benefit and a relatively high level of 
job/income security achieved through the legal protection of core workers. However, given 
the dramatic decline in employment – especially, amongst the youngest (40% in 2014, 
ISTAT) – and the increasing use of non-standard contracts, in 2012 the Italian labour market 
started to undergo an important process of reconfiguration. This has then become part of an 
ambitious project of structural reform that the Renzi’s government (2014 on-going) is 
currently undertaking.  The first intervention in 2012 was on the conditions under which 
workers can exit the labour market, the so-called ‘exit flexibility’ (Colombo and Regalia, 
2014:7).  This was done by reshaping the law on unfair dismissal (Article 18) along with the 
system of shock absorbers in order to avoid gains in flexibility having a negative impact on 
job security. Accordingly, the automatism of the unlawful dismissal (Article 18 of the 
Workers’ Statute) – which required either the immediate reinstatement of the worker in the 
workplace or a substantial monetary allowance – has been superseded by a distinction 
between ‘discriminatory dismissal’, ‘disciplinary dismissal’ and ‘economic dismissal’. Thus, 
the first part of the new discipline gives employers more flexibility to dismiss workers in the 
presence of ‘objectively justifiable economic reasons’ (Colombo and Regalia, 2014).  At the 
same time, the reform has included some rules aimed at rationalising social security benefits, 
in particular unemployment benefits, and entitled atypical workers to become potential 
recipients. However, given the scant financial resources allocated to the second part of the 
reform, the one linked to the extension of social protection, the intervention on individual 
dismissal (external flexibility) has, de facto, increased the level of both income and job 
insecurity (Colombo and Regalia, 2014).  
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The so called ‘jobs act’ set out by the current government, seems to be in accordance with the 
2012 attempts to foster higher labour market flexibility. Nonetheless, the legislative degree 
(legge delega) approved at the end of 2014 includes five measures that seem to tackle the gap 
left open by the previous reform and address the security dimension. Such measures are: 
 
1. Reconfiguration of the shock absorbers towards ‘universalistic’ forms of 
unemployment benefits; 
2. Active Labour Market Policies (institution of a ‘National Agency for the Improvement 
of Occupation’); 
3. Rationalisation and simplification of the procedures linked to the administration of the 
employment relationship; 
4. Rationalisation of the different forms of employment; 
5. Measures to reconcile work with private life (extension of maternity leave and social 
security to atypical workers, tax credit to encourage women with under aged children 
to enter the labour market, and a mandate for social partners to bargain on issues of 
working time and performance related pay to allow workers to reconcile their job with 
parenting and elderly care, especially through the use of telework).    
The way in which these 5 measures presented by the Renzi government will be implemented 
in the future is likely to determine what direction, if any, the current (and long lasting) labour 
market transition in Italy is going to take.   
4.4 The Chemical and the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
In Italy, the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for more than 2,800 companies and 
about 180,000 employees (Tartaglione, 2012; Farmindustria, 2014; Federchimica, 2014). 
Despite dramatic value chain restructuring which caused unexpected plant closures and 
massive collective dismissals between the 80’s and the 90’s, today the industry does not 
present any sign of a structural crisis. The Return on Investment (ROI) is well above the 
average for manufacturing (6% versus 4% in 2011) and leverage is limited (0.6 compared to 
0.9) thanks to a lower debt and a higher capitalisation (Federchimica, 2014). 
 
In particular, with a turnover of about 52 million euros in 2013 (Federchimica, 2014), the 
Italian chemical industry is the third most productive in Europe, whereas the pharmaceutical 
industry is the second, after Germany (Farmindustria, 2014). Medium and large Italian firms 
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represent about 25 per cent of the entire production, but the most significant share of 
production is covered by foreign multinational groups. Their presence in the industry is three 
times higher than in the Italian manufacturing industry as a whole (Federchimica, 2014). 
Chemical and pharmaceutical firms, in Italy, focus their activities on very specific families of 
goods that are characterised by a high technological content. Almost 29 per cent of chemical 
and pharmaceutical employees hold a post-graduate degree – 57 per cent in scientific subjects 
– double the average of the manufacturing sector (Federchimica, 2012). The most prominent 
form of employment is the standard labour contract, which has covered 95 per cent of the 
total workforce over the past ten years; 3.9 per cent of workers are covered by temporary 
contracts – 5 per cent of whom are women – and 1.1 per cent of workers are on 
apprenticeships (Federchimica, 2012). Italy has the second largest number of innovative 
chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises in Europe and the second largest number of 
enterprises that are involved in R&D activities (Federchimica, 2012). In job-training has 
always been strategic to the sector, both to keep up with an industry that is in constant 
transformation and to make sure that employees understand new technologies, legal and 
health and safety procedures, and rules of internationalisation.  According to a survey carried 
out by Federchimica about 80 per cent of chemical firms have strengthened R&D during the 
crisis (Federchimica 2014), while according to Farmindustria, pharmaceuticals rank first in 
Italy for R&D spending more than double that of medium-high tech sectors, and more than 
five times more than the manufacturing average (Federchimica, 2014).  Given the high cost 
of energy and raw materials, this industry has coped with increasingly high levels of global 
competition by innovating production procedures, diversifying product portfolios, and 
reaching foreign markets.  If during the Great Recession chemicals have experienced a 
significant contraction of internal demand – 20 per cent since 2007 – their exports have 
grown by 14 per cent (Federchimica, 2014) allowing the industry to feature as one of the best 
on an index of resilience within manufacturing (Mancini, 2014). With regard to 
internationalisation, pharmaceuticals appear to be ‘a true success story’ considering that from 
2008 to 2013 exports increased by 64 per cent as opposed to the 7 per cent average increase 
in manufacturing (Farmindustria, 2014:2).    
4.4.1 Collective Bargaining Actors and Institutions  
 
The chemical and the pharmaceutical sector is the only industry in which reform of the 1993 
Protocol – and its resulting institutional developments – have led to neither innovations nor 
disruptions in social dialogue activities. This is a clear sign that, despite having to act within 
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the limits set at the intersectoral level, the social partners in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry have benefitted from a significant amount of autonomy from the respective 
confederal organisations.   
 
In 2006, three years ahead of the FARCB, the social partners signed an agreement called 
‘Guidelines for company level negotiations and derogations of national provisions’. On the 
side of the employers the organisations involved are the National Federation of the Chemical 
Industry (Federchimica) and the National Pharmaceutical Industry Federation 
(Farmindustria), which have always shared the same negotiating table and signed the same 
agreements. Given the link between pharmaceuticals and the NHS, and their resulting 
specificities, the sector has traditionally voiced employers’ interests through the involvement 
of both associations. On the side of the unions, the three most representative sectoral 
organisations are: 1) the Italian Chemicals, Energy and Manufacturing Workers’ Federation 
(Filctem-Cgil); 2) the Energy, Chemicals and Allied Industries Federation (Femca-Cisl); and 
3) the Energy and Manufacturing workers’ Union (Uilcem-Uil).  
 
Despite the fact that traditional political affiliations are still important at the confederal level, 
within the chemical and the pharmaceutical sector, employers and trade union organisations 
have historically shown a distinctive level of pragmatism (Colombo and Regalia 2014). The 
social partners believe that it is thanks to such pragmatism that they were able to introduce 
some pioneering solutions, re-shaping not only industrial relations in the sector, but also the 
Italian bargaining system as a whole (Burroni and Pedaci 2011). As set out in the 
introduction to the 2006 sectoral agreement, the social partners’ objectives have been: 
 
To modernise the national collective labour agreement and enhance company level 
bargaining’[in order to make these instruments] ‘more appropriate to the new needs 
of enterprises and workers, and to support organisational changes, to strengthen the 
competitiveness of companies’ [and]‘to increase employment (Burroni and Pedaci, 
2011:5). 
 
Moreover, in contrast to the 2009 confederal agreement, the guidelines negotiated within the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector provided a strict regulation of opening-clauses and 
derogations, as well as a variety of mechanisms that preserve the hierarchy between the 
different bargaining levels. The empirical material used for this thesis shows that none of the 
social partners advocated a transformation of the two-tier bargaining system or promoted a 
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model of disorganised decentralisation. In doing so, they took full advantage of the 
autonomy provided by the institutional framework in which they are embedded. In 
particular, the content of the sector level agreements confirms their distinctive use of the 
‘participative model’ to find a compromise between issues of competitiveness and 
employability. In this regard, some of the most relevant provisions are: 
 
1. Derogations to sector level agreements are valid only in two limited cases: first, if 
companies face temporary economic difficulties and any deviation from the sector 
level agreement can save or consolidate employment; and second, even where 
companies are not in a critical situation, if they are, nevertheless, likely to benefit 
from a temporary derogation in order to attract investments and/or save and/or 
consolidate and/or grow the overall business performance and levels of employment.  
2. Company level derogations are allowed to modify a variety of norms regulating 
working conditions. These can involve any element of fixed and variable pay – except 
for minimum wage rates which remain an exclusive prerogative of sector level 
negotiators – for example, seniority pay increases, severance payments, performance-
related pay, bonuses, shift work allowances, and overtime. Moreover, according to the 
2006 agreement, any deviation to sector level terms and conditions had to be 
approved by the National Bargaining Committee. This provision, however, was 
lightened in 2009 by excluding working-time flexibility from the authorisation 
procedures and, finally, abolished with the 2012 renewal.  
3. Derogations can only be temporary and linked to the specific situation/objective for 
which they have been negotiated. The 2012 agreement reduces the temporal limit 
from 4 to 3 years and confirms the derogative break previously introduced (2006-
2009): three months before a sector level renewal derogations are seen as 
‘inappropriate’. 
 
In other words, the innovative drive characterising industrial relations in the chemical- 
pharmaceutical sector allowed employers to drip-feed the flexibility they needed to face 
increasing market competition. At the same time, it helped unions to increase their 
involvement in the sector’s strategic choices and to save jobs in times of economic 
difficulties. 
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However, in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, as in other sectors, there is a 
discrepancy in collective bargaining coverage between the sector and the company level 
(Colombo and Regalia, 2014; Femca-Cisl, 2014). Although there is no official information on 
the percentage of bargaining coverage, the interviews with the sector level representatives – 
both employers’ and employees’ sides – indicate that such a coverage reaches about 70-75 
percent at sector level, yet at firm level it stands below 35 percent. This gap seems to reflect 
the average of the latest official data for manufacturing: 80 per cent coverage for sector level 
bargaining (Pedersini, 2014); whereas coverage is 45 per cent (Bank of Italy figures) and 25 
per cent (according to trade union sources) at company level (Burroni and Pedaci, 2011; 
Banca d’Italia, 2006). This lack of depth of the collective bargaining system (Clegg, 1976) is 
perceived by the unions in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector as a threat to the 
‘participative’ approach to decentralisation. In particular, they believe that this is likely to 
reduce shop stewards’ bargaining power as well as their actual capability to engage with the 
competences that have been delegated. 
 
Derogation clauses are a very delicate matter. We [Uilcem-Uil] have been harshly 
criticised for it and, partially, this is understandable. The level of union 
representation at the company level is relatively low. If the relationship between 
employers and employees at the company level is not good; if there is no trust, 
companies could seriously take advantage of the situation to worsen employees’ 
conditions. 
Sectoral Secretary Uilcem-Uil, February, 2013 
Companies implement changes within very strict time limits. Shop stewards complain 
that their requests are most of the times ignored, and want us [sector level 
representatives] to intervene - which we often do - to re-open the discussion, so that 
management can re-consider their conditions. 
Sectoral secretary Filctem-Cgil, December, 2012 
 
In addition, the proactiveness of sector level social partners in re-defining bargaining 
competences and widening the extent of decentralisation might have had a double-edged 
effect. On the one hand, it has certainly helped to reinforce the role of collective bargaining in 
the sector and fostered a climate of collaborative industrial relations. On the other hand, by 
competing with the confederal level on a normative ground, the boundaries between 
bargaining competences have become more blurred. As a result, the conflict of interests 
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between the confederal and the sectoral level has increased and ideological distances within 
unions have widened – especially within Cgil. 
 
‘Contrary to the indications of Cgil, in this sector [chemical and pharmaceutical] we 
[Filctem-Cgil] are keen to strengthen the role of company level negotiations. The last 
renewal was a particularly difficult experience in Cgil, there was a clear 
incompatibility between the objectives of the general secretary [of the sector] and the 
objectives of the confederal secretary, especially, with regard to the extent of 
applicability of the derogation clause on young employees’ [unlimited, according to 
the 2012 agreement]. ‘We cannot forget that our provisions [sector level] are 
universally binding and, if tomorrow there is a problem, the judge will need to decide 
which norm applies [confederal or sectoral]. If an issue of normative ambiguity is 
raised [between the confederal and the sectoral normative] it will represent a defeat 
for both levels. 
      Sectoral secretary Filctem-Cgil, December, 2012    
  
Finally, with regard to their relationship, the sector level social partners describe it as a 
mutual interdependency, suggesting that such a relationship developed around two particular 
sector features. The first one is social dialogue on health and safety issues which represents a 
cornerstone of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector all across Europe. In contrast, the 
second feature can only be understood within the economic and political context in which the 
Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector lies. Starting from the late 80s the chemical 
industry – to a larger extent than the pharmaceutical industry– has gone through the 
privatisation of state-owned companies and resources. The rising prices of raw materials and 
the contraction of the domestic market has led to a reconsideration of product portfolios. 
Thus, in order to focus on greater innovative content and added-value, many important 
business functions have been externalised and outsourced. In some cases, manufacturing 
plants have been closed altogether causing massive unemployment in the sector. By engaging 
in collective bargaining, the social partners not only set the conditions necessary to deal with 
the economic transition of the 90s, but also offered companies the economic and normative 
stability to face more recent challenges. Indeed, the Italian tendency to overly regulate both 
economic and labour fields – and its resulting bureaucracy – have required actors to find their 
own ways to sustain companies in a highly competitive global market, where efficiency and 
productivity levels are constantly subject to benchmarking operations. As a result, the social 
partners in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector have developed what it is described as a 
‘special’ relationship within the Italian industrial relations panorama. 
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For the past year we have tried to elaborate and explain why our sector is 
characterised by such a good relationship, able to survive many different and difficult 
historical moments. We would like [to think] that this special relationship has become 
a patrimony for our industry. 
Sectoral secretary Filctem-Cgil,December, 2012. 
 
There is a very good relationship between us [employers and employees’ 
representatives]. It has always been the same for many years and we want it to be the 
same. We are actively working on keeping it alive by creating a school of industrial 
relations through which to train our HR people and shop stewards. We rely on each 
other’s credibility. We need to, because this allows us to do many things 
                                Central Director of Industrial Relations Federchimica, March 2013. 
 
A summary of the distinguishing features of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector is 
provided below. 
 
Table 4.2: Collective Bargaining Arrangements in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sector 
Italy Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sector 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Organised decentralisation 
Open & Derogation clauses  
Articulation Mechanisms Delegation (primarily): 
1. Sector-level Agreements 
2. Potential overlapping between confederal and sector level 
3. High cooperation between sector and company-level actors 
Union density  
1. Sector-level: 70% (no official data exist) 
2. Company-level: 35% (no official data exist) 
Employers-Union Relationship Cooperative – low level of ideological/political conflict – pragmatic 
Autonomy of Sector-Level Actors 
from the Confederal-Level 
Medium Autonomy  
4.5 Country-by-Country Framework of Analysis 
 
In this section, a series of expectations will be tested to explore whether and how collective 
bargaining arrangements regulate issues of flexibility and security within the Italian chemical 
and pharmaceutical industry. This country-by-country analytical framework consists of an 
adaptation of the comparative hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 and sets the context for the 
cross-country comparison of sector level institutional arrangement in Italy, Denmark, and the 
UK (RQ1). 
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The relevant propositions are: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
It follows that for the Italian case, the three relative expectations are: 
 
1. Given the institutional resources provided by the interconfederal agreements in 1993 
and 2011 – competence demarcation and centrally controlled decentralisation – 
flexibility and security have become prominent issues in the agenda of sector level 
social partners. 
2. Given the legal mechanisms according to which labour law is to be supplemented by 
collective agreements, issues of flexibility and security are expected to be items of 
sector level bargaining. Yet, items of security are likely to be more prominent than 
items of flexibility (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011) with very little scope for external 
flexibility in particular.  
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3. As a result of a two-tier bargaining system and the provision of opening clauses and 
derogations, the sector level framework enables and constrains company level 
bargaining on issues of flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
4.5.1 Flexibility and Security in Social Partners Agenda 
 
The interviews with the sector level social partners reveal that issues of flexibility and 
security have indeed been added to the collective bargaining agenda. Significantly, both sides 
of the negotiating table define flexibility as any measure enabling companies to react – as 
quickly as possible – to unexpected economic changes. In particular, the employers’ 
organisations – Federchimica and Farmindustria alike – describe flexibility as a functional 
means to maximise productivity levels and enhance competitiveness. As a matter of fact, the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector has a large share of multinationals that allocate resources 
to individual branches on the basis of the outcomes of benchmarking. According to the 
employer organisations, the branches that are located in Italy need to be as adaptable as 
possible to meet financial expectations: 
 
Given the international context in which pharmaceuticals operate, flexibility equips 
our companies with whatever they need to attract investments and react to changes. 
The level of competitiveness of our companies depends on flexibility and we 
[Farmindustria] try to achieve as much flexibility as possible avoiding any serious 
breach of trust between us and our counterpart. 
                              Head of Industrial Relations Farmindustria, June 2013. 
 
When we talk about flexibility we [Federchimica] think about the good flexibility and 
not just to increase the number of precarious jobs. We want to be able to keep up with 
the increasing level of international competition and act upon it! Chemical companies 
need to react very quickly to changes in the market, if they want to survive. But, we 
want flexibility to be participated. We have in mind the German model of industrial 
relations. We think that transparency and fairness are the basis on which consensus 
can be reached and the breadth of bargaining topics enlarged 
Central Director of Industrial Relations Federchimica, March 2013. 
 
Thus, despite being perceived as vital, the notion of flexibility promoted by the employers’ 
organisations is based on the principle of consensus and is pursued through a ‘participatory 
method’. For the chemical organisation in particular, flexibility is a ‘process more than a 
target’ that, in order to deliver what it promises, requires the contribution of both employers 
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and employees alike. Accordingly, collective bargaining is believed to represent the most 
suitable method for reaching a common understanding between parties. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, flexibility is perceived by union officials as a potential threat to the 
standard labour contract and a source of precarious work. Nevertheless, similar to the 
employers’ organisations, they emphasise that flexibility policies, in particular, working- time 
flexibility, functional flexibility, and temporary work, can indeed be beneficial for 
employees: 
 
In Italy there is not a culture that recognises flexibility as a value. The injection of 
flexibility has increased employees’ perception of insecurity. In some cases this is 
true. In others, flexibility has been just too negatively connoted. The focus is too much 
on precarious jobs. The companies I deal with are not always in the position to secure 
long-term employability as they are subject to peaks in demands; others need to inject 
as much internal flexibility as possible, and this is good flexibility. There is no point 
in taking an ideological stand on something that is unavoidable. Then, we [Italians] 
perhaps close an eye on the black economy! 
Sectoral secretary Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
The approach of my union to flexibility has always been in the direction of reducing 
the use of temporary contracts, for example making them more expensive. However, 
there is also another face of the coin: when you try to put an obstacle in the way of 
short-term contracts, employers find a way around. There are also other forms of 
flexibility - for example working-time - that, as long as they don’t become too 
extreme, they are generally seen as acceptable. 
Sectoral secretary Uilcem-Uil, February 2013 
 
In order to make a responsible use of flexibility we [the social partners] would need 
the support of the government [that should provide universal forms of security as a 
compensating measure]. Having said that, we [Femca-Cisl] have always been open to 
what we see as good flexibility. In this sense we believe we are a particular innovative 
union - as shown by our campaigns in favour of company level negotiations, 
especially, with regard to flexible pays, employee classification, and contractual 
welfare. 
Sectoral secretary Femca-Cisl, February 2013 
 
From the unions’ perspective, to compete in a global market such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals – subject to seasonal peaks, new technology implementation, and threat of 
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relocation – meeting requests for flexibility is likely to increase the employees’ value to the 
organisation, and at the same time, enhance job security. In addition, the interviews confirm 
that because of the lack of adequate welfare provisions to support workers’ income during 
transition times, the notion of flexibility has tended to overlap with job insecurity.   
 
With regard to security, data reveal that this concept is characterised by greater ambiguity 
than flexibility. While employers’ organisations have a wide understanding of security – 
including welfare private funds, combination security and training – union representatives see 
it almost exclusively as an effect of legal restrictions on atypical work. For example, while 
Federchimica argues: 
 
In order to face the crisis, we have put a lot of efforts in developing welfare funds that 
can support employees’ level of income during transition times or, simply, as a form 
of income integration. You can find measures of this kind in the latest agreement that 
we have just signed. We also put a lot of emphasis on work-life balance and training. 
It is not always easy to do so through norms that are binding for the entire sector. But 
we have made sure to provide companies with whatever they need to negotiate over 
these particular issues. 
Central Director of Industrial Relations Federchimica, March 2013 
 
Security is something that should be provided by the state […]. The kind of security 
that we [the social partners] can provide is linked to the fruition of some benefits. 
During the latest renewal we have had a very heated debate on this matter. Measures 
addressing security, such as training, are expensive. Many companies do not have the 
resources. Originally, the intention was to extend these measures to them all. But, at 
the end, it seemed more reasonable to allow each company to choose what they can 
do. 
Sectoral secretary Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
In conclusion, consistent with expectation 1, data show that flexibility and security have 
become prominent issues for sector level social partners. This is the result of their choice to 
engage with the institutional resources made available by the interconfederal level (ie. 
autonomy in their spheres of competence) and to deploy social dialogue and collective 
bargaining as a means to enhance competitiveness and overcome statutory inefficiencies. In 
turn, their constant interaction has allowed common views on flexibility and security to 
emerge and pushed these views onto their respective bargaining agendas. 
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4.5.2 Flexibility and Security in Collective Agreements 
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements signed in Italy between 1998 and 
2012 were considered and contrasted with the interview data.  Table 4.3 indicates which 
sector level agreements address each of the seven flexibility and security categories 
elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bekker et al., 2008), 
and indicates whether the provisions enhance flexibility and security respectively, and if so 
which form.  
 
Table 4.3: Flexibility and Security Provisions 
   Flexibility Security  
Pay 1998: Fixed Bonus  
2002: Introduction of guaranteed 
payments in companies where no 
negotiations take place 
 Income  
Income 
Training 1998: OBN1 to identify training 
strategies; first attempt to regulate 
apprenticeship 
2002: Continuous in-job training; 
Supplementation of 300/70 Law on 
individual right to training  
2006: extra 1,5 days for training 
2012: simplification of 
apprenticeship  
Functional  
Functional – External  
 
Functional 
Functional 
 
Functional 
Functional 
Job 
Job – Employment    
 
Job 
Job  
 
Job – Employment   
Job – Employment  
Job Classifications 1998: new system of Job Class; 
Attempt to supersede men and 
women’s differences in tasks  
2009: Reform of Job Class Chapter 
2012: Stronger link between Job 
Class and Training  
Multi-skilled and multi-functional 
employee as a way to improve 
productivity and employability 
Functional 
Functional 
 
Functional 
Functional 
 
Functional 
Income 
Job 
 
Job – Income  
Job – Income  
 
Employment 
Working-time 1998: extra working-time can be 
accumulated and used as PTO2 
Extended scope for weekend working  
2002: Extended yearly and weekly 
working for specific categories of 
workers;  
Working-Time  
 
Working-Time 
Working-Time 
Combination  
 
Combination 
 
 
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
2002: to supplement the law 198/97 
all clauses specifying circumstances, 
restrictions on use and quotas for 
temporary workers are set 
 Job – Employment  
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
1998: Extension of pension plan to 
temps  
2002: Pension plan extended to 
apprentices, creation of an health 
insurance 
 Income – Combination  
 
Income – Combination  
Measures for 
employment 
2006: More flexible clauses to deploy 
atypical workers in the south of Italy 
External Employment 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1"OBN: Organismo Bilateral Nazionale - It is a bipartite institution (with no negotiation duties) in which at the 
2 PTO: Personal Time Off 
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In particular, Table 4.3 shows that functional flexibility is the most prominent form of 
flexibility found in the collective agreements and is enhanced through negotiations on 
training and job classification. The second most prominent form of flexibility is working-
time flexibility the scope of which, given the nature of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector, has traditionally been very extensive. In 1998 the social partners had already agreed 
on ‘normalising’ weekend working and had experimented with formula such as overtime 
accumulation in exchange for personal time-off. These particular measures were intended to 
balance the need for high levels of work-time flexibility with employees’ private lives, thus, 
improving combination security. Yet, the interviews with the social partners contradict this 
finding by revealing that most employees preferred to monetise the extra hours accumulated 
rather than using these as time-off. Accordingly, measures on working time are more likely to 
enhance wage flexibility than combination security. 
 
The ‘conto ore’ [longer working hours accumulation in exchange for personal time 
off] should have increased productivity and occupational levels. The problem is that 
it did not work as expected. Workers, especially men, have started to ask [for] more 
money instead of holidays and companies have been happy to accept their request. At 
the time in which we closed the deal, Uilcem was accused to encourage over-time, 
while the real intention was to inject some good flexibility [towards combination 
security] 
Sectoral Secretary Uilcem-Uil, February, 2013. 
 
This notwithstanding, by recognising and normalising provisions on working time earlier 
than other industries, the experience of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry reveals a 
relatively high demand for flexibility. Moreover, data show that the scope for external 
flexibility in the agreements is limited due to the constraining effect that the provisions on 
individual dismissal have had on the bargaining agenda. In contrast, provisions for atypical 
workers only came into effect in the collective agreements of 2002, when the social partners 
became legally obliged to regulate their use and quotas for temporary contracts. This finding 
is concurrent with expectation 2. More surprisingly, however, Table 4.3 reveals that external 
flexibility has been pursued by the social partners in an indirect way by making the use of 
apprenticeship programmes available to companies. In a context of labour market rigidity 
(OECD 1999), such programmes represented the only means for employers to hire workers 
on a temporary basis who, in exchange, were offered continuous in-job training.   Finally, the 
analysis shows that none of the categories selected directly enhances wage flexibility. 
119"
"
 
As for security, table 4.3 confirms that all forms of security can be found in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical agreements signed between 1998 and 2012 and job security, in particular, is 
the most prominent. The attention to issues of security in the sector is also corroborated by 
the interviews with the social partners. Both sides of the negotiating table confirm that unions 
have met employers’ requests for greater flexibility because security, especially job security, 
has been offered in exchange. Given the profile of the chemical and pharmaceutical worker – 
multi-skilled and multi-functional, particularly valuable to companies investing in training – 
employers’ organisations foster skill retention by granting generous salary provisions and 
social entitlements, as well as significant job security. Moreover, data show that in Italy, 
categories such as job classification and training, which scholars argue address primarily 
employment security (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011), have had a more substantial impact on job 
security and income security. In this regard, Ibsen and Mailand affirm that training, along 
with the removal of job classifications, enable job transferability in the external labour market 
(2011). However, where the labour market is rigid (OECD, 1999) or ‘medium rigid’ (OECD, 
2004) as a result of legal regulations, and characterised by ‘dualistic’ (Ferrera, 1996) forms of 
unemployment benefits, such provisions benefit almost exclusively the internal labour 
market, contributing to both job security and income security. In fact, external mobility 
through training has only recently become an agenda item for the social partners, in 
particular, as a measure to tackle unemployment (see 2012, 2009, and 2006 agreements). 
Similar considerations apply to the category of provisions for atypical workers, which are 
usually expected to foster employment security in the external labour market (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). In Italy, however, social partners deal with this issue only in response to 
legal constraints, by setting limitations to the use of temporary contracts. As a consequence, 
collective bargaining on atypical work contributes to the enhancement of job security more 
significantly than to the enhancement of employment security. Finally, combination security 
is enabled by negotiations on both working-time and social entitlements. The latter category, 
in addition, addresses income security. 
 
Besides dealing with flexibility and security, Table 4.3 indicates that sector level collective 
bargaining fosters a variety of combinations of flexibility and security. Apparently, not all the 
relevant categories seem to lead to such an outcome. For example, pay and social benefits 
and entitlements are only related to the dimension of security. However, the interviews with 
the social partners partially contradict this data indicating that forms of sector level welfare 
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such as integrative pension plans (Fonchim) and health insurance (Faschim) have indirect 
implications for wage flexibility. Because medical expenses and additional pension 
contributions are covered, employees can de facto rely on higher real wages. Moreover the 
social partners suggest that these measures are often used by employers to compensate 
requests for flexibility, in particular, to ease negotiation processes over working-time and 
procedural flexibility. Thus, in the specific case of social benefits and entitlements, the 
contribution of collective bargaining to flexibility and security trade-offs can be understood 
as a result of the overall package deal, as found by Ibsen and Mailand (2011). Training 
addresses both functional flexibility and job security with employment security entering the 
picture only in 2006, when training became a means to increase functional flexibility and 
tackle unemployment (employment security). As previously illustrated, in 1998 provision on 
training had already opened the sector up to a certain amount of external flexibility, but in 
2012 apprenticeship programmes were explicitly referred to as a measure to address both 
external flexibility and youth unemployment (employment security). The category of job 
classification leads to a variety of combinations in flexibility and security. Primarily, it 
enables greater functional flexibility and income security, as well as functional flexibility and 
employment security (2012). Provisions on working-time address both working-time 
flexibility and combination security. Finally, the category of measures for employment 
contributes to the improvement of both external flexibility and employment security.  
 
In conclusion, consistent with expectation 2, the analysis of sector level agreements shows, 
first, that the different forms of flexibility and security entering onto the agenda of sector 
level bargaining are both constrained and enabled by legal regulation. For example, given the 
limited scope for external flexibility due to the norms on individual dismissal, collective 
agreements have mainly contributed to the enhancement of internal forms of flexibility. For 
the same reason, all the relevant categories used for this analysis are shown to address issues 
of security more prominently than issues of flexibility. Moreover, given the extent of rigidity 
in the Italian labour market (OECD 1999, 2004), categories such as training, job 
classification and provisions for atypical workers appear to improve job security more 
significantly than any other form of security. Second, findings show that, as a result of both 
welfare state inefficiencies and ‘retrenchment policies’ – such as the ‘half-hearted 
universalism’ of the NHS (Ferrera, 1996; Ferrera, 2005:34) and the new pension reform – 
employees representatives have been particularly receptive to integrative forms of welfare 
services and have pushed these issues on to the collective bargaining agenda (Johnston et al., 
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2012; Burroni and Pedaci, 2014). In other words, by acting in these instances the social 
partners have not only increased levels of combination security in the sector, but also 
contributed to an increase in the breadth of bargaining topics leading to a variety of flexibility 
and security trade-offs. 
4.5.3 Procedural Flexibility and Procedural Security 
 
The section draws attention to the articulation mechanisms provided by the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector to enable and constrain company level negotiations on issues of 
flexibility and security.  Table 4.4 shows which rules of procedural flexibility are provided by 
the sector level agreements (1998-2012) to empower company level social partners over each 
of the seven flexibility and security categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature 
(Chapter 3).   The main findings are described below. 
 
Table 4.4: Articulation mechanisms between sector and company level 
  Flexibility Security  
Pay 1998: CL CB on PSS can exchange 
the bonus for working-time reduction 
2006: Temporary Derogations on  
Pays 
2009: Company Fund (to be 
instituted through CL CB) to support 
Solidarity Pacts 
PSS given through Fonchim or 
Faschim (fiscal benefits) 
Simplification of PSS provisions for 
SMEs 
Wage – WorkTime (CL)3 
 
Wage (CL) 
 
 
 
Wage – Functional (CL) 
Wage (CL) 
 
Wage (CL) 
Job (CL) 
 
Job (CL) 
 
 
 
Job –  Combination (CL) 
Combination – (CL) 
 
Income (CL) 
Training  2006: Derogations on Training 
plans; 
Temporary derogations on training 
2009: The SL Guidelines 
coordinating CB decentralisation 
contain ‘Training’ as an item for CL 
CB only. 
Functional (CL) 
 
Functional (CL) 
Functional (CL) 
Employment (CL) 
 
Employment (CL) 
Employment – Job (CL)  
Job Classifications 2012: Multi-skilled and multi-
functional employee as a way to 
improve productivity and 
employability: Opening clauses and 
temporary derogations allowed 
Functional (CL) Employment (CL) 
Working-time 1998: Opening clause to extend (no 
more than 48) and reduce weekly 
working-time (32-24) in areas of 
crisis (specifically south of Italy) to 
improve productivity. 
2002: Open-clauses on flexi-time and 
shift-work 
Solidarity Pact on working-time 
reduction 
Open-clause on working-time 
reduction for re-engineering jobs 
through training 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
Working-Time (CL)  
 
WorkTime–Functional (CL) 
 
 
Job (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Job- Combination (CL) 
 
Job (CL) 
 
Job- Employment (CL) 
 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
3 (CL): Company Level 
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Opening-clause on part-time work 
2009: SL Guide Lines coordinating  
CB decentralisation contain 
‘working-time’ as an item for CL CB 
(up for derogation as well) 
2012: Opening-clauses on:  
 a. 28.5 holiday days  for shift-
workers 
 b. Weekly working-time 
 c. Overtime work (which loses is 
character of being extraordinary) 
Working-time is subject derogation 
(not below minimum agreed and in 
respect of ‘individual fundamental 
rights’) 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
Working-Time  (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
Combination (CL) 
Job – Combination (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Job – Combination (CL) 
 
Job – Combination (CL) 
Job – Combination (CL) 
 
Job – Combination (CL) 
 
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
2012: Opening clauses on 
circumstances, restrictions on use and 
quotas for temporary workers. 
Temporary derogations from SL 
provisions are allowed. 
External (CL) 
 
 
 
External (CL) 
Employment (CL) 
 
 
 
Employment (CL) 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
2009:  CL CB of a new area so called 
‘Company Social Responsibility’ 
including: 
1.Training  
2. Employment measures such as 
reform of seniority entitlements 
3. Welfare benefits and combination 
security initiatives of any kind 
2012: PSS4 given also through 
Fonchim or Faschim (fiscal benefits) 
 
 
 
Functional (CL) 
 
Wage (CL) 
 
 
Wage (CL) 
  
 
 
Employment (CL) 
 
 
 
Income – Combination (CL) 
Combination (CL) 
Measures for 
Employment  
1998 Open-clause to extend and/or 
reduce working-time in areas of 
structural crisis (South of Italy) 
2006 More flexible clauses for 
deploying atypical contracts in areas 
of crisis (South of Italy) 
 Solidarity pacts 
 1. Reducing working hours 
 2. Job re-engineering through 
training and use of part-time work  
2009 Open clauses as a means to 
enhance income security: 
1. Bipartite CL Fund to support 
precarious workers 
2. Derogations on working-time  
3. Working-time reduction through 
Solidarity Pacts 
2012 Further CB decentralisation 
towards a variety of measures: 
1. Provisions for atypical workers 
fully delegated to CL CB 
2. Possibility to postpone SL wage 
increases of 6 months 
CL CB can modify in peius the 
minimum wage for entry-level 
workers if hired with a permanent 
contract  (wage cannot be lower than 
80% ) 
Temporary derogations to SL 
provisions of any kind through CL 
CB (CNC5 approval no longer 
needed) 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
 
External (CL) 
 
 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
Functional (CL) 
 
 
 
 
 
Working-Time (CL) 
Working-Time (CL) 
 
 
 
External (CL) 
 
Wage (CL) 
 
Wage (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility (CL) 
 
Job (CL) 
 
 
Employment (CL) 
 
 
 
Job (CL) 
Job (CL) 
 
 
 
Income (CL) 
 
Job (CL) 
Job (CL) 
 
 
 
 
 
Job (CL) 
 
Employment – Job (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Job – Employment (CL) 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
4"PPT: Profit Share Scheme 
5 CNC: Central (Sector level) National Committee  
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Table 4.4 confirms that the two-tier bargaining system found in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector in Italy does indeed shape the agenda of company level actors on 
issues of flexibility and security. Expectation 3 is satisfied. Effective procedural rules, such as 
opening-clauses and derogations, are in place to govern the relationship between the sector 
and the company level. As a result, all the categories addressing flexibility and security at the 
sector level –pay, working-time, job demarcation, training, provision for atypical workers, 
social benefits and entitlements, and measures for employment – are, potentially, items for 
company level negotiations. 
 
Thus, by delegating specific issues of flexibility and security directly to companies and 
allowing for temporary derogations to sectoral provisions, the sector level social partners 
have enlarged both the breadth and scope of company level negotiations. As a result, trade-
offs between flexibility and security are also expected to occur at company level, where, 
within the constraints set by the sector, social actors can find their own ways towards 
flexibility and security strategies.  
 
Derogation clauses have been recognised and normalised by sector level agreements since 
2006. While social partners in other industries consider this arrangement to be a potential 
threat to the multi-employer bargaining system, in chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
derogations are seen as a functional tool to address unemployment. Table 4.4 shows that 
procedural flexibility, both in the form of opening clauses and derogations, enables all forms 
of flexibility and security to be negotiated at the company level. Such rules, therefore, open 
up company level bargaining to a greater variety – certainly more than at the sector level – of 
flexibility and security trade-offs. ‘Solidarity Pacts’ are one of the most common 
combinations of flexibility and security encouraged at the company level. This proves that 
derogations have been mainly conceived by social actors as a temporary measure to cope 
with the effects of company restructuring and times of crisis. Most of these provisions, 
negotiated at the sector level between 2006 and 2012, are specifically linked to the category 
of measures for employment. Such a result seems to suggest that company level negotiations 
may enhance flexibility more substantially than security, leading to unbalanced flexibility 
and security trade-offs (see Chapter 2).  However, the analysis of sector level data only does 
not allow this conclusion to be drawn. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
The first aim of this chapter was to shed light on the outcomes of collective bargaining over 
flexibility and security within the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical industry. The second 
objective was to prepare the ground for the cross-country comparison of sector level 
collective bargaining in Italy, Denmark, and the UK, through which the first research 
questions (RQ1a/b) will be addressed. 
 
The main points being made are, first, that social partners in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector act within a system of centrally controlled decentralisation. They are embedded in a 
two-tier bargaining system according to which sector level competences are demarcated by 
confederal agreements, while it is at the sector level that modes and scope of company level 
negotiations are set in place. 
 
Second, it has been demonstrated that the sector level social partners have taken advantage of 
the institutional resources made available by the interconfederal agreements. Their autonomy 
and pragmatism has allowed them to deploy collective bargaining as a means of enhancing 
competitiveness and overcoming statutory inefficiencies. They also set in place a mutually 
supportive relationship, characterised by a relatively high level of trust, which is known as 
the ‘chemicals and pharmaceuticals’ special relationship’. Their proactiveness, has 
nonetheless, interfered with the demarcation provided by the interconfederal agreements and 
blurred the boundaries between bargaining competences. As a result, there has been an 
increasing uncertainty over the actual applicability of some of the sectoral provisions at the 
company level.  
 
Third, both as a result of their constant interaction and their ability to engage with collective 
bargaining in a strategic way – such as during the economic transition in the 90s – the social 
partners have developed similar understandings around issues of flexibility and security. 
These, have influenced the sector level agreements. Yet, the effects of legal regulations on 
the labour market mean, first, that, issues of security are more prominent than issues of 
flexibility and second, internal forms of flexibility are more prominent than external forms.   
 
125"
"
Fourth, the analysis of both documentary and interview data has also demonstrated that 
collective bargaining in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry leads to different flexibility 
and security trade-offs. These are the following: 
 
• Training addresses functional flexibility and job security, functional flexibility and 
employment security, external flexibility and employment security; 
• Job classification addresses functional flexibility and income security, functional 
flexibility and job security, functional flexibility and employment security; 
• Working-time  addresses working-time flexibility and combination security; 
• Social benefits and entitlements address internal forms of flexibility (especially 
working-time flexibility) and either combination or income security, and wage 
flexibility and combination security; 
• Measures for employment addresses external flexibility and employment security. 
 
Fifth, it was demonstrated that sector level agreements both enable and constrain company 
level bargaining on issues of flexibility and security. As a result of coordinating mechanisms 
such as competences’ demarcation – for example the 2009 new chapter on ‘company social 
responsibility’ – and competences’ delegation through opening-clauses and derogations, all 
the relevant categories addressing flexibly and security can be included in the bargaining 
agenda. 
 
Finally, given the controlling mechanisms established by the sector to govern the relationship 
between sector and company level bargaining,  trade-offs between flexibility and security are 
also expected to occur at company level. The circumstances in which firms are allowed to 
deploy opening-clauses and derogations –  for example, temporary economic difficulties, 
‘solidarity pacts’, attracting investments and saving costs – seem to suggest that company 
level actors may be more exposed to demands for flexibility than sector level actors.   
 
These conclusions have been drawn from a top-down analysis which allows a focus on the 
role of both national and sectoral bargaining institutions in addressing issues of flexibility and 
security. It shows that such institutions provide company level actors with a series of 
opportunities and resources. Nevertheless, it is not possible to explain to what extent and in 
what ways these opportunities have been taken up. In order to achieve this, it is fundamental 
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to complement the top-down perspective with a bottom-up one and to investigate how actors 
and institutions, in practice, behave at the company level.   
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Chapter 5: Collective Bargaining in Denmark 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the national and sector level institutions which frame collective 
bargaining in Denmark. Legal regulations are reviewed first in order to provide a general 
understanding of the context in which the sector level social partners interact. Special 
attention is then paid to the key elements of the Danish collective bargaining system, such as: 
a) autonomy of the social partners from the government and voluntarism of industrial 
relations; b) coordinating mechanisms across bargaining levels and resulting procedural 
flexibility; and c) the ‘culture of consensus’ and trust-based relationships between social 
actors. The last section presents the implications of the Danish welfare system for both 
collective bargaining and labour markets. 
 
The second part of the chapter covers the characteristics of the industrial sector to which 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals belong. After providing a general overview of the main 
economic and technological features of the industry, exclusive attention is focused on 
industrial relations actors and institutions. It is argued that, as a result of a ‘centralised 
decentralisation’ of collective bargaining (Due et al., 1994), sector level social partners have 
increased their respective shares of influence, thereby determining terms and conditions of 
employment for the entire workforce.  In order to achieve this they have leveraged the 
resources that the national institutional framework has provided them with, especially, their 
autonomy as a source of labour market regulation and their long lasting trust-based 
relationships.   
 
The final section covers the findings. These are presented according to a country-by-country 
analytical framework which consists of an adaptation of the propositions presented in Chapter 
3 to the specific features of the Danish case. The goal is to observe, whether, and if so how, 
sector level social partners address issues of flexibility and security and thus prepare the 
ground for the comparative analysis of sector level collective bargaining institutions across 
Italy, Denmark, and the UK (Chapter 7). The main issues explored are: a) the agenda of 
sector level social partners on flexibility and security; b) the way in which flexibility and 
security is regulated by the sectoral-level agreements (1998-2012); and c) issues of 
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procedural flexibility which shed light on the scope for flexibility and security in company 
level bargaining.  
 
It is concluded that in order to provide a clear account of the role of collective bargaining 
actors and institutions over these particular issues the top-down perspective needs to be 
complemented by a bottom-up one.   
5.2 Industrial Relations at the National level 
 
The fundamental feature of the Danish industrial relations system is its high degree of 
voluntarism, in which the regulation of pay and working conditions is entirely reliant on 
voluntary agreements between social partners (Due et al., 1994).  The State intervenes with 
legislation only if the principle of self-regulation threatens macroeconomic balances or does 
not secure reasonable protections for employees (Lind, 1998). Given the traditionally high 
levels of union membership and bargaining coverage, collective agreements in Denmark have 
no erga omnes effect and are binding only for those who voluntarily enter into them. This 
model, also defined as ‘Danish model’, has gradually developed since the 1899 ‘September 
Compromise’ when the Confederation of Trade Unions (the LO) and the Confederation of 
Employers’ Organisations (DA) signed the first Basic Agreement and laid the institutional 
foundation of the industrial relations in the country (Nielsen et al., 2014). In 1910, the 
September Compromise led in turn to the establishment, by law, of a central labour court that 
was given the responsibility of adjudicating cases related to breaches of collective 
agreements, and also an Official Conciliation Service whose role was to help mediate 
between the social partners during the renegotiation of collective agreements (Gold and 
Weiss, 1999). In addition the two confederations negotiated the ‘Standard Rules for Handling 
Industrial Disputes’ from which the fundamental mechanism of the ‘peace obligation’ has 
taken form. These rules established important procedural requirements for company level 
negotiations which still serve as control mechanisms over decentralisation (Ibsen, 2013). 
First, as argued by Ibsen (2013), the social partners cannot engage in industrial action until 
collective agreements have expired. Second, local agreements can only be renegotiated once 
a year. Third, conflicts at enterprise level need to be referred upwards to local branches and 
organisation headquarters, and only then, to the conflict regulation systems, namely, labour 
court and industrial arbitration tribunals (Ibsen, 2013). By doing so, the social partners set in 
place important elements of multi-level coordination (Due and Madsen, 2008; Ibsen, 2013). 
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Prior to the introduction of state support for the labour law system in 1910, a vital piece of 
regulation had been implemented. This is the Act on state-recognised unemployment 
insurance funds (1907) which, along with the ‘Ghent system’ established rules relating to 
unemployment benefits through funds administered by the trade unions.  In practice, those 
who were members of an unemployment insurance fund became members of a trade union 
too. By securing high levels of union membership, this mechanism both strengthened the 
labour organisations and guaranteed extensive collective bargaining coverage. 
5.2.1 Legal and Regulative Context 
 
In contrast to other EU countries, in Denmark, labour law plays a minor role (Gold and 
Weiss, 1999; Nielsen, 2006; Andersen, et al., 2014), while collective bargaining represents 
the main mechanism of labour market regulation.  A series of legal interventions have 
nonetheless covered particular categories of employees in relation to their profession, such as 
white collar workers and managerial posts, who are covered by the White Collar Act, or 
vocational trainees, who are covered by the Vocational Training Act. Other laws can be 
found in the field of annual holidays, sickness benefit, freedom of association, equal pay, 
equal treatment for men and women, and the transfer of undertakings (Lind, 1998). In 
addition, while statutory protective legislation cannot be modified by means of individual 
employment contracts, derogations to the law are allowed in specific situations, such as 
holiday legislation, collective redundancies, and competition clauses by means of collective 
negotiations (Nielsen, 2006). Although the influence of legal regulation in labour related 
matter is still very limited, for the past years there has been increasing state intervention due 
to the implementation of EU directives (Due and Madsen, 2008). Generally, the social 
partners have been involved in the decision making process. Yet, tripartite cooperation, in 
Denmark, has always had an ad hoc nature (Due et al., 2009).  
 
Thus, apart from the legislation on freedom of association there are no laws governing trade 
unions and employer’s associations. Only the Labour Court and the State Conciliator Board 
on Labour disputes have a legislative basis. Furthermore, there is no regulation of terms of 
employment, meaning that hiring and dismissing employees in Denmark is relatively 
uncomplicated. Such a regulative framework has provided a significant amount of labour 
market flexibility which, according to a survey undertaken by the World Bank, is one of the 
highest in Europe (World Bank, 2004 in Due and Madsen, 2008:224). Unlike other countries, 
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the reason is not to be found in policies of deregulation, but in the fact that regulation occurs 
via collective bargaining and not through law.   
5.2.2 Collective Bargaining as a Source of Labour Market Regulation 
 
In Denmark, collective bargaining has a mandatory normative function and serves as a 
parallel or an alternative to protective employment legislation (Nielsen, 2006). Moreover, 
there is a hierarchical relationship between collective agreements and individual contracts as 
sources of law, with collective agreements ranking more highly, lex superior (Fahlbeck, 
2002). According to Madsen et al., the multi-level nature of the Danish system reflects the 
complexity that characterises its labour market ‘with both individual agreements, collective 
agreements and legislation, with trends both in the direction of centralisation, decentralisation 
and internationalisation and with many different actors with different interests influenced by 
new norms and values’ (Madsen et al., 2001:2). 
 
This multi-level dimension has been evident since the beginning of the 20th century, when 
key institutional developments first shaped the collective bargaining system which has 
remained almost unaltered ever since (Gold and Weiss, 1999; Nielsen, 2006).  Accordingly, 
the existing sources of labour market regulation are as follows:  
 
1. Basic (inter-sectoral) agreements serve as an overarching framework for the 
conclusion and development of collective bargaining and provide the foundations for 
the relations between social partners. They include basic rules such as the right to 
organise, a peace obligation, cooperation at the workplace or the handling of unfair 
dismissals (Jørgensen, 2014); 
2. Industry-wide agreements covering different sectors of economic activity. This is 
currently the key bargaining level as it establishes both general terms and conditions 
of employment for each sector, as well as the procedural rules for company level 
negotiations (Nielsen, 2006); 
3. Company level agreements serving as a means to supplement, complement, and 
amend industry-wide agreements. These are concluded at enterprise level between 
managers and shop stewards. Company level negotiations have always been a 
characteristic feature of the Danish model (Madsen et al., 2001). The minimum pay 
system according to which salary conditions are mainly determined at the enterprise 
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level, has been a dynamic element of the organisational and bargaining system and 
guaranteed a high level of flexibility.  
 
According to Clegg (1976), such a multi-level system of regulation is characterised by an 
extreme depth, meaning that the main social actors and the agreements negotiated are 
coherent ‘right from the central level and right down to the enterprise level’ (Madsen et al., 
2001:12). Coordination, both across actors and bargaining levels, has been provided for since 
the first basic agreement in 1899 which is considered today as a sort of ‘Labour Constitution’ 
(Nielsen, 2006:24). This involves a series of fundamental rules: 
 
• Negotiations must be simultaneously undertaken and completed within a specific 
time frame which, however, can be extended; 
• If the parties reach an agreement, the proposal is sent to the members for a ballot; 
• If no agreement can be reached, further negotiations take place between the 
Conciliator and the social partners; 
• The mediation process led by the Conciliator must be concluded within a certain time 
limit; 
• If the mediation process is not successful, a notice concerning industrial action can be 
issued; 
• Industrial action occurs unless the Conciliator decides to postpone it; 
• If after two consecutive postponements (30 days) no agreement is reached, industrial 
action can take place. 
 
The Basic Agreement set forth by the main confederations (DA-LO) in 1899 produced a 
cohesive institutional arrangement linking companies – both employee representatives and 
managers – with their respective local branches, but also with representatives of the national 
organisations both at the sector and the confederal levels. Due described this institutional 
configuration as a three-tier regulation system with a central multi-industry level, a single-
industry level, and a local enterprise level (Madsen et al., 2001). As a consequence, until the 
mid-1970s, Denmark experienced highly coordinated rounds of collective bargaining. The 
two-year agreements were renewed in a coherent process every second year on the basis of 
negotiations undertaken within the private sector (DA-LO area). Once each bargaining round 
was concluded, the outcomes could be transferred to the public sector. This mechanism 
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established a clear hierarchy in the ‘coordinated agreement model with the competitive 
industries setting the patterns and the government ensuring that all parts of the public sector 
adhered to the central principles’ (Due and Madsen, 2008:231). 
 
This balance was nonetheless undermined by the economic crisis of the 70s when the 
collective bargaining system underwent a gradual process of reconfiguration. The main 
confederations, DA and LO, started to find it increasingly hard to negotiate joint solutions 
and, at the same time, satisfy their opposing interests. The culture of consensus was broken in 
1973 with a major strike in the private sector which caused three interventions from the 
government in 1975, 1977 and 1979. At the beginning of the 80s a reformed bargaining 
system, known in literature as ‘centralised decentralisation’, was set in place (Due et al., 
1994).  
5.2.3 Centralised Decentralisation 
 
A first step towards the reconfiguration of the Danish system was taken at the start of the 
1980s, when there was a shift in bargaining competences from the confederal to the sector 
level. This involved a horizontal process of centralisation at organisational level that 
determined the merger of many employers’ organisations into two big sector associations: 
Dansk Industri (the Confederation of Danish Industry) and CO-Industri (Cartel of Union in 
the Industry). Representing the largest sector – manufacturing – these associations obtained 
from the other members of DA the authority to begin the negotiation process at every 
bargaining renewal. As a result, their terms and conditions ended up functioning as a 
benchmark for the private sector as a whole. At this particular time, the Danish model moved 
from a three to a two-tier bargaining system albeit the central/confederal level retaining an 
important role of coordination. Since then, all industry-wide negotiations have been followed 
by a common ballot covering the LO-DA area which is undertaken by the State Conciliation 
Board on Labour Disputes (Due and Madsen, 2008; Ibsen, 2013).  
 
Meanwhile, a shift also occurred at a vertical level meaning that, within the practice of 
framework agreements, sector level social partners have increased the scope of company 
level bargaining by delegating a series of competences, in particular pay and working-time, 
directly to managers and shop stewards. The bi-directional shift – both horizontal and vertical 
– through which a reconfiguration of the overall bargaining system has taken place, is known 
in the literature as centralised decentralisation (Due et al., 1994). This distinguishing 
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phenomenon has resulted in an increase in depth of the bargaining system due to the 
delegation of a growing number of decisions to the company level. At the same time, the 
scope of the collective bargaining has been extended because more issues have entered into 
the sphere of the framework agreements (Madsen et al., 2001).  
 
In synthesis centralised decentralisation ‘means that the core of the bargaining structure – 
which is found at the central level – is transferred to the local level’ as a result of the 
delegating mechanisms provided, by the sectoral level (Madsen et al., 2001:18). Hence, the 
confederal level has retained an overarching coordinating role, whilst the sector level 
provides ‘demarcation’ of bargaining competences via framework agreements and the 
company level fills in the details. The corollary is that within their respective bargaining 
arenas, the social partners rely on clearly defined responsibilities and act with a significant 
amount of autonomy.   
 
It has been argued that, while increasing the breadth of bargaining topics at the sector level, 
all these developments have also provided an opportunity for local actors to negotiate 
flexibility and security trade-offs at the company level (Due and Madsen, 2008:241; Ibsen 
and Mailand, 2011). On the one hand, employers have recognised the need to ensure the 
presence of a strong local union representation within companies, as this is the only way to 
take advantage of the flexibility provided by the framework agreements. On the other hand, 
unions have contributed to the improvement of a well-functioning system of local bargaining 
as a strategy to retain/attract members. Indeed, despite a decline in union membership labour 
organisations in Denmark have shown a relatively strong resilience (Due et al., 2009). Danish 
companies continue to have a high level of union presence, with approximately 70 per cent of 
employees represented by a shop-steward (Ilsøe et al., 2007; Ilsøe, 2012).  
 
In recent years, there has been a further enlargement of the scope of collective agreements. 
Besides dealing with wages and working-time, at the beginning of the 1990s, sector level 
social partners have also started to negotiate over welfare-related matters. This was the result 
of a tripartite agreement signed in 1987, according to which all labour market actors 
committed to the enforcement of ‘a competitiveness-enhancing wages policy’ (Andersen and 
Mailand, 2005). The trade unions acted as facilitators, but in exchange they obtained the 
introduction of occupational pension schemes onto the bargaining agenda (Due et al., 2009). 
Currently, the agenda of sector level social partners encompasses a wide variety of new 
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provisions dealing with the right to training, pensions, time-off, employees with reduced 
working capacities, sick pay and paid parental leave, children’s sickness and hospitalisation 
(Jørgensen, 2014). This has brought about a sort of double level of regulation for which 
certain welfare related issues are regulated by both legislation and collective agreements. On 
the one hand, the extent of influence of political actors in the sphere of competence of the 
social partners has added pressure for the principle of self-regulation. On the other, however, 
the social partners have been able to maintain their own prerogatives by supporting each 
other’s interests and, at the same time, matching their constituency expectations (Due et al., 
2009). In particular, unions have secured desirable benefits opportunities for their members 
while employers have gained a certain degree of control over the definition and the extension 
of these particular schemes (Due and Madsen, 2008). As a consequence, the items relied 
upon for the conclusion of integrative bargaining – and the protection of the culture of 
consensus – have widened for both sides. According to the scholars, there has been a 
coordinated effort to try to reproduce at the local level the consensus-based bargaining 
system characterising, first the confederal, and then, the sector level (Madsen et al., 2001). In 
this regard, Madsen et al. observe: ‘a form of duplication and reprinting in a smaller scale 
takes place of the existing hierarchical management model with a view to the management of 
smaller units’ (2001:169).  
 
In order to produce such a coherent system of labour market regulation, the relationship 
between social partners has played a pivotal role (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). The principle 
of consensus finds, again, its roots in the September Compromise when it became clear that 
the only way for the social partners to keep the government at arm’s-length and act within a 
self-regulative context, was to arrive at compromises and contribute to the political system 
through shared solutions (Due et al., 2009). Factors such as trust and mutuality in Denmark 
have helped affirm each party’s role and represent the foundations upon which, not only 
industrial relations, but also the labour market, are based. Institutions do influence the 
behaviour of actors, but once they have been set in place actors provide feedback mechanisms 
(Larsen, 2004:141) which, in turn, strengthen institutional regulation. In the case of Denmark, 
this has evolved into a system based on organisational participation and a collectivist culture.  
 
The social partners’ postures need, therefore, to be recognised as a driving force for the entire 
labour market (Larsen, 2004). To summarise with one word, pragmatism has always been a 
key element in understanding the relationship between Danish employers’ and employees’ 
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representatives – across all levels (Fahlbeck, 2002). As argued by Larsen ‘many measures 
obtained institutional acceptance and stability partly because the actors have learned over the 
time to incorporate the other party’s deliberate rationality in their behaviours and 
understanding of experience’ (Larsen, 2004:139).  
 
Although acting within a culture of trust and consensus, there have been circumstances in 
which employers’ and employees’ representatives have competed with each other in order to 
gain political influence, such as during the legislative intervention via the White-Collars 
Workers Act or the Holiday Act. These experiences have, nonetheless, shown the parties that 
it is only when they pool their efforts that they can make a significant impact at the policy-
making level (Madsen, et al., 2001). Over the years, the relationship between social partners 
has developed in such a way as to equip them with the ability to move from an approach of 
distributive bargaining to one of integrative bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Due et 
al., 2009). This particular negotiating approach has been effectively depicted as ‘the Danish 
genius for compromise’ (Galenson, 1952).    
5.3 The Welfare System 
 
According to Esping-Andersen (1990) Denmark can be clustered within the ‘social 
democratic’ regime-type of welfare system. This implies that the standards guaranteed by the 
State with regard to equality on the fruition of social rights are amongst the highest in the EU 
area. The way in which services and benefits are issued is not based on an occupation divide. 
In contrast, the principle of ‘universalism’ allows different types of workers, from manual 
workers to civil servants to enjoy identical rights; all these types are incorporated within the 
same universal insurance scheme, yet benefits are graduated according to tailored earnings. 
As perfectly depicted by Esping-Andersen: ‘this model crowds out the market, and 
consequently constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state. All 
benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay’ (1990:28). The 
emphasis is on the need to emancipate citizens both from the market and the traditional 
family leveraging their individual independence. In that sense, the social democratic system 
includes elements of liberalism and socialism. However, as opposed to liberalism, the State 
takes responsibility for all disadvantaged categories to the best of its capacity: the 
unemployed – by co-financing both unemployment benefits and active labour market policies 
– the aged, and the children. In so doing, it guarantees support to families when their source 
of income fails and enables women to choose work rather than household. Given the costs of 
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this system, whose burden is entirely on tax-payers, there is a strong commitment of the State 
to foster full-employment, meaning that the State ‘must minimise social problems and 
maximise revenue income’ (1990:28). 
 
This particular welfare regime has had important implications for the Danish labour market, 
especially with regard to the dimension of security. In comparison with other EU countries, 
the extent of compensation for low-skilled employees in case of unemployment is (still) 
amongst the highest.  For workers employed on average minimum-wage conditions the extent 
of compensation is around 94 per cent and for skilled workers is around 68 per cent (Jensen, 
2009). More importantly, Jensen suggests that there is a correlation between a low level of 
employment protection and a high level of unemployment benefits that seems to explain the 
lack of interest that trade unions, in this country, have had for issues of job security (2009). It 
is the State that protects their members from potential labour market risks by guaranteeing 
relatively high levels of income security (Andersen and Mailand, 2005).  
 
A further aspect of the Danish welfare regime which contributes to the dimension of security 
is represented by policies of labour market activation. Since the 1990s, the Danish 
government has provided measures helping the long-term unemployed to re-enter the labour 
market. First, new criteria on the fruition of unemployment benefits have been implemented 
as a means to narrow the group of potential recipients and, as a consequence, encourage the 
unemployed to actively look for a job. For example, the maximum period for receiving 
unemployed benefits was reduced from 9 to 4 years in 2005 and from 4 to 2 in 2012, 
although extended to 2.5 years in 2012 (Mailand and Jørgensen, 2013). Second, education 
and training have been targeted at the re-qualification of the unemployed, in order to match 
the skills of those who are out of work with those the market requires. The rationale of the 
State in this matter is that high investment in human capital increases the rate of individual 
employability (Bekker et al., 2008). Consistent with the terminology reviewed in the 
literature (Chapter 2), it is therefore the State that, through active labour market policies, 
enhances employment security. Scholars have suggested that thanks to these policies there has 
been a shift from a ‘welfare-without-work’ to a ‘work-for-welfare’ approach (Benner and 
Vad, 2000:459). This meant lowering taxes, removing old work disincentives, and expanding 
childcare services with the aim of helping the government increase the labour supply towards 
the sustainability of the overall welfare system. 
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5.3.1 The Danish Flexicurity   
 
During a review of the main national institutional features of the Danish labour market 
regime it has been argued that the country is characterised by three fundamental and 
interconnected elements: 
 
a) A limited and market-oriented legislation which allows companies to hire and fire 
workers in a relatively uncomplicated way (external flexibility);  
b) Collective agreements are the main source of regulation, setting wage standards, 
minimum-pay, and working-time (internal flexibility), but also providing a series of 
social benefits, such as pension schemes, parental leave, and sick leave, both as a way 
of enhancing productivity levels and supplementing public welfare provision 
(security). The particular configuration of the collective bargaining system, also 
known as ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Due et al., 1994) has, in addition, provided an 
extensive level of procedural flexibility; 
c) Generous and universalistic welfare schemes, such as unemployment benefits and 
active labour market policies, protect both income and employment security.    
 
The interplay between these three distinguishing elements of the Danish labour market has 
made this country one of the most exemplary cases of ‘flexicurity’ and gained a great deal of 
attention both amongst academics and policy makers (Bekker et al., 2008; Jensen, 2009; 
Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Within this context, the social partners play a fundamental role. 
They partly contribute to each of the different dimensions contained in the so-called ‘golden 
tringle’ – figure 5.1 (Bekker et al., 2008) – thereby securing a flexible labour market, active 
labour market policies, and social security nets. 
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With reference to Denmark, Wilthagen and Tros (2004) suggest: ‘there is a clear trade-off 
between the high level of external-numerical flexibility and a high level of income and 
(increasingly) work security. Since the end of the 19th century, Danish workers have had a 
little protection from dismissal, but with income protection, they have the security of being 
able to find a new job quickly, thanks to training, mediation and reintegration’ (Wilthagen 
and Tros, 2004:177). The focus of their analysis is on the opportunities created by the state – 
through a combination of low level of legal intervention and high levels of welfare provision 
– to set in motion a dialectical relationship between flexibility and security, also known as 
flexicurity.  
 
However, little is known about the way in which social partners, through collective 
bargaining, take part in this process. In this regard, Andersen and Mailand (Andersen and 
Mailand, 2005:24) argue: ‘decentralisation in the bargaining system is a precondition for the 
form of flexicurity which has developed on [sic.] the Danish labour market, so is the 
increasing scope of issues included in the content of the agreements making a substantial 
contribution to the particular balance between flexibility and security on [sic.] the Danish 
labour market’. By paying exclusive attention to the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, 
the second section of this chapter explores whether, and if so, how sector level actors and 
institutions enact this particular role.  
 
What follows is a summary of the main national level institutional features framing the 
collective bargaining system in Denmark. 
Fig. 5.1 Golden Triangle 
Source: Madsen 2008:39 
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Table 5.1: National Institutional Framework  
Denmark National Institutional Framework 
Collective Bargaining Arrangements Multi-employer 
Two-tier bargaining system 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Centrally controlled (Centralised Decentralisation) 
Articulation Mechanisms Demarcation:  
1. Sector-level Agreements 
High coordination between bargaining levels 
Bargaining Coverage No extension mechanisms provided – Bargaining coverage 65 % 
(Larsen at al. 2010 in EuroWork, 2014) 
Predominant Bargaining level Sector 
Employers-Union Relationship Cooperative  
Autonomy of Sector-Level Actors 
from the Confederal-Level 
High Autonomy  
5.4 The Chemical and the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
In Denmark, chemicals and pharmaceuticals belong to the large umbrella of the 
manufacturing industry whose total turnover since 2000 increased from DKK6 475 billion to 
DKK 670 billion in 2011 (Statistical Yearbook, 2012). The investment in research and 
development reached DKK 20.7 billion in 2012 which corresponds to 56 per cent of the 
whole private sector’s expenditure (Statistical Yearbook, 2014). While the overall industry 
has been dramatically hit by the 2008 financial crisis – when production fell by more than 20 
per cent on average – chemicals and pharmaceuticals have shown an extraordinary degree of 
resilience. Thanks to their high levels of export shares, 50 and 92 per cent respectively, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the best performing clusters of companies within Danish 
manufacturing. In 2011 the three largest pharmaceutical enterprises accounted for 86.1 per 
cent of total manufacturing turnover meaning that, within this sector, revenues are 
concentrated in a few large companies, namely, pharmaceuticals (Statistical Yearbook, 2012).  
 
These companies have gained their competitive edge by specialising in chemistry and bio-
technology-based products and processes that require a heavy investment in innovation (Sin 
et al., 2013).  They rely, therefore, on a highly qualified workforce with a broad range of 
technical skills and knowledge including blue collar workers as well as chemical engineers. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
6 1.00 DKK = 0.10 GBP 
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Employers share the costs of investment with the government whose main contribution has 
been to supply more and higher quality graduates with the technical capabilities demanded by 
such knowledge-intensive business environments (Sin et al., 2013). The challenge has been 
successfully addressed; according to the bureau of statistics Denmark saw an average 10 per 
cent increase in the number of Ph.D. graduates in engineering and sciences between 1998 and 
2006, placing this small country third in the world, after only China and Mexico (Statistical 
Yearbook, 2012).   The Danish chemical and pharmaceutical industry includes a wide variety 
of companies that are global leaders in their niche markets. Proof of its success can be found 
in the establishment of an important industrial cluster, called ‘Medicon Valley’, that has 
attracted pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies and medical technology companies, fostering 
further growth and innovation right across the manufacturing industry (Sin et al., 2013).  
5.4.1 Collective Bargaining Actors and Institutions 
 
As previously established, the Danish industrial relations system has shown a significant 
tendency towards collective bargaining decentralisation. This decentralisation has occurred 
within a clear set of rules which govern the relationship between different bargaining levels. 
As a consequence, the sector has become the prominent level at which negotiations take 
place: it both provides procedural rules and identifies the matters for company level 
negotiations (Mailand and Jørgensen, 2013). During this process, the Danish manufacturing 
industry, to which chemicals and pharmaceuticals belong, has played a fundamental role. 
 
In 1989 nearly all employers’ associations in the industrial sector, including chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, merged and created the so-called Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) 
which became the dominant member of DA. This important development caused the unions 
operating in manufacturing to undergo a similar shift, a horizontal shift, altering the 
organisational structure so as to form a bargaining cartel known as CO-Industri. Within 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals the most representative unions belonging to the cartel are: a) 
HK-Privat, representing (highly-skilled) salaried employees; b) Dansk Metal, traditionally, 
representing the ‘skilled’ (metal)workers; and c) The United Federation of Danish workers 
(3F), traditionally,  representing the ‘unskilled’ workers’. 3F is the largest union in Denmark, 
but also the least representative within chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Since 1989, DI and 
CO-Industri have become the largest employers’ and employees’ organisations in Denmark.  
Every two years, these associations initiate sector level collective bargaining the outcomes of 
which function as a benchmark for all the industries in the country, both in the private and 
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public spheres. Operating in an institutional environment where legal intervention is 
minimal, DI and CO-Industri have become key-actors both in the Danish industrial 
relations system and the labour market. 
 
With regard to collective bargaining, the main competence of the social partners in the 
industrial sector is the negotiation of two categories of collective agreements, one for blue 
collar workers and one for white collar workers, covering about 70 per cent of the entire 
workforce (Ilsøe, 2012). Traditionally, blue collar workers had a much more detailed 
regulation of employment terms and conditions than the white collar workers. However, in 
the past ten years the differences between these two categories of employees have 
progressively evaporated. As a result of collective bargaining decentralization, the industrial 
agreements have turned into ‘framework agreements’ establishing a series of general 
entitlements which can be supplemented at the company level.  Foremost amongst these are 
the ‘minimum wage levels’ that represent approximately half of the actual wages paid. The 
rest is independently negotiated by mangers and shop stewards at enterprise level. 
  
What we do [sector level social partners]  is [collective bargaining on] working time, 
pensions, education and training, this minimum salary level, the conditions for 
apprenticeship, compensation for shift work, night work, equal opportunity, 
temporary agency workers and stuff like that. On the local level they [managers and 
shop stewards] can discuss everything, basically, that they want to that is within the 
framework of the sector agreement, and also issues outside the sector agreement.  
CO-Industri International Secretary, November 2013 
 
It was during the 1990s, that the scope for local level bargaining went beyond wage 
negotiations to include working hours, and from 2000 a radical opening clause enabled 
company level actors to deviate from four chapters of the industrial agreements, namely: 
 
1. Cooperation  
3. Working time 
4. Outwork and travel work 
10. Continuing training 
 
From 2004 local level representatives have been able to use this option without any control 
from the sector level, which only needs to be informed of the outcomes of negotiations. Yet, 
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if one of the two signatory parties wants to terminate the local agreement, it is obliged to 
give the other party two months’ notice – unless a longer period of notice has been locally 
agreed. This mechanism has provided shop stewards with a sort of a veto power, which was 
a precondition to their acceptance of such a strong delegation of bargaining competences 
(Jensen, 2011). It has been argued, that along with a high level of union density – 70 per cent 
in manufacturing – both at the sector and the company level, this has contributed to the 
reproduction of the bargaining power and the trust-based bargaining culture found at the 
sector level at the company level (Ilsøe, 2012:761). Moreover, it is exclusively at the sector 
level that social partners control and enable company level collective bargaining.  As a 
result, demarcation between competences is fluid and no overlaps across levels can occur. 
This is likely to provide social actors with more confidence and autonomy when engaging 
with new bargaining issues: 
 
In principle I would say that they [company level actors] can negotiate almost on 
anything they want on the local level unless you come into conflict with law. Then it 
becomes a challenge to do this and of course the local branches would always say, do 
not negotiate on things that are less than the national sector agreement!! And it does 
not happen, but I think in theory is possible on the local level to make derogations 
from the sector. 
 CO-Industri International Secretary, November 2013 
 
We have four overall topics in which you can do whatever you like at the company 
level as long as you have an elected shop steward to do it with. That’s the prerequisite 
for doing that, for instance, we have 37 working hours, that’s the average per week in 
Denmark but you can at the company level decide to go for 50 hours. But the only 
way to do that for management is to find a shop steward to do such an agreement 
with; so that’s how the unions sort of stay in control. 
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
 
The possibility of taking advantage of local level negotiations to inject higher flexibility has 
become relevant to all employers in persuading them to engage in the so-called ‘accession 
agreements’ with the union cartel, even when they are not members of DI. 
 
…Normally we [Co-Industri] try to take the current collective agreement that we have 
in DI and we say: ok this is what we will offer you [not member of DI] if you want to; 
you are outside DI but we still think that you should have the agreements that we have 
made with DI. So this is our [sector level social partners] blue-print for negotiations. 
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But of course you can do a lot of local adjustments in the actual agreement, if you do 
it with the shop stewards, and this is what they actually do in the end. 
CO-Industri International Secretary, November 2013 
 
While the process of decentralisation occurred without disrupting the traditional consensus 
between the two sides of the negotiating table, the centralisation of bargaining competences 
at the sectoral level did not occur without problems. DA and DI, in particular, engaged in a 
temporary struggle for power. In fact, as a result of the internal restructuring, the new sector 
organisation (DI) gained a 65 per cent share of DA, meaning that it became capable of 
dictating the terms for all the other members. Although agreeing with a reduction of the main 
confederation’s (DA) powers and resources, the other employers’ organisations could not 
accept a limitation on their bargaining prerogatives at the sectoral level. Thus, there was 
fierce competition with DI which broke up in 1995, when the transport sector interrupted the 
co-ordinated bargaining practice and negotiated an agreement against the will of the most 
representative association. Peace within DA was restored with the 2000 bargaining round 
(Madsen et al., 2001). Yet the interview with the director of DI shows that there are still 
elements of disagreement: 
 
Things have changed over the past 20 years, because as we have joined the plastic 
industry, the chemical industry the pharmaceutical industry…we have gathered over 
the 65 per cent share of DA which means that we have a sort of shareholder 
issues…How should I put this?? I wouldn’t say free riding…a lot of services 
connected with being members of DA, we finance a lot of these. But at the same time 
that’s a way for us to make sure that we are all aligned politically - and in terms of 
collective bargaining - and making sure that the retail businesses don’t go out and 
give away one month of vacation because this would influence our coordination. So 
we have a sort of a coordination going on in the DA but today DA is only dealing with 
political issues, they are not dealing with collective bargaining yes, they are but only 
as coordinator, they don’t take direct part in negotiations, not anymore, we do!’.  
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
 
While smaller DA members had to ultimately accept a limitation on their bargaining 
autonomy, DI has progressively stretched its sphere of influence within the labour market. As 
for the unions, they appear neutral with regard to their counter part’s conflict of interest. In 
fact, none of the sector level interviewees in CO-Industri ever referred to this specific issue.   
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Thus, by representing the two most influential sector level organisations, the reformed 
institutional framework has provided DI and CO-Industri with a great amount of autonomy. 
Social partners exercise this autonomy, not only by playing an important co-ordinating role 
for all the other sectors, but also by keeping the government at arm’s length.  
 
Trade unions and employers are autonomous and sovereign in regard to collective 
bargaining, we know what is best for our members!   
CO-Industry International Secretary, November 2013 
 
We [social partners] are totally independent and actually we ask them [the 
government] to stay away, because this [collective bargaining] is our prerogative.  
Also, in Denmark is the private sector that functions as an example for the public 
sector! 
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
 
When asked about their relationship, interviewees – both from the employers’ and 
employees’ side – made an explicit link between their independence, a long tradition of 
collaborative and constructive collective bargaining, and the notion of ‘Danish flexicurity’. 
In particular, the CO-Industri official argued that flexicurity has never represented a 
deliberate aim of the social partners. This institutional configuration occurred as a result of 
continuous adjustments made at different institutional levels to enhance the competitiveness 
of companies and improve levels of employment. The social partners, together, participated 
in this process by defending three fundamental and intertwined elements of the system: a) 
flexibility in the forms of hiring/firing/leaving jobs; b) security through unemployment 
benefits; and c) active labour market policies such as education and training, as well as 
measures to match jobseekers and companies’ demands. In his words: any other 
interpretation of flexicurity that does not rely on a combination of these three specific 
elements embodies ‘a perverted view of flexicurity’. 
 
Flexicurity represents another moment of collaboration between CO and DI… It has 
been a continuous process, over many many years, based on, and built in a climate of 
trust by the different actors: us, the employers, and the government so that, now, we 
have a level of trust that we would not cheat on each other, that the different levels of 
the flexicurity are brought together and ensured by all the participants in the labour 
market. 
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
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The involvement of the industrial sector in upholding the current institutional framework is 
apparent in the way in which social partners describe their role and relationship. Both 
employers’ and employees’ sides use the words ‘positive’ and ‘constructive’ to define the 
collective bargaining environment in which they act. Moreover, they affirm that the climate 
of collaboration and reciprocal trust built up over the years has been pivotal in the 
institutionalisation of the flexicurity system itself. ‘Keeping the drama out of the negotiation 
table’, as the DI representative argues, is the most effective way for the social partners to 
maintain the current degree of flexicurity and allow it to cope in a context that is constantly 
changing, for example, as a result of the increasing role of legally binding regulations 
coming from the EU and policies of social welfare retrenchment. In this light, according to 
both social partners, keeping their members’ expectations in line with feasible results and 
working together towards common targets is a strategy aimed at strengthening each other’s 
role and securing their respective share of legitimation in the labour market.  
 
My job as a negotiator is actually to influence my own base in a way that I can 
actually have a mandate, so that I can go to the unions and make an agreement… We 
have very clever and very realistic opponents. I wouldn’t hesitate to be quoted on that 
because that’s the truth. 
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
 
In general we have a very good cooperation with DI. We have - I don’t know if it is 
daily - it is however almost daily that we have colleagues here attending meetings 
with DI. 
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
 
This notwithstanding, five or six months before entering into a sector level collective 
bargaining round the frequency of contact between sector level social partners scales down, 
in order to avoid cooperation in other areas influencing negotiations: 
 
 It’s a bit strange to meet one day and negotiate on different issues, where there can 
be hidden discussions, and the next day you have to sit together for the think-tank and 
cooperate. We say, at the beginning of December: we scale down the meetings in 
general social dialogue issues, and then, when the collective bargaining round is 
finished, we will get back to our normal routine.   
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
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The level of trust and cooperation does indeed affect the items negotiated and is paramount in 
shaping the outcomes of social actors’ interactions. According to the CO-industri 
representative, the difference between Denmark and the other countries is that Danish social 
partners are not trapped in ‘a prisoner dilemma’ when negotiating. They may not be fully 
aware of what their counterpart’s move is, but they are confident that DI will not cheat. For 
example, unions have accepted higher flexibility to cope with the effects of the crisis, because 
they were confident that employers would share the resulting profits through wage-increases 
and/or additional resources for training in the aftermath of the economic recovery.  
 
A summary of the distinguishing features of the industrial sector is provided below: 
 
Table 5.2: Sector Level Institutional Framework  
Denmark Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sector 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Centralised Decentralisation 
Open & Derogation clauses  
Articulation Mechanisms Demarcation: 
1. Sector-level Agreements 
2. High autonomy of local level social partners 
Union density  
1. Sector-level: 70%  
2. Company-level: 70% 
Employers-Union Relationship Cooperative – Pragmatism 
Autonomy of Sector-Level Actors for 
the Confederal-Level 
High autonomy 
5.5 Country-by-Country Framework of Analysis 
 
In this section, a series of expectations will be examined to explore whether and how 
collective bargaining arrangements regulate issues of flexibility and security within the 
Danish industrial sector. This country-by-country analytical framework involves an 
adaptation of the comparative propositions presented in Chapter 3 and sets the context for the 
cross-country comparison of sector level institutional arrangement in Italy, Denmark, and the 
UK (RQ1). 
 
The relevant propositions are: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
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security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining  and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
It follows that for the Danish case, the three relative expectations are: 
 
1. Given the key-role of the industrial sector in supporting the collective bargaining 
system – centralised decentralisation – and taking into account its contribution to ‘the 
Danish flexicurity system’, the social partners have developed similar understandings 
around issues of flexibility and security; 
2. Because income security is protected by the government through unemployment 
benefits, and external flexibility is enabled by the absence of legal regulations, 
internal forms of flexibility and employment security are likely to be the most 
prominent forms of flexibility and security addressed at the sector level. Yet items of 
flexibility are more prominent than items of security, with a very little scope for job 
security in particular.  
3. As a result of the two-tier bargaining system and centralised decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, the sector level framework enables and constrains company 
level bargaining on issues of flexibility and security.   
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5.5.1 Flexibility and Security in Social Partners Agendas 
 
According to both DI and CO-Industri representatives, in the past, not only have flexibility 
and security been the primary focus of sector level agreements but also a key object of 
their constant interactions. The social partners have, therefore, developed a clear idea of what 
flexibility and security mean to them and how functional the role of sector level collective 
bargaining is in enacting their strategies. In this regard, while the minimal legal framework 
provides sector level actors with a wide degree of autonomy in shaping labour policies, it also 
exerts a strong pressure to deliver these polices as effectively as possible. The social 
partners show they are fully aware of, and extremely pragmatic about, the fact that the 
level of bargaining coverage and the survival of the current collective bargaining system 
depend on their ability to meet their members’ expectations. As a result, in recent years, 
they have increasingly worked to strengthen their mutual interdependency and joined forces 
to enhance flexibility and security in particular. 
 
For this reason, sector level actors see flexibility as an issue that is relevant, and of interest, 
to employers and employees alike. While the employers’ organisation focuses on the 
benefits for companies to easily dismiss labour, the union cartel focuses on the benefits for 
employees to move from one job to another, retaining knowledge and skills that former 
employers contributed towards developing. Interviews reveal that both social partners have 
developed a sort of Danish notion of flexibility, seen as a means to encourage labour 
mobility along with continuous training and education. 
 
We have another approach than the British approach, where they [British] don’t 
actually have very strong unions. They don’t have to take unions into consideration. 
What we [Danish] are talking about here is whether we [social partners] can generate 
a common interest and create joint results; that’s our idea. Of course we go into as 
much flexibility as we can, but again, we don’t push it over the limit, where actually 
the workers will say: ‘no thank you’ and then they will go on strike; so that’s how we 
do it, it is about power.   
 
We [Danish] have this interaction between the government, the law, and the private 
negotiations; for example, the unemployment benefits are decided by the government 
[security], but the length of the notice period [flexibility] is purely collective 
bargaining [sector level]; there is a sort of interconnection for which flexibility is 
positive. 
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
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If it is true that employers can easily dismiss labour, it is as well fair to say that 
employees can leave their jobs giving less than 2 week-notice. Flexibility also means 
being free to look for an employer that pays you more than your current one and feel 
free to resign bringing with you knowledge and skills that he has contributed to 
develop. Danish flexibility entitles employees to a great extent of self-development by 
encouraging labour mobility and continuous on-the-job training. Flexibility is a 
constant process of up-skilling and re-skilling. 
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
 
Moreover, when identifying issues of flexibility DI and CO-Industri point to the role of the 
procedural flexibility allowed by the two-tier bargaining system. According to them a 
controlled decentralisation of collective bargaining is a further opportunity to enhance the 
social partners’ effectiveness in addressing both issues of flexibility and security. By enabling 
and controlling company level bargaining they reach their members’ most local demands and 
secure their bargaining power throughout different institutional levels. 
 
The major advantage [of the framework agreement] is that you are actually able to 
decentralise responsibilities; this is the biggest flexibility in the western world! When 
we say decentralised it really is. A major pharmaceutical company would be able to 
adapt the rules to whatever need they have. Let’s say the chemical and the 
pharmaceutical companies are very heavy on investments so they have very expensive 
machineries and costly research. They have to deal with this patent windows…Which 
means that they have to work around the clock in comparison with other companies 
within the industry where you don’t have this pressure. But even though they are 
within the same [sectoral] collective agreement, they are able to do very different 
things. So the small chemical enterprise sees the agreement in the same way than the 
big pharmaceutical multinationals, they just use the rules in a different way but still 
are the same rules.  
 
… You [local level actors] can create the rules, change the rules, and it’s actually ok 
to do it. And this is the only con: that you have to find someone to do it with! 
Deputy Director of DI, November 2013 
 
It’s a bottom up approach that we have done in Denmark. This explains the anxiety 
and resistance against the other [dominant] idea of flexibility, especially [the one 
coming] from the EU. It is us [social partners] that [in Denmark] decide how much 
flexibility we want.  
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
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Turning to security, the social partners’ views on this issue are highly influenced by their 
understanding of the Danish version of flexicurity. For example, both sides of the 
negotiating table relate security to the welfare system.  In particular, CO-Industri considers 
social benefits functional in achieving two particular objectives. The first and immediate 
objective is to avoid unemployment turning into a social problem. The second one is to 
allow employers’ and employees’ organisations to focus exclusively on the improvement of 
labour market mobility, both by creating job opportunities and investing in continuous 
training and education. Similarly, the representative of DI argued that, given the security 
net provided by the unemployment benefits, the social partners are able to enhance security 
by creating job opportunities and making sure that employees are constantly up-skilled and 
re-skilled. In other words, the primary function of collective bargaining is to allow the 
social partners to improve levels of security by keeping the workforce in the sector 
constantly employable. 
 
Thus, consistent with expectation 1, the interview data demonstrate that the national and 
sectoral institutional frameworks within which social actors in the industrial sector operate 
push flexibility and security onto their bargaining agendas. Both sides of the negotiating 
table see flexibility as a positive means to encourage labour mobility along with training 
and education.  Flexibility, in addition, is provided by the procedural mechanisms enabling 
company level actors to find solutions that meet their most local demands. The depth of the 
bargaining system enables shop stewards to use the rules of the framework agreement in a 
flexible way and without fearing arbitrary managerial decisions. As for security, the social 
partners are revealed to be strongly reliant on the national welfare system which allows 
them to focus almost exclusively on the improvement of labour market mobility, as well as 
on keeping the workforce up-to-date in terms of skills and constantly employable. 
Furthermore, interview data shows that collective bargaining is a key institution within the 
flexicurity system. It is a primary responsibility of the social partners to uphold this 
system by injecting flexibility both into the internal and the external labour market 
and by improving the degree of security through continuous in-job training and vocational 
education.  
5.5.2 Flexibility and Security in Collective Agreements  
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements signed in Denmark between 1998 and 
2012 were considered and triangulated with the interview data. As anticipated in the 
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methodology section (Chapter 3), table 5.3 indicates which sector level agreements address 
each of the seven flexibility and security categories elaborated within the flexicurity 
literature (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bekker et al., 2008) and indicates whether the 
provisions enhance flexibility and security respectively, and if so which form.  
 
Table 5.3: Flexibility and Security Provisions 
  Flexibility 
 
Security 
Pay 
 
 Wage-Time  
Training 1998: Increases funding for training 
2004: 2 weeks training for dismissed 
employees 
2007: Competence Development 
Fund (CDF) to support employees’ 
wages during 2 weeks of continuous 
training 
2 weeks of vocational training paid 
85% of salary  
2012: Easier access to 2 weeks of 
vocational training (on top of 
continuous in-job training) 
Option to go part-time in exchange 
for training with wages sustained by 
the CDF 
Unspent weeks of training can be 
used for 6 weeks of continuous 
vocational training (consultants are 
made available to workers and 
companies to help choosing training 
plans) 
Functional  
 
 
Functional 
 
 
 
Functional 
 
Functional 
 
 
Functional 
 
 
Functional 
Employment  
Employment   
 
Income – Employment 
 
 
 
Employment 
 
Employment – Combination  
 
 
Employment  
 
 
Employment – Combination 
Working-time 1998: Working hours between 6am 
and 6pm 
37 Weekly hours in 12 months 
(independently from shifts) 
Tele-work 
2000: working time is weekly fixed 
Working-time flexibility on a 
voluntary basis with the involvement 
of shop stewards 
Working-Time 
 
 
 
Working-Time 
Working-Time 
 
 
Working-Time 
Combination 
 
Combination 
 
Combination 
Combination 
 
 
Combination 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
1998 Introduction of sick payments 
Day off for first day of child’s 
sickness  
-Maternity leave increase 
- Pension contribution increased 
2000: Increased pension contribution 
also for blue collars 
Increase maternity leave (on top of 
gov payments) 
Full wage during sick leaves (from 4 
to 5 weeks on top of gov allowance) 
Child’s first day of sickness fully 
paid 
2004: Pension contribution white and 
blue collars alike 
Payment during parental leave 
Paid sick leave extended from 5 to 9 
weeks 
one week paid leave for parents with 
children hospitalised  
2 weeks of training for dismissed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income – Combination  
Combination  
 
Combination – Income  
Combination – Income 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Employment 
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workers with more than 3 years 
seniority 
2007:3 weeks paternity leave 
Pension contribution for women in 
maternity leave 
2010: Pay compensation for night 
work convertible into day-offs 
1 week extension for both paternity 
and maternity leaves 
Severance payments in event of 
dismissal 
2012: Senior workers can agree 
individually shorter working-time 
Senior workers can decide if 
receiving their pension contribution 
as monthly payment or as part of the 
pension scheme  
Improvement of automatic 
compensation in case of dismissal 
 
 
 
 
 
Working-Time 
 
 
 
 
 
Working-Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combination 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination – Income  
 
Combination 
 
Income 
 
Combination 
 
Combination 
 
 
 
Income 
Measures for 
employment 
2010: Employee skills and 
competences need to match LM 
requests – in-job/vocational training  
Pension contribution paid after 2 
months of employment 
2012: Sick leave entitlements after 6 
months employment  
The period for gaining seniority 
entitlements when re-entering 
employment is reduced from 9 to 6 
months 
Functional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment 
 
 
Income – Combination  
 
Income – Combination 
 
Combination – Income  
 
Table 5.3 shows that the collective agreements signed between 1998 and 2012, in the 
industrial sector, address all the different forms of flexibility except for external flexibility. 
There is no prominent form of flexibility emerging from the analysis. All of them are 
prominent: wage flexibility is the result of delegating mechanisms on pay between the 
sector and the company levels, functional flexibility is enhanced by training provisions, 
working-time flexibility by working-time provisions. Only external flexibility, apparently, 
has not been the target of collective agreements.  
 
However, interview data partially contradicts this finding by showing that, since the 2009-
2010 economic downturn, the social partners have addressed external flexibility indirectly. 
In fact, rather than claiming more job protection to contain the effects of the crisis, they 
introduced new forms of social benefits and measures for employment (see Table 5.3) 
such as severance payments and additional training for dismissed employees. They also 
negotiated measures reducing the timeframe for workers to gain seniority entitlements – 
pension contributions, sick leaves, and personal time-off – which had never been the 
object of collective agreements before (see Table 5.3). Interestingly, the interviews 
revealed that the social partners do not consider these measures as pure forms of security, 
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but rather as a way of protecting the right of employers to easily dismiss workers (external 
flexibility) while contrasting the growth of precarious/vulnerable jobs.  
 
You could say that some things have been done to try to actually attack the 
flexicurity model and then there have been some attempts [from sectoral social 
partners] to repair things… when unemployment benefit decreased [4 to 2 years] in 
2010, we [through collective agreements] introduced the so called ‘automatic 
compensation’: if workers are dismissed, depending on their unemployment fund, 
they can receive 1-2-3 months of additional salary on top of what they would 
normally get… then there is another thing that we have done, at least in our view, 
to repair the flexicurity model that is: we provide also the possibility of vocational 
education and training… 
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
 
In other words, interviews confirm that the social partners not only have a key role within the 
Danish flexicurity agenda (see 5.4.1), but also the capacity to adjust their respective interests 
in light of unanticipated changes in economic conditions.    
 
The most prominent form of security fostered by sector level collective bargaining within 
manufacturing is combination security, as an effect of negotiations on working-time, social 
benefits and entitlements and, to some extent, measures for employment. Income security is 
mainly provided by negotiations on social benefits and entitlements and more broadly by the 
fact that sector level collective agreements set minimum wages for white and blue collar 
workers. Employment security is enhanced mostly by the category of training, and it is 
not the most prominent form of security. As previously argued, however, the level of 
employment security has been recently increased to cope with the consequences of the 
crisis. Social partners have actually recognised new social benefits and entitlements – 
additional training for dismissed employees – and measures for employment – in-job and 
vocational training funds.  
 
We [social partners] created the Danish metalworkers unemployment fund that started 
out as a project which tries to match each individual unemployed to a company, and 
they are actually quite successful in doing this. 
International Secretary CO-Industri November, 2013. 
 
Job security is not an object of sector level collective bargaining at all, as income security is 
guaranteed by public unemployment benefit. Thus, the absence of legal provisions protecting 
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job security, combined with the intentionally low intervention of the social partners on this 
matter have made the Danish external labour market particularly flexible. Interview data 
suggest that employers and employees refrain from regulating job security because 
they do not consider it as beneficial for their members. In this regard, the International 
Secretary of CO-Industri argues that higher job security is likely to damage not only 
business activities, as labour costs would immediately rise, but especially, employees’ 
interests. They would no longer benefit from the vast investment that both enterprises and 
governments’ have made in their development and, as a result, would lose the possibility of 
moving from one company to another, or from one job to another, as they find convenient. In 
addition, he suggests that, as for other European countries, measures increasing job security 
are likely to increase precarious and atypical work, issues that the Danish system seems to 
address more effectively. 
 
Finally, table 5 . 3 suggests that collective bargaining in the industrial sector fosters a 
variety of flexibility and security trade-offs that are consistent with the notion of flexicurity. 
Specifically, the category of training addresses both functional flexibility and employment 
security. In addition, it also enables combinations of functional flexibility and income 
security as well as functional flexibility and combination security.   Working-time addresses 
both working-time flexibility and combination security. While the category of social 
benefits and entitlements fosters working-time flexibility and combination security. In 
addition, interview data suggest that provisions within the category of social benefits 
and entitlements are often traded by employers in exchange for higher flexibility from 
unions, having to consider flexibility and security trade-offs as an indirect outcome of the 
overall package deal (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). Finally, the category of measures for 
employment also enhances functional flexibility and employment security. 
 
Thus, consistent with expectation 2 issues of flexibility are important items of negotiation 
between sector level social partners. The analysis of collective agreements shows that 
internal forms of flexibility are more prominent than external forms of flexibility. Yet 
interview data suggest that the social partners uphold the level of external flexibility – 
enabled by a light statutory regulation on individual dismissal and generous unemployment 
benefits – indirectly. They do so by injecting higher employment and income security into 
the labour market, thereby allowing employers to make flexible use of the workforce and 
employees to rely on more substantial resources during transition times. Their ability to 
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balance demands of flexibility with demands of security is in line with the notion of 
flexicurity that characterises the Danish labour market in which the social partners are 
shown to play a pivotal role.  In contrast to expectation 2 employment security is not the 
most prominent form of security addressed by sector level agreements. As expected, 
however, job security has not entered into sector level collective bargaining at all. Such a 
finding suggests that, given the relatively high level of protection offered by the state 
through unemployment benefits and active labour market policies, the social partners did 
not give priority to these particular issues in their agendas. Combination security is, in fact, 
the most prominent form of security addressed by sector level social partners. During the 
2009-2010 crisis, however, they showed a capacity to adjust their respective demands to the 
changing economic conditions and to respond to external attacks on the flexicurity system. 
5.5.3 Procedural Flexibility and Procedural Security 
 
This section draws attention to the articulation mechanisms provided by the industrial sector 
to enable and constrain company level negotiations on issues of flexibility and security. As 
previously argued (5.2.3), in the Danish collective bargaining system coordination between 
sector and company level social partners occurs through competency demarcation. Such 
demarcation is set out by sector level agreements which identify both the modes and the 
scope of company level negotiations. Sectoral agreements therefore allow social partners at 
both sector and company levels to act within different, yet coordinated spheres of influence 
(Chapter 2).   
 
Table 5.4 shows which rules of procedural flexibility are set forth by the sector level 
agreements (1998-2012) to empower company level social partners over each of the seven 
flexibility and security categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Chapter 3).   
The main findings are described below. 
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Table 5.4: Articulation mechanisms between sector and company level 
Pay  Wage (CL)7 
 
 
Training 2007: Deviation clause on training Functional (CL) Employment (CL) 
  
Working-time 2000: working time weekly fixed. CL 
bargaining can organise working time 
monthly or on an annual basis 
Experimental scheme on working-
time (SL organisation approval) 
2004: Experimental Scheme (removal 
of the sectoral organisations 
approval) 
2007: Deviation clause on working-
time 
WorkingTime (CL) 
 
 
 
 
WorkingTime (CL) 
 
 
WorkingTime (CL) 
 
Combination (CL) 
 
 
 
 
Combination (CL) 
 
 
Combination (CL) 
 
The two-tier bargaining system featured by the industrial sector is characterised by a high 
degree of procedural flexibility whose implications involve three of the categories addressing 
flexibility and security identified by this study. Such categories are pay, working-time, and 
training which, as a result, can all enter into company level bargaining. In line with 
expectation 3, the institutional framework featured by the industrial sector enables and 
constrains company level bargaining on issues of flexibility and security.  
 
As previously mentioned, negotiations on actual pay have been almost entirely delegated to 
company level bargaining. Only minimum pay levels are negotiated at the sector level, the 
rest is a prerogative of the company level social partners, who, as a result, are likely to foster 
wage flexibility. According to the interviews with social partners, managers and shop 
stewards have a better sense of the goals that wage bargaining can actually set – and possibly 
achieve – given the resources available. Moreover, for both employer’ and employees’ sides, 
in times of economic buoyancy, wage bargaining can secure better results for employees at 
the company level than at the sector level.  The interviewees put forward, as evidence, that in 
the last two decades the Danish manufacturing industry has reached one of the highest pay 
levels in Europe. Thus, pay can be easily adapted to company level actors’ most local 
demands. 
 
With regard to working-time, this category has always been an object of local level 
agreements as an effect of the procedural flexibility enabled by the sector framework. 
However, since 2000, sector level bargaining has further enhanced decentralisation through 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
7"CL: Company Level"
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the so called ‘experimental scheme’. Such a provision allows local bargaining to deviate from 
any measures established at the sector level in regard to working-time. Along with procedural 
flexibility, sector level social partners agreed on a series of rules governing the relationship 
between the sector and the company level. First of all, derogations at the company level are 
allowed only if negotiated with shop stewards and approved by unions’ local branches – the 
approval has been removed in 2004. Second, shop stewards are entitled to a type of ‘veto 
power’, according to which any local agreement can be withdrawn as long as management is 
provided with two-month notice. Exactly the same deviation clause was applied in 2007 to 
training. Thus, as a result of negotiations on both training and working-time social partners at 
the company level are likely to engage with issues of flexibility and security. 
 
In addition, the interview with the CO-Industri representative reveals that the level of 
procedural flexibility is as sufficient to offer unions the opportunity to extend the sector level 
framework agreement even to companies that are not members of the employers’ 
organisation (DI). CO-Industri uses this opportunity by negotiating the so called ‘accession 
agreement’ directly with these companies. As a result, these companies’ employees who are 
union members automatically gain the same entitlements as those who work for companies 
belonging to DI. First and foremost is the possibility to bargain with management on wages, 
working-time and training.  
 
Therefore, the analysis of Danish sector level collective agreements shows that, as a result of 
coordinating mechanisms governing the relationship between sector and company level, 
issues of flexibility and security can enter onto the agenda of company level negotiators. In 
addition, it confirms that such coordination occurs through demarcation, meaning that 
company level actors are entitled to bargain within clearly defined spheres of competences, 
namely, pay, working-time, and training. Although coordinated by sectoral agreements 
through procedural rules, company level actors have gained exclusive prerogatives within 
these particulars matters. This high degree of procedural flexibility has, in turn, enabled 
actors at enterprise level to autonomously engage with issues of flexibility and security. Table 
5.4 suggests that as a result of collective bargaining over the categories of training and 
working-time, trade-offs between flexibility and security are likely to occur also at the 
company level and involve functional flexibility and employment security and working-time 
flexibility and combination security respectively. However, the analysis of sector level data 
alone does not allow the research to establish either the extent to which local actors actually 
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engage with the competences that have been delegated or the nature of trade-offs. In order to 
achieve this, sector level findings need to be triangulated with company level data (see 
Chapter 8).    
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The first objective of this chapter was to shed light on the role of sector level collective 
bargaining actors and institutions over issues of flexibility and security within the Danish 
industrial sector. The second objective was to prepare the ground for the cross-country 
comparison of sector level collective bargaining in Italy, Denmark, and the UK, through 
which the first research questions (RQ1) will be addressed.   
 
This analysis has produced a series of relevant points. The first is that, in Denmark, the social 
partners are embedded in a highly coordinated institutional framework where: a) confederal 
organisations ensure the overall stability of the collective bargaining system; b) sector level 
actors negotiate framework agreements that function as the main source of labour market 
regulation; and c) company level actors offer flexibility to the system by supplementing, 
amending, and/or derogating sector level agreements according to their respective local 
demands. This particular collective bargaining system is the result of a series of institutional 
developments started towards the end of the 1980s and known in literature as ‘centralised 
decentralisation’ (Due et al., 1994). During this process, the culture of consensus as well as 
the specific characteristics of the Danish welfare system have played a fundamental role. It 
has been argued that the way in which laws, collective bargaining, and social welfare have 
over the years interacted has created the conditions for a distinctive version of ‘flexicurity’ to 
emerge.  
 
Thus, the second relevant point is that social partners, in the industrial sector, act within a 
two-tier bargaining system according to which demarcation of competences takes place 
exclusively at the sectoral level. Due to a high degree of coordination across bargaining 
levels and a high union density – about 70 per cent both at the sector and the company level 
(Ilsøe, 2012) – the social partners have gained a large degree of autonomy within their 
respective spheres of influence. It follows that no overlaps between bargaining competences 
occur. The predominant level at which negotiations take place is the sector level, while 
employers and shop stewards fill in the details of the framework agreements. Both across 
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bargaining levels and within collective organisations the relationship between social partners 
is based on cooperation and trust.   
 
Third, given the active role that collective bargaining has played for the development of the 
‘Danish flexicurity’, social partners in the industrial sector share similar understandings 
around issues of flexibility and security. These understandings are in line with the 
overarching institutional framework in which they interact. For example, flexibility – both 
internal and external forms of flexibility – is perceived neither by employers’ nor by 
employees’ representatives as a source of precarious work, but as a functional means to meet 
their member’s most local expectations. Indeed, as a result of the protections provided by the 
state, in particular, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies, the social 
partners are in a position to inject relatively high levels of flexibility. Also when the 
government fails in securing such protections, the social partners attempt to repair the system, 
offering via collective bargaining, new forms of security. In doing so, they demonstrate that 
they are capable of maintaining labour market flexibility, without it becoming a social 
problem.  On the other hand, both sides of the negotiating table believe that the State is the 
main, and the most important, provider of security. Without it playing this role, the way in 
which flexibility and security are regulated and balanced by the social partners is likely to be 
undermined.  
 
Fourth, the empirical analysis of the collective agreements signed between 1998 and 2012 
shows that there is not a prominent form of flexibility addressed through collective 
bargaining. Internal forms of flexibility can all be found in the agreements under focus, while 
external flexibility is not a direct outcome of sector level negotiations. However, interview 
data suggest that, during the 2009-2010 crisis, the social partners have addressed external 
flexibility indirectly. They have protected the employers’ right to easily dismiss labour by 
offering employees in exchange higher income and employment security. By doing so they 
have shown a capacity to adjust to unanticipated economic changes and to actively participate 
in the Danish flexicurity system.  In contrast to expectation 2, combination security – and not 
employment security – is the most prominent form of security addressed through collective 
bargaining. Yet, as expected, job security does not feature in any of the agreements analysed.  
This confirms that given the relatively high level of protection secured through 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policies, the social partners can prioritise 
issues of flexibility over issues of security in the bargaining agenda.        
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Fifth, the analysis of both documentary and interview data suggests that collective bargaining 
in the industrial sector leads to different combinations of flexibility and security. By 
negotiating over some of the seven relevant categories the social partners are able to secure 
positive outcomes for both sides. These are: 
 
• Training that fosters functional flexibility and employment security; functional 
flexibility and income security; and functional flexibility and combination security. 
• Working-time that fosters working-time flexibility and combination security. 
• Social benefits and entitlements that foster working-time flexibility and combination 
security. 
• Measures for employment that foster functional flexibility and employment security. 
 
Sixth, the framework agreements negotiated within the industrial sector enable and constrain 
company level bargaining over issues of flexibility and security. The degree of procedural 
flexibility enabled by the sector level social partners through articulation mechanisms 
involves three of the relevant flexibility and security categories. These categories are pay, 
working-time, and training which, as a result, can all enter onto the agenda of the company 
level negotiators. In addition the interview with the representative of CO-Industri reveals that 
the procedural flexibility of the system is sufficient to allow companies to enter into the 
sector level agreement even if they are not members of DI. These special agreements, called 
accession agreements, offer managers and shop stewards the opportunity to bargain over a 
wide variety of items thereby matching their specific demands for flexibility and security 
with the available resources. 
 
In conclusion, by following a top-down perspective, this chapter has provided an account of 
the role of national and sectoral level institutions, primarily, collective bargaining in fostering 
flexibility and security. It emerged that these institutions do indeed equip company level 
actors with a series of possibilities and resources. Such a perspective, nevertheless, misses the 
opportunity to explain how far and in which ways these possibilities have been taken up by 
company level negotiators. In order to achieve this, it is fundamental to complement the top-
down perspective with a bottom-up one and to investigate the outcomes of collective 
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bargaining over issues of flexibility and security at the company level as well as at the 
national and sectoral levels.   
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Chapter 6: Collective Bargaining in the UK 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter explores the characteristics of the national institutional context in 
which UK collective bargaining takes place. It is argued that the tradition of voluntarism has 
played a fundamental role in shaping power relations amongst employers and employees in 
this country. On the one hand, it enabled trade unions to become the main channel of 
workers’ representation as well as the main legitimate source of employment rights and 
protections. On the other, it represented an obstacle to the formalisation of the multi-
employer bargaining system, either through statutory regulation or cross-industry 
coordinating rules of procedure. As a result, the industrial relations framework in the UK 
turned out to be more vulnerable to changes in the economic, political, and social 
environment than other West European countries. Sector level institutions in the private 
sector collapsed altogether resulting in a sharp decline in union density and collective 
bargaining coverage.  Enterprise and workplace are the most prominent levels at which 
negotiations take place and they set the terms and conditions of employment of a relatively 
limited number of workers. Alongside the decline of collective bargaining coverage, 
however, the role of legal intervention has progressively grown.  
 
The second part of this chapter covers the characteristics of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector. After providing a general overview of the main economic and technological features 
of the industry, exclusive attention is focused on the informal framework within which the 
main employers’ association (CIA) and the national trade unions (Unite and GMB) interact. 
In line with a general trend in the UK, chemicals and pharmaceuticals are no longer covered 
by sector level bargaining institutions. However, given the characteristics of this particular 
industry – intensive both in skills and capital – employers’ organisations and trade unions 
have found cooperation beneficial on a variety of issues. As a result, social dialogue in this 
sector is relatively well developed and the relationship between actors is shown to be 
constructive.  
 
The final section deals with the findings. These are presented according to a country-by-
country analytical framework which consists of the adaptation of the propositions presented 
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in Chapter 3 to the specific features of the UK case. The goal is to observe whether, and if so, 
how the sector level social partners address issues of flexibility and security and, thus, 
prepare the ground for the comparative analysis of sector level collective bargaining 
institutions across Italy, Denmark, and the UK (Chapter 7). The main issues explored are: a) 
the agenda of the sector level social partners on flexibility and security; and b) the extent to 
which the sector level social partners are likely to influence the agenda of company level 
negotiators over issues of flexibility and security.  
 
It is concluded that social dialogue does not play a role equivalent to collective bargaining in 
addressing flexibility and security or enabling company level negotiations on similar issues.  
In a context where no sector level constraints are present, all types of flexibility and security 
can potentially enter onto the agenda of local level negotiators. However, in order to explore 
whether these issues have entered into company level negotiations and, if they have, what 
form they take, it is necessary to complement the top-down approach with a bottom-up 
approach.   
6.2 Industrial Relations at the National Level  
 
Industrial relations in Great Britain reflect a tradition of laissez-faire that is commonly known 
as ‘voluntarism’ (Hyman, 2003). British governments have accepted the delegation of 
industrial relations issues directly to employers and trade unions and, until relatively recently, 
labour law has never been considered a desirable alternative by any of the three parties 
involved (Dickens, 2010). As argued by Hyman (2003:39), the missing link between 
industrial relations and law has meant that the notion of collective contract does not exist in 
the UK: ‘collective agreements have always been binding in honour only, of legal relevance 
only to the extent that their terms might be explicitly or implicitly incorporated into the 
individual employment contracts of those covered’. In other words, in the UK, collective 
agreements are not legally enforceable contracts. Their implementation depends entirely on 
the industrial or economic sanctions to which employers and unions are exposed (Davis et al., 
2004).  
 
During the 19th century union membership and bargaining power grew quickly in a 
particularly buoyant economic context. Early industrialisation and the existence of colonies 
as markets for UK products fostered a golden age for pluralism (Brown, 2010). At the same 
time, sectoral level collective bargaining became a means of industrial peace and efficiency 
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(Kelly, 2013). But the framework within which employers’ organisations and national trade 
unions confronted each other was never formalised. In contrast to other European countries, 
in the UK, collective agreements had no legal force, thus, it was possible for lower bargaining 
levels – enterprises as well as workplaces – to supplement and/or derogate the conditions set 
forth by the sector level negotiators. As argued by Brown (2010:258), this practice had 
become common by the 1960s when the tight labour market of the preceding decade had 
favoured better pay deals at the company than at the sector level. Piecework incentive 
schemes, merit rates, and overtime payments were used by management to attract and retain 
scarce labour. As a result, national agreements became largely ineffective and employers 
begun to pull out of multi-employer arrangements to bargain on their own (Brown, 2010). 
 
In the 1970s, the ‘oil shock’ caused a deep recession and sudden rise of industrial conflict, 
culminating in 1978-79 with the ‘winter of discontent’ (Hyman, 2003). The Conservative 
Government of Margaret Thatcher decided to face the challenge by carrying out a political 
programme based on neo-liberal and anti-union policies. Between 1979 and 1997 a variety of 
government measures, intended to reframe British industrial relations, coincided with a 
dramatic decline in union density and recognition. The closed shop was outlawed, the scope 
for industrial action was reduced, and the internal activities of unions became the subject of 
statutory regulation. In addition, public support for collective bargaining diminished and the 
tripartite institutions established over previous decades were removed (Hyman, 2003). 
Meanwhile, union density declined from its maximum peak of 56 percent in 1979 to 38 
percent in 1990 and 29 percent in 2000 (Marginson, 2015). While in 1980 unions were 
present in 64 percent of workplaces with 25 or more employees, in 1998, the same figure 
stood at only 41 percent (Marginson, 2015).   
 
Many scholars have attempted to evaluate the impact of the Conservative reforms on union 
membership and collective bargaining decentralisation (Edwards, 2003; Colling and Terry, 
2010). Their findings are not clear-cut. As suggested by Hyman (2003:54) ‘what is debatable 
is how much of this is attributable to the new political and legislative regime, how much to 
high employment, how much to changes in the occupational and sectoral structure, and how 
much to management responses to a tougher competitive environment which was developing 
world-wide.’ In the main, they concluded that bargaining decentralisation and disorganisation 
predated the Conservative regimes of Margaret Thatcher and John Major whose legislative 
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measures had the effect of accelerating, rather than triggering, the weakening of the British 
industrial relations regime (Brown 2010; Dickens, 2010; Kelly, 2013).   
 
The Labour party elected in 1997 chose not to intervene in the industrial relations’ economic 
environment and to restate its commitment to labour market ‘flexibility’ (Dickens and Hall, 
2010). Nevertheless, the new government marked an important shift in policy, first, by 
ending the UK opt-out from the European social protocol agreed in Maastricht; second, by 
introducing a national minimum wage; and third, by implementing the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act on compulsory trade union recognition. With regard to the latter however, the 
procedures set in place by the government turned to be less generous than had been hoped for 
by the unions (Hyman, 2003). Recognition requires majority support in an employee ballot, 
but in addition 40 percent of all employees covered need to vote in favour.  It has been 
argued that although introducing some important changes, the Labour government mostly 
acted within a framework of underlying continuity (Hyman 2003; Simms and Charlwood, 
2010). 
 
It is important to emphasise that since 1979 industrial relation institutions have been 
constantly adapting to a changing political and economic context. For example, while sector 
level collective bargaining has almost disappeared, the role of labour law has progressively 
grown (Dickens, 2010).  Although increasingly encroached on by the law, voluntarism, 
however, has never been formally or actually dismantled. The relationship between 
employers and employees is still based on the old tradition of state non-interference; union 
recognition is voluntary and collective agreements have retained their non-legally binding 
nature.  
6.2.1 Collective Bargaining Institutions and Actors  
 
For most of the 20th century the employment relationship in UK has been regulated by means 
of collective bargaining. Trade unions and employers’ organisations entered into reciprocal 
commitments to serve the interests of their respective constituencies without the state 
interfering. The primary characteristics of British voluntarism are (Goodman et al., 2009): 
 
a) Non-legally binding collective agreements; 
b) Voluntary union recognition by employers; 
c) A relatively low level of formalisation  of the industrial relation system; 
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d) A light framework of statutory provisions on dispute settlements along with no 
governmental power to interrupt industrial action or impose cooling-off periods. 
Such an approach was supported by both unions and employers (Davis et al., 2004) but for 
different reasons. Trade unions saw legislation only as a means to discourage hostile 
interventions of the labour courts in industrial disputes, while employers were keen to avoid 
any interference with their managerial prerogatives (Dickens, 2010). There was also a strong 
belief amongst the unions that ‘what the law bestowed, the law could take away’ (Hyman, 
2003:46). Union leaders have thus preferred to keep the government at arm’s length and work 
towards the consolidation of their own bargaining strength. The corollary is that the conduct 
of collective bargaining has been largely governed by negotiated rules of procedure set at 
both sector and enterprise levels and not by labour law, and employee rights to representation 
have been exerted almost exclusively through union membership (Terry, 2010). It follows 
that even in 1970s, when trade unions reached their maximum level of influence (Terry, 
2010; Marginson, 2015), not all employees were evenly represented. Workers in sectors and 
workplaces with no unions present were not covered by collective agreements and had no 
access to union rights. In 1980 only 28 percent of private service workplaces reported the 
presence of a shop-steward in comparison to 55 percent in manufacturing (Terry, 2010).    
 
While voluntarism came to represent an obstacle to the universal enforcement of collective 
agreements, another important factor accounts for the absence of coordinating mechanisms 
between bargaining levels. This is the limited role and status of the main trade union 
confederation – the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) which has always lacked the consensus to 
engage in ‘neo-corporatist’ centralised negotiations (Hyman, 2003). In contrast to other 
countries, historically unions have been reluctant to share both resources and bargaining 
power with a central body. As a result, the TUC has never had a mandate to negotiate the 
‘rules of the game’ with the main employers’ organisation – the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) – campaign on behalf of unions, or intervene in collective bargaining.   
 
Accordingly, the nature of the British collective bargaining system has been always largely 
decentralised and the relationship between bargaining levels rather unclear (Davis et al., 
2004). Until 1970, shop stewards could represent employees without any mandate from the 
sectoral unions. Often, they were acting without their recognition (Clegg, 1976; Hyman, 
2003). Moreover, where sector level agreements were present, they never played a strong role 
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of coordination for company level negotiators (Arrowsmith, 2010). For paying little attention 
to the content of national level agreements, shop stewards were actually accused of producing 
high ‘normative incoherence’ (Davis et al., 2004:39). This problem, however, ceased to be 
relevant with the subsequent collapse of industry-wide agreements, the decline of informal 
workshop bargaining, and an increasing focus on the company level.  Within a single firm, 
the social partners found it easier to maintain a certain degree of control over the terms and 
conditions negotiated at company and plant levels – where both levels exist (Davis et al., 
2004).  
 
Thus, in theory, negotiations between social partners can occur at any level and there is no 
legally specified hierarchy of collective agreements (Davis et al., 2004). For example, lower 
level agreements can derogate from the provision of higher level agreements. Moreover, 
when there is only one collective agreement its enforcement depends on whether or not this is 
incorporated into the individual employee’s contract. Equally, when more than one 
agreement is applicable, any conflict between them is resolved by the terms of the individual 
employment contract (Davis et al., 2004).  
 
Finally, in a context of laissez faire and low coordination, it is up to the parties to establish 
which matters they want to jointly regulate (Gamwell, 2014). From a quantitative 
perspective, the most prominent issues in the bargaining agenda have been pay and working-
time, while from a qualitative one, these are new production technology and work 
organisation (Davis et al., 2004). The social partners are not entitled to set forth provisions 
below the standards identified by labour law. This notwithstanding, in matters such as 
working-time the law itself recognises drastic derogation-clauses that can be included both in 
individual contracts and collective agreements. 
6.2.2 Disorganised Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining  
 
In a context in which no legal framework exists, collective bargaining is an exclusive 
prerogative of employers and unions and the enforcement of their agreements only depends 
on the power resources available to them (Gamwell, 2014). Towards the end of the 1960s the 
conditions within which sector and company level collective bargaining took place in Britain 
changed, marking a progressive shift of power resources in favour of employers and against 
trade unions (Kelly, 2013). Along with the aforementioned decline in union density and 
recognition (see section 6.1) there have been three important institutional developments. 
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First, decentralisation has increasingly taken a disorganised form. Second, there has been a 
steep decline in collective bargaining coverage, and third, there has been a move to ‘single-
table’ bargaining arrangements (Marginson, 2015).  
 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s the process of collective bargaining decentralisation 
occurred ‘within and alongside national, multi-employer agreements’ confirming that there 
were two parallel collective bargaining systems: one formal at sector level and one informal 
at site level (Marginson, 2015:3). Ten years later a more formalised two tier bargaining 
system was in place. Marginson (2015:3) observes that ‘four out of every five workplaces, 
covering three quarters of the manual workforce, continued to follow multi-employer 
agreements, but their nature had changed from setting standards to minimum wage rates’. 
Actual wage rates were determined in workplace or company negotiations in the majority of 
workplaces. However, between the 1980s and the 1990s a large share of employers withdrew 
from multi-employer arrangements altogether (Brown, 2010). 
 
As the multi-employer system begun to unravel, collective bargaining coverage automatically 
declined. Many smaller firms – where unions were not recognised – could no longer rely on 
the conditions set forth by the sector. In 1984 industry-wide agreements established pay 
conditions in about 50 percent of private sector workplaces, but in 1998 the figure declined to 
16 percent (Marginson, 2015). Heery (2000:8) argues that the primary form of trade unionism 
in UK is ‘enterprise unionism’ according to which the core of union activities, collective 
bargaining included, takes place at the company level. This implies that, in the private sector, 
there is a strong link between trade union density and collective bargaining coverage: the 
higher the membership amongst a firm’s workforce, the higher the probability is that the 
employer will enter into credible commitments with shop stewards.  In the past this link 
between membership and coverage provided company level bargaining with a relatively high 
level of depth (Clegg, 1976). However, the historically uneven presence of unions at 
workplace level made this depth ‘far from universal’ (Clegg, 1976:18). In 1984 47 percent of 
workplaces (with more than 25 employees) were covered by collective bargaining, in 1998 it 
was 24 percent and only 12 percent in 2011 (Marginson, 2015). 
 
After the collapse of multi-employer arrangements in the 1990s, and the consolidation of both 
company and site level bargaining structures, there has been a move towards single channel 
forms of representation. This means that in workplaces where more than one union is 
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recognised, they all negotiate together (Marginson and Sisson, 2006). In this regard Goodman 
et al. (2009:50) observe: ‘in 2004 a single union was recognised in just under half of 
workplaces with union recognition, just less than one-third recognised two unions and around 
one-fifth recognised three or more. Single-table bargaining occurred in 60 per cent of 
workplaces at which more than one union was recognised’. Besides showing a growth of 
single channel forms of representation, this data confirms that the number of employers who 
are willing to negotiate with unions is also in sharp decline at workplace level. The absence 
of a centrally regulated process of decentralisation has provided employers with the option to 
negotiate at the level they find most convenient, but also not to negotiate at all. It has been 
proposed that this particular approach is responsible for an increasing ‘bifurcation’ of 
employment protections along the lines of ‘contract and status’ (see Chapter 2) (Streeck, 
1987; Goodman et al., 2009). Similarly, Marginson (2015:5) observes: ‘decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and the shift from multi-employer bargaining signalled the 
marketization of collective bargaining around firm-specific structures and a shift towards 
unilateral managerial regulation as coverage declined.’  
 
Scholars have extensively debated the reasons behind this sharp decline in union membership 
and collective bargaining coverage (Brown, 2010; Simms and Charlwood, 2010; Kelly, 2012; 
Marginson, 2012). Despite putting emphasis on different factors, they all agree that these 
phenomena can be explained by the interaction of several economic, political, and social 
changes (Simms and Charlwood, 2010). It is suggested that the variation in trade patterns and 
the introduction of new technologies have had a dramatic impact on the British economy and, 
as a result, re-shaped employers’ and employees’ interests too (Arrowsmith, 2010; Brown, 
2010). In addition, the election in 1979 of the Conservative Government and the subsequent 
political and legal changes have reduced trade unions’ resources and exposed them to ‘the 
full force of wider economic changes’, as well as reduced their options for collective action 
(Dickens, 2010; Simms and Charlwood, 2010:132).  
 
More specifically, Marginson (2015) argues that the privatisation of state-owned companies 
and the subsequent increase of foreign direct investment have re-shaped employers’ strategic 
interests and thus accelerated the process of disorganised decentralisation. Foreign-owned 
multinationals showed a clear preference for single-employer bargaining prompting imitation 
amongst their larger British competitors (Marginson, 2015). Unlike other European countries, 
from the 1970s large employers chose to dismantle multi-employer arrangements rather than 
170"
"
negotiating formal procedures for a controlled bargaining decentralisation (Arrowsmith, 
2010; Marginson, 2015). At the same time, given the relatively weak coordination between 
the TUC members and shop stewards, as well as the strong tradition of workplace 
organisation, the response of the unions was to prioritise enterprise level negotiations 
(Hyman, 2003; Marginson, 2015).  
 
As for the changes in public policy towards collective bargaining, Marginson (2015) adds 
that, in light of the nature itself of British voluntarism, their impact has been much stronger 
than it could have been anywhere else in Western Europe (Marginson, 2015). The legal 
support for multi-employer bargaining in the UK has traditionally been weak: a) agreements 
have never been legally binding; b) binding peace-clauses have never existed; and c) no 
extension mechanisms have ever been provided. Thus, ‘multi-employer bargaining in Britain 
was more vulnerable to the changing preferences of employers and trade unions than in other 
West European countries’ (Marginson, 2015:6).     
 
The break-away from multi-employer arrangements has inevitably resulted in an increasing 
fragmentation of the collective bargaining system (Edwards, 2003). It has been argued, 
however, that ‘the fact that the process is decentralised and fragmented does not necessarily 
mean that outcomes are less uniform than previously. The outcomes of individual settlements 
do not deviate much from each other neither do arrangements where no collective bargaining 
occurs’ (Davis et al., 2004:45). In this regard, Arrowsmith (2010) argues that the dynamics of 
employment relations in Britain are primarily shaped by sector-specific factors. Yet, he adds, 
in comparison to other European countries, such dynamics are not necessarily the result of 
sector level governance. Formal institutions account for the nature of employment relations 
only partially. The rest needs to be sought in three important sector characteristics: the first is 
‘activity’, the second is ‘identity’, and the third is the extent of ‘organisation of employers 
and trade unions into sector level associations’ (Arrowsmith, 2010:182). While the first and 
the second characteristics will become key variables in the second part of this thesis (see 
Chapter 8 and 9) the third one explains why a country with no industry-wide bargaining in 
place can be included in a comparative analysis of sector level industrial relations 
arrangements.  
 
As already described, formal articulation governing the relationship between social partners 
at the sector level does not exist in the UK (with a few exceptions). Nonetheless, employers 
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are usually well organised in business and trade associations and trade unions keep their 
sector divisions even when, as a result of a merger, industry wide unions enter into larger and 
more general organisations (Arrowsmith, 2010). Often these actors establish (or maintain) 
informal relationships and mutually engage on issues of common concern, for example, 
training and/or health and safety. Typically, a certain amount of organisation between parties 
is provided by state institutions such as sector skills councils. By focusing on the chemical 
and the pharmaceutical sector, the aim of this chapter is, therefore, to investigate whether, 
through social dialogue activities, as opposed to collective bargaining, sector level actors are 
able to influence the scope of local level bargaining over issues of flexibility and security.    
 
Below is a summary of the main national institutional features which characterise the 
collective bargaining system in the UK. 
  
Table 6.1: National Institutional Framework  
UK National Institutional Framework 
Collective Bargaining 
Arrangements 
Single-employer 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Disorganised Decentralisation  
Articulation Mechanisms Non-existent  
Bargaining Coverage                                                              25 per cent in the private sector in workplaces with more 
than 25 (WERS 2011). 
Predominant Bargaining level Plant-level 
Autonomy of Sector-Level 
Actors from the Confederal-
Level 
N/A 
6.3 The Chemical and Pharmaceutical sector  
 
Generating a turnover of £60 billion a year, the chemical and pharmaceutical sector is 
described as the ‘heart of the UK Economy’ (CIA, 2013). Occupying a position at the head of 
many supply chains within manufacturing, the sector is particularly strategically placed 
(Martin, 2013; CIA, 2014). The industry’s trade balance is a positive £25 million every day, 
whilst the rest of manufacturing has a daily deficit of around £300 million (CIA, 2014). In 
addition, chemicals and pharmaceuticals represent around 12 per cent of value added in 
manufacturing, which is equivalent to 1.5 per cent of total GDP. There are 600,000 workers 
in the UK who depend on chemical and pharmaceutical businesses (Martin, 2013), a 
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relatively high proportion of which are employed in medium sized enterprises when 
compared to other European countries (CIA, 2014). On average full-time employee hourly 
earnings are 20 per cent higher than in manufacturing in general (Martin, 2013). Moreover, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals together are the largest export sector - (£52 billion) compared 
to automotive (£30 billion) and aerospace (£21 billion) - and every day add £30 million 
pounds to the UK balance of payments (CIA, 2014). In contrast to the rest of manufacturing, 
where there is a deficit of £81 billion pound, this industry has shown a surplus of £6 billion. 
Finally, chemical and pharmaceutical businesses invest £600 million and £4.2 billion 
respectively in research and development (R&D) – together they make up 40 percent of the 
entire manufacturing spend, making the pharmaceutical sector the largest contributor to R&D 
in the UK (CIA, 2013).  
 
Today, chemicals and pharmaceuticals belong to one of the few sectors in the UK which has 
been successful in competing in high value-added markets (Heyes, 2001; Earl-Slater, 1998). 
When emerging economies moved into the traditional markets of the UK chemical industry, 
companies reacted to lower labour costs by offering high innovative products, excellent 
quality, and efficiency. This was possible thanks to a significant investment in human 
resources (Lloyd and Newell, 2001). Not surprisingly, training and development have been 
areas of close collaboration between sector level employers’ organisation and trade unions. 
According to Lloyd and Newell having greater resources and higher profits margins, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals can afford ‘to think more long-term about managing 
employees than in many others industries in the UK’ (2001:358). In fact, social partners’ 
lobbying activities led the government to set up a Sector Skills Council named COGENT. 
This initiative is aimed at enabling industrial partnerships and helping employers to identify 
skill demands, establish standards, and commission high quality training solutions. Indeed, 
since most of the companies have foreign-headquarters - especially in pharmaceuticals 
investing - in employee up-skilling programmes and career pathways attracts new investors 
(CIA, 2014).  
 
The most recent financial crisis has affected chemicals more significantly than 
pharmaceuticals. In 2009, internal demand for chemical products ‘hit a five year low’ 
(ECITB, 2011), resulting in chemical companies having to make cut backs and/or close down 
facilities. The sector showed more optimistic results in 2010 when the market suggested a 
rise in activities and recovery of specific closed plants (ECITB, 2011). Pharmaceuticals, on 
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the other hand, have reported successful margins during the crisis. Thanks to the high volume 
of exports, these particular companies were better equipped to face the challenges of an 
increasingly tight and competitive product market (ECITB, 2011).  
6.3.1 Collective Bargaining Actors and Institutions 
 
Scholars have argued that, although there are no formal articulation mechanisms between 
bargaining levels in the UK (with few exceptions) a certain degree of co-ordination between 
social partners, and across bargaining levels, still exists in some sectors. Firstly, 
coordination can occur horizontally – between different unions within one sector – and 
vertically – within unions and their shop stewards (Cully, 1999; Hyman, 2003:39). Secondly, 
the empirical data collected for this study show that some form of interaction between 
employers and national trade unions may also occur as a result of social dialogue activities. 
In the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, where sector level bargaining are no longer 
present, social dialogue between the employers’ organisation, the Chemical Industry 
Association (CIA), and the most representative trade unions - Unite and GMB - takes place 
within an informal framework. Such a framework enables the social partners to meet three 
times per year and discuss at least five areas of common concern: 1) health and 
safety/environmental issues; 2) sustainable development; 3) capturing the European 
experience of employment relations; 4) the spread of best practices of employment relations; 
and 5) business policy and social policy. More importantly the employer’s organisation and 
the trade union officials describe social dialogue in this sector as one of the most 
constructive experiences amongst UK manufacturing. 
 
[The relationship is] very good, very good, probably the best I deal with. For GMB I 
do not deal only for chemicals but I do also manufacturing, building materials and 
food manufacturing. Social dialogue is by far the most positive in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry.   
GMB National Officer, May 2013  
 
Yes, we have a good relationship with GMB generally, and with CIA we have a good 
working relationship when it comes to dealing with the companies because it is mostly 
at the company level, as I’m sure you are aware, that the work gets done in this 
country; and the CIA comes in and we quite often find that they agree with us and 
they try to push the employers in a genuine direction so dialogue with them is good as 
well. 
Unite Research Officer, January 2014 
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There is a genuine social dialogue at national level, of course it doesn’t always 
happen, when companies get into disputes with employees you wonder where it is 
gone, but I think there is a good aspiration in the sector. 
CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013    
 
The social partners have been interested in maintaining an informal relationship because 
of the specific characteristics of the sector they represent. First of all, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals compete in a highly innovative global market, where excellent quality and 
efficiency are paramount to business survival. Consistent investments on research and 
development are more strategic than in other sectors (Lloyd and Newell, 2001). For example, 
employee training and development has become an area in which employers’ association and 
trade unions find collaboration still beneficial. One of the principal outcomes of this 
collaboration is the ‘Sector Skills Council’, ( COGENT), that the government set up as a 
response to their shared lobbying activities. 
 
Further, the interviews with the social partners suggest that the characteristics of the 
workforce employed in chemicals and pharmaceuticals – both higher paid and higher skilled 
in comparison to other manufacturing industries – do indeed account for the level of 
cooperation reached in the sector. 
 
There is also an interest of the CIA to maintain good relationship with the employees’ 
association because the employees in the sector are particularly highly skilled and 
highly paid. It is very noticeable… particularly pharmaceuticals, they are not in the 
same position of other companies in terms of the way the rest of the economy needs to 
deal with the same issues… In the 2013 pay-rolls, which are almost coming to an end, 
all across the economy the sort of average level pay settlement is between 2 and 3 per 
cent. In [name of a large pharmaceutical company] was 4.8 and that is the difference! 
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
 
You find in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector that they get higher salary than 
across a lot of others sectors of the industry, they are being paid a premium because 
of the skills they have.  
Unite Research Officer, January 2014 
 
Moreover, sector level representatives from both sides argue that their relationship has 
significantly strengthened as a result of the European sector social dialogue established in 
2009.  One of the primary outcomes of their cooperation is the ‘European Framework 
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Agreement On Competence Profiles For Process Operators And First Line Supervisors In 
The Chemical Industry’. 
 
In April 2011 we did an agreement, a framework agreement at European level on the 
competences of process operators and first line supervisors. We know [social 
partners] that dialogue has been carried out in companies on a negotiation basis. It 
has not been as wide spread as we wanted to be but it has happened as a result of that 
[EU level] dialogue. And we have similar examples at the nation level when we have 
spoken about issues such as health and safety. And the dialogue we’ve had at national 
level has led to discussion and negotiations within companies.  
CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013  
 
I mean I have been in this industry for a long time, and only ten years ago people 
weren’t really interested about how fuels in this industry is used and also in the way 
in which rubbish was treated in the process and now this would be absolutely out of 
question! Also at the end to be fair there is also a much more rigorous regulation. 
Just as CIA reacts to changes so do we, we agree on this.  
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
 
This constructive relationship notwithstanding, sector level social dialogue in the UK has 
never gone beyond a pure form of consultation. In this regard the employers’ organisation 
representative argued: 
 
There may be an agreement to say well let’s do this as a course of action or let’s work 
together on this….’ …’ we identify areas of development and we share information on 
issues concerning ownership or you know, unions may be informed of closures 
sometimes before we are. You know it is very much a dialogue with intention!  
I think in the UK, being the UK, we begin to see a growing scepticism of what 
happens in Europe and this is not just on social dialogue but on everything. Sadly I 
think, we are beginning to see that views being attached to social dialogue, you know, 
this is European; now so far so good but I’m just worried for the future.’  
 CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013 
 
The GMB’s official confirmed: 
 
We don’t operate at sector level because there is no sector in terms of the things that 
interest our members’…’we don’t have the focus to take issues to the CIA for 
example, which is why we end up talking to them about health and safety, 
environmental issues, and energy issues and not paying conditions’. 
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
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Thus, representing a ‘good aspiration’ more than a well-functioning institutional framework, 
social dialogue in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector has primarily had the advantage of 
bringing the social partners together. Nonetheless, the fact that it exists has provided 
actors with the opportunity to strengthen their relationship and find common ground for 
cooperation. 
 
I think that, it [social dialogue] may not always produce direct results but the fact that 
it exists means that there is a platform where unions and employers are used to talk to 
each other. Very often it means that they can talk about more difficult subjects 
because they have been talking anyway, so I think there is good evidence across a 
range of issues where the fact the social dialogue is there means that unions and 
employers work together also on other issues. 
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
 
Likewise, the union representative from GMB observed that regular meetings at the sector 
level increase the chance to discuss a variety of issues, both formally and informally, that 
would not be raised in any other circumstances. While the participant from Unite stressed 
that some sort of cooperation occurs because social actors know each other in-depth and 
have developed a good understanding of what their reciprocal interests may be.  
 
In synthesis, the interview data shows that the chemical and pharmaceutical sector has an 
informal framework within which social dialogue activities occur. Such a framework 
encouraged the social partners to develop a common agenda on a variety of issues that are 
relevant to the sector. These issues, however, are not the ones traditionally dealt with via 
collective bargaining. Environmental issues, health and safety, and energy issues have 
become matters of consultation between the employers’ association, the CIA, and the unions, 
Unite and GMB, primarily as a result of their participation in the European sector social 
dialogue established in 2009. Their constant interaction, formally, at the EU level and, 
informally, at the national level has indeed contributed to developing a good working 
relationship between them.  
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Table 6.2: Sector Level Institutional Framework  
UK Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sector 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Disorganised decentralisation 
No sector-level bargaining   
Social dialogue 
Articulation Mechanisms N/A 
Union density N/A 
Employers-Union Relationship Constructive 
Autonomy of Sector-Level Actors 
from the Confederal-Level 
N/A 
 
6.4 Country-by-Country Framework of Analysis 
 
In this section, a series of expectations will be examined to explore whether and how 
collective bargaining arrangements regulate issues of flexibility and security within the UK 
chemical and pharmaceutical industry. This country-by-country analytical framework 
consists of an adaptation to the comparative proposition presented in Chapter 3 and sets the 
context for the cross-country comparison of sector level institutional arrangement in Italy, 
Denmark, and the UK (RQ1). 
 
The relevant propositions are: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
178"
"
In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining  and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
 
It follows that for the UK case, the three relative expectations are: 
 
1. Social dialogue institutions are likely to be less effective than collective bargaining 
institutions in shaping common understandings around issues of flexibility and 
security as their outcomes are much more open-ended. 
2. Given the absence of sector level agreements proposition 2 does not apply. 
3. Given the absence of sector level bargaining proposition 3 may apply if, and 
only if, social dialogue plays an equivalent role to collective bargaining in enabling 
and constraining negotiations taking place at the company level.  
6.4.1 Flexibility and Security in Social Partners Agendas 
 
Interview data show that employers’ and employees’ representatives at the sector level 
have not yet developed a shared definition of flexibility and security policies. As clearly 
stated by the Unite representatives, these issues have not entered into social dialogue 
activities. According to him, the debate on flexibility and security occurs exclusively at the 
company level. Thus, sector level actors are not entitled to produce any strategy that is likely 
to improve the levels of flexibility and security injected into the labour market. 
 
No, in that regard [flexibility and security] the dialogue is at the company level. The 
only agenda that we have is to keep what we have got!! No, what can I say? We have 
a hostile government with regard to trade unions and a hostile environment we are 
operating in, bearing in mind the finances, all the government talks about austerity. 
Unite Research Officer, January 2014  
 
Similarly, when asked about flexibility and security, the GMB official does not mention or 
recall any specific measures that the union is currently advocating. He suggests that GMB 
takes part in social dialogue on flexibility and security only at the EU level where there is a 
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quite developed transnational framework. At sector level, however, British social actors 
cannot be as effective, first, because there is no sector level collective bargaining, and 
second, because company level social partners are not particularly receptive to these matters. 
 
Finally, the employers’ organisation representative reports that although flexibility and 
security may be discussed via social dialogue in the UK, the social partners have not been 
successful in meeting the agenda. There are examples of workforces that have undertaken 
new and flexible forms of work, as well as employers that have offered some sort of security, 
however these are limited and temporary. The CIA’s representative states that in 2008-09 the 
UK tried to implement what he calls the ‘German model’ but this experience was 
unsuccessful. By German model he means ‘if people go on short-time their pay can be 
protected while they do training’. According to him, this target was not met for the reason 
that, in the UK, there is not a national agenda on employment issues. In fact, the debate is 
mainly on individual items. The result is a fragmented strategy, if not a total lack of strategy, 
which inhibits sector level social partners’ effectiveness. Further, he argues that there is a 
general resistance to the idea of sharing issues of flexibility and security at the 
national/sector level.  
 
I think people are nervous about it for historical reasons, but the world moved on. I 
mean, 80-90% of our companies are foreign headquartered and this still is a big issue 
for us, we welcome foreign investments but we still don’t have that national 
understanding of labour issues’. 
CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013 
 
As a result of this lack of coordination between the national and the sectoral level, as well as 
the lack of sector level bargaining, the social partners have not developed a similar 
understanding around issues of flexibility and security. For example, the GMB representative 
sees flexibility as any measures enhancing market mobility, in particular: 
 
To ensure that there are no artificial barriers to people entering the labour market, if 
they want to. This means more than just changes in shifts, but this may well mean re-
engineering jobs so that they are doable by a wide range of people; and of course re-
engineering needs to happen without doing any damage. 
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
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The CIA representative sees flexibility as a much wider strategy of labour deployment that 
includes all kind of measures such as: 
 
Anything that is lawful and reasonable…I know that reasonable is a subjective 
word… people know when they are being unreasonable. 
CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013 
 
The Unite representative, when asked about flexibility, focuses solely on company level 
bargaining outcomes: 
 
We’re having to be flexible on wages we try to make sure people’s wages are 
keeping up with the cost of living but we are being flexible persuading our 
members to accept lower wage levels, we’ve been flexible in regard to working time 
and work arrangements, flexibility and security go together because we are being 
flexible to secure jobs. That’s how I can put it really. 
Unite Research Officer, January 2014 
 
The same issue recurs with security: for the employers’ organisation active labour 
policies are not required. Security increases when the interests of businesses are met, 
including flexibility. 
  
W’re constantly pushing for flexibility, greater skills levels for people taking new 
things and there is a link to security because we feel that the more we can do, you 
know, the more secure we are, and that’s how companies see it. 
The CIA wants to make the UK the best place for companies, chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies, to invest. We want to be the location of choice and there 
are lots of examples where work which was outsourced in China is coming back to the 
UK for competitiveness reasons, for quality reasons, and we want to promote that as 
security from the employment angle… ‘…the cost of energy is a big issue for our 
companies, in the US it is about half of the price of UK and Europe. From the security 
point of view this is going to be a challenge. 
CIA Director of Employment and Communication, May 2013 
 
Again, the CIA sees security as an outcome of a more competitive and dynamic business 
environment: if instead of cutting labour costs the social partners were able to push towards 
lower energy costs, higher employment security would be automatically achieved.   
 
Union representatives, from GMB and Unite, have a different view of security. While the 
GMB sees security as a way to increase workers’ employability, the representative from 
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Unite sees security as a sphere of competence of legal provisions. Unions do not have the 
power to shape policy-making on security, they can only work together to exert some 
pressure on the government agenda. 
 
We are very keen on promoting apprenticeship and training and increasing skills 
level of our workforce and that does not just mean introduction of apprenticeship it 
means all sort of opportunities for people to acquire skills which means they are 
more employable and therefore getting more job security 
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
 
We are constantly fighting, we are trying to influence the coalition and the future 
labour government, if there is a future labour government, to actually start 
addressing these issues, we are fighting against history really in this country. There is 
no fall-back position for us  
Unite Research Officer, January 2014 
 
Furthermore, an interesting element that emerges from the interviews is that the sector level 
social partners do not consider helpful – indeed, are unable to define – the distinction 
between job security and employment security. Given the deregulated nature of the labour 
market, achieving security in the external and internal labour markets is probably 
perceived as part of the same objective. 
 
The inconsistent notions of flexibility and security developed by the social partners have not 
encouraged any constructive collaboration on these issues. The CIA representative affirms 
that there are cases in which, within companies, policies on flexibility and security are 
implemented by collective bargaining. However, when this happens it cannot be 
interpreted as an implication of social dialogue activities. The sector level social partners are 
not in a position to set local bargaining agendas. This is the reason why experiences of 
negotiations between flexibility and security items are generally limited and temporary. 
 
Thus, with regard to expectation 1, interview data show that, although experiencing high 
demands for flexibility and security, the weakness of social dialogue institutions in the UK 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector does not enable the social partners to propose a common 
agenda. The lack of sector level collective bargaining hinders the social partners’ ability to 
develop common understandings around these issues. It follows that social dialogue, in the 
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UK, cannot be considered as effective as collective bargaining in addressing flexibility and 
security.  
 
Finally, in relation to expectation 3, interviews suggest that flexibility and security may be 
the object of informal discussion between sector level social partners. Nevertheless, the 
sector is not provided with any formal mechanisms to ensure that these issues find their way 
onto the agenda of company level negotiators. 
 
No, I don’t think so [that issues of flexibility and security enter collective bargaining 
agenda as a result of social dialogue activities]. I think sometimes it’s an 
outcome but it doesn’t start as an objective. It could be an accidental result. Plant-
level bargaining do not include flexibility and security in the way in which we [sector 
level social partners] understand it. 
CIA Director of employment and communication, May 2013 
 
It doesn’t work quite like that…but at least in chems and pharms …the social 
dialogue is increasingly leading to company level discussions on exactly these issues 
because perhaps, late in the day, the employers are waking up to the fact that they 
have structural problems in the demographic core of their employees’.  
GMB National Officer, May 2013 
 
The employment law in this country is so skewed in regard to employers rather than 
employees that even trying to get social dialogue on the table is difficult enough, we 
would love to be able to start to talk to companies and have them actually respond to 
us on things such as corporate responsibility, but you know, they are not interested. 
There isn’t government regulation, there isn’t any!  
Unite Research Officer, January 2014 
 
Thus, single-employer bargaining arrangements do not provide any mechanisms 
governing the relationship between the sector and the company level that can be compared to 
collective bargaining institutions. Issues of flexibility and security are not addressed in a 
coordinated fashion. As a consequence, the scope of company level bargaining on issues of 
flexibility and security is potentially unlimited. 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The first objective of this chapter was to explore the role of sector level social dialogue 
within the UK chemical and pharmaceutical sector. The second objective was to prepare the 
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ground for the cross-country comparison of sector level collective bargaining in Italy, 
Denmark, and the UK, through which the first research question (RQ1) will be addressed. 
 
By observing the institutional configuration of this particular sector, a series of relevant 
points have emerged. First, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry in the UK features an 
informal framework for social dialogue. Such a framework allows the social partners to meet 
both formally and informally to discuss a small number of issues of common concern. In 
addition to the health and safety compact – the area in which both parties have shown the 
highest level of commitment – another important focus of attention has been workers’ 
training and development. Given the technologies and the product standards required in this 
industry, skills are considered a fundamental source of competitive advantage. In fact, by 
lobbying the government, the social partners obtained the institution of the ‘Sector Skills 
Council’ named COGENT, which they consider one of the most positive outcomes of their 
interaction. Thus, although the sector framework enables nothing more than consultation, 
social dialogue has (at least) had the advantage of fostering a good working relationship 
between the social partners.  
 
The second point is that the lack of collective bargaining institutions limits the initiatives of 
the social partners over the issues of flexibility and security. In particular, first, it undermines 
their ability to develop shared understandings around issues of flexibility and security. 
Second, it inhibits their effectiveness in pursuing their respective agendas. Thus, it is shown 
that sector level social dialogue does not play a role similar to that of collective bargaining in 
addressing issues of flexibility and security. 
 
It follows that articulating mechanisms between the sector and the company level are not in 
place. Thus, the third relevant point is that social dialogue does not play an equivalent role to 
collective bargaining in enabling and constraining company level negotiations. The scope of 
company level bargaining over flexibility and security is, potentially, unlimited. It depends 
only on the willingness of employers and shop stewards to engage with these issues. 
 
The only way to observe the extent to which flexibility and security have become the object 
of local level agreements, is to complement these findings with a company-focus. As 
described in Chapter 3, however, access to chemicals and pharmaceutical enterprises in the 
UK was denied.     
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Chapter 7: Engaging with flexibility and security at the sector level 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the first set of research questions which have 
been derived from the comparative institutional analysis. These are: 
 
o RQ1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social 
dialogue in different countries address issues of flexibility and security?;  
o RQ1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different 
countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level 
bargaining agendas?  What are the implications for the actors involved? 
 
In order to address RQ1a, the findings which emerged in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are analysed in 
a comparative fashion. Accordingly, the first part of the chapter focuses on the national 
institutional features that make Italy (Chapter 4), Denmark (Chapter 5), and the UK (Chapter 
6) exemplary cases of the Southern European, Nordic European and Western European 
clusters (Visser, 2009). Then, these clusters are compared and contrasted in the light of the 
arrangements framing collective bargaining and social dialogue in the three countries.  
 
It is argued that the most significant difference across Italy, Denmark and the UK revolves 
around the role of collective bargaining in regulating the labour market. Crucially, in Italy 
labour law and collective bargaining have a complementary relationship, in Denmark 
collective bargaining is the main form of labour market regulation while, in the UK, 
industrial relations arrangements play only a residual role at the sector level. In addition, it is 
shown, that although they share a similar configuration of sector level arrangements, Italy 
and Denmark feature different degrees of bargaining institutionalisation which is apparent in 
the varying extent of coordination between sector and company level bargaining structures, 
different provisions on extension mechanisms, and variations in the level of bargaining 
coverage. In contrast, due to the lack of sector level bargaining institutions in the UK, issues 
of coordination are non-existent.  
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The second part of the chapter presents the rationale for comparing Italy and Denmark, on the 
one hand, and the UK, on the other. The Danish and Italian chemical and pharmaceutical 
sectors feature similar institutional configurations that make them particularly suitable 
contexts for the analysis of collective agreements over issues of flexibility and security. A 
two-tier bargaining system and coordinating mechanisms between bargaining levels function 
well in both Italy and Denmark alike. Moreover, although bargaining decentralisation has 
increased in both countries, it has occurred in a controlled fashion. Hence, the sector is still 
the most prominent bargaining level at which negotiations take place. In contrast, in the UK, 
sector level collective bargaining has disappeared. Interactions between sector level social 
partners in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector occur only by means of informal social 
dialogue, the coordination mechanisms governing the relationship between sector and 
company level no longer exist. As a result, in the UK, RQ1b cannot be an object of 
investigation.  
 
The final section of this chapter deals with the findings. These are presented according to the 
proposition shaped in Chapter 3 and reflect the country by country framework of analysis. In 
order to undertake the first level of comparison (RQ1a) which involves Italy, Denmark, and 
the UK, the following issues will be investigated: a) the role of sector level institutional 
arrangements in shaping the scope of social partner’s agendas over issues of flexibility and 
security across the three countries; b) the role of collective bargaining and social dialogue 
activities in shaping social partners’ perceptions around issues of flexibility and security; and 
c) the role of national institutions, such as labour law and social welfare, in influencing the 
scope of social partners’ agendas. The second level of comparison (RQ1b) involves Italy and 
Denmark exclusively and the main issues investigated relate to the role of coordination 
mechanisms in conditioning the scope of the firm level agenda on issues of flexibility and 
security.  
 
With regard to RQ1a, it is concluded that the institutional configuration framing the chemical 
and pharmaceutical sector in Italy, Denmark, and the UK accounts for the varying extent of 
social partners’ agendas over issues of flexibility and security. While in Italy and Denmark 
the multi-employer bargaining system exerts some pressure on social partners to engage with 
these issues, in the UK, informal social dialogue does not play an equivalent role. Within 
Italy and Denmark, as a result of the constant interactions between the sector level social 
partners, similar understandings on flexibility and security have developed serving to push 
186"
"
such issues into their respective bargaining agendas. In contrast, in the UK, the lack of 
collective bargaining institutions has hindered actors’ capability to formulate a shared 
agenda. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the interaction between sector level collective 
bargaining and national institutions – specifically labour law and social welfare – are partly 
responsible for the extent of variation in the scope of sector level bargaining on flexibility 
and security across Italy and Denmark.  
 
Turning to RQ1b, the comparative analysis of Italy and Denmark shows that the coordinating 
mechanisms set in place to govern the relationship between sector and company level 
bargaining shape the content of firm level negotiations over issues of flexibility. In Denmark, 
a fluid demarcation of competences, coupled with a high depth of the collective bargaining 
system is likely to provide local level actors with a higher level of autonomy than in Italy. 
However, the extent to which firm level actors engage with issues of flexibility and security 
can only be understood by combining the sector and the company foci to analyse the 
outcomes of collective bargaining at the firm level. Findings on this will be covered in 
Chapter 9.    
7.2 Collective Bargaining at the National Level 
 
Italy, Denmark, and the UK exhibit a series of differences in their production regimes, 
welfare states, and employment arrangements that have made them exemplary cases of three 
distinctive country clusters, respectively Southern European, Nordic European and Western 
European clusters (Visser 2009). In accordance with Visser’s (2009) argument Chapter 4 
shows that in Italy the state plays a prominent role in the market economy – predominantly 
through legal interventions – and both labour market and welfare system have a dualistic 
nature.  Trade unions are generally consulted over labour market issues, but they do not 
participate in the distribution of welfare resources. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that Denmark 
is a coordinated economy where the welfare regime is highly inclusive and the social partners 
take part in a well-functioning decision-making system. The role of legal intervention is 
minimal and labour organisations manage social benefits and active labour market policies 
directly. Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrates that the UK is a prominent example of a market-
based economy and the principle of self-regulation of private interests applies to both its 
labour market and industrial relations regimes. It follows that the law, in this country, plays a 
residual role and the employment relations system is hardly institutionalised.  Table 7.1 
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summarises the main national institutional differences characterising the countries under 
focus. 
 
Table 7.1: National institutional differences 
 Italy Denmark UK 
Market Economy State  Coordinated Market 
Welfare System Dualistic 
Social partners are consulted 
Inclusive 
Social partners are decision-
makers 
Social Partners do not play 
any significant role 
Labour Market Law and Collective 
Bargaining are 
complementary 
Collective Bargaining is 
prominent 
Both law and collective 
bargaining play a secondary 
role 
 
These distinctive national institutional arrangements are partly reflected in the collective 
bargaining structures which characterise Italy, Denmark, and the UK. In particular, Chapter 4 
shows that, in Italy, legal regulations and collective bargaining have a complementary 
relationship. This means that it is the law which compels certain unions – under the principle 
of representativeness (see 4.2) – to negotiate in some particular areas. Within these areas, 
collective bargaining can, in turn, supplement and/or derogate legal regulations. In contrast, 
Chapters 5 and 6 show that, in Denmark and in the UK, the law governs neither the labour 
market nor the relationship between trade unions and employers organisations. However, 
while in Denmark it is collective bargaining (rather than the law) that plays this particular 
function, in the UK both law and collective bargaining have a much less strategic role in the 
regulation of the labour market.  
 
This leads to a further important difference across the three countries, namely, the level of 
institutionalisation of their collective bargaining systems. Although they are all embedded in 
a voluntaristic framework of industrial relations – relatively less voluntaristic in Italy given 
the role of labour law (see 4.2.1) – in Denmark employers organisations and trade unions 
have negotiated a series of procedures setting in place important elements of multi-level 
coordination. In this country, such mechanisms have reinforced the social partners’ mutual 
commitment and, at the same time, guaranteed a high level of bargaining coverage.  
 
Conversely, in the UK the institutional framework within which actors interact has been 
characterised to a great extent by informality. Different rules of procedures have been 
negotiated by social partners across both sectors and companies. As a result, the collective 
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bargaining system has traditionally lacked central control. This relatively low level of 
institutional formalisation has exposed collective bargaining structures to changes in the 
legal, political and economic spheres resulting in a much more rapid decline of bargaining 
coverage than in other countries.  
 
As for Italy, the degree of institutionalisation of its collective bargaining system places this 
country in an intermediate position between Denmark and the UK. Also, in Italy, legally 
binding norms are rare and the autonomy of social partners is high. However, in contrast to 
Denmark and the UK, in Italy the law has served to strengthen collective bargaining 
indirectly, first, by recognising fundamental union rights, such as the right to strike, and 
second, by fostering a de facto erga omnes effect of collective agreements. Within this 
favourable legal context employers and labour organisations have negotiated a series of 
interconfederal rules establishing a hierarchical relationship between bargaining levels, as 
well as shaping the bargaining competences of both sectors and companies. At the same time, 
extension mechanisms, deriving from customary civil law, have guaranteed a high degree of 
collective bargaining coverage. Table 7.2 summarises the main differences and similarities 
characterising the industrial relations system in these countries  
 
Table 7.2: Industrial relations differences and similarities 
 ITALY DENMARK UK 
Industrial Relations Voluntaristic  Voluntaristic Voluntaristc 
Bargaining Arrangements Medium Institutionalised Highly Institutionalised Informal 
Institutionalisation 
Coordination  Existent  Existent Non existent 
Extension mechanisms Existent – De facto Non existent Non existent 
Bargaining Coverage Relatively high Relatively high Low 
 
7.3 Collective Bargaining at the sector level 
 
The analysis of the institutions featured in the chemical and the pharmaceutical sector in each 
of the countries under focus (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) indicates that the degree of institutional 
variation between the UK and Italy, on the one hand, and the UK and Denmark, on the other, 
is wider than the one between Italy and Denmark. It has been argued, in Chapter 6, that in the 
UK, the highly voluntaristic nature of the industrial relations system limited the role of the 
state in providing mechanisms to support collective bargaining. At the same time, it inhibited 
the role of the main trade union confederation – Trade Union Congress (TUC) – and the 
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central employers’ organisation – the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) – in negotiating 
overarching rules of procedures. As a result, at the beginning of the 1980s, multi-employer 
arrangements in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector were no longer able to provide a 
well-functioning framework for collective bargaining. Similar to other industries, the sector 
was not equipped with the institutional strength needed to cope with the series of external 
pressures coming from both the economic and political environments and, as a result, ceased 
to function. Since the collapse of the sector framework a series of developments have 
followed: 
 
• a rapid and disorganised decentralisation of bargaining took place;  
• single-employer bargaining became prominent;  
• collective bargaining became marketised around firm-specific structures and 
unilateral decision making; 
• union membership and collective bargaining coverage declined. 
 
These specific characteristics mark the most apparent difference between the UK, on the one 
hand, and Italy and Denmark on the other. In particular, due to the fact that multi-employer 
bargaining structures no longer exist in the UK, a different type of comparison needs to be 
conducted across the three countries. Accordingly, the analysis will be divided into two 
subsequent steps. First, the role of informal social dialogue, which now takes place in the UK 
(Chapter 6) at the sector level, will be compared with the role of collective bargaining in Italy 
and Denmark (Chapters 4 and 5). Then, the analysis will focus exclusively on the actual 
outcomes of collective agreements across Italy and Denmark.  
 
As previously argued, both in Italy and Denmark the sector under focus features a two-tier 
bargaining system, as well as coordinating mechanisms governing the relationship between 
bargaining levels. Although bargaining decentralisation has increased in both countries, it has 
occurred in a controlled fashion. Hence, the sector remains the most prominent bargaining 
level and sets the framework within which company level negotiations take place. However, 
Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that a series of differences do emerge across the Italian and Danish 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors; before turning to the findings, these differences need to 
be reviewed.  
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The first and most apparent difference across the two countries is that in Denmark chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals lie within the industrial agreement encompassing all subsectors in 
manufacturing; whereas, in Italy there is a sector-specific agreement. One implication is that 
the emphasis on flexibility and security is likely to be more pronounced in Italy than in 
Denmark where such issues could be diluted by the requirements of other industries.   
 
Second, in the Danish industrial sector, company level negotiations have always represented 
an integral element of the collective bargaining system, while in the Italian chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector these have played a secondary role. Thus, in a context in which 
customary extension procedures secure the enforcement of industry-wide agreements, such as 
in Italy, a discrepancy between sector and company level coverage has emerged. Chapter 4 
showed that, in Italy, sector level bargaining covers about 80 per cent of the workforce, but 
only some 20-25 per cent of companies engage in local negotiations (Burroni and Pedaci, 
2011). In Denmark, conversely, coverage at the sector level is reproduced at the firm level – 
70 per cent and 77 per cent respectively (Ilsøe, 2012) – thanks to a more even presence of 
shop stewards across companies. As an effect of the ‘accession agreements’ (see Chapter 5), 
according to which firms that are outside employers’ associations can also engage in 
negotiations with unions’ representatives, coverage is actually higher at the company than at 
sector level. It can, therefore, be concluded that the depth of the bargaining system is higher 
in Denmark than in Italy. It follows that, within the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector, there is also a relatively lower degree of union coordination between bargaining 
levels, union bargaining power, and autonomy of shop stewards.  
 
The third relevant difference across these two countries can be found in the type of 
articulation mechanisms that govern the relationship between bargaining levels. It is thanks to 
these mechanisms that, in Italy and Denmark, decentralisation is controlled and bargaining 
competences are assigned to sector and company level social partners. Specifically, Chapters 
4 and 5 show that articulation between bargaining levels provides actors with a series of 
institutional resources and, at the same time, contributes to the shaping of perceptions and 
priorities with regard to their bargaining agendas. In Italy and Denmark this occurs primarily 
via demarcation, meaning that sector and company level social partners act within different, 
albeit coordinated, spheres of competences. In Italy, the procedures setting the basis of this 
particular form of coordination have been laid out by a series of confederal agreements. 
However, as decentralisation has increased, sector level social partners have started to 
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delegate new competences to company level negotiations.  As a result, demarcation has 
become more blurred and overlaps between competences at the sector and the company level 
occurred. In contrast, demarcation in the Danish industrial sector has always been provided 
by sector level collective agreements, meaning that, in this country, sector level actors are 
free from any confederal interference. They are, therefore, more autonomous and accountable 
than in Italy when engaging in bargaining activities.  
 
Fourth, Chapters 4 and 5 propose that in order to provide a comprehensive account of the 
context in which sector level social actors interact, it is fundamental to focus attention on a 
further dimension, the welfare system. By drawing on Esping-Andersen’s work (1990) it has 
been argued that welfare provisions are likely to shape both social and economic behaviour, 
and by implication, the industrial relations arena as well (Esping-Andersen, 1990). According 
to Esping-Andersen (1990) the welfare state has had structuring and ordering effects for 
many institutions, but the most apparent can be found within the fields of working life, 
employment, and the labour market. Traditionally, this concept has been linked to the role of 
the state in providing services for individuals against the risks they may face when their 
working capacities fail (Titmuss, 1951). In Italy and Denmark this role has been played in a 
significantly different way with important implications for whether and how these issues 
entering into the sector level bargaining agenda.  Chapter 4 showed that the nature of welfare 
provisions in Italy is predominantly polarised, with different programmes for private and 
public sectors’ employees and almost no protection for self-employed and temporary 
workers. There are no universal benefits or minimum income schemes and active labour 
market policies are not well developed. It has therefore been argued in Chapter 4 that: a) 
incomes are secured through relatively high levels of legal protections against individual 
dismissal; b) there are few incentives to external mobility as well to up-skilling and re-
skilling; and c) active labour market policies tend to be ineffective. In contrast, Chapter 5 
showed that the Danish welfare system guarantees a wide degree of inclusivity, universal 
benefits are in place and there is a correlation between the low level of employment 
protections and the high level of unemployment benefits. Thus, as employment protections 
are primarily provided by collective agreements, sector level social partners in Denmark play 
a much more active role in shaping labour market policies than in Italy. Such autonomy is 
reflected in the scope of their bargaining agenda which is expected to be much wider than in 
Italy. 
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Finally, a further difference between Italy and Denmark can be found in the role of legally 
binding regulations for the labour market. Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated that the 
relationship between labour law and collective bargaining has important implications for the 
autonomy of social partners and, thus, also for the scope of both sector and company level 
negotiations. In Denmark, a minimal legal framework empowers employers’ associations and 
unions who are the only ones responsible for the regulation of the labour market. For this 
reason, there are no formal limits on the items that can enter into their bargaining agenda, 
flexibility and security included. It is expected, however, that due to the existence of 
universal unemployment benefits and well-functioning active labour market policies, the 
scope for flexibility in Danish collective bargaining is likely to be higher than the scope for 
security. Conversely in Italy, legal interventions are in place to both provide universal 
minimum employment standards and assign collective bargaining the role of supplementing, 
derogating and substituting existing regulations. If, on the one hand, the complementary 
relationship between labour law and collective bargaining legitimises social partners as 
political interlocutors and policy-makers, on the other, it implies that social partners are not 
the only labour market players. It is therefore expected that due to the relatively high level of 
job security – provided by law – and the lack of universal welfare provisions, collective 
bargaining in Italy is more likely to engage with issues of security than with issues of 
flexibility. The literature reviewed in Chapter 4 shows that, although in place, legal 
mechanisms aimed at pushing solidarity pacts, fixed-term contracts, and work and training 
contracts into the bargaining agenda have hardly had any impact (Caruso and Zappalà, 2004). 
Scholars suggest that, historically, flexibility in collective bargaining has been enhanced in 
small doses and by trying not to undermine the general mechanisms of legal regulation of 
labour (Colombo and Regalia, 2014). Yet, in recent times, legal interventions, such as the 
decree law 138/2011 and the 2012 and 2015 labour reforms, seem to have substituted the 
logic of complementarity with the logic of deregulation. Only future research can establish 
what the impact will be, if any, for sector level collective bargaining actors and institutions in 
Italy.   
 
Table 7.3 summarises the main institutional features characterising sector level structures 
across the three countries under focus.  
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Table 7.3: Collective Bargaining arrangements across Italy, Denmark, and the UK 
 Italy Denmark UK 
Sector level structures Multi-Employer Multi-Employer Single-Employer 
Coordination Existent Existent Non-Existent 
Depth of bargaining system Restricted Extensive N/A 
Type of coordination 
Level of coordination 
Demarcation Confederal 
Delegation: Sector 
Demarcation: Sector N/A 
N/A 
Scope of bargaining Limited (Law-Welfare) Extensive (Law-Welfare) N/A 
 
7.4 Sector level institutions as a source of flexibility and security: A comparative 
analysis between Italy, Denmark, and the UK  
 
The first research question set out by the present comparative analysis (see Chapter 2) aims to 
observe the extent of cross-country variation in the way in which collective bargaining and 
social dialogue activities engage with issues of flexibility and security in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector. The countries under focus are Italy, Denmark, and the UK.  
 
RQ1a To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social dialogue 
address issues of flexibility and security in different countries? 
 
In order to answer this question, propositions 1 and 2 (see Chapter 3) will be examined: 
 
1. The institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector accounts for 
the scope of the sector level social partners’ agenda over issues of flexibility and 
security (Marginson and Galetto, 2015); collective bargaining and social dialogue 
represent functional mechanisms for the social partners to develop similar 
understandings around these issues and enhance the possibility for exchange of ideas, 
package deals, and joint problem solving between the parties (Ibsen and Mailand, 
2011). Informal social dialogue arrangements, as found in the UK, provide a less 
procedurally secure mechanism than the formal collective bargaining institutions that 
are found in Italy and Denmark. 
2. In countries in which labour law is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with flexibility and more with security, since the law reduces the 
scope for some forms of contract-based flexibility – in particular external flexibility. 
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In contrast, where social welfare is more developed collective bargaining and social 
dialogue engage less with security and more with flexibility, because the security 
dimension is already covered by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011). 
 
In light of the above propositions it is expected, first, that issues of flexibility and security 
will figure on the social partners’ agenda in all the three countries under focus. Nonetheless, 
they are likely to feature more prominently in the presence of formal sector level bargaining 
arrangements, such as in Italy and Denmark, than in the UK where only informal social 
dialogue is in place. Second, it is expected that issues of security will feature more strongly 
on the Italian sector level bargaining agenda, and issues of flexibility will feature more 
strongly on the Danish one.  
7.4.1 Italy, Denmark, and the UK – Proposition 1  
 
Chapter 6 established that the lack of sector level bargaining institutions in the UK chemical 
and pharmaceutical sector accounts for the ineffectiveness of social partners in addressing the 
issues that are relevant for this study. Although experiencing high demands for both 
flexibility and security, the predominantly informal approach to social dialogue in this sector 
has been demonstrated to hinder the capability of the social partners’ to put forward a shared 
agenda. The fact that informal social dialogue exists, and that under the more institutionalised 
framework of European social dialogue the main employers’ organisation and trade unions 
regularly meet, has allowed social partners to set in place a constructive relationship. In turn, 
this relationship has enabled them to actively collaborate over issues of common concern – 
such as health and safety, energy, and environmental issues. Even so, in contrast to their 
Italian and Danish counterparts, they have never agreed on a substantive agenda concerning 
flexibility and security. Hence, the first conclusion that can be drown by examining 
proposition 1 is that informal social dialogue in the UK does not act as functional equivalent 
to formal collective bargaining. 
 
The rest of this section will therefore consist of a comparative analysis of the findings 
presented in Chapter 4 on Italy (see table 4.3) and Chapter 5 on Denmark (see table 5.3). 
Table 7.4 summarises the outcomes of collective agreements in these two countries and 
involves each of the seven flexibility and security categories identified within the literature 
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on flexicurity (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). In addition, the table 
indicates whether the provisions address flexibility, and if so which form; security, and if so 
which form; or both flexibility and security, as well indicating which forms.   
 
Table 7.4: Outcomes of collective agreements on flexibility and security in Italy and Denmark 
 Flexibility Security Flex & Sec 
Pay Wage DK Income IT  
Training    Employment (DK 2004) Functional & Job (IT 1998 – 
2002 – 2006 – 2012)  
Functional & Employment (IT 1998 
– 2006 – 2012) (DK 1998 – 2007 – 
2012) 
Functional & Income (DK 2007 – 2012) 
External & Employment (IT 
1998)  
Functional & Combination 
(DK 2007 – 2012) 
Job 
Classifications 
  Functional & Income (IT 
1998 – 2009 – 2012 )  
Functional & Job (IT 1998 – 
2002 –  2009 – 2012)  
Functional & Employment (IT 2012) 
Working-time 
 
Working-time (IT 
2002) 
Working-Time 
(DK 1998 – 2000) 
 Working-time & Combination 
(IT 1998 – 2002) (DK 1998) 
Provisions 
for Atypical 
workers 
 Job  (IT 2002) 
 
 
Social 
Benefits and 
Entitlements 
 Income (IT 1998 – 2002) (DK 1998 
– 2000 – 2004 – 2007 – 2010 – 
2012) 
Combination (IT 1998 – 2002) (DK 
1998 – 2000 – 2004 – 2007 – 2010 – 
2012)  
  Employment (DK 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment  
 
Working-time & Combination 
(DK 2010 – 2012) 
Measures for 
employment 
   Employment (DK 2010) 
  (DK 2010 – 2012) 
  Combination (DK 2010 –   
  2012)   
External  &  Employment  (IT 
2012) 
Functional   &   Employment 
(DK 2010) 
 
 
This table shows that both in Italy and Denmark collective agreements engage with different 
forms of flexibility and security. This is consistent with proposition 1 suggesting that the 
institutional configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector exerts pressure on social 
partners to prioritise these issues in their bargaining agendas. Chapter 4 confirmed that, in 
Italy, interconfederal agreements provide sector level actors with a series of institutional 
resources enabling negotiations on items that are particularly functional for the sector. It is 
thanks to their constant interaction that the sector level actors have developed shared 
understandings around issues of flexibility and security which, in turn, became items of 
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collective bargaining. Similarly, Chapter 5 showed that, in Denmark, the institutional 
framework within which sector level social partners operate enables them to address 
flexibility and security directly. Given the key role that collective bargaining exerts within the 
‘Danish flexicurity’ system, social partners enhance flexibility both in the internal and 
external labour market and improve the degree of security through continuous in-job training 
and education. As a result of their joint efforts in achieving this, similar understandings 
around flexibility and security have emerged. Hence, the fact that chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals come under the wider industry agreement in DK does not appear to have 
mitigated the extent to which flexibility and security feature on the bargaining agenda and in 
the consequent agreements. 
7.4.2 Italy and Denmark – Proposition 2 
 
Table 7.4 shows that not only does collective bargaining engage with flexibility and security, 
both in Italy and Denmark, but also that negotiations lead to a variety of flexibility and 
security trade-offs. However, whether agreements address one form of flexibility and/or one 
form of security varies across the seven substantive categories. Thus, in order to tackle 
proposition 2, the next paragraphs explores each of the seven categories in detail.   
 
1. Pay: In Italy the category of pay only addresses income security, while in Denmark it only 
addresses wage flexibility. This outcome reflects national institutional differences. The 
Danish flexicurity system is based on the principle that income levels are sustained through 
active social policies while sector level collective bargaining protects minimum-wage levels.  
This mechanism allows companies to adapt remuneration strategies according to their local 
resources. By contrast, in Italy, income security is achieved through a centralised system of 
wage setting and by enhancing job security through legal constraints.  
 
2. Training: In Denmark the category of training enables job transferability in the external 
labour market, thereby enhancing employment security. This is due to the fact that the Danish 
labour market is characterised by high levels of flexibility fostered through light regulation 
on individual dismissal and generous unemployment benefits. In addition, both in Italy and in 
Denmark, training fosters trade-offs between functional flexibility and employment security. 
However, two factors reduce the effect of training policies on employment security in Italy.  
First, laws have operated to reduce external mobility. As a result, training measures do not 
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play the same strategic role as in Denmark in terms of creating job opportunities for 
outsiders.  On the contrary, in Italy training measures increase internal mobility, leading 
primarily to trade-offs between functional flexibility and job security. Secondly, the 
investment in active labour policies made by sector level social partners in these two 
countries is based on a substantially different approach: in Denmark the sector funds in-job 
and vocational training directly; in Italy training policies are enacted by allowing companies 
to match their training needs with the resources available locally. As the burden of employee 
up-skilling and re-skilling is to a large extent on the shoulders of single employers – and only 
marginally sustained by public resources – training policies in Italy are more likely to 
enhance internal forms of flexibility and job security. However,  as Chapter 4 revealed, given 
the high level of flexibility required by the chemical and pharmaceutical industry – high 
intense in technologies and organised on a continuous process basis – sector level social 
partners have used apprenticeship programmes as a means to gain some sort of external 
flexibility in exchange for in-job and education for employees. In doing so, they produced a 
trade-off between external flexibility and employment security. Finally, in Denmark, the 
category of training also leads to a variety of trade-offs between functional flexibility and 
income security and functional flexibility and combination security. This data further 
corroborates proposition 2 suggesting that the national framework within which the Danish 
sector level social partners interact provides them with more institutional resources than their 
Italian counterparts. In particular, through the direct administration of training funds 
bargaining actors have increased the variety of items they can rely upon towards the 
negotiations of flexibility and security trade-offs.  It follows that, when engaging with issues 
of flexibility and security sector level social partners in Denmark have more autonomy and 
the scope of their bargaining agendas is more extensive than their counterparts in Italy.  
 
3. Job classifications: this category is only an object of sector level collective bargaining in 
Italy, reflecting the choice of social partners not to give up on centralised wage bargaining. A 
rigid principle of classifying employees according to their education, responsibilities, and 
seniority has been pursued in Italy, as a way of protecting the income levels of employees. 
However, in Italy chemicals and pharmaceuticals have experienced higher demands for 
functional flexibility in comparison to other industries. Therefore, sector level collective 
bargaining has progressively adapted its classification scheme to the increasing need for a 
multi-skilled and multi-functional workforce. Negotiations on job classifications have been 
instrumental to the enhancement of both dimensions of functional flexibility and income 
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security as well as functional flexibility and job security. Furthermore, in 2012 the job 
classification scheme was reformed in an attempt to transfer the effects of in-job training and 
education to the external labour market, thereby improving both functional flexibility and 
employment security. Yet, because of the weak link that exists in Italy between training 
measures and employment security, and because of the reduced scope for external flexibility 
in the labour market, the job classifications reform is still more likely to address job security 
than it is employment security.  In Denmark, this category is not an object of sector level 
collective bargaining at all, simply because sector level bargaining is only entitled to set 
minimum wage levels, while pay bargaining occurs primarily at the company level.  
 
4. Working-time: given the nature of chemicals and pharmaceuticals’ production processes, 
in Italy and Denmark alike, social partners have relied heavily on working-time as one of the 
most functional means to deliver high productivity levels. Thus, the scope of sector level 
bargaining on working-time traditionally has been very extensive. However, one of the most 
distinguishing responsibilities of trade unions in this particular sector is the role they play in 
monitoring the potential implications of working-time flexibility on workers’ health and 
safety and work-life balance. Interviews with social partners in both countries confirm the 
direct involvement of those at the sector level in making sure that productivity targets 
(working-time flexibility) are not met at the expense of employees’ well-being (combination 
security). Therefore, in contrast to a previous study conducted on the manufacturing sector 
(Ibsen and Mailand, 2011), the present research does not refrain from linking the category of 
working-time to trade-offs between working-time flexibility and combination security.  
 
 5. Provisions for atypical workers: this category in Denmark is not a target of sector level 
bargaining because the level of external flexibility is extensive enough to encourage standard 
forms of employment. In contrast, in Italy, provisions for atypical workers have entered 
collective bargaining agendas as a result of delegating mechanisms included in the law 
liberalising temporary contracts. This legislation enhances external flexibility in the labour 
market, while sector level bargaining provides job security by setting restrictions on the use 
and quotas for temporary workers.   
 
6. Social benefits and entitlements: the analysis of the agreements suggests that negotiations 
on the category of social benefits and entitlements address primarily the dimension of 
security, in particular, income and combination security, both in Italy and in Denmark, and 
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employment security only in Denmark. This confirms that the scope for employment security 
in sector level bargaining is wider in Denmark than in Italy. In addition this study shows that 
in Denmark negotiations over this particular category also enhance working-time flexibility 
and combination security. However, interviews with social partners reveal that, in Denmark, 
collective bargaining on social benefits and entitlements may lead to further trade-offs. Once 
again, this result can be understood in light of the autonomy afforded to the Danish social 
actors by the institutional framework in which they interact. During the latest economic 
crisis, for example, sector level social partners used their autonomy to bargain over new 
provisions – severance payments and training programmes for dismissed employees – 
thereby contributing to levels of employment and income security. These measures, however, 
are interpreted by both sides of the negotiation table as a means to protect the right of 
employers to easily dismiss workers (external flexibility) while contrasting the growth of 
precarious jobs (employment security). Although more effectively in Denmark than in Italy, 
social benefits and entitlements are traded by the employers’ organisations in exchange for 
higher flexibility in both countries. Therefore, in line with existent findings (Ibsen and 
Mailand, 2011), trade-offs between flexibility and security in this category are interpreted as 
an outcome of the overall package deal.   
 
7. Measures for employment: in Denmark negotiations over the category of measure or 
employment address both employment and combination security, and functional flexibility 
and employment security. In Italy, this category addresses only external flexibility and 
employment security. In both countries the category of measures for employment has entered 
into the bargaining agenda to cope with the effects of the latest financial crisis. However, 
while in Denmark, priority is given to the enhancement of functional flexibility, in Italy the 
same category enhances external flexibility. This finding reflects the different role that sector 
level social partners exert over their respective labour markets. In Denmark, training funds 
are used to increase the extent of flexibility in the internal labour market and the level of 
security in the external labour market, while in Italy, where social partner do not manage 
similar resources, they tried to deal with peaks in demand by increasing external flexibility.    
 
Crucially, the analysis shows that although featuring similar sector level bargaining 
structures, the way in which social partners address flexibility and security in Italy and 
Denmark varies across the seven substantive categories. The extent of the variation can be 
partly explained by the role played by the welfare system and by labour law in shaping the 
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scope of social partners’ agenda.  In Italy, the regulation of the labour market through legal 
constraints reduces the autonomy of bargaining actors in addressing certain forms of 
flexibility and security – in particular, external flexibility and employment security. At the 
same time, it pushes internal forms of flexibility – such as functional and working-time 
flexibility – and job security into the bargaining agenda.  In Denmark, a minimal legal 
framework and generous unemployment benefits, enable social partners to take a more active 
role in shaping the degree of flexibility and security injected into the labour market.  
 
Thus, the findings confirm that sector level bargaining structures interact with macro 
institutional features, namely, social welfare and legal constraints.  However, the real picture 
is more nuanced than what proposition 2 suggests. It is shown that in Italy the law plays an 
important role in shaping the outcomes of negotiations over flexibility and security alike – 
and not just security. It does so by reducing the scope of the bargaining agenda and limiting 
the extent of social partners’ autonomy when engaging with these particular issues. In 
contrast, in Denmark, a minimal legal framework and a generous welfare system enable 
social partners to have a direct impact on the regulation of both flexibility and security. 
Further, the degree of autonomy afforded to the social partners in Denmark means that they 
have the capacity to adjust their respective agendas in response to unanticipated changes in 
economic conditions. This they have done by engaging with different forms of flexibility and 
security not primarily with flexibility as proposition 2 suggests. 
 
In other words, this comparative analysis of sector level agreements in Italy and Denmark, 
demonstrates that similar bargaining structures can lead to different outcomes on flexibility 
and security. Such differences are the result of the distinctive role played by the law and the 
welfare system in these two countries. While in both Italy and Denmark internal forms of 
flexibility are more prominent than external forms of flexibility, the research shows that it is 
the social partners in Denmark who have greater opportunities to enhance flexibility and 
security in the internal and external labour market alike, as well as to negotiate a wider 
variety of trade-offs between these. Such opportunities are provided by the interaction of 
sector level bargaining institutions with macro-institutional features. It is argued that it is the 
interaction between national and sector level institutions that is primarily responsible for the 
varying degrees of autonomy of sector level actors across these two countries.   
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7.5 The role of sector level institutions for firm level bargaining over flexibility and 
security: A comparative analysis between Italy and Denmark  
 
The second research question set out by the present comparative analysis (see Chapter 2) is 
aimed at observing the extent to which sector level social partners influence the way in which 
company level collective bargaining engages with issues of flexibility and security within the 
chemical and the pharmaceutical industry. The countries that are examined are Italy and 
Denmark as this issue does not arise in the UK.  
 
RQ1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different 
countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level 
bargaining agendas?  What are the implications for the actors involved? 
 
In order to answer this question proposition 3 will be examined: 
 
3. Articulating mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level influence the scope of company level bargaining over issues of 
flexibility and security (Marginson and Galetto 2015). 
 
Table 7.5 summarises how articulating mechanisms between bargaining levels are likely to 
allow categories of flexibility and security into the company level negotiations across Italy 
and Denmark. 
  
Table 7.5: Role of articulating mechanisms for company level bargaining in Italy and Denmark 
 Demarcation  Delegation  
 Italy Denmark Italy Denmark 
Pay Interconfederal Sectoral Sector DE (2012)  
Training  Sectoral 
 
Sector OC,  DE (2006) Sector DE (2007) 
Working-time  Sectoral 
 
Sector OC, DE (2009) Sector DE (2000) 
Job classifications Interconfederal  Sector DE (2012)  
Provisions for atypical workers   Sector DE (2012)  
Social benefits and entitlements   Sector OC, DE (2009)  
Measure for employment   Sector – Working-Time (1998) 
Sector  – Atypical work (2006) 
Sector – Solidarity pacts (2009) 
 
Note: OC= Opening clause – DE = Derogation clause 
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Consistent with proposition 3, Table 7.5 shows that in both Italy and Denmark mechanisms 
of procedural flexibility shape the content of company level bargaining over flexibility and 
security. In Italy all the seven substantive categories are expected to enter into the agenda of 
company level negotiators as a result of demarcation at the interconfederal level – on pay and 
job classifications – and delegation at the sector level – on training, working-time, provisions 
for atypical workers, social benefits and entitlements and measures for employment. By 
contrast, in Denmark, only the categories of pay, training, and working-time are expected to 
become items of company level negotiations since they are the ones explicitly covered by 
demarcation. However, in Denmark demarcation occurs only at the sectoral level meaning 
that managers and shop stewards have exclusive prerogative over such categories. Further, 
table 7.5 shows that, training in 2007, and working-time in 2000 have also been the object of 
a drastic opening clause providing that local actors can lower the minimum terms and 
conditions set forth at the sector level.   
 
So, it is suggested that, in Denmark, the clear framework within which competences 
delegation occurs, coupled with a high depth of collective bargaining (see 5.2.2), have 
provided company level actors with a wider degree of autonomy than in Italy. Due to the fact 
that legal regulation is minimal (see 7.3) and there is no interference from the confederal 
level, it is expected that Danish managers and shop stewards will feel more secure than their 
Italian counterparts when engaging with their bargaining competences, including those 
involving flexibility and security. In this regard, Chapter 4 shows that social partners in the 
Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector have broadly interpreted their bargaining 
competences and used their cooperative (special) relationship to enlarge the scope of 
company level negotiations. They did so by setting in place a series of delegating 
mechanisms, such as opening clauses and derogations.  However, as a result of this double 
level of coordination, overlaps between bargaining levels have emerged and the uncertainty 
of company level actors has potentially increased.   
 
Furthermore, Table 7.5 draws attention to the fact that the two tier-bargaining system has 
experienced a growth of procedural flexibility in both countries. In Denmark, the category of 
pay has been entirely delegated to company level negotiators – although minimum wage 
levels are still provided by the sector. In Italy, the interconfederal agreements (1993-2009-
2011) set in place a system of centralised wage bargaining according to which company level 
actors can only negotiate on variable pay. Yet, to cope with the effects of the economic crisis 
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in 2012 sector level social partners introduced a derogation clause establishing that entry-
level salaries could go below the parameters negotiated at the sector level.  This is an 
example of potential conflict between confederal and sector level provisions that may 
discourage company level actors from enacting newly delegated responsibilities. Employers 
are likely to refrain from engaging with provisions whose actual applicability is uncertain, 
while unions fear that local negotiations may reduce the protections provided by the sector 
level. 
 
With regard to training and working-time, both Italy and Denmark have reached a similar 
level of procedural flexibility. However, in Denmark this category has entered into the 
company level bargaining via demarcation, while in Italy via delegation. Over these 
particular categories Danish and Italian sector level bargaining institutions have played a 
fundamental role in shaping the agendas of firm level social partners, who as a result, are 
likely to address flexibility and security.  
 
Further, Table 7.5 shows that derogation-clauses feature in both countries. In Denmark, the 
so called ‘experimental scheme’ was introduced earlier than the ‘temporary derogation’ in 
Italy to cover the category of working-time (from 2000) and the category of training (from 
2007). Formally, the introduction of the ‘temporary derogation’ occurred in Italy with the 
2006 sector level agreement. However, this institutional mechanism did not increase the 
breadth of local bargaining topics as expected. According to the sector level social partners 
the main problems were, first, that, in order to enact this formula, management and shop 
stewards needed special authorisation from a central authority and second, that the matters 
eligible for derogation had been only vaguely identified.  
 
In 2009 sector level social partners in Italy signed an agreement entitled ‘Guidelines of Social 
Responsibility towards Local Level Collective Bargaining’ which removed the requirement 
for national approval of temporary derogations and identified specific areas of applicability. 
During the last bargaining round in 2012 the option to derogate was extended to all the 
categories that are relevant to this study, except for wage bargaining (pay can be modified in 
peius only for entry-level workers and in times of crisis). In contrast, in Denmark, job 
classification, provision for atypical workers, social benefits and entitlements, and measures 
for employment are neither the object of demarcation nor delegation. Therefore, only when 
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looking at the firm level will it be possible to gauge the extent to which they have become 
matters of company level negotiations (see Chapter 9). 
 
Thus the analysis of the agreements suggests that the formal scope of company level 
bargaining on issues of flexibility and security is wider in Italy than in Denmark. However, 
the interviews conducted at the sector level show that none of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies belonging to the employers’ organisations have signed any 
agreement derogating the terms and conditions set at the sector level. Future research may 
confirm whether the simplification of the procedure enabling temporary derogations will 
have enlarged the scope of company level bargaining in Italy and caused, as many detractors 
argue, a more deregulated system of collective bargaining decentralisation.  
 
In synthesis, despite timing and social partners’ effectiveness in pursuing further bargaining 
decentralisation, this comparative analysis shows that on the procedural aspects – the role of 
sector level bargaining for firm level social partners – the two countries under focus show 
more similarities than differences.  Both in Italy and Denmark, the coordinating mechanisms 
featured by the chemical and pharmaceutical sector do indeed shape the content of local level 
negotiations. In Italy all the seven substantive categories of flexibility and security can 
potentially enter into the agenda of managers and shop stewards, whereas in Denmark they 
are expected to bargaining only on pay, training, and working-time.  Yet, the extent to which 
such expectations are correct can only be determined by complementing the top-down 
approach with a bottom-up one and investigating the outcomes of collective bargaining over 
issues of flexibility and security at the company level (see Chapter 9). 
7.6 Discussion 
 
Consistent with Marginson and Galetto’s findings (2015), this study demonstrates that the 
institutional configuration framing the chemical and pharmaceutical sector in Italy, Denmark, 
and the UK accounts for the varying extent of social partners’ agendas over issues of 
flexibility and security. First, while in Italy and Denmark the multi-employer bargaining 
system exerts some pressure on social partners to engage with these particular issues. In the 
UK, informal social dialogue does not play an equivalent role. Sector level actors are shown 
to be ineffective in shaping the extent of flexibility and security injected into the labour 
market. In addition, due to the fact that the UK chemical and pharmaceutical sector is not 
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provided with any formal mechanisms governing the relationship between the sector and the 
company level, it is not possible to consider whether sector level institutions exert any 
influence on company level bargaining. Such findings shed further light on the fundamental 
role of sector level bargaining arrangements as a source of flexibility and security in the 
labour market.   
 
Crucially, consistent with Ibsen and Mailand (2011) and Marginson and Galetto (2015) this 
study demonstrates that in Danish and Italian collective agreements internal forms of 
flexibility are more prominent than external forms of flexibility. The chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector, in both countries, experiences particularly high demand for functional 
flexibility and working-time flexibility which collective bargaining addresses in a 
particularly effective way. This also occurs in Italy, where the scope for flexibility has been 
traditionally less extensive than in Denmark. Turning to security, the most original 
contribution of this study is to show that in the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector job 
security has entered into the bargaining agenda. This is in contrast to Marginson and 
Galetto’s findings (2015) which found that job security is not an outcome of negotiations 
at the sector level. This result can be explained by two different factors. First, Marginson and 
Galetto’s analysis (2015:7) focuses exclusively on ‘the direction of travel of sector level 
collective agreements’, reflecting the methodological choice not to consider the extent to 
which different dimensions of flexibility and security are the subject of legal regulation. 
Consistent with this approach, they argue that, in Italy, the categories of training and 
provisions for atypical workers address employment security. However, if sector level 
agreements in Italy are analysed in light of the laws regulating individual dismissal (Art. 18 
Law 300/70) and temporary contracts (legislative decree 368/2001), it emerges that there is 
only a little scope for employment security. Indeed, when legal provisions are in place to 
enhance job security, training measures are more likely to foster mobility in the internal 
labour  market  than  to  improve  the  level  of  employment  security  in  the  external  labour 
market (Streeck, 1988). Similarly, when the law entitles collective bargaining to introduce 
limits and quotas to the use of atypical contracts, the rationale is to increase job security for 
insiders at the expense of employment security for outsiders. 
 
The second reason lies in the different nature of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector and 
the metalworking sector (Marginson and Sisson, 2006; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 showed that in Italy, Denmark, and the UK alike, chemicals and 
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pharmaceuticals lie within a capital-intense industry, compete in a high-added value 
market, and require highly-skilled employees. A similar study conducted by Pulignano and 
Keune (2015) on the role of bargaining institutions across multinationals found that skills, 
products, and international competition shape the extent of local actors autonomy when 
negotiating on flexibility and security. By implication it is suggested that these particular 
factors may influence the outcomes of sector level negotiations too. For example, given the 
relatively high investment in skills development, and the positive productivity trends which 
characterise the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector, employers have more incentives 
than in other industries to retain their employees. At the same time, trade unions have gained 
more capacity – or bargaining power – to push job security into the bargaining agenda.   
 
Hence, this comparative analysis confirms that the institutional context in which sector level 
social partners interact does indeed help to shape the content of collective bargaining over 
issues of flexibility and security (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). 
Nevertheless, although featuring similar sector level bargaining structures, as well as similar 
articulation mechanisms between bargaining levels, Danish social partners have been shown 
to be more effective than Italian social partners a) in addressing issues of flexibility and 
security, and b) in negotiating a wider variety of flexibility and security trade-offs. It has 
emerged that there are at least two further elements that account for this particular result.  
 
First, by observing the role of social welfare and legal regulations in Italy and Denmark, it is 
found that the interaction between bargaining institutions and national institutional features 
help to shape the content of their sector level bargaining. Specifically, the high level of 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policies featured by the Danish flexicurity 
system enables social partners to focus on the regulation of different forms of flexibility and 
security both in the internal and the external labour market. Within this context, social 
partners can focus primarily on the improvement of labour market mobility by negotiating 
trade-offs between flexibility and security. By doing so they are able to meet both employers’ 
short-term demands and employees’ need for up-skilling and re-skilling. Differently, in Italy 
the level of external flexibility is restricted by legal regulation while the level of job security 
is enhanced by it. As a result, the scope for flexibility and security in the internal labour 
market is more extensive than in the external one, reducing the capacity of collective 
bargaining to lead to certain flexibility and security trade-offs. Thus, while confirming that 
the variation of scope for flexibility and security in collective bargaining across countries is 
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due to the differing boundary between legal regulations and collective agreements provisions 
(Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015) this study suggests that social 
welfare also plays an important role.  
 
Second, this study demonstrates that when exploring the extent of variation in bargaining 
outcomes across countries it is not only institutions that matter. Collective bargaining actors 
do indeed matter too. In this regard, Chapter 4 showed that the proactiveness of the Italian 
sector level social partners in re-defining bargaining competences and widening the extent of 
decentralisation in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector may have had important 
implications for flexibility and security. On the one hand, it has helped to reinforce the role of 
collective bargaining in the sector and fostered a climate of collaborative industrial relations 
(see Chapter 4). Because of this special relationship, social partners have pushed internal 
forms of flexibility and job security into their bargaining agenda and also negotiated a variety 
of flexibility and security trade-offs. On the other hand, by competing with the confederal 
level on a normative ground, social partners in the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector 
have blurred the boundaries of competences between bargaining levels. In so doing, they 
have produced a shift from decentralisation through demarcation to decentralisation through 
delegation, which has softened the controlling mechanisms set in place to govern the 
relationship between the sector and the company level. It follows that all the categories of 
flexibility and security that are relevant to this study have become potential items of company 
level negotiations.  In order to explore whether company level actors take their competences 
further, it is, however, necessary to combine the sector and the company foci and explore 
which forms of flexibility and which security have actually entered into their bargaining 
agenda (Chapters 8 and 9). For the moment, it can be only anticipated that, on the procedural 
aspects, the choices of sector level social partners have played a fundamental role. 
 
In synthesis, this comparative analysis of sector level industrial relations arrangements across 
Italy, Denmark and the UK confirms that different institutional frameworks influence the way 
in which flexibility and security are injected into the labour market at the sector level (Ibsen 
and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). In addition, this study demonstrates that, 
when comparing Italy and Denmark, more similarities than differences emerge across these 
two countries. Multi-employer bargaining structures are found to exert some pressure on 
Danish and Italian social partners to engage with different forms of flexibility and security, as 
well as to negotiate a variety of trade-offs between these. In contrast, in the UK, the lack of 
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collective bargaining institutions does not allow social partners to play a similar role for the 
labour market. Further, by governing the relationship between the sector and the company 
level the two-tier bargaining system which is a feature of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector in Italy and Denmark shapes the content of company level negotiations over flexibility 
and security. As a result, these issues are expected to be more likely to be addressed at the 
company level in these two countries than in the UK, where such institutional mechanisms do 
not exist. Similarly, the provision of a framework that steers company level bargaining on 
items of flexibility and security is likely to foster less heterogeneity in the content of 
collective agreements in Italy and Denmark than in the UK. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to fully grasp the extent to which sector level institutional mechanisms 
do actually influence the strategies of company level actors, further research needs to be 
undertaken on the outcomes of company level collective bargaining. Combining the sector 
and the company foci, it will be possible to observe the relationship between sector and 
company level institutions and the implications of such a relationship on issues of flexibility 
and security (Chapter 9).   
7.7 Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to address the first two research questions raised by 
the present comparative analysis. By exploring the industrial relations features which 
characterise the chemical and pharmaceutical sector across Italy, Denmark and the UK a 
series of relevant findings has emerged. 
 
First, different forms of flexibility and security have entered into sector level collective 
agreements both in Italy and Denmark. The institutional configuration of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector exerts some pressures on Danish and Italian social partners to address 
flexibility and security directly. As a result of their constant interaction the social partners 
have developed similar understandings over these particular issues and, at the same time, 
increased the opportunity for exchange, package deals and joint problem solving towards the 
definition of flexibility and security trade-offs.  
 
Second, sector level social dialogue in the UK does not play an equivalent role to collective 
bargaining in addressing flexibility and security. Significantly, it is shown that the lack of 
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sector level bargaining institutions in the UK does account for the ineffectiveness of the 
social partners in addressing these issues. The predominantly informal approach to social 
dialogue in the UK chemical and pharmaceutical sector hinders the social partners’ ability to 
develop common understandings around flexibility and security. As a result, the social 
partners in the UK are unable to elaborate shared actions towards the regulation of flexibility 
and security in the labour market. 
 
Third, although featuring similar sector level institutions, the scope for flexibility and security 
in Italian and Danish collective agreements varies across the two countries. It emerges that 
the interaction between national institutions and collective bargaining arrangements helps to 
shape the content of sector level bargaining over flexibility and security. In Italy, the law 
reduces social partners’ capacity to increase the level of flexibility and security in the external 
labour market. Therefore, sector level collective bargaining is more likely to address internal 
forms of flexibility and job security than in Denmark. In contrast, in Denmark, a weak legal 
framework and generous unemployment benefits enable social partners to regulate flexibility 
and security both in the internal and the external labour market as well as to negotiate a wider 
variety of flexibility and security trade-offs than in Italy. 
 
Fourth, by observing the articulation mechanisms governing the relationship between sector 
and company level bargaining in Italy and Denmark, this study demonstrates that the two-tier 
system has experienced a growth of procedural flexibility in both countries. However, this 
trend is more apparent in the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector than in the Danish 
one. As a result of a series of delegating mechanisms negotiated in 2009 – in particular 
opening clauses and derogations – in Italy, all the substantive categories of flexibility and 
security have become matters of company level bargaining. In contrast, demarcation of 
competences in Denmark is more fluid and only the categories of pay, working-time, and 
training have been devolved to company level negotiators. It is shown, however, that the 
extent to which local level actors are likely to take their competences further is not only 
shaped by institutions. The choices of the sector level social partners also play a fundamental 
role. The distinctive proactiveness of social partners in the Italian chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector may have had important implications for the way in which issues of 
flexibility and security are addressed within this industry. First, this proactiveness has helped 
to strengthen the level of cooperation between sector level actors towards the definition of a 
shared bargaining agenda. Second, it has blurred the boundaries of demarcation producing 
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uncertainty over the competences of company level actors. These two characteristics, along 
with a low depth of the bargaining system, are likely to affect company level actors’ 
autonomy who, as a result, are less likely than their Danish counterparts to enter into local 
bargaining on issues of flexibility and security.  
 
In order to observe what forms of flexibility and what forms of security have actually entered 
into the firm level bargaining agenda, the sector focus needs to be complemented with a 
company one. 
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Chapter 8: Company Case-Studies 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the context within which the company level analysis has been carried 
out, the primary objective being to lay the empirical basis for the comparison undertaken in 
Chapter 9 where the following research question (RQ2) will be addressed: 
 
o RQ2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements 
at the sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of 
security outcomes?  
o RQ2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition 
and organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of security 
outcomes? What are the implications in terms of the nature of negotiated trade-offs? 
 
Given the highly internationalised nature of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector, the 
companies under focus are manufacturing plants of large multinational organisations. In order 
to protect their anonymity they have been given the pseudonyms of Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 
(in Italy) and Firma 1 and Firma 2 (in Denmark).  Access has been secured through the 
Italian and Danish employers’ organisations – Federchimica and DI – and national/sectoral 
trade unions – in particular, Filctem-Cgil and HK-Privat in Italy and Denmark respectively. 
Two case-studies have been selected for each country reflecting the methodological 
underpinnings of the present thesis, that are, first, to underscore issues of within-country 
variation, and second, to further explore the role of micro-organisational contingencies in 
shaping the agenda of firm level collective bargaining. However, the choice of the actual 
organisations was purely pragmatic and dependent on the companies’ consent. The researcher 
nevertheless provided the intermediaries at the sectoral level with a series of selection 
criteria: production sites needed 1) to employ more than 250 employees, 2) be covered by 
either company or site-level bargaining, 3) secure access to their collective agreements and 
allow for interviews with both managers and shop stewards, and 4) to be integrated in an 
international organisation having more than one production plant.  
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In light of this, the chapter covers both the economic and the institutional features framing 
collective bargaining in each of the four manufacturing plants, selected in order to allow 
similarities across countries and cases to emerge (see Chapter 3).  The following issues will 
be investigated: 1) the structural characteristics of the companies; 2) collective bargaining 
actors; 3) the relationship between bargaining levels; 4) the outcomes of collective bargaining 
over flexibility and security; and 5)  the nature of flexibility and security trade-offs. Once this 
context has been established, it will be possible to complete the second level of the 
comparative institutional analysis where the sector findings that emerged in Chapter 7 will  
finally be combined with the outcomes of company level bargaining (see Chapter 9).  
8.2 Impresa 1 
 
Impresa 1 is a manufacturing plant of an international and vertically integrated company 
employing 35 thousand people in 37 countries. It is headquartered in South Africa and 
operates world-wide facilities supplying a range of products such as liquid fuels, high-value 
chemicals and low carbon electricity.  Its value-chain has a group structure based on four 
clusters – South Africa (SA) Energy, International Energy, Chemical, and Other Businesses 
– that work as diverse and independent business units organised along product lines. The 
company owns more than 200 direct and indirect subsidiaries globally which conduct their 
businesses through one or more divisions. Each subsidiary has its own board of directors. 
Thus, the company only exercises its right to ensure that the groups’ minimum requirements 
are complied with in respect of matters such as financial management, internal control, 
human resources management, stakeholder relationship, and sustainability. Figure 8.1 
provides a representation of the company’s segmental operating model.   
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Fig 8.1 Company’s operating model 
 
 
The financial performance of the organisation is solid with group operating profits growing 
23 per cent in 2012 alone, notwithstanding the volatility of the macroeconomic environment 
– in particular the euro zone crisis – and further operational challenges. Due to the 
characteristics of the product market and the level of integration, this company is constantly 
subject to significant risks with regard to: 1) the development of new technologies, 2) skills 
shortages, 3) feedstock costs, 4) interruption of the value chain for labour disruption or 
stoppages in the supply of oil, gas, and water, and 5) compliance with safety legislation. 
Therefore, there is a strong global management focus on cost control which is achieved 
through internal benchmarking. Such practices, aimed at delivering targeted performances 
and developing standardised management systems, exert strong rationalisation pressures on 
individual divisions and keep internal competition for investments high. 
 
In 2012 the chemical cluster was the most negatively affected by decreased demand on the 
back of the European crisis, reflected in lower profits. However, the specific production 
processes (O&S see Figure 8.1) with which the Italian divisions are involved showed 
particularly good performance indicators, contributing almost half of the chemical cluster’s 
operating profit. Despite some reduction in volumes, the divisions have maintained their 
gross margins and even saw some improvements.  In Italy, the company has a regional 
headquarters and three production plants in different regions that manufacture a number of 
diversified products both sold in the global market and processed for internal purposes. 
Figure 8.2 shows where the Italian divisions are located – Headquarters and Impresa 1 are 
Italian'Divisions'
[use'of'acronym'to'
protect'anonymity]'
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based in Lombardy, while two manufacturing plants are based in the south of Italy, one in 
Sicily and the other in Sardinia.    
 
Fig. 8.2 Map of Italian divisions 
 
 
 
Overall, the chemical cluster produces the world largest and most diversified portfolio of 
alcohols and surfactants’ derivatives and makes a contribution of 17 per cent to the group 
operating profit. More than 3 thousand buyers, predominantly industrial private customers, 
rely on these products, including intermediates that are used for detergents and cleaners, oil 
and gas recovery, metal processing, personal care, and lubricants. As a result, the company 
over the years has gained a strong competitive position in the global market.  
  
In Impresa 1 production is organised on a continuous process basis and 400 employees, 
predominantly skilled and highly skilled blue-collar workers, are involved with it in a variety 
of activities. Here, both the levels of employment and volumes of production have remained 
stable for the past ten years. Together with the Italian headquarters and a number of 
production plants, Impresa 1 used to be affiliated to a state-owned chemical enterprise 
privatised during the 1990s. The South African multinational took over in 2001. Yet, due to 
unsatisfactory financial results, in 2005 the Italian divisions underwent an important process 
of restructuring. As a result, top managers were completely replaced, three hundred people 
Headquarters'
Plant'1'
[Impresa'1]'
Plant'2' Plant'3'
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were laid off, and only three production sites survived.  Today, the Italian branches are 
relatively healthy and profitable. Strategic decisions with regard to global human resource 
management are shared with local management. However, HR managers at the local level 
are no longer in a position to act autonomously.  
  
8.2.1 Collective Bargaining Actors  
 
Due to the fact that the multinational to which Impresa 1 belongs owns 3 further divisions in 
Italy, collective bargaining in this manufacturing plant occurs within the framework provided 
by a company level agreement. These divisions, moreover, are located in different Italian 
regions, both in the North and the South and employ a significant number of workers – over 
six hundred. Therefore, company level bargaining has assumed a sort of a national character 
and become relevant not only for the actors involved but also for policy-makers in the 
country and the sector. This is demonstrated by the fact that within Federchimica, the 
employers’ organisation, the HR director of the company plays a particularly influential role.    
 
In collective bargaining the HR managers and shop stewards negotiate at two different and 
hierarchically related levels: the company and the plant level. In accordance with 
interconfederal and sectoral provisions, company level negotiations set out an overarching set 
of rules that apply to all the divisions alike, whereas those at plant level are more focused on 
the organisation of practical and specific aspects of the production lines.   
 
Reflecting the distinctive objectives of these two bargaining levels, negotiations involve 
different actors and end up with different types of agreements. Consistent with the fact that 
the company level has the primary function to translate the strategic directions of the global 
headquarters into acceptable compromises for both bargaining parties, the agreements at this 
particular level involve different varieties of items and take the form of package deals 
covering both blue and white collar workers. By contrast, the ad-hoc and pragmatic character 
of the provisions covered by plant level negotiators require a single-item approach and, 
depending on the issues, different categories of employees may be covered. It follows that 
bargaining rounds at the company level open once per year or every other year, while at the 
plant level negotiations are constantly on-going. Given the complementary relationship 
between company and plant level negotiations, this study takes into account the outcomes of 
the agreements signed at both levels. By doing so, it is possible to give a more thorough 
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account of the role of collective agreements in Impresa 1, in addressing flexibility and 
security. 
 
The main actors involved in collective bargaining across the four divisions (two in 
Lombardy, one in Sardinia and one in Sicily) are:  
 
Employer’s side 
 
• HR Director  as driver 
• Italy CEO as a link to the global structure 
• CEFO in order to monitor the financial impact of the collective agreement 
 
Unions’ side 
 
• National officers representing the three most representative unions with the key role 
of unifying the different positions across geographical locations, 
• Unitary Work Place Structure (RSU) delegates for each site 
 
The main actors involved in collective bargaining within Impresa 1 are as follows 
 
Employer’s side: 
 
• HR general director (depending on the topic) 
• Plant level HR directors and line managers 
 
Unions’ side:  
 
• RSU delegates – the most representative union within Impresa 1 is Filctem-Cgil while 
Femca-Cisl, and Uilcem-Uil are the second and the third most representative 
respectively. All unions in total represent the 50 per of the workforce. 
• Sector level officials are involved when issues are particularly sensitive, such as for 
pay and collective dismissals and/or any time the agreement is hard to reach. 
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In Impresa 1, collective bargaining is seen as a function that adds value to the business 
strategy. Both sides of the negotiating table affirm that their respective sector level 
organisations have had a pivotal role in fostering a culture of constructive social dialogue and 
making sure that it could survive important generational and structural changes. The HR 
director reveals that he sits on the Industrial Relations National Committee based in 
Federchimica. The chemical employers’ organisation is the only one within the main 
Confederation – Confindustria – that includes firm level representatives as permanent 
members. By participating in national negotiations as a signatory party the HR director has, 
therefore, both actively shaped and reproduced the sector’s distinctive values: 
 
There is a top-down as well as a bottom-up approach to industrial relations in the 
sector that has fostered a particularly favourable exchange of views across 
bargaining levels. Sector level social partners set a series of conditions [framework 
agreement], but they are also very receptive to the demands we [HR directors] have. 
There has been a clear will to set in place this particular model of industrial 
relations, without the commitment of the employers’ organisations, the national trade 
unions and the companies this would have not been possible.  
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012   
 
Similarly, the union side suggests that the culture of consensus promoted by the sector has 
proved to be particularly successful at the firm level. Sector level trade unions and shop 
stewards make sure that this legacy is kept alive by cooperating on different grounds. This 
occurs both by organising joint training activities and supporting each other during collective 
bargaining. For example, when engaging with particularly delicate matters, such as pay, 
sector level officials take part in order to strengthen the shop stewards’ bargaining power. 
Further, being independent from the firm and expert on the content of the agreements, they 
make sure that local disputes do not interfere with national interests. Interviews suggest that 
there is a strong interdependency between Impresa 1’s RSU and the sector level 
representatives. 
 
‘We [RSU delegates] are paid to work here. We are hired by an employer not for 
representing a union. This also implies that we have limits: when we have our 
meetings with the general HR director I have to study things. The HR director is the 
man who signed the last sector level agreement. I can’t know the document as much 
as he does. I’m in the company for other reasons. We [delegates] have to use common 
sense and leave political matters to those who can deal with them [sector level 
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unions]. I wouldn’t be able to take full responsibility for company level bargaining on 
a variable pay scheme’. 
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
The participative model of industrial relations characterising the chemical and the 
pharmaceutical sector in Italy is reflected in the collaborative relationship developed by 
managers and shop stewards in Impresa 1. 
 
‘It is difficult to answer a question that wants you to summarise in a few sentences 
how the relationship is between us and the unions. It has been a long process but I 
could say: overall good with difficult moments depending on the topics; certainly 
collaborative’. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
The fact that we have constant confrontation brings about - I don’t want to use the 
word admiration - but at least reciprocal trust... The chemical sector is the only one 
in which RSU delegates and heads of HR departments participate together in sector 
level meetings…Often people think that this particular relationship is due to the 
characteristics of the chemical employee: highly skilled and well paid. However, we 
[chemical unions’ representatives/workers] like to remind that we also have blue 
collars; we have manufacturing plants as well as the metalworking sector. I think this 
[special relationship] is really a result of the training we have, and on those shared 
meetings [at the sector level]. We know each other, we can confront without 
necessarily fighting. The company sees that we are willing to help, that we are on the 
same boat after all.  
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
This notwithstanding the HR director expressed a number of concerns over the future of the 
participative model enacted by Impresa 1. These have to do with important changes a) in the 
institutional configuration of the collective bargaining system, b) in the strategic interests of 
the companies, and c) ineffectiveness of union responses. According to him, such changes are 
redefining the context of firm level negotiations making it increasingly hard for industrial 
relations actors to retain their autonomy and find compromises that are suitable to all. 
 
a) Negotiations are always more time consuming because many actors are involved at 
different levels: from the national [sector] to the company passing by the territorial 
ones. At some stages – and with some of them in particular – the process goes 
smoother, with others seems impossible. Often, it also happens that the confederal 
level decides to give its contribution and then things get really messed up! 
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b) Social actors have changed affecting the possibility to find compromises. I’m now 
one of the oldest actors left in the chemical industrial relations (IR) scenario, and I 
see clearly that companies’ approach is changing. IR are losing their strategic role to 
the business, often this activity is perceived by companies as a pain, a residual 
responsibility for the HR department whose focus is clearly shifting to direct 
management. The new hired in HR are quite young business oriented profiles with no 
interest or enthusiasm for IR and no skills or training to talk to the unions. 
 
c) We deal with the fact that there is a lack of employees’ representation, thus 
negotiations have become very difficult and unstable. Unions’ representatives 
perfectly know that they have lost consensus [in Impresa 1], this is why they tend to 
subject the content of our collective agreements to referendum, which is 
unacceptable! If employees do not agree with it, are we supposed to start over? In the 
past we were perfectly able to convince our respective sides of the value of each 
compromise found…it is not a coincidence that one of the latest objectives of 
Federchimica is to create a school of IR that HR managers and RSUs delegates will 
have to compulsory attend. Now, it is all about preserving our history and tradition’. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
Similar considerations on the reduction of social partners’ autonomy emerge from the 
interview with the RSU delegate. However, he identifies a main driver for the change, 
primarily the internationalisation of the company’s business strategy. 
  
Company and plant level negotiations work very well in good times, when everyone 
takes advantage of a democratic decision-making: shop stewards for obvious reasons, 
and management in terms of reputation. But what are we supposed to do when your 
HR director calls you and tells you that the EU headquarters has decided to 
implement a certain thing in a certain period of time? My answer cannot be: hold on, 
let me organise an assembly with the employees, discuss some options, vote for one of 
them and get back to you with a counterproposal. That’s just not possible! The HR 
director’s answer would be: I give you 10 days and take into account that if you don’t 
make the right call this manufacturing site could be relocated in China. You say yes! 
Meanwhile unions have lost their role and credibility. And how about HR managers, 
actually? HR Managers, especially at plant level have zero power. They give voice to 
what the headquarters decides. 
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
To summarise, the interviews with the social partners reveal that the participative model of 
industrial relations characterising the chemical and the pharmaceutical sector is reproduced at 
the firm level, where bargaining actors have developed a trust-based and collaborative 
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relationship. This is the result of a shared process involving sector level employers’ 
organisations and trade unions which, through both a top-down and bottom-up approach, 
have developed a notion of collective bargaining as a common value. However, both sides of 
the negotiating table express some concerns about the future applicability of this model 
within the company. There have been important changes both in the institutional environment 
and in the structure of the firm that have had important implications for the role of the 
collective bargaining actors. These changes are as follows: 
 
1. the increasing interferences at different bargaining levels with the competences of 
company level actors as a consequence of  bargaining decentralisation;  
2. the increasing pressure on local management at the expense of industrial democracy 
due to the company’s internationalisation; 
3. the marginalisation of shop stewards as a result of their ineffectiveness in representing 
employees’ interests.    
 
Such changes, in Impresa 1 are reducing the autonomy of HR managers and the RSU who are 
finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the demands of those they respectively represent – 
the headquarters directions on the one hand and the employees’ interests on the other. 
8.2.2 Collective Bargaining Institutions and Bargaining Decentralisation 
 
Given the multi-level nature of the Italian collective bargaining system HR managers and 
shop stewards, in Impresa 1, act within a framework of conditions set forth at the confederal, 
the sectoral, and the company level. In particular, the social partners emphasise the 
differences in the strategic objectives of the company level and plant level negotiations, as 
these are the ones that most directly influence the outcomes of their interactions. 
 
The target of company level negotiations is to supplement the sector level agreement through 
ad-hoc provisions that support the strategic interests of the multinational to which Impresa 1 
belongs.  At this level, the main concerns of the social partners have been to improve the 
company’s performance over two fundamental parameters: profitability and productivity. The 
2013 bargaining round has, however, devolved part of this responsibility to Impresa 1. By 
increasing the degree of procedural flexibility, it has therefore widened the scope of the plant 
level bargaining agenda.  
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First, the latest company level agreement (2013) linked the Italian divisions’ profitability to 
that of the global business, meaning that wage conditions are no longer dependent on the 
average performance of the three sites. In exchange for the unions’ consent to give up one of 
their main prerogatives, namely, pay bargaining, management offered the possibility to the 
plant level social partner of bargaining over three per cent of the variable pay scheme.  
 
Second, the company level agreement entitled the social partners in Impresa 1 to negotiate on 
a series of items that are assumed to enhance productivity. Plant level managers and shop 
stewards are, in fact, considered more capable than company level actors of identifying 
measures which improve the way in which work is organised. They have a better sense of: a) 
the typology of activities carried out, b) the resources available, and c) the technological and 
skill requirements. 
 
In Impresa 1 the indicators of productivity are: 
 
- Efficiency of technologies and machineries; 
- Organisation of work; 
- Usage of the plants ; 
- Volume and levels of production; 
- Typology of products manufactured and skills deployed; 
- Quality; 
- Individual productivity. 
 
In other words, while the role of company level agreements is to implement the global 
strategy with regard to human resource management, plant level negotiations deal with the 
more pragmatic and organisational aspects of the production processes. Ideological 
differences between actors at this level are minimal; collective bargaining is perceived as a 
resource to strengthen the competitive position of the plant. In Impresa 1 managers and shop 
stewards have used this opportunity to negotiate primarily on issues such as flexitime, 
working-hours, and shift-work.  Both sides of the negotiating table refer to both company and 
plant level collective agreements as one of the positive outcomes of their constant and 
constructive interactions. They, nonetheless, recognise the more fundamental role of the 
sector level framework as a source of regulation. According to them this represents the 
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primary means to benchmark employment conditions and allows the sector’s culture to be 
retained. 
  
The main advantage of plant level bargaining is that there is low level of conflict 
between social actors. We know each other much better and we confront on a wider 
variety of items than the ones typically discussed at the sector level. Having said that, 
I believe that the sector level collective agreement still represents the most important 
reference we should have to regulate the employment relationship. We need the sector 
to be able to provide a few, clear, reliable rules and mechanisms that allow those 
[companies] who can afford it to bargaining over local and organisational issues. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
Obviously company level CB becomes the ‘space’ in which companies can develop 
innovative and creative solutions, as well as to find a customised answer to specific 
requests. It becomes functional to companies’ need of speeding up some processes 
taking into account also the RSU suggestions. So, it is fair to recognise both sides an 
area of freedom in which to meet up and find original compromises. From our 
perspective, however, it is more effective to act within the framework set by the sector 
level social partners than to authorise each single site to reconsider things all the 
time. We need stability in order to be productive and competitive. What we want is a 
few stable and reliable rules. For the IR strategy we have, further decentralisation of 
CB would be rather dangerous.  
Impresa 1 CEO, December 2012 
 
Decentralised bargaining is positive in the sense that it allows employees to 
participate in the decisions related to how work is organised and how they can 
contribute to improve competitiveness and productivity. However, decentralised 
bargaining is tough during economic downturns, it increases the conflict between 
parties and social dialogue deteriorates, left aside the marginalisation of shop 
stewards… The sector level agreement is like the bible because it contains rules that 
apply to everyone. Then, if there are chances to improve those rules via company 
level bargaining, why not? Decentralisation doesn’t have to mean abandoning the 
sector level collective agreement, rules are there, I [as a shop-steward] can only make 
them better. 
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
Further, all the social partners confirmed that when engaging in plant level negotiations they 
do so in light of the rules and procedures set forth at the confederal, the sectoral, and the 
company level. The HR director, in particular, referred to the 1993 interconfederal 
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Agreement as a fundamental piece of regulation that, although formally superseded (see 
Chapter 4), in Impresa 1, still represents the main source of decentralisation.  
 
The agreement that really matters is the one signed in 1993, the rest is politics. They 
needed to sign a new agreement because there were political interests pushing 
towards this direction. The target of the government [Berlusconi government] was to 
get rid of Cgil and the same target has eventually started to be relevant to Cisl. But if 
you ask me if those agreements really matter my answer is no. If you read the 
agreement [2009 interconfederal agreement] with the eyes of those who should 
practically implement it, it is a totally useless tool…no, no, no, I’m very critical on the 
subject’. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
For this reason, the social partners in Impresa 1, confirmed that the main way in which they 
engage with the competences they have been delegated is through the opening-clauses 
offered by the sector level agreement. No derogations have been hitherto negotiated. They all 
agree on the need to keep in place a well-functioning framework for coordination, especially, 
since there has been a shift at the sector level from a prescriptive to a more programmatic 
approach.  
 
From the union perspective, the only way to retain some form of coordination – and to resist 
increasing attempts towards their marginalisation – is to secure a strong link between sector 
and company level representatives. While strengthening shop-steward bargaining power, this 
approach has nonetheless increased the risk of overlaps between bargaining levels. 
 
There is a clear distribution of competences between bargaining levels, but some of 
them may overlap. For example, when company level bargaining starts, also we 
[sectoral unions’ representatives] participate in it to support shop stewards.  
Impresa 1, Sector level Official Filctem-Cgil, June 2013 
 
This also suggests that HR managers in Impresa 1 are more independent than shop stewards 
are from their respective sector level organisations. 
 
It’s a matter of roles and competences. According to my experience an RSU may be 
not qualified enough to negotiate over certain items. If an RSU signs an agreement 
without carefully consider the consequences, it could significantly damage 
employees…for the relationship we have here at Impresa 1 I think delegates don’t risk 
to be tricked, but plant level and company level bargaining can be a very dangerous 
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tool to be played against us. First, we [delegates] are not professionals, remember? 
But our counterpart is made by professionals. Second, we work here. This gives you 
an idea of the unbalance between us…it is better to leave some matters to those who 
can deal with them’. 
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
In contrast, the HR director affirms: 
 
Speaking about company level collective bargaining we [management] are much 
more independent from the national [sectoral] and confederal levels than our 
counterparts. Once we have agreed our bargaining platform with Federchimica we 
normally have nothing to worry about. Unions’ representatives at times are 
incoherent, inconsistent and weak, especially when they report to the confederal level, 
which is the moment in which they feel more politically exposed. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
This poses an important challenge to the union side. As a result of their reducing effectiveness 
in representing employees, management has actually started to question the mandate of shop 
stewards. Crucially, if management cannot trust the RSU to represent employees and to 
ensure that there are no obstacles to the actual implementation of collective agreements, they 
will also be sceptical about the contribution that local negotiations may bring about: 
 
Negotiations often last 3 years, in those 3 years unions’ representatives should get an 
understanding of what their members’ want. If they are not able to do so, then we 
[management] may consider the possibility to call our employees and explain it to 
them directly. In the past this could have never happened and it is a clear sign of 
unions’ weakness. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
Another problem we have with unions is that they have changed the way in which they 
organise themselves: in the past unions had a hierarchical structure where roles 
where clearly defined. Once we reached an agreement at a certain level, at such a 
level this agreement would have never been contested. Now everything is different, 
even though we have the agreement, unions are too weak to implement it successfully. 
They are not able to get the approval of their own internal divisions and subdivisions. 
For the company this is a total disaster, if we find an agreement we don’t want it to be 
re-discussed and re-approved via referendum at local level. This affects significantly 
union representatives’ credibility in our eyes. The typology of our interlocutors 
doesn’t help the process of negotiation. We [managers] have a way of communicating 
that is much more transparent than theirs: we organise site review meetings twice per 
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year in which all unions’ representatives and employees are invited. In these meetings 
we inform employees over the company’s financial results and achievements, and we 
discuss any kind of issues and challenges that may be raised’.  
Impresa 1 CEO, December 2012 
 
To summarise, the interview data suggest that the main role of collective bargaining within 
Impresa 1 is to deal with the pragmatic and organisational aspects of the production 
processes. HR managers and the RSU negotiate over particular issues that are likely to 
augment the level of productivity, thereby strengthening the competitive position of the 
manufacturing plant.  They do so in respect of the coordinating mechanisms set in place at 
the confederal, the sectoral and the company level reflecting the multi-level nature of the 
Italian collective bargaining system. In addition, the social partners, in Impresa 1, reveal that 
the latest institutional developments at confederal level (2009 and 2011 agreements) have had 
a limited impact on the scope of their bargaining agenda. However, given the more 
pronounced power imbalances at the local level, the threat of further decentralisation had the 
effect to marginalise RSU delegates who, as a result, rely increasingly on sector level social 
partners. While on the one hand this strengthens their bargaining power and intensifies inter-
organisational cooperation, on the other, it produces not only overlaps between the bargaining 
levels but also uncertainty over the actual applicability of the agreements. Managers have 
responded to this by questioning the mandate of shop stewards.  The trust-based relationship 
between the social partners in Impresa 1 has, therefore, come under significant strain. 
8.2.3 Flexibility and Security in Collective Bargaining  
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements made available by the social partners 
in Impresa 1 were considered and contrasted with the interview data.  Table 8.1 indicates 
which company level agreements address each of the seven flexibility and security 
categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, Bekker, 
Wilthagen et al. 2008), and indicates whether the provisions enhance flexibility and security,  
and if so which forms.  
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Table 8.1: Impresa 1 – Flexibility and security in collective bargaining  
  Flexibility Security  
Pay 
Interconfederal 
Demarcation 
Implementation of the company Short-Incentive Scheme (2013) 
Variable Pay (2015, 2013, 2012, 2010, 2008, 2006, 2004, 2002) 
Wage 
Wage 
 
 
Training 
Sectoral 
Delegation 
Introduction of new job profiles (2011, 2011, 2007) Functional  Job  
Job Classifications 
Interconfederal 
Demarcation 
Introduction of new job profiles (2011, 2011, 2007) Functional Income 
Working-time 
Sectoral 
Delegation 
Shift-work (2015-2014-2013-2012, 2011---) 
Extended scope for on-call work (2013) 
Overtime can be accumulated and used as personal time-off or 
monetised (2014-2012-2011-2010) 
Working-Time 
Working-Time 
Working-Time 
 
Combination 
Combination  
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
Sectoral 
Delegation 
   
Social Benefits and 
Entitlements 
Sectoral 
Delegation 
Transport service (2014 – 2005) 
 
Company Welfare Fund (Faschim) substituting a previous 
health plan instituted in the 1990s (2013) 
 
Vocational Training Fund and Lunch Voucher (2014) 
 
 
Combination  
 
Combination 
 
 
Combination 
Measures for 
employment 
Sectoral 
Delegation 
   
 
Table 8.1 shows that social partners in Impresa 1 do indeed regulate flexibility and security. 
They do so by negotiating over five out of the seven substantive categories that both the 
interconfederal and the sector level agreements delegate to company and plant level 
bargaining. While pay and job classification have entered onto the local agenda thanks to 
demarcation at the interconfederal level, all the other categories, training, working-time, and  
social benefits and entitlements, have been delegated from the sector to the company and 
plant level of bargaining. 
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This confirms that articulation mechanisms exist and that they enable management and shop 
stewards to engage with these particular issues. Specifically, data shows that most of the 
agreements reached in recent years in Impresa 1 involved the categories of pay and working-
time followed by training and job classification, thereby confirming that productivity targets 
are at the top of the bargaining agenda. These categories address wage, working-time and 
functional flexibility respectively. With regard to security, it is worth noticing that given the 
centralised system of wage bargaining provided by the sector, job classifications enhance 
income security while training enhances job security. Both categories of working-time and 
social benefits and entitlements address combination security. External flexibility and 
employment security are not an outcome of collective bargaining in Impresa 1 showing that 
the social partners have the capability to inject flexibility and security exclusively in the 
internal labour market.   
 
Further, Table 8.1 indicates that the fact that articulation mechanisms comprise categories 
addressing flexibility and security does not necessarily mean that they all enter onto the 
agenda of plant level negotiations. For example, the category of Provisions for Atypical 
Workers is not an object of plant level collective bargaining at all. This confirms that local 
actors, in Impresa 1, refrained from implementing the 2009 interconfederal agreement – and 
by implication, the delegation included in the 2012 sector level agreement too – which 
recognises that it is possible for company level actors to negotiate provisions on atypical 
workers.  Such consideration can be extended to the category of measures for employment, 
included in the 2012 sector level agreement as an important driver of procedural flexibility.  
 
Crucially, this finding shows that the agenda of the social partners in Impresa 1 is not shaped 
by institutional mechanisms only – demarcation at the confederal level and/or delegation at 
the sector level. The choices of the actors also play a fundamental role. The interview data 
suggest that there are two factors that may account for such choices. One is the level of union 
density which, in Impresa 1, is about 50 per cent of the entire workforce. Employee 
representatives fear that management could take advantage of their relatively weak 
bargaining power to decrease the terms of the sectoral agreement. This is why they strongly 
rely on sector level representatives during negotiations. 
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I can’t say to Filctem representatives at the sector level that I want negotiate the 
short-incentive scheme because this is something that needs to happen at the company 
level [and not at site level]. If I do, the sector level would probably send me to hell 
and they would be right! This [taking further competences] is a topic in which 
common sense needs to prevail. You can call it modesty, caution, awareness of each 
other’s role, it doesn’t matter. Look, the RSU signature is very important, if the 
company goes with it to a national level union officer and says: ‘they have signed, 
that’s it!’ then there is nothing unions can do for you to amend this mistake. 
Sometimes companies can trick delegates a bit in order to sign something, because 
they are good at it. This is why it is always important to share the negotiation process 
with more competent people’. 
Impresa 1, RSU delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
The union side does not consider at all the possibility that plant level bargaining could 
actually improve employees’ conditions with regard to flexibility and security. This suggests, 
first, that at the plant level shop stewards are weaker bargaining actors than at the sector 
level, because they are employed by the company, and second, that trust between actors at 
this level may come under significant pressure.   
 
The other variable accounting for actors’ choices in Impresa 1 has to do with the effects of 
the 2009 and 2011 interconfederal agreements which, by softening the controlling 
mechanisms set in place to govern the relationship between the sector and the company level, 
caused uncertainty in the regulative framework of plant level negotiations. Indeed, by 
engaging only with the most traditional items of negotiations – as provided by the 1993 
interconfederal agreement – the HR managers, in Impresa 1, have contained the risk of 
lengthy and expensive litigation.  
 
How can collective bargaining possibly do such a thing [use the procedural flexibility 
they have]? Actors at the company level have a legal framework to respect, they can’t 
customise the law as they please. Unions at the company level should be much 
stronger for us [social partners] to be able to engage with flexibility or security more, 
are unions strong??![rhetorical]. Employees do not trust each other anymore, 
solidarity measures have been very unpopular, people do not like changes, especially 
if they might lose money’.  
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
Thus, this analysis shows that the institutional framework of the Italian collective bargaining 
system shapes the content of negotiations on issues of flexibility and security in Impresa 1. It 
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does so through articulation mechanisms set forth at the confederal level (demarcation) and 
the sectoral level (delegation). As a result, HR managers and the RSU bargain on the 
categories of pay, training, job classification, working-time, and social benefits and 
entitlements. Therefore, all the different dimensions of flexibility and security except for 
external flexibility and employment security are an outcome of plant level negotiations.  
 
Further, the social partners in Impresa 1 have not yet taken advantage of the procedural 
flexibility offered by the latest interconfederal agreements and – by implication, the sector 
level agreements as well. This suggests that the scope for flexibility and security in their 
bargaining agenda is only partly shaped by institutions, and that other factors play a 
fundamental role. These are: a) the extent of union density, b) the autonomy of company and 
plant level actors, and c) the level of trust between them. On the one hand, these factors 
induce shop stewards to refuse further bargaining competences that may reduce employee 
entitlements with regard to flexibility and security. On the other, they discourage HR 
managers from engaging with items that may cause long and costly litigation.  
8.2.4 Types of flexibility and types of security: Any trade-offs?  
 
Table 8.1 shows that not only have flexibility and security entered onto the agenda of 
company level negotiations, but also that the five substantive categories allow for different 
combinations of flexibility and security to occur. Pay only addresses wage flexibility, while 
working-time both addresses working-time flexibility and leads to a trade-off between 
working-time flexibility and combination security. Further, social benefits and entitlements 
addresses only security, while training and job classifications lead to different flexibility and 
security trade-offs. These are functional and job security, and functional and income security 
respectively. The interviews with the social partners reveal that this outcome is strictly related 
to the need of Impresa 1 to satisfy the financial objectives set by the global headquarters. 
Indeed, since the global expansion, the Italian divisions have undergone significant 
competitive pressures which, in 2005, resulted in the closure of two manufacturing sites. 
Issues of profitability and productivity have, therefore, become pivotal to Impresa 1 which, in 
order to survive, has relied heavily on the introduction of different forms of organisational 
flexibility. The HR director affirmed that the only way for collective bargaining to be 
considered as a useful resource by the global headquarters is to serve its strategic interests, 
first amongst these, the ability to quickly adjust to unexpected changes in the global market.  
230"
"
 
Flexibility has become increasingly relevant when the business has reached a global 
scale. Now it is vital for us to ensure that IRs maintain its strategic value to the 
company. Impresa 1 needs to be competitive in the global market and flexibility is a 
competitive advantage, as simple as that. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
Moreover, the interview with the CEO shows that Impresa 1 is not only subject to 
competitive pressures coming from the global environment but also from regular intra-site 
benchmarking. 
 
We go through benchmarking operations with the purpose of measuring the 
effectiveness of our processes and headcount. In the last one, the result hasn’t been so 
good. Basically we have been asked to describe the activities carried out by our 
employees and divide them into 2 categories: ‘standard’ and ‘not standard’. 
According to this measurement system the higher we score in the ‘not standard’ 
activities the more effective and efficient we are. Ninety per cent of the employees we 
have on shift resulted to be engaged in ‘standard activities’. This mainly shows that 
we are using more employees than other branches, thus, more than we would need… 
Impresa 1 CEO, December 2012 
 
Management react to both external and internal competitive pressures by deploying collective 
bargaining as a means to enhance flexibility and comply with the headquarters requests. In 
addition, they affirmed that in order to obtain the employees’ commitment to this, they offer 
different forms of security in exchange.  
 
‘If at the company level we work together it is more likely that flexibility and security 
are going to be simultaneously achieved. It’s logical: if employees keep an open mind 
on organisational flexibility, also their security may increase, and we will both 
achieve a better status.  We can’t always wait for things to change or rely on the 
government intervention, we have to make the most with the resources available…I 
see things changing very quickly around me and we must adapt. If we work together, 
however, we are more likely to contain and address such changes rather than keep 
running after them…On issues of flexibility companies can’t act unilaterally. Unions 
and employees’ support is fundamental, as it is fundamental a good managerial 
structure capable of elaborating and implementing effective strategies.  
Impresa 1 CEO, December 2012 
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This suggests that while procedural mechanisms enable different categories of flexibility and 
security to enter onto the bargaining agenda, the actual types of flexibility and security 
negotiated, in Impresa 1 are linked to organisational choices arising from firm-specific 
contingencies. For example, negotiations on training and job classifications were part of a 
series of organisational changes aimed at improving Impresa 1’s performance on the above 
mentioned productivity indicators. The system of job classifications has been made 
increasingly more flexible to achieve functional flexibility, while different forms of monetary 
compensation have enhanced the dimension of income security. At the same time constant 
training has ensured that employees can take up new tasks and responsibilities while 
increasing their long-term job security. Given the continuous nature of the production 
processes working-time in particular has been a recurring object of both company and plant 
level negotiations; both HR managers and shop stewards refer to it as a constant attempt to 
achieve a better balance between work and private lives. 
 
If there is a business need, especially at plant level where there is more scope for 
collective bargaining on organisational issues, we surely negotiate on flexibility and 
security. For example, here [across the Italian subsidiaries as an effect of the 
company level framework] we have a very flexible working time that allows 
employees to reconcile their private lives with work. 
Impresa 1 HR Director, December 2012 
 
…Another example of flexibility and security is our working time, having such a 
flexible time makes women in the condition to work and also take care of their family. 
This is not a small thing at all!  
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
One of the most evident examples of the pressures that the headquarters’ demands exert on 
HR managers and shop stewards in Impresa 1 can be found in the 2013 company level 
bargaining round, which served as a way to implement/impose the global bonus incentive 
scheme on the Italian divisions. As a result of the agreement the annual bonus has been 
linked to global performance, meaning that only 3 percent of the variable is currently left to 
plant level negotiations. In exchange for such an extreme form of wage flexibility unions 
have obtained a series of welfare benefits which have enhanced combination security, in 
particular, through generous pension and health provisions.  
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From our perspective [RSU] what the company proposed was a very innovative 
scheme. Not only from the economic perspective but, especially, for the security that 
Fonchim and Faschim [company welfare funds] provide us. This agreement includes 
health insurance for any kind of medical expenses - from the dentist to a surgery - that 
covers not only us [employees] but our families as well. This means wives, husbands, 
and kids… this is very important! This is real money and also an example of good IR. 
Employees in Impresa 1 have the feeling that the company takes care of them and that 
unions are useful because we are able to find innovative solutions that work for 
everyone. 
Impresa 1 RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
Thus, this analysis shows that while procedural mechanisms allow different categories of 
flexibility and security to enter onto the bargaining agenda in Impresa 1, the types of 
flexibility and the types of security negotiated are actually shaped by the ability of the local 
actors to cope with requests deriving from the global headquarters. In particular, it is argued 
that the level of international competition and the extent of intra-site benchmarking exert 
strong pressures on HR managers to increase the level of organisational flexibility. In 
Impresa 1, HR managers have used collective bargaining as a functional means to enhance 
different forms of internal flexibility by offering long-term security. With regard to the 
bargaining agenda the findings, therefore, suggest that while local HR managers are in the 
driving seat, the unions’ approach in Impresa 1 is largely reactive. 
8.3. Impresa 2 
 
Impresa 2 is a manufacturing plant of a global pharmaceutical company headquartered in the 
United States and employing 28 thousand workers across 17 countries. Europe, after the 
United States, is the most productive region and within it, Italy (Impresa 2) is the most 
productive country. Less than a decade ago, this pharmaceutical company divested all its 
peripheral activities and focused exclusively on the core businesses: bio-technology and bio-
pharma. As result, the company has become a research intensive and high-tech environment 
whose business model is currently based on a light organisational structure and on a reduction 
of managerial layers, increasing spans of control. The company operates under a single value 
chain and across four business functions – Global Commercial Chain, Global Finance 
Development, Enterprise Services and Global Manufacturing and Supply – to make sure that 
the different strategic interests of the organisation are met. In addition, the company ensures 
that its commercial capabilities are shared across geographical locations to achieve a 
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‘specialty care focus’, meaning that products are customised according to the buyers’ 
demands – predominantly public customers – and distributed following country-
specific/regional-specific legal requirements 
 
Its external model of business development – involving primarily strategic acquisitions in the 
area of research and development (backward vertical integration) – imposes short to medium-
term financial targets. One direct consequence of this model is that it subjects manufacturing 
plants to constant peaks in production. Within the Global Manufacturing function there is a 
network of 12 sites that employ more than six thousand employees worldwide, operating in 
multiple technology platforms including biologics, active pharmaceuticals ingredients and 
small molecules.  Impresa 2 is the most productive manufacturing plant outside the US: 90 
per cent of its production is exported to reach 65 countries across five continents. Since 1965, 
when it was built, the plant has had stable growth in terms of its workforce. Following a 
series of significant changes in the company’s business strategy, in the past twenty years 
Impresa 2 has grown from two hundred employees in the 90s to seven hundred employees 
today. After the closure of 15 production plants globally, the headquarters implemented a 
plan known internally as ‘Network Project’ aimed at redistributing production across the 
surviving divisions. As a result of its successful financial performance, Impresa 2 attracted a 
large share of the global demand becoming one of the biggest and most complex 
manufacturing plants in Italy both in terms of the volume of production and the number of 
production lines. The majority of workers in Impresa 2 are skilled and highly skilled blue-
collar workers. Yet, there are also white collar workers on the site who deal with 
administrative and management functions. In Italy, the multinational company to which 
Impresa 2 belongs owns two divisions both based in Lazio. In organisational terms Impresa 2 
lies within the Manufacturing Global Chain and the Italian headquarters within the 
Commercial Global Chain.   Figure 8.3 shows where the Italian divisions are located. 
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Fig. 8.3 Map of Italian Divisions 
 
 
 
8.3.1 Collective Bargaining Actors  
 
It has been mentioned that the multinational to which Impresa 2 belongs has two divisions 
within the same Italian region. With regard to collective bargaining this implies that the 
framework within which social partners interact at the plant level is provided by a 
hierarchically superior bargaining level, the company one. However, in the case of Impresa 2 
the bargaining mandate of local actors is very wide because the two divisions exert totally 
different functions and employ different categories of workers – white collar workers at the 
headquarters and blue collar workers at the production plant. Therefore, there is no need to 
benchmark employees’ terms and conditions across the two sites. The primary objective of 
company level bargaining is to translate the global headquarters’ strategic objectives with 
regard to head count and financial performance in terms of profitability and productivity 
parameters to implementation at plant level. Yet the majority of the negotiations on how to 
meet such parameters occur at the plant level directly, because Impresa 2 is the only 
manufacturing division based in Italy.  
Headquarters'
Plant'1'
[Impresa'2]'
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Thus, depending on the issues involved, different actors participate in the negotiation process. 
At the company level, covering both the headquarters and Impresa 2, these actors are: 
 
Employer’s side 
 
• HR general director  
• Management Committee 
 
Unions’ side 
 
• RSUs representing both divisions 
• Territorial divisions (province) of sectoral unions: they seat at the bargaining table at 
least once per year to gather information on the company performance and short-term 
strategy. They are involved also on negotiations covering collective dismissals and/or 
company restructuring. 
 
At the company level there is no direct involvement of national level representatives because 
both divisions are located within the same region (Lazio). Yet the HR general director has 
direct and continuous contacts both with the sector level unions – Filctem-Cgil, Femca-Cisl, 
and Uilcem-Uil – and the sector level employers’ organisations – Farmindustria and 
Federchimica. Moreover, given the different business functions undertaken by the two 
divisions, the headquarters has developed a closer relationship with Farmindustria, 
representing the commercial interests of pharmaceuticals, whereas management in Impresa 2 
is in more direct contact with Federchimica. This constant exchange of views between the 
social partners across different levels is part of the IR strategy promoted by the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector. 
 
The main actors involved in collective bargaining within Impresa 2 are the following: 
 
Employers’ side 
 
• HR general director and local Management Committee 
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Unions’ side 
 
• RSU - the most representative union is Uilcem-Uil followed by Femca-Cisl and 
Filctem-Cgil that are equally representative. Thirty per cent of the employees are 
union members.  
 
Although negotiations occur at both company and plant levels, it is primarily local HR 
managers and RSU who are directly responsible for the regulation of flexibility and security 
in Impresa 2. Therefore, only plant level agreements will be considered in this study. These 
primarily take the form of single-item negotiations and are constantly on-going. 
 
The social partners in Impresa 2 affirm that collective bargaining is one of the activities in 
which their good relationship has allowed them to cooperate. Both the employer and the 
employee side suggest that the climate of constructive IR promoted by the sector level is 
reproduced at the plant level, contributing to their ability to implement innovative solutions 
that, in turn, become models for the pharmaceutical industry as a whole.  
 
We do not always agree and it is not always easy to come to a solution. However, I 
would say that our qualifying feature is that we are willing to listen to each other, and 
that we don’t look for a confrontation, as the metalwork sector always does. When I 
meet with my counterpart I know that I will not have a NO as an answer. I will 
probably have to explain, to justify my position, to convince the unions. But I know 
that my counterpart, as well as I, is keen to find a solution. In this company we fully 
embraced the tradition of social dialogue promoted by the national level social 
partners.   
Impresa 2 plant level HR Director, June 2013  
 
We have been quite successful in avoiding conflict. We have always worked together 
in order to find shared solutions. From an historical perspective, we have been even 
accused to be too accommodating in some circumstances. But if you look at the 
results, and how the model has developed within Federchimica, we are very satisfied; 
and we consider it as part of the company values.     
Impresa 2 HR General Director, June 2013  
 
The relationship is positive, within a multinational there are many issues that need to 
be considered and up to now we [social partners] have been proactive in the sense 
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that we have been able to anticipate potentially controversial issues that could have 
affected our ability to find acceptable compromises. 
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013  
 
Between the HR managers and the employers organisations there is constant interaction. 
Although manufacturing pharmaceutical products, Impresa 2 deals primarily with 
Federchimica, the chemical employer’s organisation, while Farmindustria is actually closer to 
the commercial interests of the sales division. The general director sits on the sector level 
Industrial Relations Committee (Comitato Strategico Permanente) thereby participating in 
the definition  of the sector level IR strategy with regard to collective bargaining. The 
relationship with the employers’ organisation is, therefore, collaborative and functional 
towards the improvement of company performance. However, Federchimica never interferes 
with the agenda of plant level negotiations.  
 
The RSU delegates are less independent than management from their respective unions’ 
representatives. They both refer to a hierarchy of problems that require different actors at 
different levels to be dealt with. As a rule of thumb, the RSU negotiate together with the 
representatives at the territorial level. They are believed to have more competences and 
bargaining power to face management requests on issues that are of particular concern. If the 
conflict, however, is unmanageable and no agreement can be reached sector level unions join 
the negotiating table.  
 
There have been circumstances in which we felt it was necessary to leave the matter 
to higher level representatives for example during the last divestment process. 
Generally speaking however, we always negotiate with the support of the territorial 
branches.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
Union density is relatively low in Impresa 2, nevertheless, thanks to the strong links between 
the RSU delegates and their respective territorial representatives, unions have been able to 
strengthen their bargaining power: 
 
I can say that, although the percentage of union members in relation to the workforce 
is relatively low, it is around the 25-30 per cent, in those few moments of tension 
ended up with strikes, the ability of unions to organise workers has been exceptionally 
high.  
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Impresa 2 HR and IR manager at the plant level, June 2013  
 
Further the HR director revealed that it is not uncommon for management to have direct 
contact with union representatives at the territorial level before talking to the RSU, 
suggesting that shop stewards within Impresa 2 can be overstepped:  
 
The RSU act within the autonomy that the legal, and the interconfederal framework, 
provided shop stewards with. When necessary, they know how to ask the support of 
higher level union representatives depending on the topics. Yet, it is not a mystery that 
the HR director has regular contacts with territorial unions’ representatives. It can 
happen that local level negotiations go nowhere and, when this happens, we need to 
find a solution.  
Impresa 2 HR General Director, June 2013  
 
In addition, with regard to their autonomy, both sides of the negotiating table refer to the 
limitations of acting within a highly internationalised multinational company.  The global 
headquarters leaves the different regions a certain amount of independence to comply with 
their own national IR regulative frameworks. However, they affirmed that the scope to 
leverage on such autonomy can be very wide or very restricted depending on the matters 
concerned.  
 
I give you an example: the latest restructuring process was decided by the global 
headquarters. Targets were set at global level but we managed and implemented the 
plan independently. Let’s say that, more than directly intervening, the global 
headquarters wants to be involved in the definition of the strategy that is supposed to 
lead to a certain result. Anything else is up to us. 
Impresa 2 HR General Director, June 2013 
 
The most difficult conversations we have with the RSU concern the need to quickly 
implement decisions. They need to understand that we have business needs to 
consider that do not allow us [mangers] to wait for them to agree all the times. It is a 
complex matter because we [HR managers] fully understand that this approach 
clashes with the culture of the company and the sector [with regard to IR]. We do not 
underestimate this issue and we work every day to align their [RSU] view with the 
one of the company. 
Impresa 2 HR plant Director, June 2013 
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It is the headquarters that decides what we [manufacturing division] can produce and 
how much. Then all the plants need to implement the decision using the strategy the 
find more effective, sometimes, as in the case of the latest divestment, managers do 
not even have to organise meetings with the unions, but our managers have involved 
the RSU anyway.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
Within this context of relatively low autonomy the social partners use collective bargaining 
as a means to implement strategic decisions coming from the headquarters. Negotiations 
occur primarily to deal with the organisation of production lines. However, if agreement 
cannot be found, managers act unilaterally.   
 
Keep in mind that unions are involved when it is considered necessary but we cannot 
let negotiations get in the middle of more important objectives. At times we need to 
force things because they [RSU] need to understand the big picture. There are areas 
in which we [Management] have the autonomy such as working-time, salary policies, 
training, and job rotation and we use it.  
Impresa 2, HR director, June 2013 
 
This shows that there are circumstances in which, in order to meet productivity objectives 
imposed by the global headquarters, local management needs to impose unilateral measures. 
These circumstances, however, are exceptional and limited. Moreover, when this happens, 
unions are both involved in the decision making process and informed of the reasons behind 
HR managers’ choices. It can, therefore, be concluded that, overall, Impresa 2 complies with 
the model of IR promoted by the sector level social partners. This is also demonstrated by the 
fact that HR managers and shop stewards have developed a collaborative relationship that has 
allowed them to interact over a variety of issues. HR managers are more autonomous from 
the employers’ organisation than shop stewards are from their respective territorial 
representatives. The broad extent of the unions’ intra-organisational cooperation has allowed 
the RSU to offset the risk of its marginalisation due to the low level of union density at the 
plant. Although embedded in a sector in which managers consider collective bargaining to 
bring added-value to the business, the autonomy of the social partners in leveraging on such 
institutional resource is restricted by the need to satisfy the global headquarters’ demands.     
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8.3.2 Collective Bargaining Institutions and Bargaining Decentralisation 
 
Given that Impresa 2 has been a part of a highly internationalised multinational company 
since the 1990s, there has been a strong need to compete with other manufacturing sites for 
the allocation of internal resources. According to both sides of the negotiating table, 
collective bargaining provided a way of implementing a series of organisational changes that 
allowed Impresa 2 to attract significant investment.  
Collective bargaining is not useful, it is fundamental! 
Impresa 2 HR plant director, June 2013 
 
Thanks to the plant level agreements negotiated within the Network Project, Impresa 
2 became the most productive manufacturing plant in Europe [within the 
Multinational to which it belongs] 
Impresa 2 RSU, delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
The HR managers decided to implement the first and biggest company restructuring in 2000, 
the so called ‘Network Project’, by collaborating with shop stewards. Since then, the social 
partners have shown that they are capable of putting in place a series of innovative 
agreements that, by drastically reducing costs, have resulted in a remarkably high level of 
productivity. This participative model of IR has become a distinctive feature of Impresa 2, 
reaffirmed in 2011 under the name of the ‘Human Resource Service Delivery Model’.  A 
‘Single Act’ put together all the agreements signed since the 1970s at plant level and stated 
that industrial relations in Impresa 2 are based ‘on a special relationship of social dialogue 
with the internal clients as well as on more informed employees over the economic and legal 
effects of plant level collective bargaining. ’  
  
The framework within which such innovative agreements have been negotiated is one set by 
the chemical and pharmaceutical sector. However, neither managers nor shop stewards refer 
to the sector level framework as a rigid piece of regulation, but rather they see it as an 
opportunity to empower local actors and meet company-specific needs. For example, many of 
the measures negotiated in Impresa 2 to comply with the first Network Project – in 2000 –
were only included in the sector level agreement in 2012. In other words, Impresa 2 has 
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always found the space to experiment with innovative provisions, thereby making the most of 
the delegating mechanisms provided by the sectoral agreement. In addition, interviews show 
that HR managers are currently looking at the derogating procedures introduced in 2009 and 
2011 (interconfederal agreements) with increasing interest. 
  
The main way in which decentralisation occurred is through the opening-clauses 
provided by the sector level agreement but now it is starting to be considered the 
option to derogate as well.  
Impresa 2 HR plant director, June 2013 
 
If you analyse the agreements we signed [sector level agreement] in the past 10-15 
years, you’ll see that the normative contribution has shrunk in favour of more 
opportunities for mutual engagement at the company level such as the company 
welfare. Why? Because we take for granted that social partners do not need to affirm 
their prerogatives anymore, we take these as given. Actors are now mature at every 
level and they can take up different challenges – obviously, avoiding abuses and in a 
responsible way. After 7 years of temporary and controlled derogations we can finally 
see them as an opportunity, the opportunity of empowering local actors, if they need 
more CB autonomy. This works for us [chemicals and pharmaceuticals], it would not 
work in the metalworking sector where social partners have always legitimated each 
other through conflict. If their interests didn’t diverge, they would not know how to 
represent their members. We do not have this kind of relationship with our unions.  
Derogations do not scare us and we can open ourselves to this possibility’. 
Impresa 2 HR general director, June 2013 
 
In contrast, the RSU’s position on the matter suggests a certain amount of resignation 
showing that union representatives are sceptical about the possibility of plant level 
negotiations ever being able to improve on the sector level framework: 
 
The way in which work is organised depends very much on productivity needs and it 
is very hard for unions to change management mind with regard to some issues. To 
improve conditions of the sector level agreement with company level bargaining is 
real challenge at the moment and it is also very unlikely to happen. 
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
I think our target is to ensure that the values promoted by the sector level framework 
are respected. Anything else we need to consider ourselves lucky if the company 
involves us. Derogations would never apply on the bonus scheme because companies 
would not do that. Derogations can work for organisational needs and, look, these 
things have always happened. Do you think that it is the RSU that decides on shifts? 
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We come to an agreement but they could also act unilaterally. So better to be at least 
part of the process as it happened last time with the reduction of working-time.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013 
 
However, with regard to the possibility of taking the competences that the 2009 
interconfederal agreement assigned to plant level negotiators further, the HR director 
identifies two important problems: a) the level of union representation at the company level, 
and b) an excessively regulated labour market. According to him both these problems limit 
the autonomy and, therefore, the ability of HR managers and shop stewards to take advantage 
of the procedural flexibility provided by the collective bargaining system. 
a) Then it’s true that there is a problem of unions’ representation at the company 
level. With whom do I negotiate? Unions need to redefine their role, if they want to be 
effective. 
b) In Italy the labour market is also too heavily regulated by law. We need to let 
social partners breathe and find the solutions that work better for them. The ‘Statuto 
dei Lavoratori’ worked very well in the 1970s when it contributed to the affirmation 
of very important principles, because there was a purpose. Yet purposes change and 
we need to be able to adapt, if we do not want to be cut off [the market that is 
increasingly more internationalised]. We need to move on and start avoiding mistakes 
like the one recently made with the Fornero’s labour reform [Monti’s government]. 
Impresa 2 HR general director, June 2013 
 
To sum up, collective bargaining in Impresa 2 is considered primarily as a strategic way of 
reducing costs and increasing productivity. As a result of the increasing pressures coming 
from the global headquarters the social partners have leveraged on the procedural flexibility 
recognised by the sector level framework to both improve plant performance and attract 
investment. The success of this experiment has strengthened the social partners’ mutual 
recognition and established a model of participative industrial relations. The framework 
within which collective agreements are negotiated is set at the sector level. In particular, 
opening-clauses are the main way in which the social partners have engaged with their 
bargaining competences. In addition, the newly instituted mechanism of derogation is 
considered an interesting opportunity by managers who do, however, identify limits to its 
practical applicability. By interfering with actors’ autonomy, such limits reduce their ability 
to make a valuable contribution.  The unions are silent on the matter, showing that their 
ability to resist further bargaining decentralisation is rather limited. Yet, they strive to be as 
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informed as possible about the company’s strategy so as to defend both their role as 
negotiators and the terms and conditions currently in force. 
8.3.3 Flexibility and Security in Collective Bargaining  
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements made available by the social partners 
in Impresa 2 were considered and contrasted with the interview data.  Table 8.2 indicates 
which company level agreements address each of the seven flexibility and security 
categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, Bekker, 
Wilthagen et al. 2008), and indicates whether the provisions enhance flexibility and security, 
and if so which forms.  
 
Table 8.2 Impresa 2 – Flexibility and security in collective bargaining 
  Flexibility Security  
Pay 
 
 
 
 
Interconfederal 
Demarcated 
Network Agreement minimum salary – 
sectoral parameters – for entry level workers. 
Within three years employees reach the 
salary threshold indicated by respective job 
classifications (2001, renewed in 2005) 
 
Variable Pay (2002, 
2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,
2011,2012) 
Wage   
 
 
 
 
 
Wage  
Job  
 
Training 
 
 
Sectoral Delegated 
Training during peaks in production instead 
of reducing working-time (2004, 2006) 
 
Training FondoImpresa – Instituted by an 
interconfederal agreement in 2002 (2008-
2009-2011) 
Functional  
 
 
Functional 
Job and Income 
 
 
Job and Employment 
 
 
Job Classifications 
Interconfederal 
Demarcated 
 
Introduction of new job profiles to meet 
productivity needs 
(2001,2003,2004,2005,2006,2008) 
Functional Income 
Working-time 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral Delegated 
Shift-work (2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007 
----- up to 2012) 
 
Reduction/Increasing working hours 
(2005,2006,2007, 2009, 2010,2011, 2012) 
 
PTO for workers on shift (2001, 2004, 2008 
 
Working-Time 
 
 
Working-time 
 
 
Working-Time 
 
 
 
 
Job security 
 
 
Combination 
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Overtime can be accumulated and used as 
PTO or monetised (2001,2008) 
Working-Time Combination 
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral Delegated 
Renewal of non-standard contract 2003 
 
Extensive use of atypical workers in 
exchange for regular stabilisations of a 
certain percentage of them  (2002- 2004-
2005-2006-2007-2009) 
 
Use of agency workers for starting a new 
production line (2004) 
 
 
External flexibility 
 
 
 
 
External flexibility  
Employment security 
 
Job security 
 
 
 
 
Job security (of core 
workers) 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
 
 
Sectoral Delegated 
Company Welfare health scheme (2003-
2004,2009-2010-2011)  
 
Adoption of Faschim (2004) 
 
Company Welfare pension scheme (2004-
2007) 
 
 
 
Combination  
 
 
Combination  
 
Combination 
 
 
Measures for 
employment 
 
Sectoral Delegated 
   
 
Table 8.2 shows that all forms of flexibility and all forms of security have entered onto the 
agenda of plant level bargaining in Impresa 2 as a result of the delegating mechanisms 
contained in the sector level collective agreements. However, the social partners in Impresa 2 
are more effective in addressing flexibility and security in the internal than in the external 
market. By negotiating over six out of the seven substantive categories, pay, working-time, 
job classifications, training, provisions for atypical workers, and social benefits and 
entitlements HR managers and the RSU are able to improve the levels of functional, working-
time and wage flexibility, on the one hand, and the level of combination, job and income 
security on the other. Employment security is only enhanced by the category of training and 
provision for atypical workers. The latter, in addition, also enhances external flexibility.   
 
The category of measures for employment has not entered onto the plant level bargaining 
agenda showing that, although articulation mechanisms are in place, plant level actors have 
not utilised the procedural flexibility that both the interconfederal and sectoral agreements 
provided for after 2009. This result is consistent with the interview data which suggests that 
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the low level of union density, as well as overlaps between different sources of labour market 
regulation, increase the level of uncertainty at the plant level so that the social partners feel 
unsecure in letting new items of flexibility and security onto the bargaining agenda. 
 
For large companies increasing the competences of bargaining actors would be a 
great opportunity because you give them the power to strengthen the level of 
productivity quickly, which means growth, so then you can redistribute the additional 
profits to the employees via economic agreements. We [management] need to improve 
productivity cutting costs and we try to do that as much as possible with our unions. 
Increasing flexibility is what we do to achieve this, and we always think about new 
ways; for example, we thought about reducing the stop & go between two temporary 
contracts - as we call it - via collective bargaining. But you always have this doubt 
about its actual feasibility, the judge can always say that this breaches the terms of 
the sector level agreement that is hierarchically above plant level bargaining. 
Impresa 2 HR plant director, June 2013 
 
Opening to derogations can have a dramatic effect if unions are weak at the company 
level.  
Impresa 2 HR general director, June 2013 
 
The interviews show that there are practical problems with the use of the procedural 
flexibility recognised by the interconfederal agreement due to the fact that unions at the 
company level have reduced bargaining power. If unions are not sufficiently representative at 
the local level, managers become uncertain of the legal effects of derogations and, therefore, 
they refrain from taking their competences further. It follows that the social partners in 
Impresa 2 prefer to address flexibility and security by deploying the delegating mechanisms 
provided by the sector level agreements. Pay and working-time are the categories that are 
more regularly the object of plant level negotiations and they address both wage and working-
time flexibility. The categories of job classification and training enhance functional flexibility.  
Since 2009 the social partners, in Impresa 2, have used the funding made available by an 
interconfederal agreement signed in 2002 (Fondo Impresa) as a way of coping with the 
increasing need for an up-skilled and re-skilled workforce. By doing so, they have shown that 
they have the capability to leverage on the resources provided by higher institutional levels. 
Finally, the category of Provisions for atypical workers increases the level of external 
flexibility. Overall, however, Table 8.2 demonstrates that internal forms of flexibility – 
especially working-time and functional flexibility – are the most prominent forms of 
flexibility that have entered onto the bargaining agenda. 
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As for security, data reveal that by negotiating on the category of Pay, the social partners in 
Impresa 2 have managed to increase the level of employee job security. In fact, in order to 
hire employees through a permanent contract, HR managers and shop stewards have agreed 
on a special remuneration package which provides that entry-level workers are only entitled 
to the minimum salary negotiated at the sectoral level. Within three years, however, these 
workers obtain the same wage conditions as the ones established by the relevant job 
classification. By negotiating over the category of training, the social partners have addressed 
different forms of security. In particular, they have improved the dimensions of job, income, 
and employment security.  The category of job classification addresses income security, while 
working-time addresses both combination and job security. Further, the category of 
provisions for atypical workers enhances employment security and job security. Finally, by 
recognising different forms of welfare benefits, in particular, health insurance and pension 
plans, the category of social benefits and entitlements enhances combination security.  Thus, 
Table 8.2 shows that as a result of plant level negotiations, the social partners in Impresa 2 
are able to address all forms of security. Yet, internal forms of security, in particular job and 
combination security, are more prominent than external forms of security.   
8.3.4 Types of flexibility and types of security: Any trade-offs?  
 
Table 8.2 shows that not only have flexibility and security entered onto the agenda of 
company level negotiations but also that the six substantive categories allow for different 
combinations between flexibility and security to occur. The interviews with the social 
partners suggest that this outcome is linked to the need of Impresa 2 to keep up with the 
competitive pressures coming from the global headquarters. Both HR managers and shop 
stewards affirm that the incredible success of the production plant is due to its ability to 
regularly outperform other divisions, thereby gaining a relatively higher volume of 
commissions. In 2000s as a result of benchmarking operations two manufacturing plants in 
the UK and one manufacturing plant in Germany were closed down and Impresa 2 was able 
to absorb their entire production. If on the one hand this has contributed to a massive growth 
of the plant that went from 200 employees in the 1990s to 700 in 2012, on the other it has 
hugely increased the demands on local management to control costs.  Within this context, 
collective bargaining has become a means to achieve higher levels of flexibility.  
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During the 1970-80 the IR in Impresa 2 followed a national trend. Things however, 
have changed as soon as the manufacturing plant was incorporated in a much more 
global network where the IR national framework has started to be less influential. It is 
the headquarters that tells which patents you have and what you can produce 
depending on how you perform in comparison to the other manufacturing plants in 
France, Germany, the UK, and the States. This internal competition obviously brings 
about a change in the plant level IRs that have gone to a different direction, let’s say 
more modern, I mean more linked to parameters such as productivity and flexibility.  
Impresa 2 HR general director, June 2013 
For us [RSU] it is a challenge to explain to the employees that what they ask may not 
be possible for reasons that have to do with external factors such as productivity 
targets that are dictated by the headquarters and not by local management; or for 
example, we need to reduce working-time or increase temporary workers because if a 
company decides not to renew a partnership there is just a sudden stoppage of an 
entire production line.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013 
 
Given the closures of other manufacturing divisions across Europe, for both HR managers 
and shop stewards increasing the level of flexibility is perceived as a paramount objective, as 
well as the only strategy likely to ensure long-term job security to a plant that is constantly 
subject to peaks in production. 
 
The way in which HR managers in Impresa 2 have injected such flexibility is by negotiating 
with the RSU which, in exchange, has obtained different forms of security. 
   
When working for such an internationalised multinational company the role of unions 
is different, first, it is difficult to find rights to defend when HR policies are so well 
developed; second we all know [workers] that we [the RSU] need to accept 
compromises. Management want more flexibility but they also have an interest in 
giving security in exchange, first for issues that have to do with reputation, second 
because they need our skills, and third, and most important, they want us to work 
more efficiently.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013 
 
In addition the union side suggests that the reason why the RSU has been successful in 
obtaining some forms of security via collective bargaining has to do with the characteristics 
of the product market in which Impresa 2 operates. In fact, although competing for internal 
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resources with other manufacturing plants, Impresa 2 belongs to a multinational that has 
gained a strong competitive position in the global market and that is healthy and profitable.  
 
If we were not hired by a pharmaceutical company we [RSU] would be here talking 
about collective dismissals as other manufacturing plants in the region are doing at 
the moment. It is the company that makes unions strong! 
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013 
 
It is the company that makes unions strong, if the company is weak there is no much 
unions can really do.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
The interview with HR managers confirms that finding a compromise between flexibility and 
security is an objective of plant level negotiations: 
 
There is a direct correlation between higher flexibility and the forms of security 
negotiated, in fact, at each bargaining round we [managers] put a lot of emphasis on 
the fact that our [as employees] security derives from our [managers] ability to 
contain costs, especially on declining products [those whose patents are expiring]. 
The organisation of work needs to deliver this! 
Impresa 2 HR plant director, June 2013 
 
Further, data show that while procedural mechanisms enable different categories of flexibility 
and security to enter into the bargaining agenda, the actual types of flexibility and security 
negotiated in Impresa 2 are linked to organisational choices arising from firm-specific 
contingencies. For example, after the closure of a few manufacturing divisions in Europe in 
2000, the two strategic objectives of Impresa 2 have been 1) to satisfy a rapidly growing 
global demand and 2) to do so in a cost-effective way. Thus, by reducing wages – wage 
flexibility – for entry-level workers the social partners have increased the number of 
permanent employees – job security. Training has entered onto the agenda of plant level 
negotiations in order to cope with peaks in demand, thereby increasing both functional 
flexibility and job security, and functional flexibility and income security. In addition the 
deployment of the interconfederal fund for increasing the training opportunities of atypical-
workers has enhanced both functional flexibility and employment security. Typically, the 
category of job classification addresses functional flexibility and income security. However, 
this particular category is the one which, in past few years, unions have had the most 
difficulty in getting HR managers to bargain over. Interview data suggest that such 
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difficulties are due to the global headquarters’ unwillingness to comply with the sector level 
framework: 
 
The job classifications have stayed the same since 2008 despite our competences have 
changed because the global headquarters decided to freeze them, which, to our 
understanding, is unfair. There is a sector level framework that states otherwise. They 
should know that national industrial relations matter. We can accept global policies 
but they [policy-makers at global level] should also know that being in Italy they have 
an internal framework to respect.  
Impresa 2 RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
Negotiations on working-time play a fundamental role in Impresa 2 as they allow managers 
to adjust the number of employees to constant peaks in demands.  For example, working-time 
reductions – working-time flexibility – are negotiated to avoid collective dismissals during 
peaks in demand, thereby addressing the dimension of job security.  The category of 
working-time enhances both working-time flexibility and combination security too. The need 
to cope with constant peaks in production is also apparent in the fact that external flexibility 
has entered onto the agenda of plant level negotiations: 
 
Atypical contracts for us [HR managers] are a huge opportunity because we live in an 
economic context in which it is not possible to hire people ignoring financial results. 
Today the number of people hired is totally up to the global headquarters. Thus, 
playing with the number of temporary workers is the only way for us, managers, to 
reduce costs and stay competitive. 
Impresa 2 HR plant director, June 2013 
 
According to the interviews with management, temporary workers allow Impresa 2 to 
achieve three fundamental targets: 
 
1. Controlling costs 
2. Offering job experience to people that are outside the labour market 
3. Training professionals that may be permanently hired 
 
Between 2007 and 2011 more than 200 temporary employees have seen their contracts 
transformed into a permanent employment relationship. Thus, by negotiating over the 
category of provisions for atypical workers, HR managers and the RSU have simultaneously 
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achieved external flexibility and job security. In particular, unions have supported the 
extensive use of temporary workers in exchange for a management promise to regularly hire 
a certain percentage of them. Moreover, when engaging with the production of new patents 
whose success was uncertain, the social partners have agreed to deploy agency workers. In 
doing so, they have increased external flexibility along with job security for the core 
workforce.  
 
Thus, this analysis shows that while procedural mechanisms allow different categories of 
flexibility and security to enter onto the bargaining agenda in Impresa 2, the types of 
flexibility and the types of security negotiated are actually shaped by firm level specific 
characteristics. In particular, it is argued intra-site benchmarking exerts strong pressure on 
HR managers to increase the level of organisational flexibility. In Impresa 2, HR managers 
have used collective bargaining as a functional means to enhance all forms of flexibility, 
including external flexibility. Unions on the other hand have been able to obtain long-term 
forms of security in exchange. According to the interviews with the shop stewards, the 
product market in which the company operates, as well as the relatively low level of 
international competition, strengthens the union’s bargaining power over the definition of 
flexibility and security trade-offs.  
8.4 Firma 1 
 
Firma 1 is a manufacturing plant of a global pharmaceutical company headquartered in 
Denmark. It is wholly owned by an independent foundation, created in the 1980s with the 
aim to ensure a stable and long-term basis for the company’s development. According to the 
foundation’s Charter, the company can neither be sold nor have ties to family, minority 
shareholders or other third party interests. The profits generated over the years have stayed in 
the company and set the conditions for its gradual international growth. Currently, the 
multinational to which Firma 1 belongs is a vertically integrated organisation with more than 
5000 employees in 61 countries and a portfolio of highly diversified products. It is a world 
leader in dermatology care. In 2009, it went through an important organisational 
restructuring, based on a large project of geographical expansion following a strategy called 
‘Going for Gold – step by step’ based upon  ‘one hundred years’ of new market penetration 
and strong global development. Since 2010 the company has set up 11 new divisions 
increased its headcount by 60 percent, and gained a leading position in its global product 
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market. The project was taken further in 2012 when new measures aimed at improving 
competitiveness and optimising operational efficacy were implemented. In particular, along 
with its traditional research-based approach, the company started to seek external linkages. 
As a result, the new regional structure has shifted focus from north Europe to a global 
outreach comprising 5 regions and 9 focus markets. Figure 8.4 shows revenues by region 
excluding the ‘Well Established Products’ unit that accounts for 14 per cent.   
 
The Global Product Supply department ensures that a variety of products reach their 
particular focus markets.  Over 950 employees deal with this function across six production 
plants that are based in Denmark, France, Ireland, and Australia.  
 
In Denmark the company owns two production divisions that serve the global market. 
Production and workforce have steadily increased over the past 20 years along with the 
international growth of the organisation. A small site handles the initial steps in the active 
pharmaceutical ingredients production, whereas Firma 1 is a big and multi-functional site 
employing 600 skilled and highly skilled employees specialised in so-called active substances 
– advanced organic chemical synthesis, fermentation, and advanced purification techniques. 
In Firma 1 the majority of workers are involved with production processes including 
repairmen in the floor, electricians, and laboratory technicians.  
8.4.1 Collective Bargaining Actors  
 
Firma 1 is affiliated to Dansk Industri, the employers’ organisation in the sector. However, 
none of its HR managers cover any particular role for sector level negotiations. Rather it is 
local bargaining that follows the pace set by the industry-wide agreement occurring once 
every three years. Despite the presence of two manufacturing divisions in Denmark, 
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collective bargaining in Firma 1 takes place only at the plant level and results in package 
deals.  Negotiations start with a first meeting in which the employers’ side and all the unions’ 
representatives from Dansk Metal, 3F, and HK Privat sit together. Depending on the issues, 
however, negotiations can end up with one single agreement that covers all workers or two 
separate agreements: one covering employees at Dansk Metal (DM) and 3F, and another 
covering employees at HK-Privat. When the agreements are signed – at the last meeting – the 
Executive Vice President also sits at the bargaining table, to reinforce the company’s 
commitment to its workers. In total about 500 employees are covered by collective 
agreements. However, in terms of workforce composition 100 per cent of the 54 highly 
skilled employees are union members (DM); 84 per cent of the 100 semi-skilled employees 
are union members, (3F) and 60 per cent of the (approximately) 264 laboratory technicians 
(HK Privat) are union members.  
 
Finally, given that laboratory technicians (HK-Privat) make up the largest group of workers, 
the HK-Privat representative is also the chairwoman of the Unions’ Klub (defined below) and 
also the driver of negotiations. It is worth mentioning that because DM and 3F always 
participate at the same bargaining table, in this study, the DM representative participated on 
behalf of 3F as well and acted as spokesperson for both unions during the interview. Both the 
HK-Privat and DM representatives were interviewed together.  
 
In sum, the main actors involved in collective bargaining within Firma 1 are the following 
 
Employers’ side: 
 
• HR director and HR manager 
• Vice President of Manufacturing and Engineering  
• Executive Vice President (at the last meeting) 
 
Unions’ side: 
 
• Klub – shop stewards from three most representative unions – HK-Privat (laboratory 
technicians), 3F (lower skilled workers), Dansk Metal (highly skilled workers) 
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• Depending on the issues, separate bargaining tables can start for DM and 3F on the 
one side, and HK-Privat on the other. 
 
The management and shop stewards in Firma 1 have daily interactions which are beneficial 
for collective bargaining, but also functional for the organisation of work. The HR manager 
explained that plant level negotiations occur every three year and follow the pace set forth by 
the sector level agreement. This provides employees with a relatively long-term perspective 
with regard to their working conditions while increasing their commitment to the production 
processes. Within this stable context, it is the union representatives who, every day, make 
sure that tasks and working-time are scheduled in a way that maximises the interests of both 
the company and their respective constituencies.  
 
I don’t know if the shop stewards told you that but they are divided into groups 
[according to their tasks] and they have the responsibility to plan their work and 
organise themselves, for example, they need to find out how many people are needed 
for doing a certain job.  And it’s not the line manager that assigns tasks; they [shop 
stewards] take full responsibility for it. We did not agree on that through a local 
agreement, we did it because our relationship allows us to do things informally. That 
makes employees think differently and instead of being told: now you need to use this 
machine for these many hours they are those who decide, and they are just more 
motivated to take that extra step! 
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
The interviews with the shop stewards confirm that the relationship between the two sides of 
the negotiating table is based on constant interaction and is positive and collaborative. 
Moreover, they emphasise that trust is the key factor enabling management and employee 
representatives in Firma 1 to find compromises that are acceptable to all.   
 
We have a good dialogue and it’s important because most of the things we [shop-
steward] achieve depend on this.  It happens that their [management] answer to what 
we ask is NO, but normally they have a good argument and we are able to see it. We 
are good at finding compromises, both ways. Social dialogue helps building trust, 
without it, compromises cannot happen.  
Firma 1 shop-steward HK Privat and Chairwoman of Klub, July, 2014 
 
The word trust is really important, it’s, I’d say, a keyword; when we are in a room 
and we talk about something it stays in the room; and this is because we trust each 
other. 
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Firma 1 shop-steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
Interview data show that shop stewards feel empowered as bargaining actors. The positive 
results achieved via collective bargaining are evidence of their ability to improve the sector 
level framework. In light of this, they affirmed that they are confident that they will be able to 
fully embrace their bargaining role.   
 
We want to bargain at the local level! Because we believe that the industry agreement 
is not as good, and we can make it better! 
 Firma 1 shop-steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
It is in the context within which the social partners (in Firma 1) interact that the reasons for 
such effectiveness can be found. First, both management and shop stewards have a high 
degree of autonomy from their respective organisations, which are only consulted for 
information purposes prior to a bargaining round. This means that there is no external 
interference in the social partners bargaining agenda in Firma 1.  
 
We have a great relationship with our contact person in DI; and if we have some 
issues, for example, if at the first meeting they [the Klub] bring up something that I 
am not sure what the consequences could be for us [the company], I ask to DI. At 
times we contact them [DI] to make sure that we are not doing something that is not 
in line with the sector agreement. 
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
The union to which we [shop stewards of the Klub] belong does not suggest us items 
for negotiations; they give us information in order to be prepared at the bargaining 
table. It’s only a support and good ideas and, then I [as a chairwoman of the Klub] 
take from them what I want according to the situation in my company... They [sector 
level representatives] don’t sit with us at the bargaining table, but they support us all 
the times. 
Firma 1 shop-steward HK Privat and Chairwoman of Klub, July, 2014 
 
Second, by avoiding representation problems, the high union density in Firma 1 helps to 
strengthen the autonomy of the shop stewards who, as a result, can leverage on their 
bargaining power.  While HR managers are confident about the shop stewards ability to 
channel employee voice and ensure the stability of the shop-floor, the national unions can 
also rely on them to meet their members’ local demands. Finally, the interview with the HR 
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manager suggests that the autonomy of the unions in Firma 1 is further strengthened by the 
positive stance of the global headquarters towards collective bargaining.  
 
Well up until now we have had our executive vice-president sitting, at least, at the 
final meeting with the unions. It’s a signal that he cares and that he makes some 
commitment towards them, it’s a very symbolic moment showing them that they do 
make a difference, that they are important, and that he values the efforts they make to 
create an environment in which we [both sides] cooperate and work good [sic] 
together. And I think that it is very important that we keep this good relationship with 
the unions because it helps us to find good solutions, often, also without negotiating 
all the times.  
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
I think the company encourages us to do what we [shop stewards] do and they listen 
to us! We have this power because we have a good dialogue and it’s all about it. We 
cooperate with them, so respect goes both ways… trust, respect and transparency are 
keywords here [Firma 1]. To give you an idea, it’s been more than 20 years since the 
last strike! 
Firma 1 shop-steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
To summarise, the social partners in Firma 1 engage in plant level negotiations at every 
sector level bargaining round. By doing so, they ensure a certain amount of stability for the 
shop-floor, allowing employees to focus primarily on production processes. It is also thanks 
to this ongoing social dialogue that HR managers and shop stewards have been able to 
develop a positive and constructive relationship, increasing the common ground for 
compromise. The union side perceives collective bargaining primarily as a means to improve 
the terms of the sector level agreement, while HR managers view it both as a means to gain 
flexibility and to give employees recognition. The social partners described themselves as 
independent bargaining actors that are not subject to interference from higher institutional 
levels. Such autonomy – especially the shop stewards’ – is partly due to the high level of 
union density at plant level, as well as the positive attitude of the Danish headquarters 
towards collective bargaining. 
8.4.2 Collective Bargaining Institutions and Bargaining Decentralisation 
 
In Firma 1 collective bargaining is one of the positive outcomes of the collaborative 
relationship that the social partners have developed within a long tradition of social dialogue. 
According to the HR managers, it is a useful tool to gain some sort of flexibility from the 
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sector level framework, while for the unions, collective bargaining is an opportunity to 
improve employee working conditions. 
 
The sector level agreement is very basic and, well it’s getting better, but still it’s very 
inflexible both in terms of working-time and the way in which working-hours are paid. 
When we negotiate with the unions we can gain flexibility. 
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
After the sector level agreement we [Klub members] meet to discuss the new rules on 
education or maternity leave or minimum salary; then we meet [with management] 
and we say: ‘well we should change things at the local level because the overall 
framework has changed’. For example, in the past years education has become more 
important [in the sector level agreement], so in the last bargaining round we asked 
[management] to give us more training or more money! 
Firma 1 shop-steward HK Privat and Chairwoman of Klub, July, 2014 
 
Both side of the negotiating table affirmed that the framework within which plant level 
bargaining takes place is very clear and that there are no overlaps between bargaining 
competences. In particular, for the union side, the provisions set forth by the sector level 
agreement represent an important starting point which managers and shop stewards have an 
opportunity to customise according to the resources available. Moreover, they describe the 
Danish model as creating a particularly effective institutional space within which to exercise 
their bargaining role, because there is no interference from other sources of labour market 
regulation, such as the law. Therefore, there are no elements of uncertainty over the items that 
can be put onto the plant level bargaining agenda. 
  
It’s not the state in Denmark that makes the law for the workers; it’s the workers and 
the companies that do this together.  And we do like it very much! We [in Denmark] 
have the employers’ organisation and the union cartel that sit together and decide 
what should happen for the next 2 to 3 years. And then, we shop stewards negotiate at 
the company level according to what we can do here, and so, we can make it [the 
sector level framework] better. The Danish model works like that. It’s not the law that 
tells you what you should agree upon. It’s the best model because it’s based on 
dialogue. 
Firma 1 shop-steward HK Privat and Chairwoman of Klub, July, 2014 
 
Within this system shop stewards have a double responsibility. First, they ensure that the 
local instances are brought to the attention of the national unions which have the strength to 
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force all companies into minimum working standards. Second, once the sector level 
agreement formalises such instances, shop stewards push local managers towards a better 
deal.  
 
It’s easy, I ask to my employees: ‘What could be improved? What should we try to get 
in terms of salary? What about flexibility of working-hours? What about education 
and holidays?’ I take their comments with me to my union and ask them to bring these 
instances up for the sector level bargaining round. Then, if the conditions at the 
sector level are better than the one at the local level, we [shop stewards] take these 
instances to management, and we check if we can change things. Everything starts 
from the big one! [the sector level agreement] Again that’s the Danish model! 
Firma 1 shop steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
The HR manager confirmed that plant level negotiations occur within the framework 
negotiated by the sector level social partners. The main target at the local level is, therefore, 
to make sure that overall package deals do not breach the terms set forth by the sectoral 
agreement. However, she adds that, as long as shop stewards agree, there is indeed the 
possibility to derogate from the sectoral agreement on single items.    
 
I think most of the things are negotiable, and these things are increasingly more [sic]. 
But we have a clear sense of what we can do. We made agreements on a lot of things 
because on payments the big agreement [sectoral agreement] is very inflexible. If you 
take it literally you need to pay something anytime that the company needs some 
flexibility. So for example, in here [Firma 1] we agreed that we do not have to make 
an agreement anytime that employees are required to work differently [different 
shifts]. We can also go below the sector level agreement, of course you need to agree 
that with the unions, but if you compensate that loss on something with an 
improvement of something else, so that the overall balance is not damaged, then it’s 
ok.  
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
With regard to flexibility, the interview with the HR manager showed that there has been 
increasing difficulty in aligning mechanisms of industrial democracy, such as collective 
bargaining, with the needs arising from the internationalisation of the business. She 
suggested, in particular, that it has become harder to negotiate with shop stewards because 
changes in production lines are constant and the company requires the workers to adapt as 
quickly as possible. For this reason, the social partners in Firma 1 have signed a collective 
agreement providing that plant level negotiations need to follow the sector level bargaining 
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round and that some of the most common issues, such as flexi-time, can be removed from the 
local bargaining agenda. It is through constant social dialogue, however, that arrangements 
on flexi-time are currently made. As previously mentioned, shop stewards are the ones who 
divide tasks and assign shifts on the production floor.  
 
The next sector level agreement will be in three years so we will also negotiate [at the 
plant level] again next time in three years. This is what up until now we have agreed 
to do, it is not compulsory but we try to do because it’s nice, now you have three years 
ahead before the next round and it gets quieter, yeah, you know it’s normally a long 
process and if you should do it every year it would be hard. 
Firma 1 HR manager, July 2014 
 
To summarise, collective bargaining in Firma 1 is an important institutional resource 
regulating the employment relationship. For both management and shop stewards their role is 
complementary to that of the sectoral level social partners. While the industry-wide 
agreement is responsible for setting minimum working conditions, plant level social partners 
fill in the details. A clear demarcation of competences between the two levels avoids any 
overlapping of competences and provides local actors with the certainty they need in order to 
engage with a wide variety of topics. In addition, the social partners confirm that sector level 
agreements are the primary source of labour market regulation. This notwithstanding, they 
also demonstrate that they act within a space of relatively high autonomy at the plant level. In 
addition, the data show that while the institutional environment enables local level actors to 
leverage on the institutional resources provided at sector level, the increasing 
internationalisation of the company has started to represent a real challenge for negotiations. 
It emerges, in particular, that changes in the business strategy in Firma 1 are redefining the 
role of collective bargaining.  
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8.4.3 Flexibility and Security in Collective Bargaining  
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements made available by the social partners 
in Firma 1 were considered and contrasted with the interview data.  Table 8.3 indicates 
which company level agreements address each of the seven flexibility and security 
categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, Bekker, 
Wilthagen et al. 2008), and indicates whether the provisions enhance flexibility and security, 
and if so which forms.  
 
Table 8.3: Firma 1 – Flexibility and security in collective bargaining 
  Flexibility Security 
Pay 
Sectoral  
Demarcation 
Pay bargaining (2012-2010-2007-2004) 
 
Wage    
Training 
 
Sectoral 
Demarcation 
In-job training - Multi-flexible production: 
job rotation (2007-2010) 
Functional  Employment security 
Job Classifications   
 
 
Working-time 
 
Sectoral 
Demarcation 
Shifts  and on call payments (2004-2007) 
Overtime payments (2000-2004-2007) 
Flexi-time (2010) – Multi-flexible production 
Working-Time 
Working-time 
Working-Time 
 
 
Combination  
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
  
 
  
 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
Neither demarcated 
nor delegated 
(not expected) 
Seniority entitlements (2002) 
Pension plan  (2004) 
 
 
Income security 
Combination security 
Measures for 
employment 
 
Neither demarcated 
nor delegated 
(not expected) 
Severance Payments (2010) 
Extended notice period 
Extra training (2010) 
Training during notice period (2010) 
In-job training certification (2014) 
Vocational education (2014) 
 Income Security 
Employment security 
Employment security 
Employment security 
Employment security 
Employment security 
 
Table 8.3 shows that in Firma 1 the social partners regulate issues of flexibility. They do so 
by engaging with all the competences that the sector level agreement demarcates for 
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company level actors: pay, training, and working-time. This confirms that the articulation 
mechanisms provided by the Danish collective bargaining system are effective in shaping the 
scope of the local bargaining agenda over flexibility and security. In particular, by engaging 
with pay, training, and working time, management and shop stewards are able to address 
wage, functional and working-time flexibility, while by negotiating on training and working-
time they also address employment and combination security.  
 
Further, the data reveal that the social partners in Firma 1 also engage with two of the 
substantive categories that are not explicitly the object of either demarcation or delegation at 
the sectoral level. These categories are social benefits and entitlements and measures for 
employment which address income, combination and employment security.  It follows that as 
a result of negotiations, HR managers and shop stewards in Firma 1 are able to enhance all 
forms of internal flexibility – wage, functional, and working-time flexibility – and all forms 
of security. 
 
Crucially, Table 8.3 confirms that the categories that are the object of sectoral demarcation 
are those on which the social partners actually engage in collective bargaining. It follows that, 
legitimated by the sector level framework, local actors feel entitled to adjust demands for 
flexibility and security to the resources available locally. By acting in an institutional 
environment in which the role of legal regulation is minimal, managers and shop stewards 
become the primary source of labour market regulation on such issues. 
 
Flexibility for us is taking a step away from the big agreement [industrial agreement] 
and negotiating our own agreements, so that we can have better working-time and 
less rigidity with how work is organised. 
Firma 1 HR manager, July, 2014 
 
The minimum salary in the big agreement per hour is too little, and we look at other 
pharmaceutical companies in here and, if it’s higher [than in Firma 1], we say that we 
want the same! Pharmaceuticals here in DK steal [poach] each other’s employees!! 
And that’s because of the salary so we bargain to make sure the best employees 
stay… and we are doing really well.  
Firma 1 shop-steward HK Privat and Chairwoman of Klub, July, 2014 
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However, it also emerges that institutions only partially account for the scope of the 
bargaining agenda over issues of flexibility and security. The strength of the actors in Firma 
1 plays a fundamental role too.  Specifically, the interview with the HR manager sheds light 
on the fact that union density may have two important implications. The first implication is 
that it may constrain HR mangers from entering into collective bargaining over categories 
that are covered neither by delegation nor by demarcation. Table 8.3 confirms this by 
demonstrating that the categories of social benefits and entitlements and measures for 
employment do indeed address different forms of security. It is argued that negotiations on 
such categories are used by the company as a way of showing recognition to the shop 
stewards – and by implication to the unions – for keeping the production floor quiet and 
guaranteeing high levels of productivity. Interestingly, the HR manager refers to collective 
bargaining as a ‘sort of HR policy’ suggesting that because unions are strong, benefits such as 
pension plans, training and severance payments can be found in Firma 1 agreements. The 
second implication is that unions are not just reactive: they are able to leverage on 
institutional resources, such as collective bargaining to participate in the actual definition of 
different forms of security.  
 
We don’t bargain locally because it’s strategic for the business per se but more 
because it is important for the employees. In that sense it [collective bargaining] is a 
sort of an HR policy which well somehow it is strategic because of course we have an 
expectation for the employees to be loyal and flexible and we want to thank the reps 
for not having any issues at all. We never had an interruption of production because 
they [shop stewards] deal with the issues we have with the workers. If you look at the 
total company here [in Firma 1’s headquarters] we are 1600 people and around 500 
of them [those working on the production sites] are on collective agreements. So it’s 
quite a large number and most of them are in a union. I’d say more than 80 per cent 
and the other are in the yellow unions.  
Firma 1 HR manager, July, 2014 
 
Further, the social partners, in Firma 1, show that they have the capability to use collective 
bargaining as a means of tackling unanticipated changes in economic conditions. For 
example, as a result of the 2009 organisational restructuring, the packaging department was 
included in an outsourcing project involving 150 redundancies.  During that particular time, 
the social partners managed to agree a series of measures to support employees’ 
redeployment in the external labour market. Some of these measures consisted of a temporary 
provision for three month notice and additional training. However, the decision to shut down 
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the production plant was withdrawn after excellent levels of productivity were revealed by 
the 2013 benchmarking exercise.  All the agreements dealing with collective dismissal were 
cancelled in 2014. Yet, in order to keep equipping employees with multiple sets of skills, in 
case of similar future scenarios, the social partners agreed that in-job training had to be 
certified and that a new fund for vocational education had to be instituted. This suggests that 
in a high-trust environment where company level bargaining is legitimated by a high union 
density both social partners have the strength to serve their own interests. 
 
Thus, collective bargaining in Firma 1 addresses issues of flexibility and security.  It does so 
by engaging with the three categories of flexibility and security that are the object of 
demarcation in the sector level agreement.  It follows that articulating mechanisms do indeed 
shape the content of local level agreements over these particular issues. Further, this analysis 
demonstrates that categories that are not explicitly covered by articulation, such as social 
benefits and entitlements, and measures for employment, entered onto the bargaining agenda 
as well. Overall, collective agreements in Firma 1 enhance internal forms of flexibility and 
all forms of security. It is argued that a clear demarcation of competences, coupled with a 
high level of union density strengthened the autonomy of both HR managers and shop 
stewards who, as a result, can leverage on collective bargaining to meet their specific 
flexibility and security demands. High union density, in particular, legitimates shop-steward 
bargaining power and prioritises issues of security in the bargaining agenda. Finally, the 
interviews show that the social partners also have the capability to deploy collective 
bargaining to cope with unexpected changes in the global business strategy.  
8.4.4 Types of flexibility and types of security: Any trade-offs?  
 
Table 8.3 shows that not only have issues of flexibility and security entered onto the agenda 
of local level negotiations but that by engaging with the categories of training, working-time 
and measures for employment, collective bargaining in Firma 1 also fosters different 
flexibility and security trade-offs. It is suggested that while sector level articulation 
mechanisms account for the choice of the social partners to engage with these particular 
categories, the actual items negotiated over depends on contingent needs arising from the 
company’s global strategy. Such contingencies increase the pressures on HR managers to 
control costs by introducing different forms of flexibility and influence the extent of shop 
stewards’ effectiveness in negotiating compensating forms of security.  
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Significantly, the interviews with the social partners reveal that demands for flexibility have 
been increasing in Firma 1 ever since the company redistributed its operations 
internationally. As part of a project of global restructuring in 2009 benchmarking has started 
to impose stricter productivity targets forcing HR managers to control costs through the 
implementation of new forms of work organisation. One of the most immediate effects of this 
internationalisation was a shift in the role of collective bargaining in Firma 1 which has 
begun to be perceived by management as an obstacle to organisational flexibility. 
 
We need to be flexible and quickly adjust to the business needs without having to 
make with them [shop stewards] a new agreement or have negotiations. We need that 
flexibility and flexibility is about being reasonable… you know, we have a code of 
conduct and HR policies that apply to all the employees, no matter which category of 
employees we [she identifies herself as an employee] are, these policies are very good 
so you know. 
Firma 1, HR manager, July 2014 
 
The strategy known in Firma 1 as ‘multi-flexible production’, embodies this rationale and, 
while theoretically presented as a much needed change in the employees’ mind-set, in 
practice consists of the removal of some issues that would normally fall into the category of 
working-time from the negotiating table, in exchange for policies aimed at reconciling work 
with private life. In particular, these aspects encompass over-time payments and measures of 
flexi-time.   
It’s more about changing the mind set and be flexible, taking ownership; and not like 
looking all the time that there is something new [change in the organisation of work] 
for an extra form of payment. Because you know a lot of companies are forced to 
move their production where labour costs are cheaper, in here sometimes payment for 
overtime and shifts can be up to 50 percent higher than the normal salary. It is a lot 
more expensive than in other places.  We made this flexitime to avoid this to happen 
and it can be useful also for the employees who can adapt work with their family 
needs, for example, by playing a bit with the shifts, getting to work an hour later and 
working one hour more. If you as an employee are not looking at the time then also 
management acts in the same way, now [after the 2010 agreement] they are free to 
organise themselves as they please as long as the targets are met.  
Firma 1 HR manager, July, 2014 
 
In the past 5 years flexibility has been very high, because we have to meet 
productivity targets now, and we need to work longer hours. The flexi-time we have 
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now was difficult to accept at the beginning because not everyone can be as flexible. 
But it is true that when I go to my manager and I say:’ today I’m going to be here at 3 
o’clock’, and then tomorrow I say: ‘today I can be here at 6 o’clock’, this is fine for 
her. When my child is sick I can go home to stay with my child.  
Firma 1 shop-steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
The same logic applies to the categories of training and measures for employment that were 
brought onto the bargaining agenda to address functional flexibility and job security and 
functional flexibility and employment security.  
 
The multi-flexible project is not only good for the company it’s also good for the 
employees. We had situations in which we stopped manufacturing a product because 
it was no longer worth the cost. Then, what do we do with the workers? So even 
though we need employees in the production line, we have to lay them off and hire 
someone else. In this way [with the multi-flexible system 2010] we ensure that if we 
need to turn down the volume of a product because it doesn’t sell so well then we can 
just rotate workers. Now with the certification thing we ensure also that if employees 
are laid off they can prove their competences [to other employers]. This is part of our 
last agreement [2014].  
Firma 1 HR manager, July, 2014 
 
The ability of collective bargaining to react quickly to business changes and to improve the 
level of productivity in Firma 1 is demonstrated by the decision of the multinational to 
withdraw the 2012 outsourcing project involving the packaging department. After the multi-
flexible production strategy was implemented the results of the 2013 benchmarking were so 
outstanding that they led to a reversal of the redundancy procedures. 
   
Sometimes employees may not be happy because not everyone wants to learn new 
things. But they [employees in Firma 1] have understood what this journey [new 
business strategy] has given them. Their results have outperformed any other 
companies. They could not find any other outsourced companies that could do better 
than them. You know, we have had our activities monitored to see how our 
productivity is going and the costs of it, and the result was that their performance is 
world class. So I think they have learnt - may be they didn’t like it - but that this was 
for the best. But it’s not something everybody is always happy about. Not everybody 
likes changes but this is flexibility and, if you are flexible than you can keep your job. 
Firma 1 HR manager, July, 2014 
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Thus, it can be concluded that different categories of flexibility and security entered onto the 
local level bargaining agenda both as a result of the delegating mechanism included in the 
sector level agreement and as a result of the effect of high union density on the shop 
stewards’ bargaining power. In contrast, the actual types of flexibility and security negotiated 
are linked to the structural and economic characteristics of the company. In particular, the 
internationalisation of the business imposes strong pressures on HR managers to control costs 
and introduce different forms of flexibility, especially working-time and functional flexibility. 
This notwithstanding, shop stewards in Firma 1 have been able via collective bargaining, to 
participate in the definition of compensating – and long-term – forms of security. Training 
activities are used to enhance both job and employment security, while severance payments 
were introduced onto the bargaining agenda to guarantee an additional form of income 
security during transition times. As for working-time, the category has been the object of 
derogation, meaning that the social partners have agreed to remove some forms of 
compensation for shifts and overtime. In exchange for their flexibility, different forms of 
combinations security have been recognised.  
8.5 Firma 2 
 
Firma 2 is a manufacturing plant of a global pharmaceutical company headquartered in 
Denmark. It is a wholly owned multinational enterprise employing 40 thousand employees 
in 75 countries. By supplying 180 countries across the world and controlling 48 per cent of 
its product market, it has gained a dominant market position. Internal growth and massive 
investment in research and development are pursued by the company as a strategy to ensure 
long-term profitability. These objectives are reflected in its organisational structure that is 
based on a Foundation and three interconnected Enterprises, as set out in Figure 8.5. 
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In organisational terms the Foundation awards grants and Enterprise 1, the foundations’ 
wholly owned subsidiary, manages the Foundations’ commercial activities.  Enterprise 1 is 
the holding company for the other organisations in the group. In addition to its ownership in 
Enterprise 2 and Enterprise 3, Enterprise 1 manages the Foundations’ endowment by: 
• Investing in life science companies at various stages of their development. 
• Investing in well-managed, well-established and profitable bio-medical and bio-
industrial companies and making financial investments in equities and bonds. 
In other words, the business model on which the company relies is characterised by a 
combination of both a collaborative and a partial integration model. Such a strategy has been 
designed as a way to magnify the benefits of a highly specialised Research & Development 
portfolio, while reducing its major risk. In particular, the model of specialisation has allowed 
the present multinational to build a significant competitive advantage in its product market, 
as well as a brand, over diversified organisations with multi-segment products and services. 
At the same time it has, however, made the company highly dependent on these specific 
segments thereby exposing it to global competition.  By entering into strategic alliances and 
partnerships agreements, especially in emerging national economies, the company has 
reduced this risk because it has set in place a flexible and adaptive structure that can change 
according to internal and external factors while meeting long term financial goals.  
 
Further, the business model of this multinational is based on: 
 
a. Four strategic focus areas targeting different diseases; 
Enterprise'1''
FoundaMon' Grants"
Enterprise'3'
Enterprise'2'
Investment"in"
life:science"
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"
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b. Five core capabilities – R&D, Diseases Global Understanding, High Quality and 
Cost-effective Production, Marketing, and Maintaining a Leading Position;  
c. Five geographical areas – sales depend on the location of the customers (see Fig. 8.6)  
d. Two business segments based on therapies and each including: research, 
development, manufacturing, and marketing of different products.  
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Fig. 8.6 Sales by Region 
 
 
At the end of 2014 the total number of employees was 41,450 with the 30 per cent of them 
employed in Product Supply. The company owns 9 plants across US, Brazil, France, China, 
Russia, and Japan employing approximately four thousand workers. In Denmark there are 7 
further manufacturing plants that participate in supplying the global market – exports 
account for 99 per cent of total sales. All seven manufacturing plants will be the object of the 
present analysis and are referred to as Firma 2. Figure 8.7 shows the location of the plants. 
 
 
 
In Denmark, more than eight thousand employees are involved in different activities across 
five different divisions: 
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1. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients  
2. Finished Products  
3. Devices and Supply Chain Management  
4. Biopharm  
5. Product Supply Quality   
 
In terms of workforce composition, in Firma 2 there are primarily semi-skilled and skilled 
employees, but also operators and lab technicians. In Denmark there are also about 300 
employees who support Product Supply in functions such as Finance, IT, Human Resources, 
and Environmental management. However these are outside the scope of this study.  
8.5.1 Collective Bargaining Actors  
 
The multinational to which Firma 2 belongs is not a member of the sectoral employers’ 
organisation – Dansk Industri. However, collective bargaining at company level occurs 
within a well-functioning framework of industrial relations. There are professional full-time 
shop stewards in-house that represent each of the unions within the sectoral union cartel – 
CO-Industri. For the semi-skilled and skilled blue collar workers these are 3F and Dansk 
Metal (DM) while for the lab technicians it is HK –Privat. Together with the employer’s side, 
these unions bargain for the entire workforce across the seven production plants. Thus, 
because there are no site-level agreements, for the purpose of this study, all seven plants can 
be considered as a single organisation – Firma 2.  
 
The above mentioned unions are free to open a bargaining table that covers all employees 
alike or to negotiate separate agreements on behalf of each of their constituencies. In both 
cases, negotiations result in package deals. When negotiating separately, HK-Privat initiates 
the bargaining round and the terms agreed function as a benchmark for the other categories of 
worker. Skilled and semi-skilled employees – Dansk Metal and 3F respectively – used to 
bargain together as their pay conditions are remunerated hourly. 100 percent of skilled and 
semi-skilled employees are union members (DM, 3F), and 60 per cent of laboratory 
technicians are union members (HK Privat). The ‘scientists’ employed in the production 
plants belong to the ‘professional academics union’. However, the exact share of union 
membership is uncertain (Dansk Magisterforening). Overall, in Firma 2 the union density is 
77 per cent. The chair of the unions’ Klub is the HK-Privat representative who is also an 
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employee elected member of the company Board of Directors. Given her role within the 
company and the Klub, she is considered a key negotiator for the union’s side.  
 
Thus, the main actors involved in collective bargaining within Firma 2 are the following 
Employers’ side: 
 
• The Vice President (VP) of ‘people relations and compliance’ 
• Team of the Vice President  
 
Before opening a bargaining round the VP needs to obtain the mandate of the ‘employers’ 
board’. This institution is composed of four vice presidents who meet formally six times per 
year and, informally, as many times as required.  
 
Unions’ side: 
 
• Klubs – given the large share of employees covered by collective agreements – over 
5000 employees – in Firma 2 there are full-time shop stewards representing each 
union belonging to CO-Industri, the sector level cartel. All Klubs share the same 
facilities (offices), ‘the House’, and work closely together on a variety of matters 
concerning all seven production plants.  
 
The multinational company to which Firma 2 belongs is not a member of the sector level 
employers’ organisation, meaning that the social partners in this company act with a 
relatively high level of autonomy, especially on the employer’ side. With regard to industrial 
relations issues the VP does not have any formal contact with Dansk Industri. Shop stewards 
benefit from the entitlements deriving from their membership. However, being full-time 
employee representatives, they do not require the assistance of the national unions during 
negotiations. It is possible, however, for them to ask for advice before and during collective 
bargaining.   
 
Our company has never been part of DI because we don’t need them. Well, I think 
that one of the reasons is that we have this very good collaboration with our unions. 
You know when DI and CO-Industri negotiate [sector level social partners] they have 
to look at the overall labour market, so they cannot go into details for each company. 
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But we [social partners in Firma 2] can do it here, so we don’t feel the interest of 
going into an organisation that takes decisions for us.  
VP of people relations and compliance, November, 2013 
 
We negotiate on our own, the CO-Industri unions are not involved.  
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
This notwithstanding, in the 1970s, an accession agreement signed with CO-Industri bound 
Firma 2 to the overall terms and conditions set out at the sector level. In contrast to DI 
members, Firma 2 managed to keep open the possibility of negotiating on items that are not 
subject to delegation, as well as to derogate from any chapter of the industrial agreement. 
Both interviewees affirmed that this has never happened and that the package deals reached 
in Firma 2 have, historically, been more generous than the sector level ones. 
 
We accepted it [accession agreement] but we said we wanted to be free to go below 
that conditions, if we could agree with our shop stewards; but of course we have 
never done it, we don’t need to, we are always much above the minimum. 
VP of people relations and compliance, November, 2013 
 
If you take the sector agreement is good to have it, and it is important and necessary 
to have it, but it really is something in general terms; and you have the possibility to 
make it more detailed and better, if you have local negotiations. 
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
The interview with the VP shows that the decision to enter into the accession agreement was 
made by the headquarters, which was interested in benchmarking the company’s industrial 
relations against those at sector level. For companies, being outside of the employers’ 
association in Denmark means that shop stewards – who have significant organisational 
capacity – are entitled to engage in industrial action during local bargaining. The decision to 
sign the accession agreement has therefore been made by the multinational to which Firma 2 
belongs primarily as a way to secure the unions’ respect of the peace-clause.  
 
In Denmark unions [sector level - CO-Industri] can go to a company and say now we 
want a collective agreement with you [company outside DI] and it can be difficult for 
a company [that is not affiliated to DI] to say NO, because then, they [local unions] 
can go on strike, or lock-out, or something like that, so, a lot of companies [outside of 
DI], I don’t want to say are forced, but close to ‘forced’ into some collective 
agreements [to sign an accession agreement].  
VP of people relations and compliance, November, 2013 
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This reveals that in Denmark, union density at the local level plays a fundamental role, 
because it creates incentives for large companies – even those that choose not to be members 
of DI – to enter into collective bargaining under the sector level framework. Further, the 
freedom retained by management and shop stewards, in Firma 2, within such a framework 
has contributed to the perception of local bargaining as an opportunity to customise the rules. 
Management, in addition, see collective bargaining as a functional tool to avoid individual 
negotiations and ensure stability for the shop-floor. 
 
Moreover, company level bargaining can occur as often as the social partners find it 
necessary, although at least once each year there is a collective agreement setting pay 
conditions. Typically, it is the union side that asks management to start the negotiation 
process. 
 
We do it without any pressure or timeline. We tackle issues as they come along. If 
there is an issue that is not regulated in the big agreement [sector level agreement] 
then they [shop stewards] just call us [management] and perhaps we will make one. 
So we can do it the whole year around’. 
VP of people relations and compliance, November, 2013 
 
Both sides of the negotiating table describe their relationship as positive and constructive. In 
particular, they emphasise that the long tradition of social dialogue in Firma 2 has reinforced 
trust and mutual recognition. None of the interviewees used the word ‘conflict’ to describe 
moments of tension between unions and management, rather they rather referred to such 
moments as occasional disagreements.  
 
Of course we may have different interests and some disagreements but we will always 
agree on what is the best for the company because what is the best for the company is 
the best for the employees, because then, they [employees] still have their jobs.  
VP of people relations and compliance, November, 2013 
 
Our role is about negotiations and we find compromises, this is what our relationship 
is about. Of course we can have our difficult moments but never conflict, I would say 
disagreements  
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
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This good relationship notwithstanding, interview data suggest that the social partners’ ability 
to actually find compromises in Firma 2 is linked to the headquarters’ directions as well as to 
the institutional context in which they interact. For example, although showing an incredibly 
good economic performance, during the 2011 bargaining round the company did not meet 
employees’ salary expectations and, failing to agree with the shop stewards, implemented pay 
increases unilaterally. The dispute ended with a joint document in which both parties stated 
that, for the first time in 20 years, no agreement could be reached. The reason given by HR 
was that, although the company had not been hit by the financial crisis, salary provisions 
could not overly exceed market levels. Unions interpreted this decision as a lack of autonomy 
on the part of their counterpart from the headquarters rather than a deliberate attempt to 
leverage on their bargaining power.  
 
I mean, it’s a funny thing, because we know them [counterpart] so well, we also have 
a high level of trust between us and when they say: this is what we can give you, I 
know it’s true. And therefore it’s not their fault, the VP and her people are not the 
ones that decide the strategy, it is higher up, in a sense she is like us, she is also 
employed [by the company] and she has to come to a result for somebody else, she 
needs a mandate and therefore it’s not so easy for her either. There is a lot of respect 
and mutual trust.  
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
Further, the options for unions to fight management decisions in 2011 were limited by the 
fact that it is unlawful under the terms of the sector agreement to organise a strike during 
company level bargaining. This suggests that in Firma 2 the headquarters’ strategy on the one 
hand, and the peace clause on the other, limit the autonomy of HR managers and shop 
stewards alike.  
 
To sum up, social partners in Firma 2 are independent from sector level organisations. 
Although acting with wide autonomy, their bargaining power is nonetheless constrained by 
both institutional and non-institutional factors. Specifically, while the headquarters directions 
limit the mandate of HR managers, the peace clause imposes non-strike action on the unions.  
Within this context, both sides of the negotiating table have found a space to develop a 
cooperative relationship and established a climate of trust.   
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8.5.2 Collective Bargaining Institutions and Bargaining Decentralisation 
 
Since the multinational to which Firma 2 belongs is not a member of the employers’ 
organisation, issues of collective bargaining decentralisation have never been relevant for the 
company. With regard to the relationship between bargaining levels the accession agreement 
has, nonetheless, produced effects that are similar to the ones experienced by companies that 
are members of DI. It is the sector level agreement that serves as main reference for the social 
partners and opens the company level debate over potential areas for improvements. 
 
So the company signs the renewal at the sector level directly with CO-Industri so, in 
that sense, we still have the benefits from the big agreement. In terms of industrial 
relations there is not a big difference about being inside or outside of DI… We have 
many local agreements that build upon the sector level. Now I show you: so, this [the 
sector level agreement] is more or less like the bricks of the house, and this [collection 
of local level agreements] is our way to put furniture in it and decorating the rooms. 
The sector is the basis of the pyramid and these are the top layers. Basically we 
[Klubs] act as if we were CO-Industri but at the local level, we [Klubs] are the same 
unions! [as the sector level ones] 
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
We [social partners] always respect the sector level agreement, unless we find another 
agreement at the local level. I only have it in Danish [collection of local level 
agreements] and this is the book that we normally put on top of the sector level 
agreement, and we say this is the one that is important because this is what matters in 
Firma 2! We [social partners] normally supplement the sector level agreement, but we 
can also change it. 
VP of people relations and compliance’, November, 2013 
 
Significantly, both the social partners suggest that their effectiveness in improving the sector 
level framework is enhanced by the outstanding performance of the company, as well as the 
features of the product market within which it operates.  
 
We are a big company in Denmark, if we were a company of 200-300 employees then 
we would probably see more benefits in being part of DI and let them negotiate for us. 
Here we have the resources do it ourselves and we see more benefits in negotiating at 
the local level than not doing it at all. 
VP of people relations and compliance’, November, 2013 
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We are a big company and this means that we have the resources to negotiate better 
agreements [than the sector level]. For example in Firma 2 if you work on Saturdays, 
and you are on shifts, you get 60 percent on top of your normal salary and on 
Sundays is 90 percent. If you look at the sector level it should be 25percent more, and 
it is a fixed amount, no matter what, so that’s where there is really the possibility to 
make the most at the local level. But of course [name of the multinational] is an 
outstanding company in Denmark and also in comparison to other companies in the 
world, and we have worked our way up so now we are amongst the big 20 [globally], 
but that’s because we found a cure for an illness that is just pandemic. 
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
To summarise, as a result of an accession agreement signed in the 1970s, collective 
bargaining in Firma 2 follows the guidelines negotiated at the sector level. However, due to 
the fact that the social partners can negotiate on any items and derogate from the sector level 
agreement, the level of procedural flexibility they can rely upon is potentially unlimited. 
Thus, in this context, the local balance of power between management and shop stewards’ 
becomes a crucial factor for the outcomes of their interactions. Significantly, by magnifying 
the potential implications of industrial disputes, the high level of union density in Firma 2 has 
produced incentives for management to enter into collective agreements – and strengthened 
the unions’ autonomy too. In addition, the favourable economic context characterising Firma 
2 has enabled both management and shop stewards to take advantage of collective bargaining 
to improve the terms and conditions set forth at the sector level.  
8.5.3 Flexibility and Security in Collective Bargaining  
 
In the empirical analysis, all the collective agreements made available by the social partners 
in Firma 2 were considered and contrasted with the interview data.  Table 8.4 indicates 
which company level agreements address each of the seven flexibility and security 
categories elaborated within the flexicurity literature (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, Bekker, 
Wilthagen et al. 2008), and indicates whether the provisions enhance flexibility and security, 
and if so which forms.  
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Table 8.4: Firma 2 – Flexibility and security in collective bargaining  
  Flexibility Security 
Pay Pay bargaining (2000 to 2013 every year) Wage    
Training Vocational Training (2012)  Employment 
Job Classifications   
 
 
Working-time Shift  and Overtime payments (2000, 2004, 
2006, 2007) 
Part-time (2012) 
Working-Time 
 
Working-Time 
 
 
Combination  
Provisions for 
Atypical workers 
  
 
  
 
Social Benefits 
and Entitlements 
Pension plan  (2000, 2005, 2012) 
Maternity Leave and Parental Leave (2002) 
Entitlements for severance payments  
 
 
Combination  
Combination 
Income 
Measures for 
employment 
Job Transfer Centre (2004-2008-2012) 
internal forms of ALPM including training 
and job placement 
 Job  
 
Table 8.4 shows that issues of flexibility and security have entered into the collective 
bargaining agenda in Firma 2. The social partners have addressed these issues by negotiating 
over pay, training, working-time, social benefits and entitlements, and measures for 
employment. Due to the fact that management and shop stewards in Firma 2 are free to 
engage on any issue as well as to derogate from the industrial agreement, it is not possible to 
establish a causal relationship between the procedural flexibility provided by the sector level 
agreement and the five substantive categories that are the object of local level bargaining. 
However, the interviews with both sides of the negotiating table show that local level 
bargaining in Firma 2 acts primarily as a way of complementing the provisions negotiated at 
the sector level. It is from what is defined as the ‘big agreement’ that full-time shop stewards 
and HR management start the negotiating process and find ad-hoc compromises that reflect 
both the resources available locally and the power relations between them. By suggesting 
items for negotiation, the sector level framework does indeed shape the content of local level 
bargaining.    
 
The main forms of flexibility addressed by social partners in Firma 2 are wage and working-
time flexibility which are the result of negotiations over the categories of pay and working-
time. In addition, the social partners address  all forms of security – employment, income, 
combination and job security as a result of negotiations over training, working-time, social 
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benefits and entitlements, and measures for employment. It follows that that in Firma 2 issues 
of security are more prominent than issues of flexibility.  
 
Interestingly, the interviews with both the employer and the union sides reveal that the notion 
of flexibility and security, in Firma 2, are not the objects of a particularly developed debate. 
For example, neither the VP nor the employee representative was able to put forward a 
definition of the two terms.  Yet the content of the agreements demonstrates that issues of 
flexibility and security have indeed entered onto their bargaining agenda.  
 
For me it is really difficult to understand what you mean when you say flexibility and 
security because these are not themes for us, we tackle things as they come along, 
sometimes we look at pension and we say, how can we improve this? Then it’s done. 
Then we have this JTC [Job Transfer Centre] and we look into this one and we find an 
agreement on how to handle it. I guess that it is also because the company is doing 
really well so we did not come across these issues in a problematic way, we just do 
what we need to do and when it is needed. 
VP of people relations and compliance’, November, 2013 
 
To be honest, we [social partners] do not have any particular debate on flexibility and 
security. We do talk about skills and competences but it’s just to add value to the 
employee that can better contribute to the workplace. 
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
Thus, given the distinctive institutional context in which the social partners, in Firma 2, 
interact, the analysis of the local agreements does not allow the research to establish a clear 
link between the scope for flexibility and security and the procedural flexibility provided by 
the sector level framework. However, the interviews suggest that managers and shop 
stewards do indeed consider the industrial agreement as a key reference point for setting their 
bargaining agenda.  Secondly, while the content of the agreements show that five of the seven 
substantive categories have entered into collective bargaining and have addressed different 
forms of flexibility – in particular working-time and wage flexibility – and all forms of 
security – the interviewees have not developed a clear understanding around these particular 
issues. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that dimension of security in Firma 2 is more 
prominent than the dimension of flexibility.   
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8.5.4 Types of flexibility and types of security: Any trade-offs?  
 
Table 8.4 shows that all the substantive categories that have entered into local agreements in 
Firma 2 address either flexibility or security, but not both. The category of pay only enhances 
wage flexibility, while working-time enhances working-time flexibility. Similarly the 
category of training addresses employment security, working-time addresses combination 
security, social benefits and entitlements addresses income security and combination security, 
and measures for employment addresses only job security.  
 
This result, however, does not indicate, that trade-offs between flexibility and security do not 
occur. Simply, in Firma 2 such trade-offs need to be considered as an outcome of the whole 
package deal. 
 
We never only negotiate on salaries when we open a pay bargaining. It can be more 
of a package, so for example, in one specific issue is what we would like to have, as 
management, and then in another issue, is what they [shop stewards] would like to 
have, so I think it’s a kind of a package in order to balance things out…’  
                                               ‘VP of people relations and compliance’, November, 2013 
 
‘To be honest, I think that it’s obvious to compromise between the interests of 
managers and the interests of employees. Isn’t it what collective bargaining is all 
about? For instance, in an agreement the VP asks for measures making our 
performance better, for example, over-time, training etc and we [shop stewards] try to 
meet their requests by asking for more things, for example, parental leave or 
sometimes part-time – also if personally I don’t see why part-time should be useful, 
but this is what some young employees want recently.  
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
In addition, the interviews with the social partners suggest that the outstanding financial 
performance of the company creates an opportunity for both management and shop stewards 
to find compromises that are functional to both parties. The overall positive outcomes of their 
interactions may also explain their difficulties in unpacking the notions of flexibility and 
security and understanding the implications for local level negotiations.  Yet, the difficulty in 
putting forward a clear definition of flexibility and security does not mean that Firma 2 does 
not experience these kinds of demands. On the contrary, Table 8.4 demonstrates that different 
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forms of flexibility and security have indeed entered into the bargaining agenda. The fact that 
the social partners are not familiar with the terminology does not mean that the underlying 
issues are not addressed. More likely, management and shop stewards’ effectiveness in 
meeting their respective interests has meant that flexibility and security have not emerged as 
issues of conflict.  
  
What we see sometimes is that for productivity needs we [management] ask workers 
to stay longer hours. But we pay for them at a higher rate [than the sector level 
agreement], and again this [rate] has been negotiated with the union. We always look 
for a balance… any time that we ask our employees to sacrifice their time off to work 
more, we pay a lot of money for it; and it’s always a personal choice. If you don’t 
want to work more you do not do it. 
‘VP of people relations and compliance’, January, 2014 
 
We [shop stewards] do take advantage of local level bargaining, and maybe this is 
also another evidence of having top standards in this regard. It’s a good story! 
Really. 
Chair of Klubs – (HK Privat) and member of the Board of Directors, November 2013 
 
In other words, the analysis of collective bargaining in Firma 2 shows that the social partners 
are able to negotiate trade-offs between flexibility and security independently from 
productivity targets deriving from the benchmarking exercises. The institutional context, as 
well as the economic characteristics of the multinational to which Firma 2 belongs, enable 
unions to gain in security despite the headquarters’ requests for flexibility.  Table 8.4 shows 
that such trade-offs do not occur through the negotiations on individual categories of 
flexibility, but rather as a result of the overall package deal – as for the 2012 bargaining 
round. Yet, issues of security in collective bargaining are more prominent than issues of 
flexibility.  
8.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the institutional and the economic characteristics within which 
company level negotiations occur across the four manufacturing plants which were 
investigated. In order to establish the context for the comparative analysis that follows 
(chapter 9), it also explored the role that such characteristics have for issues of flexibility and 
security. Some preliminary differences and similarities emerged both across countries and 
companies.  
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In this regard, it was found that while articulating mechanisms between bargaining levels 
shape the way in which the different categories of flexibility and security have entered into 
company – and plant level – bargaining across the four cases, these are not the only relevant 
factors. The presence of shop stewards is also shown to be an important variable. 
Specifically, high union density enables Danish local actors to engage with competences that 
are outside the scope of sector level articulation. In contrast, low union density reduces the 
incentives of the Italian local level actors to take further some of the competences that are the 
object of demarcations – at the interconfederal level – and delegation – at the sector level.  
Moreover, the analysis indicates that the actual types of flexibility and security negotiated – 
and the combination between these – are not necessarily the result of institutional 
arrangements. It emerges that company level contingencies – such as the characteristics of the 
workforce and the production processes, the role of each manufacturing plant along the value 
chain, and increasing intra-site benchmarking – suggest to social partners a variety of items 
for local negotiations. In particular, these independent variables produce incentives for HR 
managers to control costs through the implementation of flexibility and allow shop stewards 
to participate in the definition of compensating forms of security. It follows that while the 
different forms of flexibility and security entering into the bargaining agenda vary across 
companies and categories, the negotiations also result in a variety of flexibility and security 
trade-offs across the four manufacturing plants investigated.  
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Chapter 9: Engaging with flexibility and security at the company level 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to address the second set of research questions which 
have been derived from the comparative institutional analysis: 
 
o RQ2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements 
at the sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of 
security outcomes?  
o RQ2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition 
and organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of security 
outcomes? What are the implications in terms of the nature of the negotiated trade-
offs? 
 
In order to address these questions two complementary steps are undertaken. First, the 
relationship between sector and company level institutions is explored in light of the findings 
presented in Chapter 8. This allows the research to establish whether the expectations 
developed in Chapter 7 about the enabling role of sector level institutions are corroborated by 
the outcomes of company level bargaining. The second step investigates the relationship 
between firm-specific contingencies and the nature of flexibility and security entering into 
company level bargaining. Indeed, the focus on non-institutional variables sheds light on the 
link between institutional rules and organisational contingencies so that the considerations 
around which local actors define their flexibility and security strategies, in practice, can be 
understood.  
  
It is argued that sector level institutions provide HR managers and shop stewards with a 
series of opportunities to engage with issues of flexibility and security both in Italy and 
Denmark. However, the different degree of autonomy within which company level actors 
interact across – and within – these two countries accounts for the extent to which they take 
such opportunities further. It is shown that in Denmark articulation mechanisms are not 
always necessary for suggesting which items of flexibility and security are the subjects of 
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negotiation at the company level. In contrast, in Italy the mechanisms in place are not always 
sufficient, meaning that the fact that they are provided by both the interconfederal and the 
sectoral level does not ensure that issues of flexibility and security will enter onto the agenda 
of company bargaining. The study identifies two relevant explanations. A clear framework of 
rules for negotiation on the one hand, and high union density at company level on the other, 
persuade Danish shop stewards to accept further bargaining competences and avoid potential 
representation problems. Since shop stewards are actually able to guarantee the successful 
implementation of the agreements, management has no reason to contest their mandate; both 
sides are in the position to benefit from the outcomes of their interaction. In Italy the situation 
is reversed. An unclear framework of rules for company level bargaining, coupled with low 
union density discourages local level actors from entering into reciprocal commitments and 
provides more incentive to accept the conditions set forth at the sector level.  
 
In addition, the non-institutional focus allows the research to establish that the actual types of 
flexibility and security negotiated are, to a large extent, dependent on the organisational 
characteristics of the multinationals in which the social partners are embedded. The way in 
which multinationals organise their cross-border activities influences the ability of the social 
partners within subsidiaries to make strategic use of collective bargaining. In particular, it 
encourages the global headquarters to either benchmark common work patterns through the 
implementation of international HR policies or to simply impose financial targets for each 
division.  
 
In this regard, when multinationals are concerned primarily with financial targets (rather than 
common work patterns), local HR managers retain the scope to achieve flexibility by taking 
into consideration local power contingencies. This, in turn, provides unions with the 
opportunity to leverage on institutional resources, such as collective bargaining, to exchange 
flexibility with compensating forms of security. Within this context, the social partners shape 
balanced trade-offs between flexibility and security because, as a result of negotiations, both 
sides are able to gain in equal measure (see Chapter 2). It is concluded that, in Denmark, the 
global headquarters’ ability to take advantage of local imbalances of power is reduced by the 
strong presence of shop stewards. Despite sharing similar organisational characteristics, the 
four case studies show that the scope for security in the Danish subsidiaries is still higher than 
in Italy. 
283"
"
 
9.2 Collective bargaining at the sector level 
 
Chapter 7 demonstrates that the institutional configuration of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector in Italy and the industrial sector in Denmark serve a similar role. 
Namely, they both enable and constrain company level negotiations on issues of flexibility 
and security. This is possible thanks to the articulation mechanisms that govern the 
relationship between bargaining levels and shape the agenda of the social partners within 
companies. In particular, it is shown that on the procedural aspects, Italy and Denmark share 
more similarities than differences. The two countries under focus are characterised by: a) 
multi-employer arrangements; b) two-tier bargaining systems; c) centrally controlled 
decentralisation; and d) mechanisms of articulation based on demarcation.  
 
Further, Chapter 7 establishes that when exploring the role of the sector for company level 
bargaining it is not only institutions that matter. Significantly, a comparative analysis of 
sector level bargaining arrangements across Italy and Denmark points to the fact that actors’ 
choices matter too. Indeed, although procedural flexibility has recently grown in both 
countries, this trend is more apparent in Italy where sector level social partners have used 
their ‘special relationship’ to mark a shift from decentralisation through demarcation to 
decentralisation through delegation. In Denmark, further decentralisation has been provided 
(only) by recognising hardship clauses in the category of training, in 2007, and working-time 
in 2000. Thus, according to the sector level framework the competences of company level 
social partners are greater in Italy. Here, the categories of flexibility and security that are 
expected to enter into company level bargaining are Pay, Working-Time, Job-Classification, 
Training, Social Benefits and Entitlements, Provisions for Atypical Workers, and Measures 
for Employment while, in Denmark, they are only Pay, Working-Time, and Training. Table 
9.1 summarises the sectoral institutional characteristics of the two countries (see Chapter 7) 
and indicates (potential) implications for company level bargaining on flexibility and 
security.  
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Table 9.1: Sector level bargaining arrangements in Italy and Denmark and potential implications for company level 
bargaining on flexibility and security 
 
 Italy Denmark 
Collective Bargaining Arrangements Multi-employers 
Two-tier bargaining system 
Multi- employers 
Two-tier bargaining system 
Collective Bargaining 
Decentralisation 
Centrally controlled 
Open & Derogation clauses  
Centrally controlled  
Open & Derogation clauses 
Articulation Mechanisms Demarcation – National level 
Delegation – Sector level 
Demarcation – Sectoral Level 
Delegation – Sectoral level 
Content of Company Level 
Collective Bargaining 
- Pay (variable bonus) 
- Working-time 
- Job classification 
- Training 
- Social benefits  
- Atypical work 
- Measures for employment 
- Pay 
- Working-time 
- Training 
 
 
 
 
A comparative analysis of sector level bargaining arrangements across Italy and Denmark 
goes so far as to establish that actors and institutions account for the content of company level 
negotiations over issues of flexibility and security. However, the sector focus fails to 
demonstrate the extent to which company level actors engage in practice with the 
competences that are the object of delegation. By complementing the sector level findings 
(Chapter 7) with the company level data (Chapter 8), the next section aims to achieve this. 
9.3 The sector and the company foci 
 
In order to set the context for the comparative analysis of company level bargaining 
arrangements (RQ2a/b), it is essential to understand the extent to which sector level 
institutional mechanisms influence the strategies of company level actors. A cross national 
comparison of sector and company level bargaining in Italy and Denmark allows a focus on 
the relationship between sector and company level institutions and the implications of such a 
relationship for issues of flexibility and security.  
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Based on two important cross-national differences identified in Chapter 7, this research 
developed a series of expectations about the role of articulation mechanisms for company 
level bargaining. The first relevant difference relates to the mechanisms controlling 
decentralisation. While in the Danish industrial sector decentralisation is controlled at the 
sector level, primarily via demarcation, in the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector 
decentralisation is controlled both at the confederal level – via demarcation – and at the 
sectoral level – via delegation. In Italy, this double form of articulation produced two parallel 
and potentially opposing developments. On the one hand, it softened the controlling 
mechanisms set in place to govern the relationship between the sector and the company level, 
thereby widening the scope of company level bargaining. On the other, it blurred the 
boundaries of competences between bargaining levels, thereby increasing the extent of 
uncertainty over the items that can enter into company level negotiations. As a result of this 
uncertain framework of rules, company level actors in Italy are less likely than in Denmark to 
enact the procedural flexibility provided by the sector level agreement. 
 
The second relevant difference that emerges from the sector level comparison concerns the 
role of company level bargaining. While in the Danish industrial sector local level 
negotiations have always represented a key-element of the collective bargaining system, in 
the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector these have played a secondary role. This 
feature is also reflected in the depth of bargaining (Chapters 4 and 5) which in Denmark is 
found to be significantly higher than in Italy. It is, therefore, expected that Danish company 
level actors will be more confident than their Italian counterparts with regard to the exercise 
of their bargaining prerogatives.  
 
The data presented in Box 9.1 indicate that these relevant differences do indeed account for 
the extent of cross-national variation – or within country similarity – in the degree of social 
partners’ autonomy when engaging in firm level negotiations. For example, Box 9.1 confirms 
that the lack of interference from the interconfederal level in Denmark provides a more clear 
devolution of competences than in Italy which, in turn, guarantees managers and shop 
stewards the certainty that they need to enact their role of negotiators. In contrast, in Italy, 
company level initiatives appear to be constrained by national/political interests so that the 
social partners tend to act less independently than their Danish counterparts. For example, by 
enhancing further decentralisation, the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector in 2012 
entered into an open ideological confrontation with the confederal level. The opposing views 
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of two equally important sources of decentralisation have produced uncertainty over the 
actual competences of company level negotiators who, as a result, prefer to interpret the 
sector level framework in a conservative fashion.  Box 9.1 shows the main similarities 
(within country) and the main differences (cross country) emerging across the four 
manufacturing plants investigated (see Chapter 8). 
  
Box 9.1: Interview data – Bargaining decentralisation for HR managers and shop stewards.  
 Denmark Italy  
 
 
 
Firma             
1  
 
I think most of the things are negotiable, and 
these things are increasingly more [sic.]. But we 
have a clear sense of what we can do. 
 HR manager, July 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It’s easy, I ask to my employees: what could be 
improved? what should we try to get in terms of 
salary? what about flexibility of working-hours? 
what about education and holidays? I take their 
comments with me to my union and ask them to 
bring these instances up for the sector level 
bargaining round. Then, if the conditions at the 
sector level are better than the one at the local 
level we [shop stewards] take these instances to 
management and we check if we can change 
things. Everything starts from the big one! [the 
sector level agreement] Again that’s the Danish 
model! 
Shop-steward Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
 
Often it also happens that the confederal level decides to 
give its contribution and then things get really messed 
up! …speaking about company level collective 
bargaining we [management] are much more 
independent from the national [sectoral] and confederal 
levels than our counterpart…unions’ representatives at 
times are incoherent, inconsistent and weak, especially 
when they report to the confederal level, which is the 
moment in which they feel more politically exposed…’  
HR Director, December 2012 
 
We [delegates] have to use common sense and leave 
political matters to those who can deal with them…. 
National officials [the sector] are much more entitled 
than us to deal with delicate matters, they have a 
national picture and they are professionals. Of course 
they ask for our opinion but there is a separation of 
roles. Across companies there are different interests and 
national secretaries are the ones supposed to make a 
synthesis between our [company level social partners] 
positions.  
RSU, Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impresa 
1 
 
 
 
Firma 
2 
 
We [social partners] always respect the sector 
level agreement, unless we find another 
agreement at the local level. I only have it in 
Danish [collection of local level agreements] and 
this is the book that we normally put on top of the 
sector level agreement, and we say this is the one 
that is important because this is what matters in 
Firma 2! We [social partners] normally 
supplement the sector level agreement, but we can 
also change it 
VP of people relations , November, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
We have many local agreements that build upon 
the sector level. Now I show you: so, this [the 
sector level agreement] is more or less like the 
bricks of the house, and this [collection of local 
level agreements] is our way to put furniture in it 
and decorating the rooms. The sector is the basis 
of the pyramid and these are the top layers 
Chair of Klub, HK-Privat,  November 2013 
 
The problem we face is that such a decentralisation of 
collective bargaining [as fostered by the sector-level 
agreement] is not recognised [by all social partners at the 
confederal/national level]. Thus we [HR managers] lack 
legal certainty and litigations are lengthy. Also, the 
position of the labour courts has been historically in 
favour of the employee, we need to wait how the 
jurisprudence evolves on these issues [further 
decentralisation], and the sentences produced, before 
being sure we can actually engage with new competences 
[he refers to hardship clauses]. We know that this system 
will not break through before the next 5 years and, 
reasonably, to gain the legal certainty we need, 5 years 
are way too many’  
HR (plant) director, June 2013 
 
 
I think there is a distribution of competences across 
levels but sometimes, especially when issues involve 
political spheres at territorial or national level this 
division of competences gets more complicated. I give 
you an example, at the last sector level renewal [2012] 
the General Secretary of Filctem-Cgil lost the support of 
his confederation and after signing the agreement – the 
day after actually – he gave his resignation.  
 RSU delegate Uilcem-Uil, June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impresa 
2 
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Further, the combination of the sector and the company level analysis demonstrates that by 
strengthening unions’ bargaining power, union density at the company level also influences 
the degree of local actors’ autonomy when engaging in collective bargaining.  Section 9.2 
indicates that, formally, the scope of company level bargaining on issues of flexibility and 
security is more extensive in Italy than in Denmark. Yet, interviews at the company level 
(Chapter 8) reveal that the Italian social partners are less open than their Danish counterparts 
to engaging with company level negotiations. In particular, the Danish case studies 
demonstrated that the strong presence of shop stewards at a company level strengthens the 
power relations between social actors who thus feel legitimated and confident about the 
outcomes of their interactions. In contrast, in Italy, where there is weaker union 
representation, local level social partners are more reluctant to let new items enter onto their 
bargaining agendas and prefer to act upon the conditions set at the sector level. Because of 
their reduced bargaining power, shop stewards fear that managers may take advantage of 
collective bargaining to decrease the conditions negotiated by the sector level, while 
managers doubt the ability of shop stewards to secure the implementation of the agreements. 
It follows that in Italy, actors are found to be more sceptical than in Denmark about the 
contribution that company level negotiations may bring about. Box 9.2 presents the relevant 
data. 
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Box 9.2: Interview data – The role of company level-bargaining for HR managers and Shop stewards. 
 Denmark Italy  
 
 
 
Firma             
1 
 
We don’t bargain locally because it’s 
strategic for the business per se but more 
because it is important for the employees… If 
you look at the total company here [in Firma 
1’s headquarter] we are 1600 people and 
around 500 of them are on collective 
agreements. So it’s quite a large number and 
most of them are in a union... I’d say more 
than 80 per cent 
HR manager, July, 2014 
 
We want to bargain at the local level! because 
we believe that the industry agreement is not 
as good, and we can make it better! 
 Dansk Metal, July, 2014 
 
 
We deal with the fact that there is a lack of employees’ 
representation, thus negotiations have become very difficult 
and unstable. Unions’ representatives perfectly know that 
they have lost consensus [in Impresa 1], this is why they 
tend to subject the content of our collective agreements to 
referendum, which is unacceptable!  
HR Director, December 2012 
 
 
 
 
It’s a matter of roles and competences. According to my 
experience an RSU may be not qualified enough to negotiate 
over certain items. If an RSU signs an agreement without 
carefully consider the consequences, it could significantly 
damage employees…for the relationship we have here at 
Impresa 1 I think delegates don’t risk to be tricked, but plant 
level and company level bargaining can be a very dangerous 
tool to be played against us. First, we [delegates] are not 
professionals, remember? But our counterpart is made by 
professionals. Second, we work here. This gives you an idea 
of the unbalance between us…it is better to leave some 
matters to those who can deal with them’. 
RSU, Delegate Filctem-Cgil, December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impresa 
1 
 
 
 
Firma 
2 
 
In Denmark unions [CO-Industri] can go to a 
company and say now we want a collective 
agreement with you and it can be difficult for 
a company to say NO, because then, they can 
go on strike, or lock-out, or something like 
that, so, a lot of companies, I don’t want to 
say are forced, but close to ‘forced’ into some 
collective agreements.  
VP of people relations, November, 2013 
 
If you take the sector agreement is good to 
have it, and it is important and necessary to 
have it, but it really is something in general 
terms; and you have the possibility to make it 
more detailed and better, if you have local 
negotiations 
Chair of Klub, HK-Privat, November 2013 
 
 
Then it’s true that there is a problem of unions’ 
representation at the company level. Opening-clauses can 
have a dramatic effect if unions are weak at the company 
level. With whom do I negotiate? Unions need to redefine 
their role, if they want to be effective 
HR General Director, June 2013 
 
 
 
The way in which work is organised depends very much on 
productivity needs and it is very hard for unions to change 
management mind with regard to some issues. To improve 
conditions of the sector level agreement with company level 
bargaining is a real challenge at the moment and it is also 
very unlikely to happen. 
RSU delegate Femca-Cisl, June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impresa 
2 
 
Crucially, while confirming the significance of articulation mechanisms for the varying 
extent of the firm level bargaining agenda across countries, this analysis also suggests that 
these mechanisms do not provide the only explanatory factor. The lack of interference from 
higher institutional levels and the presence of employee representatives at the company level 
prove to be equally significant. First, they persuade shop stewards either to accept – as in the 
case of Denmark – or resist – as in the case of Italy – the delegation of additional bargaining 
competences. Second, they reduce – as in the case of Denmark – or increase – as in the case 
of Italy – the risk of representation problems occurring, in particular, those linked to 
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management questioning the mandate of shop stewards. It is argued that, by relying on a 
wider degree of autonomy, company level actors in Denmark have more opportunities than in 
Italy to take advantage of the institutional resources available locally.   
9.4 The Role of Collective Bargaining Actors and Institutions 
 
The data presented in Chapter 8 show that, across the four manufacturing plants investigated, 
there is a series of independent variables along which differences and similarities can be 
explored. By focusing attention on such variables it is possible to grasp whether – and if so 
how – the interaction between sector and company level bargaining arrangements affects the 
nature of flexibility and the nature of security outcomes. This step addresses RQ2a. 
 
In particular, the four company case studies confirm that institutional characteristics have a 
strong influence on the agenda of local level bargaining both as a result of the multi-employer 
bargaining system and the articulation mechanisms governing the relationship between the 
sector and the company level. In addition, they enable the research to establish that the extent 
to which local negotiators accept in practice the delegation of further bargaining competences 
depends on the degree of local actors’ autonomy from higher institutional levels. Thus, in 
order to observe how company level bargaining engages with flexibility and security across 
companies the first three independent variables considered are: 1) the autonomy of company 
level actors from sector level social partners; 2) the role of sector level collective agreements; 
and 3) coordinating mechanisms between bargaining levels. Moreover, because Chapter 8 
points to the fact that the reproduction of sector level bargaining relations at the company 
level facilitates bargaining activities and fosters negotiations over a wide range of areas a 
fourth variable needs to be taken into account, which is 4) the relationship between managers 
and shop stewards. Finally, the company focus highlights that within multinationals both the 
content and outcomes of local negotiations are sensitive to global management demands. 
However, it also shows that within subsidiaries, international human resources practices are 
tailored to local power relations, suggesting that socially constructed contingencies set limits 
to the transfer of global decisions. Given this, the remaining independent variables that are 
relevant to the present comparison are: 5) the autonomy of local level actors from the global 
headquarters; and 6) the role of local bargaining as described – and enacted – by the actors 
involved.  
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The next section reviews the extent to which similarities and differences occurred across the 
four manufacturing plants investigated along each of the six independent variables. The 
implications for issues of flexibility and security will follow. Table 9.2 provides a 
systematisation of the data.  
 
Table 9.2: Role of Actors and Institutions across companies  
 Impresa 1 Impresa 2 Firma 1 Firma 2 
Autonomy of 
local level actors 
from the sector 
level             
Shop stewards: Low-
medium (union 
representation 50%) 
 
HR: High – they receive 
external support but 
they bargaining 
independently   
Shop Stewards: Low-
Medium (union 
representation 30%) 
 
HR: High – they receive 
external support but they 
bargaining independently   
Shop Stewards: High 
(union representation 
83% in average)  
 
HR: High – they 
receive external 
support but they 
bargaining 
independently   
Shop Stewards: High 
(union representation 
77% in average)  
 
HR: Very High – 
they do not require 
external support and 
bargaining 
independently 
Role of Sectoral 
Collective 
Agreements 
Key-reference 
Division of 
competences between 
bargaining levels can be 
blurry  
Key-reference 
It allows for flexibility at 
the local level  
Derogations as an 
opportunity to empower 
local actors  
Overlap of competences 
between sector and 
company level 
General framework 
providing flexibility 
for company level 
bargaining 
 
 
General framework 
providing minimum 
entitlements  
Coordination 
between 
bargaining levels 
High  
bottom-up & top- down 
approach (company and 
sector level social 
partners sit at their 
respective bargaining 
table) 
High  
Bottom-up & top-down 
approach (company and 
sector level social partners 
sit at their respective 
bargaining table) 
Medium  
Regular contacts 
both between DI and 
HR managers and 
Unions and Shop 
Stewards.  
Low  
No contacts between 
DI and HR managers 
Shop stewards 
benefits from the 
entitlements of 
membership 
Managers-
Unions 
Relationship 
Constructive  
 
Constructive 
Accommodating 
Functional towards 
common targets   
Constructive 
Cooperative 
Partnership  
Constructive 
Cooperative 
Partnership 
Autonomy of 
local actors from 
the Headquarter 
Low  Low 
  
Medium-High 
 
Medium-High 
Role of Local-
Level Collective 
Bargaining 
Boosting productivity 
Providing flexibility  
Allocating resources in 
an effective way 
Disciplining different 
Managing restructuring 
and collective dismissal 
Bonus-scheme  
Issues such as 
- working-time 
Enhance flexibility 
Engaging employees 
Matching 
employees’ requests 
with the company  
Allocating resources 
To avoid working 
conditions to be 
discussed on 
individual basis  
Effective allocation 
of resources  
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forms of payments  
Implementing HR 
policies 
Dealing with collective 
dismissal 
- salary policies 
- training  
- job-rotation 
Can be items of 
negotiations but, if no 
agreement is possible the 
company proceeds 
unilaterally 
so to retain skilled-
workers 
Improving flexibility  
Improving working 
conditions 
Increasing 
employees’ 
entitlements 
Engaging employees 
  
 
The first relevant variable is the extent of actors’ autonomy from their respective sector level 
representatives. In the Danish manufacturing plants, the social partners were shown to have 
a higher degree of autonomy than their Italian colleagues when sitting at the bargaining 
table. In Firma 1, for example, the extent of coordination is similar for both management and 
union sides. Shop stewards and HR managers obtain external support from their respective 
(sector level) consultants almost exclusively on the interpretation of the industrial agreement. 
Sector level unions never get involved in company level negotiations. Only local-level 
branches do, very rarely, when no agreement can be reached. Firma 2 does not belong to the 
employers’ organisation (DI). Therefore, once the mandate from the board of directors has 
been obtained, the extent of the HR manager’s autonomy is unlimited. Shop stewards are in 
a similar position to their counterparts. They work as ‘Klubs’ whose main responsibility is to 
represent employees throughout different channels of negotiation –including the company 
board. They know in depth the content of the sector level agreement – which Firma 2 signed 
directly with CO-Industri – and participate in company level bargaining without either 
involving or notifying their respective unions’ branches. 
 
In Impresa 1 shop stewards are used to negotiating with the support of sector level social 
partners as they feel more secure acting under the watch of professional trade unionists. This 
has both the advantage of them not being employed by the company – thus being more 
independent – and of knowing the content of the sector level agreement in depth. While 
benefitting from strong links with the sector level employers’ organisation, management act 
within a wider degree of autonomy than the shop stewards. The general director of Impresa 
1sits on the Industrial Relations National Committee instituted within Federchimica with the 
objective of complementing a more typical top-down approach to collective bargaining with 
a bottom-up one. Interviews at the sector and the company level revealed that Impresa 1 is 
known in the employer’s organisation as a model for company level bargaining and for 
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having contributed to both shaping and embracing the sector values. In Impresa 2 similar 
dynamics to those observed in Impresa 1 emerged. While shop stewards affirm that they 
acted in strong collaboration with the territorial and the sectoral level unions, management 
showed that they were much more independent from the sector level organisation. Impresa 2 
rarely involves Federchimica when negotiating at the plant level while the territorial unions 
directly participated in negotiations. 
 
Thus, data show that between Firma 1 and Firma 2, in Denmark, and between Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2 in Italy, there is a similar degree of local actors’ autonomy from their respective 
sector level frameworks.  Although Firma 2 is not affiliated to DI the level of coordination 
on the union’s side is comparable to that of Firma 1. In both cases shop stewards involve the 
sector level – and/or the territorial union branches – but only to receive external support on 
the interpretation of the industrial agreement or to gather information on bargaining trends. 
As for the employer’s side, while HR managers in Firma 1 have a formal relationship with 
DI consultants, in Firma 2 there is no interaction between local managers and the employers’ 
organisation. This suggests that HR managers in Firma 2 are more autonomous than in 
Firma 1 in setting their bargaining agenda. In both Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 shop stewards 
showed that they were less independent than their Danish counterparts. Although all were 
constrained by the sector level framework, HR managers could set their bargaining agendas 
with autonomy, whereas the shop stewards shared their bargaining prerogatives with sector 
level negotiators. 
 
In regard to the second variable – role of sector level agreements – the analysis confirms 
some of the issues which emerged in the previous section. For example, shop stewards within 
Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 considered the sector level agreement as a key-reference because it 
provides certainty on the application of minimum employment standards. Further, according 
to the HR manager in Impresa 2, the procedural flexibility enhanced by the sector level 
agreement recognises new opportunities for company level actors. It does so in a spirit of 
collaboration between bargaining levels, evident in the shift it produced from the normative 
role of collective bargaining to collective bargaining as a means of employee engagement and 
welfare resources allocation. However, he added that the Italian attitude of periodically 
reforming the labour market through different forms of intervention interferes with industrial 
relations developments and causes conflicts of interest across bargaining levels. By pointing 
out the effects of the 2009 confederal agreement on collective bargaining competences, the 
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general director of Impresa 1 raised a similar issue. In his words: ‘if you read the agreement 
with the eyes of those who should practically implement it, it is a totally useless tool’. Indeed, 
in order to make it viable, social partner at the sector level had to intervene by first of all 
regulating the option to derogate. Yet, some competences are difficult to engage with because 
the general framework is unclear and they carry the risk of costly litigation.    
 
By contrast, the sector level agreement in Firma 1 and Firma 2 provides only a general 
framework within which companies can find the flexibility they need to meet their contingent 
demands. All social partners believe that company level agreements can be more beneficial 
both for the business and employee interests. On the one hand, HR managers emphasised the 
advantages of having a general framework that, by benchmarking employment conditions 
across the sector, provides stability for companies. On the other, they consider such a 
framework to be either too inflexible – Firma 1 – or too basic – Firma 2. In both companies 
shop stewards suggested that, given the outstanding performance of pharmaceuticals in 
comparison to other businesses, company level bargaining can redistribute more resources 
than at the sector level.  
 
Thus, with regard to the role of sector level agreements for company level bargaining, more 
similarities than differences emerge across Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 on the one hand, and 
Firma 1 and Firma 2, on the other. In particular, it is shown that in the two Italian 
manufacturing plants the social partners prefer to act upon the terms of the sector level 
agreement; whereas in Denmark they are willing to engage with company level negotiations. 
For the unions, the sector level agreement in Italy is important because it benchmarks 
employment conditions across industries, while for HR managers the main strength is that it 
provides stability. By contrast, in both Danish manufacturing plants the social partners 
perceive the sector level agreement as an inflexible and basic framework that they can 
improve upon. While managers gain flexibility, the unions can use their position to 
redistribute locally available resources and in the subsector in which they operate there are 
more of these resources than in rest of the manufacturing industry.  
 
The third variable taken into account is the extent of coordination between social partners 
across different bargaining levels. Within Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 such coordination is high. 
Both the HR general directors of the two companies sit on the Industrial Relations National 
Committee, instituted by Federchimica as a means to identify guidelines for sector and 
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company level negotiations. As for the union side, the shop stewards receive on-going 
training from their respective branches both at sector and territorial levels and receive 
assistance during negotiations.  
 
In Firma 1 DI’s consultants are involved in local level negotiations only if management need 
support on the interpretation of the sector level agreement. In contrast, sector level unions 
ensure that a certain amount of coordination always takes place across bargaining levels. 
They do so by training shop stewards and by sharing information on the outcomes of local 
negotiations. However, national officials never actually sit at the bargaining table where 
managers and shop stewards have exclusive prerogatives. In Firma 2 the employer’s side 
does not have any relationship with DI (informal or formal) as the company is not a member 
of the sector level organisation. No coordination between the sector and the company level, 
therefore, exists. Full-time shop stewards in Firma 2 are affiliated to the organisations 
participating in the unions’ cartel – Co-Industri – and they benefit from the entitlements 
linked to their membership, such as training and information sharing. However, no formal 
coordination occurs during the collective bargaining process. 
 
To summarise, in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 the extent of coordination between bargaining 
levels is high both on the employers’ and the unions’ sides. The HR managers sit on the 
Industrial Relations National Committee helping to both shape and reproduce the sector level 
values, while unions not only train and share information with shop stewards but, depending 
on the topics, also participate at the local bargaining table. In both Firma 1 and Firma 2 the 
sector level unions train and share information with the shop stewards. Yet, in Firma 2 
employee representation occurs through full-time – and highly specialised – shop stewards – 
that do not require the same level of external assistance as their counterparts in Firma 1. As 
for the employer’s side, in Firma 1 a certain amount of coordination between HR managers 
and the DI exists while in Firma 2 there is no formal relationship between the sector and the 
company level actors. It follows that HR managers in Firma 2 are more autonomous than in 
Firma 1. 
 
The fourth variable is the relationship between managers and shop stewards. Besides 
Impresa 1 – where disagreements are considered a normal expression of a plurality of 
interests between the parties – none of the social partners report critical issues or irreparable 
cleavages. All the actors across the companies define their relationship using adjectives such 
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as: constructive, accommodating, and functional towards common goals. In addition, in both 
Danish companies, shop stewards stress issues of trust and managers issues of cooperation. 
This particular climate is the result of the industrial relations culture promoted by the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector in Italy and by the industrial sector in Denmark which is 
found to be reproduced at company level. This notwithstanding, between the Italian plants – 
Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 – and the Danish plants – Firma 1 and Firma 2 – there is a 
difference in the nature of the relationship between managers and shop stewards. Indeed, in 
Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 actors describe their relationship as constructive, whereas in Firma 
1 and Firma 2 they describe it as both constructive and cooperative, meaning that managers 
and shop stewards, in the Danish plants, have a deeper level of interaction than their Italian 
counterparts in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2.  
 
The fifth relevant variable taken into account is the autonomy of local bargaining actors from 
their respective global headquarters. In both Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 the social partners 
agreed that the level of management’s autonomy, when negotiating over issues that are 
relevant to the business, is relatively low. For example, according to the CEO of the chemical 
company (Impresa 1), global management has never tried to impose any specific strategy of 
industrial relations directly. Even so, he added that ‘the Italian sites need to be receptive to 
HR policies, such as the global short-incentive scheme’ which has been implemented through 
collective bargaining. Consistently, the shop-steward suggested that ‘industrial democracy 
requires time to be enacted, a time that social actors are not provided with before 
implementing a change’.  With regard to time constraints, Impresa 2 faces similar issues to 
Impresa 1. In addition, management specify that local actors have a wide margin of 
autonomy to decide how to implement a change given the resources available. Yet, the 
change as such is centrally agreed, suggesting that the degree of autonomy here is relatively 
lower. 
 
The situation is different in Denmark where the social partners showed a higher level of 
autonomy from the directions given by headquarters than in Italy, primarily, as they are 
involved in the production of such directions.  Before starting a bargaining round, it is the HR 
department that in Firma 1 suggest the agenda to the executive VP who, accordingly, decides 
on the extent of the mandate. Given their active role in pursuing the company’s strategic 
objectives and in light of their bargaining power, also shop stewards demonstrate capability 
to influence the business strategy. The interviews with both sides of the negotiation table 
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confirm that the executive VP has a direct channel of communication with employee 
representatives which are both consulted and informed over the company financial targets. In 
Firma 2 full-time shop stewards sit directly at the company board, while the HR manager 
defines in collaboration with the board of directors the boundaries of her mandate, meaning 
that both management and shop stewards in Firma 2 are considered strategic actors.  
 
Thus, social partners, both in Firma 1 and Firma 2, show a higher degree of autonomy than 
the social partners in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 from their respective global headquarters. It 
emerges, in particular, that while Danish HR managers and shop stewards are involved in the 
companies’ strategies decisions in Italy local actors have less capability to influence the 
headquarters directions. Further, because in Firma 1 the chair of the Klubs – HK-Privat 
representative – is one of the board of directors, shop stewards ability to influence the 
company strategy is relatively higher than in all the other companies.  As for the Italian 
plants, while in Impresa 1 management affirm that local actors need to be ‘receptive’ to 
global HR strategies, in Impresa 2 the HR director sustains that changes are ‘centrally’ 
decided, suggesting that, also between the two Italian companies, there is a difference in the 
degree of the HR managers’ autonomy.   
 
The last independent variable – the role of local bargaining as perceived by the actors 
involved – is derived by a combination of all the other variables and indicates in which ways 
and towards which ends social actors engage with their bargaining competences. In Impresa 1 
social partners deploy company level negotiations to complement the sectoral framework 
with ad-hoc provisions supporting the strategic interests of the global headquarters in the 
region. Typically, such interests have to do with parameters of profitability – economic and 
financial results – and productivity – organisation of work, typologies of activities carried out 
by each operation, technologies implemented and skills required. In addition to that, plant-
level negotiations deal with the pragmatic and organisational aspects of production processes, 
such as working-hours, flexitime and the 3 percent of the profit-sharing scheme. This 
suggests that, in Impresa 1, market-led considerations sit at the top of the bargaining agenda. 
In Impresa 2 local agreements are aimed primarily at negotiating the incentive scheme and 
managing restructuring processes which often includes collective dismissals. Other topics, for 
example, working-time, salary policies and job classifications, training and job-rotation can 
be items of plant level negotiations. But, if no agreement is reached, management proceed 
unilaterally. Social partners in Impresa 2 consider collective bargaining as a strategic 
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resource, especially for the opportunity it provides to improve productivity and secure the 
subsidiary’s growth. It can, therefore, be inferred that, in Impresa 2, it is productivity-led 
considerations that are at the top of the bargaining agenda.  
 
Issues of productivity also cover a significant share of the collective bargaining agenda in 
Firma 1 and Firma 2, in particular, as a way to gain flexibility. In contrast to Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2, however, shop stewards in these companies appear to be more confident about the 
possibility of local agreements also improving employees’ working conditions. In Firma 1 
management not only deploy local bargaining to enhance flexibility but also to show 
recognition and commitment to employees.  As a result, shop stewards in Firma 1 perceive 
company level negotiations as a way of improving the sector level framework as well as 
retaining skills via different forms of rewards. Further, in Firma 2 management consider 
negotiations useful because they avoid the discussion of terms and conditions on an 
individual basis, while union representatives emphasised the opportunity they offer to 
redistribute resources available locally. Thus, measures improving employee working 
conditions as well as productivity-led considerations characterise the bargaining agendas in 
both Firma 1 and Firma 2. 
 
Collective bargaining is deployed to complement the sector level framework with firm-
specific provisions across all four of the manufacturing plants investigated. However, while 
in the Italian plants the primary aim is to meet the strategic objectives of the headquarters in 
the region, in the Danish plants collective bargaining is also a way for the unions to take 
advantage of their prerogatives. It follows that market-led considerations and productivity-led 
considerations in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 have become prominent in the collective 
bargaining agenda, whereas in the agreements negotiated in Firma 1 and Firma 2 
productivity considerations are found together with issues aimed at improving employee 
working conditions.  
 
Crucially, this analysis demonstrates that the degree of variation across the four 
manufacturing plants investigated reflects important features of the collective bargaining 
system in which they are embedded. In particular, by reviewing the six independent variables 
across the four companies it is shown that: 
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1. The social partners in Firma 1 and in Firma 2 have a higher level of autonomy from 
the sector level framework than in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2; 
2. The sector level framework enables the social partners in Firma 1 and Firma 2 to 
exert their bargaining competences, whereas in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 it limits the 
role of negotiators;  
3. The level of coordination between sector and company level social partners is lower 
in Firma 1 and Firma 2 than in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2; 
4. The relationship between managers and shop stewards is characterised by greater 
depth in Firma 1 and Firma 2 than in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2;  
5. The autonomy of bargaining actors from the directions of the global headquarters is 
greater in Firma 1 and Firma 2 than in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2; 
6. The breadth of bargaining topics as well as the capacity of managers and shop 
stewards to meet their respective interests via negotiations is wider in Firma 1 and 
Firma 1 than in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2.  
 
In this light it is concluded that a clear demarcation of competences between the sector and 
the company level provides managers and shop stewards in Denmark with a more certain 
framework of rules to engage in local negotiations than in Italy. In fact, while in Impresa 1 
and Impresa 2 the sectoral framework is perceived as an element of stability which should 
not necessarily be modified (or that is difficult to modify– Impresa 2), in Firma 1 and Firma 
2 the sector level framework is seen primarily as a mechanism of procedural flexibility. It 
follows, first, that while in Italy company level actors feel constrained by the sector level 
agreement, in Denmark they are empowered by it; and second, that managers and shop 
stewards in Denmark are more independent bargaining actors than their Italian counterparts.  
 
In addition, it is argued that differences in union density: a) accounts for the greater 
assistance required by the Italian shop stewards during negotiations than that required by the 
Danish shop stewards; b) equips the Danish social partners with greater autonomy from the 
directions of the global headquarters than it does the Italian social partners; c) enables 
collective bargaining in the Danish subsidiaries to engage with issues that benefit both the 
employer’s and the employees’ sides, whereas in Italy it allows HR managers to exploit local 
imbalances of power to achieve primarily productivity goals; and d) is responsible for the 
deeper relationship between Danish managers and shop stewards in comparison to their 
counterparts in Italy. 
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In other words, the similarities between Impresa 1 and Impresa 2, on the one hand, and 
Firma 1 and Firma 2, on the other, are due to the different depth of the collective bargaining 
systems in which they are embedded. Significantly, the Danish case-studies confirm that 
greater depth of bargaining in this country is secured through a well-functioning sector level 
framework and a high union density at the company level. These features provide the social 
partners with the opportunity to deploy collective bargaining in a way that is beneficial for 
both sides. By contrast, in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2, where a well-functioning sector level 
framework exists – but is constrained by other sources of labour market regulation – and 
union density is relatively low, the agenda of company and plant level social partners is 
skewed towards productivity and market-led considerations.  
 
Although cross national variations are more pronounced than within country variations, the 
six substantive variables show that there are some differences also between Firma 1 and 
Firma 2 in Denmark, and between Impresa 1 and Impresa 2, in Italy. First and foremost, 
while Firma 1 belongs to the employers’ association – DI – Firma 2 does not. As a result, HR 
managers in this company are more independent bargaining actors than those in Firma 1. It is 
shown, for example, that: a) if shop stewards agree, they are entitled to deviate from the 
sector level provisions; b) overall, the industry-wide agreement plays a less influential role 
for company level bargaining; and c) there is no coordination between HR managers and the 
employers’ association. Second, employee representation in Firma 2 occurs through the 
presence of full-time – and highly specialised – shop stewards that require less assistance 
from sector level unions than their counterparts in Firma 1. Finally, while both in Firma 1 
and Firma 2 HR managers are involved in strategic decision-making, it is only in Firma 2 
that the chair of Klubs (HK-Privat) is a member of the board of directors meaning that the 
possibility to channel union voice throughout the company is higher than in Firma 1.  The 
analysis shows that there is also a certain amount of variation between Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2 in Italy, with regard to the levels of local actors’ autonomy from the global 
headquarters (variable 5). In particular, HR managers in Impresa 2 appear to be less 
independent from the headquarters than in Impresa 1.  Here the HR directors affirmed that 
local management has (only) to be receptive to the global strategy, while in Impresa 2 the HR 
director reported that strategic decisions are made centrally. 
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To conclude, the above analysis  shows that cross country variation in the role of collective 
bargaining across the four manufacturing plants investigated is more apparent than the within 
country variation. The main similarities between Impresa 1 and Impresa 2, on the one hand, 
and Firma 1 and Firma 2, on the other, are ascribed to different depths of the collective 
bargaining system across the two countries.  A clearer sector level framework and a higher 
union density equip firm level actors in Denmark with wider autonomy than in Italy and also 
increase their opportunity to take advantage of collective bargaining. At the same time, the 
analysis shows that because Firma 2 does not belong to the employers’ association HR 
managers in this company are more independent from the sector level framework than in 
Firma 1. Further, in Firma 2, it is demonstrated that shop stewards are more influential than 
in Firma 1 as they sit on the company board. As for the Italian subsidiaries a certain degree 
of variation emerges between the role of HR managers who in Impresa 2 are shown to be 
more constrained by the global headquarters than in Impresa 2.  
9.5 Flexibility and security in company level collective bargaining  
 
This section focuses on the categories of flexibility and security which have entered into 
company level bargaining across the four manufacturing plants investigated and explores 
whether the negotiated provisions have enhanced flexibility and security, and if so which 
forms. The objective is to provide an account of the role of articulation mechanisms – at the 
interconfederal and sectoral level in Italy and at the sectoral level in Denmark – for the scope 
of firm level bargaining on issues of flexibility and security. Once the way in which 
collective bargaining arrangements in Italy and Denmark shape the agenda of company level 
negotiations on flexibility and security has been established, it will then be possible to see if 
other factors – alongside with institutions – also play a role. Chapter 8 presented the findings 
in detail for each of the companies under investigation. For the convenience of the reader a 
comparative summary is provided in Table 9.3.   
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Table 9.3: Negotiated flexibility and security in Firma 1 and Firma 2 in Denmark and Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 in Italy  
  ITALY DENMARK 
  Impresa 1 Impresa 2 Firma 1 Firma 2 
Pay 
IT:  Demarcation  
        Interconfederal 
 
DK: Demarcation 
        Sectoral  
Flexibility Wage 
 
 
Wage 
 
Job 
Wage Wage 
Security  
Working-Time 
 
IT:   Delegation 
         Sectoral  
 
DK: Demarcation 
        Sectoral 
Flexibility Working-Time 
Combination 
Working-Time 
 
Job 
Combination 
Working-Time 
Working-Time  
 
Combination 
Working-Time 
Working-Time 
 
Combination 
Security 
Training 
IT:   Delegation 
         Sectoral 
 
 DK: Demarcation 
          Sectoral 
Flexibility Functional 
Job 
Functional 
Job 
Income 
Employment 
Functional 
Employment 
 
Employment Security 
Job 
Classification 
 
IT:  Demarcation  
       Interconfederal 
Flexibility Functional 
Income 
Functional 
Income 
Not expected 
(SL articulation) 
Not expected 
(SL articulation) Security 
Provision for 
Atypical 
Workers 
 
IT:  Delegation 
       Sectoral  
Flexibility  External 
Employment 
Job  
Not expected 
(SL articulation) 
Not expected 
(SL articulation) Security 
Social Benefits and 
Entitlements 
 
IT:  Delegation 
        Sectoral  
Flexibility  
Combination 
 
Combination 
 
 
Combination 
Income 
 
 
Combination 
Income 
Security 
Measures for 
Employment 
 
IT: Delegation 
       Sectoral  
Flexibility Not expected 
(unclear articulation 
low union density) 
 
Not expected 
(unclear articulation 
low union density) 
 
Income 
Employment 
 
Job Security 
 
The categories of Pay, Working-time, and Training, have entered local agreements across all 
four of the manufacturing plants as a result of the procedural mechanisms – demarcation 
and/or delegation – provided by the sector level agreements both in Italy and Denmark. The 
category of Job-classifications and Provisions for Atypical Workers are items for negotiation 
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only in Impresa 1 and/or Impresa 2. In these companies the centralised wage bargaining 
system obliges local-level social partners to adapt employees’ career paths to a remuneration 
strategy and the sector level agreement provides companies with the option of modifying the 
percentage of atypical workers through local-level bargaining. In both Firma 1 and Firma 2, 
these categories were not expected to be part of collective agreements as they have not been 
the object of articulation at the sector level.  
 
The institutional comparison shows that the two-tier bargaining system featured by the 
Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector and the Danish industrial sector enables 
categories of flexibility and security to enter onto the bargaining agenda across all four 
manufacturing plants. It does so through mechanisms of procedural flexibility which the 
research confirms to shape the content of company level agreements. Furthermore, the 
findings demonstrate that, although union density in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 is relatively 
low – 50 and 30 per cent respectively (see Table 9.2) – social actors have nonetheless 
engaged with most of the flexibility and security categories that are subject to delegation. It 
is argued that the high level of coordination between union representatives across bargaining 
levels (variable 3 see section 9.4) partially offsets issues of representation enabling collective 
bargaining to engage with five out of seven – in Impresa 1 – and six out of seven – in 
Impresa 2 – flexibility and security categories.    
 
Moreover, the analysis confirms that mechanisms of procedural flexibility are not the only 
factor which determines whether and how flexibility and security enter onto the bargaining 
agenda at the company level. For example, Table 9.3 shows that the category of measures 
for employment entered into collective bargaining in the two Danish manufacturing plants 
despite being the object of articulation exclusively in Italy. This finding allows the research 
to draw two important conclusions. First, as emerged in Chapters 4 and 8, the uncertainty 
produced by the 2009 interconfederal reform in Italy did reduce the scope of the bargaining 
agendas of Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 over issues of flexibility and security. The category of 
measures for employment was included in the 2012 sectoral agreement specifically with the 
objective of coping with the dramatic effects of the latest economic crisis. So, further 
decentralisation, temporary derogations included, was seen as an opportunity for local 
actors’ to enhance employability and competitiveness in the sector. However, the unclear 
normative framework, coupled with a low level of union representation, discouraged 
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managers and shop stewards in both Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 from taking the opportunity to 
negotiate further on this category.  
 
Second, where company level actors are confident about the outcomes of their interactions, 
such as in Denmark, sector level provisions are not always necessary for company level 
negotiations over flexibility and security to take place. By acting within a clear legal 
framework and relying on a strong mandate local level social partners – especially unions – 
feel legitimated in addressing issues that fall outside the direct scope of the sector level 
agreement. Hence, strengthened by their autonomy, shop stewards in Denmark are also 
shown to be better equipped than their Italian counterparts to react to unexpected changes in 
economic conditions. Similar considerations apply to the category of social benefits and 
entitlements that has entered into both Firma 1 and Firma 2 collective agreements, despite 
the lack of procedural mechanisms at the sector level. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that whether company level agreements address primarily 
one type of flexibility and/or one type of security not only varies across the seven categories 
but also across the four manufacturing plants under focus. Specifically, those involving 
provisions on pay concern wage flexibility in Impresa 1, Firma 1 and Firma 2; and wage 
flexibility and job security in Impresa 2; while those addressing working-time involve 
working-time flexibility in Firma 1 and Firma 2; working time flexibility and combination 
security in all the plants; and working-time flexibility and job security in Impresa 2. 
Provisions on training address functional flexibility and job security in Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2; functional flexibility and employment security in Impresa 2 and Firma 1; 
functional flexibility and income security in Impresa 2; and employment security only in 
Firma 2. Provisions on job classifications address functional flexibility and income security 
in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2; whereas provisions for atypical workers address external 
flexibility and employment security and external flexibility and job security in Impresa 2. 
The category of social benefits and entitlements addresses combination security in all the 
four plants and income security only in Firma 1 and Firma 2; while the category of 
measures for employment addresses income and employment security in Firma 1 and only 
job security in Firma 2.  
 
Crucially, when looking at the nature of flexibility and of security addressed by each of the 
seven categories across the four companies, the Table suggests that the institutional factor 
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only partially justifies the common patterns between the two Italian subsidiaries, on the one 
hand, and the two Danish subsidiaries, on the other. In fact, while the data confirm that 
articulation mechanisms suggest particular categories to the local level actors for negotiation, 
it is unclear whether they also account for the types of flexibility and the types of security – 
and trade-offs between these – that are actually addressed by the collective agreements. As 
variations emerge across the four manufacturing plants independently from the countries in 
which they lie, it appears that the nature of flexibility and security as negotiated might be 
due to other (firm-specific) considerations. 
 
To summarise, this analysis shows that procedural mechanisms governing the relationship 
between different bargaining levels arrangements do indeed account for the content of 
company level bargaining on flexibility and security. However, it also indicates that Danish 
local level actors in Firma 1 and Firma 2 are able to engage with categories of flexibility and 
security that are outside the scope of demarcation. In contrast, in Italy, mechanisms meant to 
enhance decentralisation at the sector level proved to be inadequate in enabling issues of 
flexibility and security to get onto the bargaining agendas of Impresa 1 and Impresa 2. It can 
be therefore concluded that, within multi-employers bargaining arrangements, articulation 
mechanisms are not the only factor shaping the agenda of negotiations over flexibility and 
security but, as established in the previous section, that the presence of shop stewards also 
plays a fundamental role. It is confirmed that union density at the company level discourages 
the social partners in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 from taking their bargaining competences 
further, whereas, it provides their counterparts in Firma 1 and Firma 2 with the confidence 
they need to negotiate over categories that are not the object of sector level demarcation.  
 
Finally, this analysis shows that by paying attention to collective bargaining arrangements it 
is possible to explain variations in the way in which flexibility and security enter into 
company level bargaining across Italy – Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 – and Denmark – Firma 1 
and Firma 2. However, this approach leaves a gap in our knowledge, since it does not allow 
the opportunity to determine those factors which the bargaining actors themselves, across the 
four companies, take into account when defining, in practice, their flexibility and security 
strategies. The data presented in Chapter 8 suggest that, in order to fill this gap, it is necessary 
to complement the institutional focus with the observation of firm-specific contingencies. 
This is the subject of the next section. 
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9.6 The outcomes of collective bargaining over flexibility and security 
 
This section compares the organisational characteristics of the four multinational companies 
to which Impresa 1, Impresa 2, Firma 1, and Firma 2 belong. It does so by examining a 
series of expectations developed in Chapter 8 regarding the way in which non-institutional 
variables may influence the nature of flexibility and the nature of security outcomes at the 
company level. This examination enables RQ2b to be addressed. 
 
Chapter 2 and 8 drew attention to a set of organisational characteristics against which 
similarities and differences across the four case studies might be explored. It is argued that 
such characteristics, on the one hand, exert pressures on local management to contain costs 
by increasing the level of flexibility and, on the other, enable unions to negotiate 
compensating forms of security through collective bargaining. It is worth stressing that on 
five of the seven independent variables no substantial differences emerge across the four 
companies investigated, as this underpins the argument that follows. Before reviewing each 
of the variables in detail, Table 9.4 summarises the relevant data.  
 
Table 9.4: Companies’ organisational characteristics 
 Impresa 1 Impresa 2 Firma 1 Firma 2 
Degree of 
Internationalisation 
34000 employees in 
37 countries 
High 
Internationalisation 
28000 employees 
in 17 countries. 
High 
Internationalisation 
5000 employees in 
61 countries 
High 
Internationalisation 
40000 employees in 75 
countries 
High 
Internationalisation 
Type of integration Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Product Market 
Competition 
Energy and Chemical 
 
Medium-to-low  
 
Bio-Tech/Pharma 
Medium-to-low  
Pharmaceutical  
Medium-to-low 
Pharmaceutical 
Low 
Nature of Product 
Market 
Differentiated Differentiated Differentiated Differentiated 
Model of Growth Internal Development  External 
Development 
Predominantly 
Internal development 
Predominantly Internal  
Development 
Nature of Capital Intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive 
Workers 
Characteristics 
Highly-skilled Highly-skilled Highly-skilled Highly-skilled 
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Degree of Internationalisation: the four manufacturing plants investigated all belong to 
multinational organisations that show a high degree of internationalisation. The interviews 
with social partners indicated that the international growth of these companies has produced 
incentives for global benchmarking which, in turn, has increased cost-efficiency pressures on 
subsidiaries. Social partners have responded to the challenges deriving from intra-site 
benchmarking – such as competition for the allocation of internal resources and the threat of 
relocation – by allowing productivity and market-led considerations onto their bargaining 
agendas. Such considerations are found to be particularly prominent in Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2 where flexibility is expected to be an important item for negotiation. In the 
collective agreements signed in Firma 1 and Firma 2 productivity and market-led 
considerations feature alongside policies to improve working conditions. Here, both 
flexibility and security are expected to be an outcome of negotiations.   
 
Vertical Integration: the production plants investigated are part of global organisations that 
are both highly internationalised and vertically integrated. This particular form of 
international integration has reinforced the strategic interest of the global headquarters in 
exerting control over the financial performance of their subsidiaries. In particular, the data 
analysed suggests that cross-site coordination is used by global management to ensure that 
there is consistency in the way in which the different products are incorporated along the 
value chain and that such a process occurs in the most effective way. As a result, local HR 
managers report that they come under significant pressure and that they use policies which 
enhance flexibility as a measure to reduce costs. It is expected that this flexibility will be 
achieved by means of collective bargaining across all of the four manufacturing plants that 
were studied.  
 
Product Market: The degree of international competition to which the four multinationals are 
exposed is relatively low because they have all gained a leading position in their respective 
product markets. Given this, global management has become less preoccupied with imposing 
common work patterns across the respective production sites. The four case studies indicate 
that, while financial targets are, to different degrees, set by the headquarters (in Firma 1 and 
Firma 2 social partners participate in decision making), local HR managers have retained a 
certain amount of autonomy in choosing how these targets can be met and they have done so 
by means of collective bargaining. In this light, flexibility is likely to be used by local 
managers to control cost-efficiency pressures. Flexibility, however, is not expected to be 
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implemented through a top-down approach but negotiated with the shop stewards who, as a 
result, may leverage on institutional resources to shape compensating forms of security. 
Given the relatively low level of international competition faced by Firma 2, here flexibility 
is expected to have a less constraining effect on the bargaining agenda than in the other 
companies, allowing shop stewards (also) to enhance security independently from HR 
managers’ requests for flexibility.   
 
Nature of Product Market: low international competition is not the only factor increasing the 
unions’ ability to enhance security in exchange for concessions on flexibility. By increasing 
the autonomy of local level actors, the highly differentiated product portfolio characteristic of 
the four multinationals is found to be relevant too. In particular, it emerges that product 
differentiation constrains the effects of intra-site competition – and by implication relocation 
threats as well – so that HR managers at plant level have more leverage to regulate flexibility 
on the base of local power contingencies. Indeed, interviews revealed that the four global 
headquarters are more concerned with financial results than the way in which the production 
processes are organised. In this context, unions are likely to use collective bargaining to 
accommodate HR mangers' requests for flexibility in exchange for different forms of 
security. Further, the more specialised the manufacturing production processes are, the less 
likely is the expected level of intra-site competition. It can, therefore, be inferred that the 
capacity of shop stewards to exploit their bargaining power for enhancing security is likely to 
vary across the four cases. However, this study has involved only one production plant within 
the four multinationals’ value chains. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the degree to 
which intra-site benchmarking conditions the strategies of local actors in each plant. The 
nature of the data only allows us to establish that products are differentiated and it is difficult 
to transfer technologies across, and that these characteristics have provided Firma 1, Firma 2, 
Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 with significant competitive advantage (see Chapter 8). In addition, 
due to the fact that in Firma 2 most of production occurs in Denmark, and that 99 per cent of 
products are sold in the global market, intra-site competition in this company is expected to 
be significantly lower than in the other three plants.   
 
Model of Growth: Impresa 1, Firma 1 and Firma 2 belong to international organisations 
whose model of growth is based predominantly on internal development. Firma 1 and Firma 
2 also engage with a partial integration model (only in emerging national economies) to 
reduce the risk of their highly specialised research and development portfolios. This 
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organisational strategy enables the three multinationals to set long-term financial targets 
which at plant level are found to favour continuous production processes and reduce threats 
of relocation. By contrast, external development exposes Impresa 2 to both peaks in 
production and high(er) risks of relocation. Thus, flexibility in Impresa 2 might have a more 
stringent character than in Impresa 1, Firma 1 and Firma 2 forcing local management to gain 
concessions from the unions by means of collective bargaining. Since the possibility of the 
unions gaining security independently from managers’ requests for flexibility may be 
relatively low in this context, negotiations in Impresa 2 are likely to lead to a wider variety of 
flexibility and security trade-offs than in the other companies. 
 
Intensive Nature of Capital: interviews with the social partners indicated that the highly 
intensive nature of capital characterising the four multinationals under focus reduces 
pressures on labour costs which, at the plant level, are perceived as relatively low. As a result, 
the risk of relocation does not produce a sufficiently threatening effect to erode the capacity 
of collective negotiations to play a strategic role. Productivity and profitability issues are 
relevant in the bargaining agenda across all four of the manufacturing plants investigated. 
Yet, in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 such issues are more pronounced than in Firma 1 and Firma 
2 suggesting that, in the two Italian subsidiaries, HR managers come under relatively higher 
cost-efficiency pressures. However, due to the low share of labour costs in the production 
processes, shop stewards are expected to retain the capacity to participate in the definition of 
viable compromises between flexibility and security in all the sites investigated. 
 
Highly Skilled Workforce: Since they impose limits to the cross border transferability of 
knowledge and technologies, high-skill requirements are also found to reduce the risk of 
relocation in each of the four subsidiaries observed. While driven by cost-efficiency 
considerations, these organisations have nonetheless developed an interest in the 
specialisation of each production plant which is demonstrated by the consistent investment 
made by Impresa 1, Impresa 2, Firma 1, and Firma 2 in new technologies and training. In 
particular, the four case studies demonstrate that besides containing threats of relocation, 
significant up-front investments in skills development produces incentives for local HR 
managers, first, to retain employees and, second, to use collective bargaining as a means to 
both enhance flexibility and meet employees' expectations. Given the different levels of 
specialisation and the complexity of their production processes, the skill mix is not the same 
in all plants. For example, in Denmark, Firma 1 and Firma 2 have their own packaging 
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divisions in-house and primarily semi-skilled blue collar workers are deployed. However, 
even in these companies the overall tendency is towards skill intensive environments, as 
demonstrated by the strong influence in collective bargaining of lab-technicians – despite 
HK-Privat featuring relatively low union density in both firms (see section 8.4.1 and section 
8.5.1).  In light of the high level of skills required by the production processes, shop stewards 
are expected to have significant bargaining power to improve the dimension of security in all 
four plants.  
 
By comparing the different forms of flexibility and security enhanced through collective 
bargaining across the four manufacturing divisions, (Table 9.5) it is possible to observe the 
extent to which the above variables might account for the outcomes of negotiations.   
 
Table 9.5: Outcomes of company level collective bargaining on flexibility and security 
 Flexibility Security Flexibility & Security 
Impresa1 Wage (2015-2002) 
WorkTime (2015- 2010) 
Combination (2015-2005) WorkTime-Combination (2013; 2014-
2010) 
Functional-Job (2011; 2007) 
Functional-Income (2011;2007) 
Impresa2  Wage (2012-2002) 
WorkTime (2012-2002) 
Employment (2003) Wage-Job (2005; 2001) 
WorkTime-Job (2012-2005) 
WorkTime-Combination (2008-2001) 
Functional-Job (2004-2011) 
Functional-Income (2001-2008) 
Functional-Employment (2008; 2009; 
2011) 
External-Job (2002-2009) 
Firma 1 Wage (2012-2004) 
WorkTime (2004; 2007) 
Combination (2004) 
Employment (2010;  2014) 
Income (2010) 
WorkTime-Combination (2010) 
Functional-Employment (2007-2010) 
Firma 2 Wage (2002-2013) 
WorkTime (2000; 2004; 2007; 
2007) 
Employment (2012) 
Combination 2000; 2002; 2005; 
2012) 
Income (2012) 
Job (2004)  
WorkTime-Combination (2012) 
 
In particular, it has been contended in Chapter 2 and 8 that the role of firm-specific variables 
is to shape the opportunities available to local actors to negotiate flexibility and security 
outcomes, and condition how far these outcomes are balanced or imbalanced. Crucially, 
Table 9.5 shows that flexibility and security trade-offs occur across all the four subsidiaries 
observed. Moreover, by analysing this finding in light of the data presented in Chapter 8 (see 
Tables 8.1, 2, 3, 4) it is possible to establish that all these trade-offs are balanced (see 
Chapter 2). 
  
310"
"
• Working-time flexibility and combination security: This typology of trade-offs is an 
outcome of negotiations in all four companies. In Impresa 1, Impresa 2, and Firma 1, 
it is fostered by provisions allowing workers to accumulate over-time (or on call-
shifts) in exchange for either additional annual holiday and/or personal time-off (as an 
alternative to monetary compensation); whereas in Firma 2 it is enhanced through 
forms of part-time work enabling employees to reconcile their job with unexpected 
family/personal duties. Since both sides of the negotiating table benefit in equal 
measure from the compromise reached, this trade-off between flexibility and "
security is interpreted as balanced. 
• Functional flexibility and job security: This typology of trade-off is an outcome of 
negotiations in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 where employee up-skilling and re-skilling 
represents a way for the company to rely on a multi-functional workforce (Impresa 1) 
and avoid peaks in production leading to collective dismissals (Impresa 2). Since the 
two organisations gain in productivity but, at the same time, employees obtain long-
term job security, the negotiated flexibility and security trade-off is interpreted as 
balanced. 
• Functional flexibility and income security: This typology of trade-off is an outcome of 
negotiations only in Impresa 1 and Impresa 2 where, as a result of demarcation at the 
interconfederal level, any change in employee classifications has to correspond to 
different salary conditions. Thus, by adapting skills with productivity requirements, 
HR managers enhance flexibility, whereas shop stewards automatically improve 
income security. The result in this case is also a balanced trade-off.     
• Wage flexibility and job security: This typology of trade-off is an outcome of 
negotiations only in Impresa 2 where, in order to cope with cost efficiency pressures, 
during the Network-Project (see section 8.3) the social partners used their cooperative 
relationship to negotiate a series of provisions allowing the production plant to attract 
long-term investments. For example, they agreed on an entry-level salary reflecting 
the minimum set forth by the sector level agreement in order to increase the 
headcount – yet, within three years all workers obtained the same entitlements. In this 
case the shared solution takes the form of a high benefit low sacrifice compromise 
resulting too in a balanced trade-off. 
• Working-time flexibility and Job security: This typology of trade-off is an outcome of 
negotiation in Impresa 2 where social partners agreed on forms of flexi-time (both 
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reducing and increasing working-time) in order to retain skills and avoid peaks in 
production resulting in collective dismissals. By so doing HR mangers have gained 
flexibility, whereas unions have secured long-term job security. The result is a 
balanced trade-off.  
• Functional flexibility and Employment security: This typology of trade-off is an 
outcome of negotiations both in Impresa 2 and Firma 1. In Impresa 2 it is achieved by 
using the resources of an interconfederal fund (Fondo Impresa) to train permanent 
and temporary workers. While fostering job rotation in-house (functional flexibility), 
such provision also enhances workers’ employability in the external labour market, 
thereby leading to a balanced flexibility and security trade-off. In Firma 1 under the 
risk of closure of the packaging division (see section 8.3), HR managers improved 
levels of functional flexibility through training provision, whereas shop stewards 
obtained the certification of the new skills as a means to increase the level of 
employability of those who could lose their jobs. In so doing, the social partners have 
achieved balanced flexibility and security trade-offs in both plants.  
• External flexibility and job security: This typology of trade-off is an outcome of 
negotiation only in Impresa 2 where in order to cope with peaks in production HR 
managers and shop stewards have negotiated a series of provisions. For example, one 
establishes that a large number of workers can be temporary, however, shop stewards 
need to monitor that a certain percentage of them is, over the year, hired with a 
permanent contract. Another provision establishes that new production lines are 
started by agency workers (until commissions become stable) in order to protect the 
level of job security of the core employees. While increasing external flexibility such 
measures simultaneously address long term job security leading to balanced 
flexibility and security trade-offs.   
 
In addition, Table 9.5 shows that Impresa 2 and Firma 2 feature the widest and the narrowest 
varieties of flexibility and security trade-offs respectively. Further, the table shows that trade-
offs between flexibility and security are not the only outcomes of negotiations. Collective 
bargaining also addresses only flexibility and only security. In particular, while collective 
agreements enhance the same forms of flexibility – wage and working-time –across Impresa 
1, Impresa 2, Firma 1, and Firma 2, the scope for security appears to be wider in the Danish 
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subsidiaries – Firma 1 and Firma 2 – in comparison to the Italian ones – Impresa 1 and 
Impresa 2.  
 
Thus, when looking at the relationship between firm-specific variables and the outcomes of 
collective bargaining over flexibility and security across the four production plants 
investigated, four relevant findings emerge. First, a high degree of internationalisation and 
vertical integration push issues of flexibility onto the collective bargaining agenda. In 
particular, by increasing the incentives of the global headquarters to engage in benchmarking, 
these characteristics exert pressures on local HR managers to control costs through the 
implementation of different forms of flexibility. Second, medium to low international 
competition, differentiated products, the intensive nature of capital, and high skills 
requirements enhance the security dimension. By limiting the interest of global management 
in injecting flexibility through a top-down approach and containing the risk of relocation, 
they allow local HR managers to shape their own flexibility strategies according to local 
resources and balances/imbalances of power. Given this favourable context, shop stewards 
retain scope to leverage on institutional resources, such as collective bargaining, in order to 
exchange such flexibility with compensating forms of security.   
 
The third finding is that the greater the global headquarters’ requests for flexibility are, the 
wider is the variety of flexibility and security trade-offs negotiated at plant level. For 
example, the data show that external development in Impresa 2 increased pressures on local 
HR managers to introduce cost-efficiency measures and, by implication, also increased their 
opportunities to obtain concessions from the unions. This led to the social partners 
negotiating a variety of flexibility and security trade-offs. In contrast, by strengthening the 
shop stewards’ bargaining power low levels of international competition in Firma 2 reduced 
the possibility of security being traded against flexibility. This explains why Impresa 2 and 
Firma 2 feature the widest and the narrowest variety of flexibility and security trade-offs 
respectively. 
 
Finally, this cross company comparison demonstrates that although featuring similar firm-
specific characteristics, the scope for security in Firma 1 and Firma 2 is still wider than in 
Impresa 1 and Impresa 2. The two Danish case studies, therefore, suggest that institutional 
factors partly explain the extent to which plant level actors can engage with issues of 
flexibility and security. As argued earlier, a strong presence of shop stewards and a clear 
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framework of rules for company level negotiations limit the ability of global management to 
exploit local imbalances of power, so that unions can (also) gain security independently from 
management requests for flexibility.  
9.7 Discussion 
 
Consistent with Marginson and Galetto’s study (2015), the present comparative analysis 
shows that similar collective bargaining arrangements at the sector level limit the scope of 
cross-national variation in the way in which items of flexibility and security enter onto the 
firm level bargaining agenda. In particular, this study confirms that the configuration of the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector in Italy and the industrial sector in Denmark enables and 
constrains company level bargaining over issues of flexibility and security. It does so by 
providing a series of procedural mechanisms – demarcation and/or delegation – that shape the 
content of local level agreements across the four manufacturing plants investigated. Yet, the 
company-focus complements this analysis by showing that the procedural flexibility 
enhanced by the sector level framework is not the only factor that matters. The fact that 
certain categories fostering flexibility and security are the object of decentralisation 
mechanisms – such as demarcation in Denmark and delegation in Italy – does not ensure that 
they find their way onto the company level agenda. Indeed, sectoral arrangements interact 
with both macro-institutional features and local issues of power providing company level 
actors with different opportunities across countries.  
 
For example, the present analysis shows that in Italy categories that are covered by delegation 
do not necessarily enter onto the agenda of local negotiators. By contrast, in Denmark, 
categories that are not subject to demarcation can be found in company level agreements. The 
reason for this is found in the varying amounts of autonomy that local actors have across 
these two countries, which can be explained in two different ways. First of all, in Italy, sector 
level social partners do not play the same key role as in Denmark in the regulation of the 
labour market. In contrast to their Danish counterparts they act in a context where legal 
intervention is high and they are not the only ones defining the scope for company level 
negotiations. The confederal level, through demarcation, also plays an important role. 
Crucially, the interference of different sources of labour market regulation in Italy produces 
uncertainty over the competences of firm level negotiations. As a result managers and shop 
stewards are reluctant to enact the procedural flexibility provided by the sector. In Denmark, 
where there are clear articulation mechanisms between the sector and the company level, on 
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the one side, and the lack of legal regulation, on the other, company level actors are 
empowered to push their bargaining role further.  
 
Second, the Danish collective bargaining system is characterised by greater depth than the 
Italian system, meaning that company level bargaining in Denmark has always played a more 
strategic role than in Italy. Furthermore, consistent with Ilsøe’s findings (2012), this study 
demonstrates that in Denmark high union density at the local level favours the development 
of trust-based relationships between managers and shop stewards thereby increasing 
opportunities for viable compromises between local parties. A high degree of union 
representation, in particular, provides shop stewards with the confidence to improve on the 
conditions set forth at the sector level. As a result, not only do they feel legitimated to engage 
with the competences that are subject to demarcation but also to embrace items that go 
beyond this scope. At the same time, by trusting their ability to represent the workforce, 
management develop an interest in negotiating with the shop stewards who are assumed to 
guarantee the successful implementation of the agreements.  
 
Further, although differences are more apparent across than within the two countries, this 
study demonstrates that a certain degree of variation also emerges between the companies 
that are embedded in the same institutional context. Specifically, it is shown that in Denmark 
the autonomy of HR managers from sector level bargaining arrangements is greater in the 
manufacturing plant that is not affiliated to the employers’ association. Here, a strong 
presence of shop stewards has nonetheless produced incentives to first, sign the accession 
agreement, and then develop a well-functioning framework of industrial relations, de facto 
bridging the institutional divide between the two companies. As for the Italian subsidiaries, 
HR managers are more constrained by the directions of international management in Impresa 
2, where there is lower union density, than in Impresa 1, confirming that when shop stewards 
are weaker the headquarters retains more capacity to leverage on local imbalances of power, 
to impose rather than tailor, its global strategy.  
 
Thus, the present comparative analysis shows that flexibility and security enter into company 
level bargaining in Italy and Denmark as a result of both the procedural flexibility provided 
by the sector level framework and the autonomy of local level actors. The former suggests 
categories for negotiations and the latter ensures that such categories enter into firm level 
bargaining. In addition, the Danish cases show that the way in which bargaining 
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arrangements interact with national institutional features on the one hand, and local power 
relations on the other, provides further opportunities to company level actors, for example, 
the capacity to increase the scope for security in collective agreements.  
 
Moreover, in line with Pulignano and Keune’s (2015) findings, this study confirms that the 
degree of cross-company variation in the types of flexibility and the types of security 
negotiated depend on firm-specific characteristics.  These help to shape the extent to which 
local bargaining actors can leverage on institutional resources in a strategic way. Exploring 
issues of flexibility and security in the metalworking sector, Pulignano et al. (2015) found out 
that there was a correlation between two non-institutional variables – intensity of market 
competition and level of cross-border integration – and the capability of unions to participate 
in the definition of companies’ flexibility and security strategies.  By observing collective 
agreements across companies featuring different organisational structures, she identified two 
typologies of compromise between parties: balanced and unbalanced flexibility and security 
trade-offs.  
 
This thesis (Chapter 2) operationalises the findings from Pulignano et al. (2015) using 
Walton and McKersie’s (1979) framework to suggest that balanced trade-offs can occur when 
as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security both social partners gain 
– and or lose – in equal measure. Conversely, unbalanced trade-offs occur if as a result of 
collective bargaining involving flexibility and security one social partner’s gains substantially 
exceed those of the other party.  
 
In this regard, Pulignano et al. (2015) argue that in the presence of low market competition 
and high vertical integration – both in case of homogenous product and low skills or in case 
of differentiated product and high skills – companies are likely to undergo significant cost-
efficiency pressures.  Nonetheless, actors at the plant level are in a position to use collective 
bargaining as a means to exchange flexibility with long-term forms of security. These 
findings are corroborated by the present comparison involving four chemicals and 
pharmaceutical companies that all feature vertical integration and relatively low market 
competition. Collective bargaining in these companies was found to lead to a variety of 
compromises between flexibility and security that are consistent with the definition of 
balanced trade-offs   
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Thus, Pulignano et al.’s findings (2015) in the metalworking sector and the present study in 
the chemical and pharmaceutical sector show that the ability of company level bargaining to 
engage with issues of flexibility and security is to a large extent dependent on non-
institutional factors.  Such factors have been proven to provide actors within subsidiaries with 
the opportunity to implement the global headquarters’ directions by means of collective 
bargaining. In addition, this research demonstrates that when high vertical integration is 
coupled with low market competition, global management does not develop the incentive to 
impose common organisational strategies. Constrained only by financial targets, local HR 
managers retain the scope to control costs by accounting for local patterns of power. It 
follows that in subsidiaries where unions are strong, first, the capability of the global 
headquarters to exploit local imbalances of power are relatively lower. Second, shop stewards 
gain more leverage to use institutional resources in a strategic way. Indeed, the four cases 
studies show that flexibility and security trade-offs are not the only outcomes of negotiations. 
All the subsidiaries investigated also engaged with categories that address only flexibility – in 
particular wage and working-time flexibility. As for security, this dimension is shown to be 
more prominent within Danish collective agreements than in the Italian ones.  
 
One could conclude that in contrast to Pulignano and Keune’s (2015) findings, the 
institutional dimension – union density at the company level – does indeed play a 
fundamental role. However, due to the fact that the multinational companies, to which the 
Danish subsidiaries observed belong, are both headquartered in Denmark, there could also be 
an argument for a country of origin effect (Ferner et al., 2006).  
9.8 Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to address the second set of research questions raised 
by the present comparative analysis. By complementing the sector level focus with the 
outcomes of collective bargaining across four companies in Italy and Denmark, a series of 
important findings have emerged. 
 
First, articulation mechanisms set in place to govern the relationship between bargaining 
levels account only partially for the varying extent of the company level bargaining agenda 
across different countries. Other institutional features, in particular, the autonomy of the 
social partners and the presence of shop stewards at the firm level are shown to be equally 
significant. In Denmark, such features persuade shop stewards to engage with competences 
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that are not the object of demarcation, whereas, in Italy, they reduce the social partners’ 
ability to enact the procedural flexibility offered by the sector level framework. As result 
company level bargaining plays a different role across the two countries.  In Denmark, it 
covers measures that are able to boost productivity as well as to improve working conditions. 
In contrast, in Italy, collective bargaining is deployed primarily as a means to enhance 
productivity and cope with market competition.   
 
Second, this chapter shows that the agenda of company level bargaining is more likely to 
vary across than within countries. This notwithstanding, company level social partners who 
are embedded in the same institutional context can exhibit different degrees of autonomy. 
Because one of the two Danish firms does not belong to the employers’ organisation, a 
certain degree of within country variation has been found in the level of HR managers’ 
autonomy from the sector level framework. By contrast, in Italy, within country variation 
emerges in the degree of HR managers’ autonomy from the directions of their global 
headquarters. It has been argued that in the Italian company, with lower union density, global 
management is in a position to leverage on local power imbalances towards the unilateral 
implementation of the global decisions.  
 
Third, the two-tier bargaining system featured by the chemical and pharmaceutical sector in 
Italy and the industrial sector in Denmark enables flexibility and security categories to enter 
onto the bargaining agenda across all the companies investigated. It does so through 
mechanisms of procedural flexibility – demarcation, in Denmark, and delegation, in Italy – 
that are confirmed to shape the content of company level agreements. In addition, the study 
shows that in Denmark local level actors are able to engage with categories of flexibility and 
security that go beyond the scope of demarcation, whereas in Italy, local actors are not able to 
enact all the substantive categories that are the subject of sector level delegation. It is, 
therefore, confirmed that, despite being important, articulation mechanisms are not the only 
factor that conditions the way in which firm level bargaining addresses flexibility and 
security. The strength of the social partners at the company level also plays a fundamental 
role.  
 
Fourth, whether company level agreements address primarily one type of flexibility and/or 
one type of security varies both across countries and companies, suggesting that the focus on 
institutional arrangements is not sufficient to explain patterns across cases. Indeed although 
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suggesting categories for negotiations, institutions do not entirely determine how local actors 
shape the nature of flexibility and security negotiated within companies. It is argued that it is 
primarily firm-specific contingences that provide local level actors with the opportunity to 
use collective bargaining in a strategic way, thereby leading to different flexibility and 
security outcomes across companies. In particular, when looking at the relationship between 
each multinational’s structure and the outcomes of the agreements over flexibility and 
security a relevant finding emerge. A high degree of internationalisation and vertical 
integration exert pressures on local HR managers to control costs by injecting flexibility via 
collective bargaining, whereas medium-to-low levels of international competition, 
differentiated products, intensive nature of capital, and high skills requirements strengthen 
the unions’ bargaining power towards the negotiation of compensating forms of security. The 
result is balanced trade-offs between flexibility and security because thanks to their 
interaction local actors are able to both secure positive outcomes.  
 
Finally, this chapter shows that although sharing similar organisational characteristics, the 
scope for security in the two Danish firms is wider than in the two Italian firms. It is 
concluded that in the presence of these situational contingences, institutional arrangements 
are nonetheless also able to make a difference. Thus, a strong presence of shop stewards and 
a clear framework of rules at the firm level are shown to reduce the possibility of global 
management exploiting local power imbalances, so that unions can make gains on security 
independently from management requests for flexibility.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has focused on the role of collective bargaining in shaping policies on flexibility 
and security at sector level in three countries – Italy, Denmark, and the UK – and at company 
level in two of them - Italy and Denmark. The sector that was chosen for analysis is the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector, a solid manufacturing industry exposed to international 
competition and characterised by a long tradition of collaboration between the social partners.  
 
The increasing attention given at EU level to policies that promise to achieve greater 
flexibility while protecting the level of security for the workforce, and the ineffectiveness of 
the Member States to fully embrace such a policy paradigm, have required the academic 
debate on flexicurity to look beyond public policies and legal regulation, to other sources of 
flexibility and security for the labour market. The contribution of the present thesis lies 
within this debate, demonstrating that collective bargaining, not only at the sector but also at 
the company level, exerts this important function.    
 
In particular, the research enlarged the scope of comparative analysis beyond the national 
level. By explaining differences and similarities in the role of collective bargaining in 
addressing flexibility and security both across countries and across companies within one 
sector of economic activity, this research first shed light on issues of heterogeneity within the 
boundaries of the same institutions and widened the scope of the investigation to the 
structures framing local bargaining. This novel approach, applied to Italy and Denmark, 
produced a key finding: at company level, the capacity of collective bargaining to engage 
with issues of flexibility and security – and the nature of trade-offs between these – depends 
on both institutional and non-institutional variables. Second, the choice of comparing three 
countries – Italy, Denmark, and the UK – reflecting different industrial relations frameworks, 
enabled a comparison of the social partners' postures when facing similar constraining 
pressures, such as the employers' search for greater flexibility and collective bargaining 
decentralisation.  
 
Because the objective of this comparative analysis was to observe both the role of institutions 
and the strategy of the actors involved with them, qualitative research methods were called 
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for. Indeed the actor-centred approach to institutions allowed this thesis to explore power 
relations, as well as the specificities of the social, historical and political environments in 
which such relations are produced and re-produced over time. As these are variables that are 
not easy to grasp through quantitative measurements, the research was undertaken through 
content analysis of existent documents and in-depth semi-structured interviews.  
10.1 The contribution to the literature 
 
The research recast some elements of the old debate on flexibility and confirmed that 
industrial relations arrangements, in particular collective bargaining at the sector level,  can 
act as ‘beneficial constraints’ (Streeck, 1988) because they provide company level social 
partners with the procedural security they need to adapt to growing (and contingent) demands 
for flexibility. As explained in Chapter 2, flexibility has become an inescapable feature of 
labour markets since the 1980s when a series of important developments started to undermine 
the traditional employment relationship (Supiot, 2000). Employers responded by showing an 
increasing intolerance of centralised systems of regulation and pushed towards the 
decentralisation of negotiations and decisions. Although inadequately conceptualised (Pollert, 
1991) and prone to conflicting interpretations (Elger, 1987), the notion of flexibility has 
nonetheless exerted a strong ideological influence at both academic and policy levels 
resulting in an increasing polarisation between the neo-liberal and neo-corporatist approaches 
to labour market regulation. After arguing for the inexorable character of the phenomenon, 
Streeck (1988) analysed the different – and potentially opposing – dimensions of flexibility in 
light of the contrast between status (neo-corporatist) and contract (neo-liberal) perspectives to 
suggest that they are not always mutually exclusive. According to his view, a flexible system 
of employment relations can make the most of the 'two worlds' (Streeck 1987:295) thereby 
fostering forms of flexibility that are likely to reconcile the interests of both employers and 
employees.   
 
By analysing bargaining arrangements across different national contexts and, in particular, by 
focusing on the coordinating role of sector level institutions for company level negotiations, 
this thesis provides empirical evidence to support Streeck's argument. Crucially, it shows that 
when bargaining institutions are in place at the sector level and provide procedurally secure 
mechanisms for lower bargaining levels, the social partners are in a better position to adjust 
to employers’ requests for flexibility and, at the same time, recognise different forms of 
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security for the workforce. Further, the Italian and Danish cases show that industrial relations 
institutions interact at the macro-level with national institutional features and at the micro 
level with companies’ organisational features. Thus, the effectiveness of the social partners in 
balancing flexibility and security – and the resources available to them – depends, first, on 
the role played by concurrent sources of labour market regulation, namely the law and the 
social welfare, and second, on non-institutional and more contingent variables.  In contrast, in 
the UK, where sector level bargaining is no longer in place and informal social dialogue does 
not act as a functional equivalent to formal collective bargaining, negotiating strategies are 
conditioned primarily by firm level characteristics. Within this context it is expected that 
actors will be more likely to be exposed to flexibility pressures and local power (im)balances. 
The only way to substantiate these expectations and to shed further light on the fundamental 
role of sector level bargaining arrangements would have been to observe the outcomes of 
negotiations at company level. However, despite considerable efforts to obtain access at 
company level in the UK (see Chapter 3) it was not possible to pursue this objective, which is 
thus left open for future research. 
 
This thesis has argued that Streeck’s attempt to bridge the neo-liberal and neo-corporatist 
perspectives through the notion of ‘beneficial constraint’ is consistent with a more recent 
approach to labour market regulation known in the literature as ‘flexicurity’. They both share 
the assumption that it is possible to reconcile strong demands for greater flexibility with 
equally strong demands for security. Advocated by the academic community, the flexicurity 
agenda in the early 2000s has been placed at the core of EU employment strategy. Ten years 
on, however, this agenda has proven to be too ‘elusive’ (Heyes, 2011) to be adequately 
implemented; as a result the concept has become subject to increasing critiques. The one that 
is most relevant to this thesis contends that the exclusive focus on national level interventions 
has obscured other potential sources of flexibility and security for the labour market and thus 
severely restricted flexicurity research (Burroni and Keune, 2011). By demonstrating that 
collective bargaining both at the sector and the company level addresses issues of flexibility 
and security and leads to a variety of trade-offs between them, the present study confirms that 
the flexicurity debate should enlarge its scope of analysis to sub-national institutional 
arrangements and provide a more thorough account of the structures and the actors that are 
likely to play this fundamental role. In keeping with Streeck’s work, this study also shows 
that the flexicurity debate has overlooked another form of security: the procedural security 
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that a well-functioning multi-employer system provides for subsequent company 
negotiations.  
 
Moreover, by focusing exclusively on collective bargaining, this thesis responded to the 
challenge of offering a clearer account of the context within which the notion of flexicurity is 
deployed (Burroni and Keune, 2011). In order to do so, the research utilised the theoretical 
framework proposed by Wilthagen and Tros (2004) – and applied to the Danish case by 
Madsen (2008) – who describe flexibility and security as multidimensional concepts. 
Accordingly, four different forms of flexibility and security were taken into account, together 
leading to sixteen potential flexibility and security trade-offs (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). 
Further, because scholars have established that the notion of trade-off is subject to a double 
interpretation (Leschke et al., 2006; Ibsen and Mailand, 2011) this thesis called for a more 
integrated and systematic framework of analysis. To this end an analytical approach was 
developed drawing on the work of Walton and McKersie (1965) and Pulignano et al. (2015) 
according to which two categories of trade-offs can be applied to the outcomes of collective 
bargaining. These trade-offs can be described as follows: 
 
• Balanced: if as a result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security both 
social partners gain – and/or lose – in equal measure.  
• Unbalanced: if as result of collective bargaining involving flexibility and security one 
social partners’ gains exceed those of the other party. 
 
In line with the terminology used by Walton and McKersie (1965), the analysis shows that on 
issues of flexibility and security there is integrative potential and that bargaining actors have 
adjustment capacities both at the sector and at the company level. At the sector level the 
extent to which employers and labour organisations are able to meet each other’s 
expectations are shaped primarily by the interaction between sector level institutions and 
macro-institutional features, whereas at the company level the social partners’ responses 
depend, in addition, on organisational structures. It was found, in particular, that there is a 
correlation between organisational structures and the adjustment capacities of bargaining 
actors, meaning that at the company level the nature of trade-offs negotiated (balanced vs 
unbalanced) is largely due to local contingencies and balances of power. This finding is 
consistent with the contention of Pulignano and Keune (2015) that companies can be seen as 
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spaces in which actors engage in ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ and ‘recombinant 
governance’ (Crouch, 2005). Indeed, it is at this level that many of the decisions at the core of 
the flexicurity debate are made – flexible pay, working-time, training, use of atypical 
contracts, social benefits to name but a few – and that the bargaining agenda is conditioned 
by the autonomy of the social partners as well as their willingness to find common ground for 
compromise.  
10.2 The focus on collective bargaining and research questions 
 
The objective set out in Chapter 2 was to explore two different streams of literature while 
highlighting their elements of interaction. Representing the fields of investigation from which 
the research questions set out below have been derived, each stream will be individually 
reviewed. 
 
Q1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social dialogue in 
different countries address issues of flexibility and security?  
 
Q1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different countries 
influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level bargaining agendas?  
What are the implications for the actors involved? 
 
Q2a. To what extent does the interplay between collective bargaining arrangements at the 
sector and the company levels affect the nature of flexibility and the nature of security 
outcomes?  
 
Q2b. To what extent do firm-specific characteristics – such as market competition and 
organisational structure – affect the nature of flexibility and of security outcomes? What are 
the implications in terms of the nature of negotiated trade-offs? 
10.2.1 The role of sector level collective bargaining over issues of flexibility and security  
The literature on the role of sector level collective bargaining (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; 
Marginson and Galetto, 2015) was explored first in order to call attention to a research area 
that comparative analysis has only marginally explored: the role of collective bargaining at 
the company level. More specifically, this analytical step allowed the formulation of a series 
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of expectations about the coordinating role of collective bargaining and social dialogue – in 
Italy, Denmark, and the UK – for company level negotiations.  
 
By drawing on Ibsen and Mailand’s findings (2011) on the ‘missing link’ between collective 
bargaining and flexicurity it was possible to look at sector level bargaining as a separate 
institutional forum where social partners, through constant interaction, both enhance 
flexibility and security and find compromises that can benefit employers and employees 
alike. Furthermore, this thesis has enlarged the debate in two ways, first, by examining the 
influence that national level institutions – the law and the social welfare provision – exert on 
sector level bargaining. In this regard, it was proposed that in countries in which labour law is 
more developed, collective bargaining and social dialogue engage less with flexibility and 
more with security, since the law reduces the scope for some forms of contract-based 
flexibility (external flexibility). In contrast, where social welfare is more developed, 
collective bargaining and social dialogue engage more with flexibility and less with security, 
because the security dimension is already covered by the state. Second, the thesis also 
examined the role that sector level institutions play at lower bargaining levels.  On this 
subject, the most original contribution was found in the work of Marginson and Galetto 
(2015) which covered exclusively institutional configurations. In keeping with their findings 
it was proposed that employers and unions are more likely to develop shared understandings 
of what flexibility and security mean and what forms of flexibility and security are 
appropriate to explore, where their relationship is more securely institutionalised under the 
presence of sector level bargaining. Moreover, when articulation mechanisms govern the 
relationship between bargaining levels not only are issues of flexibility and security more 
likely to be negotiated at the company level but company level agreements are also more 
likely to be characterised by a relatively low degree of heterogeneity since actors can only 
negotiate within the constraints provided by the sector. However, the present analysis went 
beyond institutions to also observe the role of actors. In doing so it confirmed that the 
presence of unions at the company level, along with the degree of trust between parties, 
increase the social partners’ opportunities to exploit integrative potential (Ilsoe, 2012) and 
this analysis thus offers a more encompassing explanation of the factors that condition the 
agenda of sector and firm level negotiations across countries.  
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10.2.2 The role of firm level collective bargaining over issues of flexibility and security  
The second stream of literature relates to the role of non-institutional factors for the outcomes 
of company level negotiations on flexibility and security. Given the international nature of 
the sector considered – the chemical and the pharmaceutical sector – an important focus of 
analysis was centred upon collective bargaining within multinationals. By looking at existing 
research findings a series of relevant variables were identified and used to undertake a further 
– and complementary – analytical step (which involved only the two countries with multi-
employer arrangements: Italy and Denmark). Drawing on the findings of Pulignano and 
Keune (2015) the variables that were identified are the intensity of market competition and 
the level of vertical integration and they were predicted to influence the nature of flexibility 
and security trade-offs in four different ways (See 2.4).  Moreover, Marginson and 
Arrowsmith (2006) showed that the degree to which product markets are international in 
scope and production sites are internationally integrated produce incentives for multinationals 
to develop global HR strategies. Because the internationalisation of HR practices has been 
found to exert pressures on local management to control costs through flexibility (Marginson 
and Arrowsmith, 2006) this thesis proposed that the internationalisation of HR practices can 
also reduce the scope for unions to negotiate compensatory forms of security. Finally, Meardi 
et al. (2009) show that relocation threats induce cost reduction and foster efficiency 
enhancing changes to the detriment of concession bargaining, therefore it was proposed that 
such threats are likely to increase subsidiaries’ demands for flexibility and, at the same time, 
negatively influence unions’ structural power in trade-offs between flexibility and security.    
 
Crucially, these two different and interrelated streams of research have set the context for a 
multi-level study in which companies were compared within their sectoral context and sectors 
were compared within their national contexts. The main contribution of this approach is to 
show that, in order to explain cross country differences and similarities in the outcomes of 
firm level bargaining over issues of flexibility and security, both institutional and non-
institutional variables need to be simultaneously considered. In particular, the findings in this 
thesis, which augment those of Marginson and Galetto (2015), show that it is not sufficient to 
look at articulation mechanisms to predict whether social partners within companies will 
engage with issues of flexibility and security. The autonomy of local HR managers from the 
global headquarters and the strength of shop stewards within subsidiaries are shown to be 
equally relevant factors. They provide firm level actors with confidence so that they can take 
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advantage of institutional resources and then negotiate agreements that serve both parties’ 
interests. Moreover, while confirming that high levels of vertical integration and relatively 
low levels of global competition foster the possibility for balanced trade-offs within 
subsidiaries (Pulignano and Keune, 2015), this thesis demonstrates that in a country where 
the depth of bargaining is low – such as Italy –  the global headquarters is in a better position 
to exploit local imbalances of power. It follows that in this country market and productivity-
led considerations tend to sit at the top of the bargaining agenda. In contrast, in Denmark, 
where not only is there a greater depth of bargaining, but articulation between bargaining 
levels is also clearer than in Italy, measures improving working conditions are found to be as 
prominent as productivity enhancing measures. Although integrated in similarly structured 
multinationals, in Denmark, local HR managers are shown to be more independent from the 
global headquarters than in Italy, while unions have greater capacities than their Italian 
counterparts to leverage on institutional resources in a strategic way. In other words, the 
institutional focus sheds light on the opportunities that sector and company level social 
partners have in engaging with issues of flexibility and security, whereas the non-institutional 
focus enabled this research to unveil the link between institutional rules and situational 
contingencies in order to understand the considerations around which local actors define, in 
practice, their flexibility and security strategies. 
10.3 The theoretical framework  
 
In this thesis collective bargaining arrangements were observed by applying the principles of 
historical institutionalism which proved to be a successful methodological tool. It was chosen 
not only because it allows a focus on institutions in an actor-centred fashion but also because 
it recognises that actions are embedded in multiple layers of institutional constraints (Djelic, 
2010). From an analytical perspective, this approach served as a way to frame the three 
countries in relation to the institutional frameworks within which they are embedded and then 
transcend the national level to contextualise the comparison at the sector and the firm levels. 
Consistent with these objectives was the application in the study, of the classification of 
country clusters proposed by Visser (2009). By doing so, it was possible to enlarge the scope 
of comparative analysis to sub-national institutions; a task that required differences (and/or 
similarities) in types of institutions and degree of institutionalisation to be taken into account 
(Bechter at al., 2012; Prosser, 2015). The over-functionalist tendencies of the neo-
institutional paradigm were therefore addressed by following Crouch’s recommendation 
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which is to analyse the constraining/enabling role of institutions while giving adequate 
attention to power relations, social compromises and other contingent results of social 
interaction (Crouch, 2005). As previously argued (Chapters 1 and 3), Vissers’ clusters (2009) 
have not been applied to offer an accurate empirical description of different national 
institutional arrangements, but as an analytical devise enabling the formulation of 
comparative propositions. This approach proved beneficial as allowed the research to 
consider important factors of labour market governance and social welfare that were found to 
be particularly relevant. 
 
By overcoming an overly deterministic approach to institutions, the research was able to 
explain empirical variance (and/or similarity) of bargaining outcomes. This was done by 
looking at contingent factors, such as the conditions of the negotiating environment, the 
interests and the goals of social actors, as well as their beliefs. In particular, Chapter 3 
promised to follow three theoretical lines of enquiry: a) Why do the social partners have the 
goals they seem to have? b) What is the role of rules in shaping why one course of action 
seems more feasible/rational than another? And c) what is understood as being rational in 
different national (and sub-national) contexts? A series of important considerations have 
emerged allowing this research to contribute to the academic debate on historical 
institutionalism. 
 
Crucially, the first line of enquiry has been used to unveil the social partners’ understandings 
around issues of flexibility and security both at the sector level – across Italy, Denmark and 
the UK – and the company level – across Italy and Denmark. The analysis showed that such 
understandings reflect the role that both institutional rules and socially constructed 
conventions play in each of the three countries that were observed. Sector level social 
partners in Italy spoke about a special relationship connoted by a distinctive pragmatism. 
Although sharing the same legal framework as other industries, the interviewees refer to the 
chemical and the pharmaceutical sector as something else within the Italian industrial 
relations panorama. Because of their legacy, the social partners were able to come up with a 
notion of flexibility that is not a synonym for precarious work but that can be functional – if 
controlled – to enhance competitiveness. As for security, the company level welfare 
initiatives that were included in the most recent agreements confirm that the social partners 
have developed a definition that goes beyond job security to also encompass other forms of 
benefits. In Denmark, the notions of flexibility and security embraced by the social partners 
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were shown to be strongly linked to the institutional configuration in which they lie, and that 
was defined as Danish flexicurity. Besides shedding light on the embeddedness of the 
phenomenon, the definition of flexicurity which emerged from the interviews emphasises the 
role that the social partners play within this particular framework. Representing the main 
source of labour market regulation, they reported feeling not only legitimated but also obliged 
to defend and reproduce it over time.  Finally, in the UK, sector level employers and labour 
organisations showed that they were not able to describe flexibility and security in a 
consistent way. However, they all referred to common issues such as historical reasons, the 
absence of a national understanding of labour issues, and the lack of an overarching political 
will to explain their weak position in facing the challenges that were relevant to this thesis. 
Also in this country social partners did indeed demonstrate that their goals were set according 
to institutional constraints (or rather the absence of institutional constraints) and perceptions 
about reality.  
 
This leads to the second line of enquiry designed to explore why one course of action is 
perceived as being more rational and/or feasible than another in different contexts. Sector 
level social dialogue in the UK has never played a strategic role in the regulation of the 
labour market, as a result, the social actors themselves do not believe in the potential benefits 
of this form of negotiation. In fact, they pursue a limited agenda that serves primarily as a 
way of keeping alive a good working relationship on issues of common concern such as 
health and safety, and energy issues. In Italy, multi-employer arrangements were shown to be 
in place to control bargaining decentralisation. However, company level social partners, both 
HR managers and shop stewards, albeit for different reasons, lack the procedural security 
they would need to engage with some categories of flexibility and security. Hence, they 
refrain from enacting part of their bargaining competences. Conversely in Denmark, the high 
depth of the bargaining system contributes to legitimate company level social partners who, 
as a result, are able to also address categories of flexibility and security that fall outside the 
scope of the industrial agreement. Believing that it is possible to improve the sectoral 
framework and find workable compromises, it seems rational to them to face each other over 
the bargaining table and increase the breadth of bargaining topics. Significantly, the Italian 
and the Danish cases showed that even when they exist, institutions may not fully explain 
policy outcomes. There are other factors, along with structures, that may account for the 
postures of social actors. 
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Following this argument, the third line of enquiry probed whether the interaction between 
institutions and actors has had any implications for negotiating strategies across the three 
countries. The historically declining coverage of collective bargaining in the UK and the 
phenomenon of disorganised decentralisation emerged as relevant to understanding the 
postures of sector level actors towards social dialogue. Despite a general scepticism about its 
effectiveness in addressing flexibility and security, the social partners have nonetheless 
chosen to commit to it, because they perceive that a good relationship will be beneficial in 
other areas. This perception/choice keeps alive informal social dialogue in the sector. In Italy, 
the social partners have leveraged on collective bargaining to overcome some statutory 
inefficiencies and cope with the challenges of a particularly internationalised and highly 
capital-intensive industry. Such pragmatism has ended up being both a resource and 
weakness for the sector. On the one hand it has strengthened the relationship between the 
social partners and increased the degree of coordination between bargaining levels, especially 
amongst unions. On the other hand, by competing on a normative ground with the central 
confederations the mechanisms controlling decentralisation became unclear.  Significantly, 
the way in which institutions and actors have interacted in this country (and sector) produced 
double-edged effects limiting the opportunities of company level social partners when 
dealing with flexibility and security. In contrast, in Denmark a similar phenomenon has 
strengthened institutional regulation, evolving into a system of organisational participation 
and a collectivist culture which keeps the level of the social partners’ legitimation high, along 
with their capacity to address flexibility and security.  
 
Thus, historical institutionalism has helped this thesis to highlight that in order to understand 
the strategies and the outcomes of negotiations, the institutional framework within which the 
social partners interact is fundamental. However, it has also shown that the focus on 
structures only partly explains the differences and the similarities emerging across countries. 
Crucially, the social actors are found to interpret institutions; and the degree of informality 
characterising this process of interpretation was shown to account for the way in which such 
institutions are enacted (or not enacted) and reproduced over time in different national 
contexts.  
 
This idea of actors enacting or not enacting institutions highlights a further area to which the 
present comparative analysis brings its theoretical contribution: institutional change. The first 
consideration is methodological and relates to the advantages that the path-dependency 
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paradigm provides to issues of change. First of all, it is shown that such an approach is not 
functionalist: incremental change can also be explained by exploring dynamics of power 
(rather than issues of efficiency). Second, a comparative analysis can explore institutions 
without necessarily generate deterministic results. Consistent with Campbell’s view, this 
study shows that actors’ choices are as important as institutions, and are not pre-determined 
(2010). On the contrary, it is actors themselves that influence institutional outcomes because 
they have the capability to ‘exercise a degree of autonomy to pick and choose from their 
repertoires as they see fit’ (2010:99).  Third, it is possible to interpret institutions in a 
dynamic fashion which means more as opportunities than constraints.  
 
The second consideration is empirical, as the findings on the Italian and the Danish case 
provide evidence to support Thelen’s work on varieties of liberalism (2014). Not only are 
these findings in line with her theoretical perspective – confirming that historical 
institutionalism is indeed relevant to this thesis (see Chapter 3). But they also contribute to a 
further stream of research that is currently investigating the link between social welfare and 
industrial relations institutions. First and foremost, this thesis sheds light on the implications 
that the interface between collective bargaining and the welfare system have on the 
dimension of security (Thelen, 2014; Crouch 2015).  
 
In particular, Thelen (2014) argues that political-economic institutions – collective bargaining 
included – have followed three trajectories of change. The findings of this thesis suggest that 
Italy exemplifies the one of dualisation because coordination on the side of employers 
continues to exist – and is strong – but in a context of narrowing in the number of firms and 
workers that are covered by company level negotiations (Thelen, 2014). Further, the way in 
which bargaining institutions are evolving in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector 
confirms that dualisation is likely to take place through a process of institutional ‘drift’ 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen and Mahoney, 2010; Thelen, 2014). First, it is 
demonstrated that institutions are not stable, and second that they require ‘active 
maintenance’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:24). If actors abdicate to their previous 
responsibilities – as company level social partners in Italy are doing with their bargaining 
competences – institutions will be subject to atrophy or erosion (Ibid.). Third, it is also 
demonstrated that change through drift – while potentially fundamental – ‘may be masked by 
stability on surface’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:24). For example, in Italy coordinating 
mechanisms between sector and company level bargaining are formally in place. However, 
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their effect is reduced by social partners’ unwillingness to enact them. This leads to a further 
consideration: while multi-employer arrangements have resisted decentralising pressures in 
this country, it is the legal framework and the social welfare that have failed to cover a set or 
risks which firm level actors should take in order to engage with issues of flexibility and 
security.      
 
The Danish case depicts a completely different scenario. Coordination between bargaining 
level is strong despite increasing decentralisation, a light legal framework makes workers 
more mobile, and the social welfare collectivises risks. Social partners at the company level 
have the incentive for enacting their bargaining competences and, by making institutions 
relevant and functional, they also legitimate their role in the labour market.  Consistent with 
Thelen’s terminology (2014), institutional change in Denmark has followed the trajectory of 
‘embedded flexibilisation’. This is evident in the fact that issues of flexibility and security 
have been assimilated by existent institutional arrangements – as the scope of the bargaining 
agenda demonstrates – rather than resisted. Through this process of interaction, industrial 
relations actors and institutions in Denmark have secured (at least in the industrial sector) 
their own survival.  
 
The general point is that the extent to which institutions that provide coordination between 
bargaining levels have egalitarian implications is dependent on the scope and 
encompassingness of these institutions (Thelen, 2014). In Italy the depth of bargaining 
(provided by union representation at the firm level) is lower than in Denmark and, as a result, 
the capability of collective bargaining to enhance the dimension of security is reduced. This 
confirms that ‘high level of organisation and unity of the labour side are indispensable for 
continued high levels of social solidarity’ (Thelen, 2014:204). It also suggests that institutions 
are fundamental, but they do not themselves prescribe the uses to which they will be put. The 
extent to which collective bargaining can address security depends on other factors, for 
example, whether or not political actors will accept to collectivise the risks associated with 
flexibility – both in the labour market and the bargaining system – through more generous 
welfare provisions. This points to the fact that the state has a fundamental role both in 
facilitating the enactment of bargaining institutions and improving the capacity of institutions 
to adjust/react to social changes (Heyes et al. 2012)  
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To conclude, this comparative analysis on the role of bargaining institutions in addressing 
flexibility and security contributes to a new debate on the impact of the welfare state on 
policies of social solidarity. The most original contribution is to show that the social welfare 
is not necessarily complementary to flexicurity as the literature on institutional 
complementarities would suggest (Campbell, 2010). The role of the social welfare is actually 
to enable further flexibilisation of both the labour market and the bargaining system without 
flexibility turning into a social problem. In other words, welfare benefits allow bargaining 
actors and institutions to collectivise risks and, as a result, enable them to adapt/adjust to 
changes in the economic and social spheres. This finding is consistent with the solidaristic 
argument on liberalisation recently made within the historical institutionalist debate (Thelen, 
2014; Crouch, 2015). In Thelen’s words: ‘generous social policy – and thus strong welfare 
state – remains central to the new politics of social solidarity in the context of these changes 
[in the market]. But the logic and the functions of social policy are quite different from the 
traditional model. Rather than serving the complementary (social-insurance) role the 
literature has traditionally assigned to them, the role of welfare policies increasingly revolves 
around re-embedding these liberalising moves in measures that collectivise the resulting 
risks’ (Thelen, 2014:16).   
 
10.4 The findings on the role of sector and company level bargaining arrangements over 
flexibility and security 
 
By applying the described theoretical lens to the research questions a series of important 
findings have followed. In this section these will be recollected in two different steps 
reflecting the multi-level nature of the thesis which was based on a cross country comparison 
of both sector (Chapter 7) and company level bargaining arrangements (Chapter 9). 
Accordingly, the findings on the role of collective bargaining and social dialogue in 
addressing flexibility and security across Italy, Denmark, and the UK will be reviewed first.  
10.4.1 The findings at the sector level  
Chapter 7 showed that while in Italy and Denmark collective bargaining arrangements exert 
some pressure on the social partners to engage with flexibility and security, in the UK, 
informal social dialogue does not play an equivalent role. The lack of sector level bargaining 
institutions in this country accounts for the ineffectiveness of the social partners in addressing 
these issues. Indeed, the predominantly informal approach to social dialogue in the sector 
333"
"
hinders the social partners’ ability to develop common understandings around flexibility and 
security. As a result, they are unable to formulate shared actions towards the regulation of the 
labour market. Moreover, due to the fact that, in the UK, the sector does not provide any 
formal mechanisms of coordination for lower bargaining levels, it is not possible to predict 
whether social dialogue serves any function in company level negotiations. Thus, this finding 
sheds further light on the role of sector level institutions as a source of flexibility and 
security.   
 
In this regard, the analysis of the sector level agreements in Italy and Denmark demonstrated 
that internal forms of flexibility, in particular functional and working-time flexibility, are 
more prominent than external forms of flexibility. This confirms that collective bargaining 
serves the demands of the chemical and pharmaceutical sector well, in particular, the need for 
a highly-skilled and multi-functional workforce, deployable on a continuous basis. This also 
occurs in Italy, where the scope for flexibility has been traditionally less extensive than in 
Denmark. Turning to security, the most original contribution is to show that job security in 
the Italian chemical and pharmaceutical sector has entered onto the collective bargaining 
agenda. This confirmed that when external rigidity is provided on the basis of status-like 
employment (such as in Italy before the 2015 labour market reform), collective bargaining is 
more likely to foster mobility in the internal than in the external labour market. In addition, it 
was suggested that when skills represent a source of competitive advantage, such as in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector, employers develop more incentives in investing and 
retaining employees. As a result, unions gain more capacity to push job security onto the 
bargaining agendas. However, in Denmark, the relatively high unemployment benefits 
secured by the State have reduced the social partners’ interest – especially the unions’ interest 
–in engaging with this particular issue. Therefore, job security, is the only form of security 
that did not feature in the Danish collective agreements. 
 
Significantly, this thesis shows that multi-employer bargaining arrangements provide social 
partners both in Italy and Denmark with the possibility of enhancing different forms of 
flexibility and security. Nevertheless, although sharing a similar institutional configuration at 
the sector level, the Danish social partners were shown to have more resources than their 
Italian counterparts to address these issues and to negotiate a wider variety of flexibility and 
security trade-offs. This result was explained in two different ways. First, the interaction 
between bargaining institutions and national institutional features conditions the agenda of 
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sector level collective bargaining over flexibility and security. Specifically, the high level of 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policies enable the social partners in 
Denmark to engage with flexibility and security both in the external and the internal labour 
market. As a result, the social actors are able to simultaneously meet employers’ short-term 
needs and employees’ demands for up-skilling and re-skilling. In contrast, in Italy, the law 
reduces the scope for external flexibility while enhancing the level of job security. Thus, the 
social partners have more options to address flexibility and security in the internal rather than 
in the external labour market, as well as a reduced capacity to produce certain flexibility and 
security trade-offs.  It was, therefore, concluded that of the various factors influencing the 
variation of scope for flexibility and security in collective bargaining across countries the 
most important is the interface between the law and the social welfare. 
 
Second, this study demonstrates that in order to explain differences in the outcomes of 
negotiations over flexibility and security across countries it is also important to look at the 
postures of the social partners. In this regard, the proactiveness of the Italian sector level 
negotiators in re-defining bargaining competences and widening the extent of decentralisation 
has had important implications for issues of flexibility and security at the company level. 
Thanks to their special relationship the social partners have pushed internal forms of 
flexibility onto their bargaining agenda and this has led to a variety of flexibility and security 
trade-offs at the sector level. In addition, they have produced a shift from decentralisation 
through demarcation to decentralisation through delegation, which has not only softened the 
controlling mechanisms governing the relationship between bargaining levels but has also 
produced uncertainty over the competences of local level negotiators. What is relevant here, 
however, is that while in Denmark demarcation occurs only at the sector level and involves 
three categories of flexibility and security – pay, training and working-time – in Italy 
delegation covers all the substantive categories of flexibility and security – pay, working-
time, training, job classification, provisions for atypical workers, social benefits and 
entitlements, and measures for employment. This means that the scope for company level 
bargaining over flexibility and security was found to be formally wider in Italy than in 
Denmark. Yet in practice, as indicated below, the bargaining agenda in the Danish companies 
was found to be wider than that in the Italian companies. 
 
In synthesis the sector level comparison confirmed that different institutional frameworks 
influence the way in which flexibility and security enter onto the collective bargaining 
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agenda across countries. In addition, this study showed that the Italian and the Danish 
collective bargaining systems play similar roles. Multi-employer bargaining arrangements are 
found to exert some pressures on both Italian and Danish social partners to engage with 
different forms of flexibility and security as well as to negotiate a variety of flexibility and 
security trade-offs between these. In contrast in the UK, the absence of collective bargaining 
institutions does not allow the social partners at the sector level to participate in the 
regulation of flexibility and security. Further, the analysis of the industrial relations 
arrangements featured by the chemical and the pharmaceutical sector across Italy and 
Denmark demonstrated that the two-tier bargaining system shapes the content of company 
level negotiations across both countries. In this light, it is concluded that issues of flexibility 
and security are more likely to be found on the agenda of company level negotiators in these 
two countries than in the UK where such institutional mechanisms do not exist. Similarly, the 
provision of a framework that steers company level bargaining on items of flexibility and 
security is likely to foster less heterogeneity in the content of collective agreements at the 
company level in Italy and Denmark than in the UK.  
10.4.2 The findings at the company level 
 
Issues of access to the companies in the UK did not allow the research to fully attest to the 
extent to which the above expectations were correct. However, by combining the sector and 
the company foci across the two countries with multi-employer arrangements – Italy and 
Denmark – the second level of comparison was nonetheless able to produce relevant findings.  
In particular, while confirming that the configuration of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector in Italy and the industrial sector in Denmark enables and constraints company 
bargaining over flexibility and security, this study showed that procedural mechanisms – 
either demarcation in Denmark or demarcation and delegation in Italy – are not the only 
institutional factors that matter. Crucially, the company level focus shed light on a further 
institutional variable, the depth of bargaining, which was demonstrated to be just as 
significant.  
 
It has been argued that in Denmark, the high depth of bargaining is secured both by a clear 
demarcation of competences between bargaining levels and the large presence of shop 
stewards within companies. These features were found to strengthen mutual trust between 
local actors who, as a result, feel legitimated to sign agreements that go beyond the scope of 
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the sectoral framework. In contrast in Italy, where the boundaries of demarcation and 
delegation are more blurred and union density at the company level is low, shop stewards are 
weaker and managers do not trust the shop-steward’s ability to secure the implementation of 
agreements. Hence, both parties are reluctant to enact the procedural flexibility provided by 
the sector level. It follows that the content – and by implication the function – of company 
level bargaining on flexibility and security is different across the two countries. In Denmark, 
it covers issues that are able to boost productivity as well as enhance working conditions; 
whereas in Italy it involves primarily measures fostering higher productivity and 
competitiveness.   
 
Thus, flexibility and security entered onto the agenda of company level negotiators both as a 
result of the procedural flexibility provided by the sector level framework and the extent of 
union density at the local level. The former suggests categories for negotiations and the latter 
ensures that such categories enter into firm level bargaining. Further, the Danish case showed 
that the way in which bargaining arrangements interact at the macro-level with national 
institutional features and at the micro-level with local power contingencies provides a further 
opportunity for company level actors: the capacity to increase the scope for security in 
collective agreements.  
 
As a result of the coordinating role that sector level arrangements play for company level 
bargaining over issues of flexibility and security, the firm level agreements were found to 
vary more across than within countries. This notwithstanding, shop stewards and HR 
managers embedded in the same institutional context also exhibited a different degree of 
autonomy. Because one of the Danish companies did not belong to the employer’s 
organisation, a certain degree of within country variation was found in the level of HR 
managers’ autonomy from the sector level framework. Here, however, a strong presence of 
shop stewards has produced incentives to first sign the accession to the employers’ 
organisation agreement, and then develop a well-functioning framework of industrial 
relations so that the institutional variation between the two companies, in practice, is 
minimised. By contrast, in Italy, within country variation emerges in the degree of HR 
managers’ autonomy from the directions of the global headquarters. It has been argued that in 
the Italian firm, where union density is lower, global management is in a better position to 
take advantage of local power contingencies towards a top-down implementation of 
decisions.  
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Further, this thesis shows that whether company level agreements address primarily one type 
of flexibility and/or one type of security varies both across countries and companies. In this 
light, it was suggested that the focus on institutions is insufficient to fully grasp the way in 
which actors define their flexibility and security strategies within firms. For this reason, the 
thesis draws attention to the organisational structures of the companies and establishes that it 
is primarily firm-specific contingencies that make it possible for local level actors to use 
collective bargaining in a strategic way. In particular, it was shown that there is a correlation 
between certain non-institutional variables and the capacity of the social partners to engage 
with issues of flexibility and security through collective bargaining. Crucially, when looking 
at the relationship between the organisational characteristics of the companies and the 
outcomes of the agreements, two relevant findings emerged. First, a high degree of 
internationalisation and vertical integration exert pressures on local HR managers to increase 
flexibility by using collective bargaining. At the same time, medium-to low levels of 
international competition, differentiated products, intensive nature of capital, high skills 
requirements strengthen the unions’ bargaining power towards the negotiation of 
compensating forms of security. In other words, by contributing to each of the two 
dimensions of flexicurity these organisational characteristics allow the social partners to 
exploit integrative potential, so that, as a result of their interactions, they are both able to 
secure positive outcomes (balanced trade-offs).   
 
Second, the thesis demonstrates that in the presence of similar organisational characteristics, 
the scope for security in the Danish firms was still wider than in the Italian firms. This 
important finding highlights that, at the company level, institutional arrangements are 
nonetheless able to make a difference. Indeed, high union density and a clear framework of 
rules at the firm level were shown to reduce the capacity of the global headquarters to 
leverage on local power relations. In the presence of these institutional constraints, unions 
develop the capacity to make gains on security regardless of managers’ postures on 
flexibility.  
 
In synthesis, the present research shows that collective bargaining at both sector and company 
level represents an important source of flexibility and security for the labour market. In 
particular, multi-employer bargaining arrangements enable and constrain company level 
negotiations on issues of flexibility and security. They do so through procedural mechanisms 
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set in place to govern the relationship between bargaining levels. However, such mechanisms 
are not the only factors that were shown to matter. From an institutional perspective the main 
differences in the content of the agreements across companies were explained by the presence 
of shop stewards, which was shown to enlarge the scope for security in negotiations. From a 
non-institutional perspective a series of relevant variables have been identified.  These are the 
level of internationalisation and vertical integration, on the one hand, and international 
competition, skills requirements, product differentiation, and the nature of capital on the 
other. Such variables were found to influence the flexibility and the security dimensions 
respectively, creating opportunities for managers and shop stewards to exploit integrative 
potential and, as a result, leading to balanced flexibility and security trade-offs.  
 
To conclude, the most original contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that sector level 
institutions account for the degree of within country homogeneity in the content of firm level 
agreements over issues of flexibility and security. In contrast, the degree of cross-company 
heterogeneity can be explained primarily by looking at firm level contingencies – both union 
density and organisational structures – meaning that at the company level both institutional 
resources and non-institutional characteristics play a fundamental role.  
 
10.5 Policy implications 
 
The research findings of the thesis have confirmed the importance of the role of collective 
bargaining as a source of flexibility and security for the labour market. In both Italy and 
Denmark such institutions have not only enabled social partners to engage with these issues 
but also fostered a variety of flexibility and security trade-offs. While in the UK collective 
bargaining arrangements were not the object of analysis, this study nevertheless demonstrated 
that the lack of bargaining arrangements at the sector level impeded their ability to make a 
relevant contribution on flexibility and security. It was shown first, that social actors did not 
develop shared understandings over these issues, and therefore, are not effective in pushing 
forward a common agenda at the sector level. Second, they were unable to set in place 
mechanisms of coordination between the sector and the company level. It follows that in the 
UK company level negotiators find themselves more exposed to firm-specific pressures such 
as those that may arise from the organisational structures previously reviewed.  
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In addition, by complementing the sector with the company focus the findings confirmed that 
in Denmark, more so than in Italy, well-functioning sector level institutions coupled with 
high union density at the local level increase the scope for flexibility within firms while also 
providing a security dimension. In Denmark, measures aimed at improving both productivity 
and employee working conditions were present in all the collective agreements that were 
analysed, whereas in Italy agreements focused primarily on the first of these elements. This 
provides evidence that bargaining arrangements can act as beneficial constraints because they 
allow both sides of the negotiating table to maximise their flexibility and security goals. 
  
In this light, it is suggested that the policy debate on flexicurity has to move beyond a focus 
on national interventions in order to include those institutions that, on a smaller scale but with 
great effectiveness, are already making a significant contribution to flexibility and security 
alike. Indeed, the national focus has deterred policy-makers from taking advantage of 
collective bargaining arrangements, the role of which has largely been overlooked in 
addressing flexicurity. For example, the EU policy discourse on micro-level adjustments has 
focused primarily on wages, something that the present thesis has shown to be only one of the 
bargaining items over which social partners exhibited the capacity to compromise. This leads 
to a second relevant point: the EU Member States have mainly oriented their policy agenda 
towards collective bargaining decentralisation. This research contends that such an approach, 
which does not take into account cross country differences in collective bargaining 
arrangements, may not always be appropriate. As the findings suggest the devolution of 
further bargaining competences from the sector to the firm level can be beneficial primarily 
in two specific instances: 1) if multi-employer bargaining arrangements are both in place and 
well-functioning; and 2) if at the firm level union representation is high. By contrast, 
fostering further bargaining decentralisation in countries where 1) there is a high discrepancy 
between sector and company level coverage and 2) union representatives at the company 
level are weak, is likely to expose local level actors to greater pressures for flexibility to the 
detriment of the dimension of security.  
 
Given this, it is proposed that sector level bargaining arrangements should be restored where 
they are no longer functional, and preserved (and if necessary strengthened) where they are 
still existent. There are two main reasons for policy-makers to take advantage of this 
particular approach. First, sector level bargaining is a policy forum in its own right where 
social partners have the capacity to find, with autonomy, acceptable compromises between 
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flexibility and security. Second, its role of coordination provides local managers and shop 
stewards with the procedural security they need to serve a similar role: to enhance 
competitiveness while improving working conditions. Thus, besides contributing in a more 
equal way to both dimensions of flexicurity (flexibility and security), this particular approach 
may also represent an opportunity to deepen European economic integration. Furthermore, 
these research findings show that in order to fully benefit from the coordinating role of sector 
level bargaining, union density at firm level needs to be high. It is therefore suggested that 
policy-makers, as well as national union officials should create the conditions for union 
representatives to gain access to companies.   
 
Finally, the research highlighted that collective bargaining arrangements interact with 
national institutions, in particular, with the law and the social welfare.  In regard to the former 
there has been a growing emphasis on labour market deregulation all across Europe. It is no 
coincidence that during the four years in which this research has been conducted, Italy went 
through a series of reforms that resulted in a reduction of legal protections for standard 
employees. Turning to social welfare, the financial crisis and the related austerity measures 
have recently put a strain on this institution too. The findings of the thesis suggest that any 
policy agenda based on bargaining decentralisation, legal deregulation and social welfare 
retrenchment is a clear farewell to the security dimension of flexicurity. Conversely, the 
thesis also indicates that there is a positive correlation between collective bargaining, 
generous welfare benefits, and high flexibility and security. 
10.6 Limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future research 
 
This thesis has produced a rich account of the role of collective bargaining in addressing 
flexibility and security and contributed to the literature on flexicurity. In addition, because the 
companies involved in the research were all international organisations, part of the findings 
can be located within the literature on collective bargaining in multinationals. However, the 
research also has certain limitations and, the most apparent, is the lack of company level data 
in the UK, which would have further strengthened the validity of the findings.  
 
Moreover, the four companies were chosen on the basis of pragmatic reasons of access and 
the four multinationals were later found to share similar organisational structures. For this 
reason, the thesis could only provide a restricted account of the role of differences in firm-
specific characteristics in conditioning the nature of the flexibility and security trade-off. Yet, 
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this limitation can also be interpreted as a strength. First, it gave consistency to the findings. 
Second, it allowed the researcher to hold these variables constant while paying exclusive 
attention to institutional and actor-related variance across cases. As a result, it was possible to 
establish a clear correlation between union density at the company level and the scope for 
security in collective agreements; and then account for the extent of variation in negotiating 
outcomes across Italy and Denmark.  
 
As the relevance of organisational structures to the agenda of company level bargaining 
became apparent, the researcher appreciated that investigating more than one plant within 
each firm’s value chain would have helped to assess, in a more precise way, the impact of 
factors such as benchmarking, threat of relocation, product differentiation, and skills 
requirements. Evidence about these variables was provided by interviews, the consistency of 
which could not, however, be checked across subsidiaries and, therefore, this aspect of the 
research might benefit from further investigation.  
 
However, not only can the most important limitations of this thesis all be addressed by future 
research, but for each level of analysis – the country, the sector, and the company level – new 
avenues of exploration have also been opened up. These new avenues are summarised below: 
 
Country: 
1. The first suggestion for future research is to attempt to re-negotiate access at the 
company level in the UK. The objective here is to complete the task of covering the 
third of Visser’s (2009) five clusters: the Western European cluster. 
2. Even so, there are two more clusters that still require investigation: the Centre-eastern 
European and the Centre-western European clusters. By extending the study to 
countries such as Poland and Germany it would be possible to provide a more 
encompassing picture of the role of different bargaining arrangements in addressing 
flexibility and security. 
3. A third suggestion for future research is to investigate – and then compare – pairs of 
countries within the same cluster, for example: Sweden as well as Denmark; Spain as 
well as Italy; and Ireland as well as the UK. Such an approach would shed light on 
issues of within cluster variation and/or similarity on the role of collective bargaining 
institutions as source of flexibility and security.  
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Sector:  
1. As Bechter et al. (2012) point out the extent to which each of Visser’s (2009) clusters 
varies by sector is an important empirical question. Thus, a suggestion for future 
research is to pay specific attention to issues of within country heterogeneity by 
focusing on a different sector of economic activity. Because this thesis sheds light on 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry – intensive in skills, capital, and 
technologies, as well as being highly internationalised – it seems relevant to explore a 
sector that is different from it in ‘nature’ (Bechter et al. 2012:192), such as: a) a more 
labour intensive and lower technology manufacturing sector; b) a low-skilled service 
sector; c) a high-skilled service sector; or d) a sector with a lower level of 
internationalisation.  
 
Company:  
1. In order to provide a more encompassing explanation of the role of firm-specific 
characteristics in conditioning the nature of the flexibility and security trade-offs, 
future research could look at chemical and pharmaceutical companies which have 
organisational structures that are different from each other. 
2. In order to explore more fully issues of heterogeneity future research could explore 
more than two chemical and pharmaceutical companies within the same country. 
3. In order to explore how the value chain conditions bargaining strategies (see comment 
above) future research could examine the role of collective bargaining in addressing 
flexibility and security in more than one subsidiary of a multinational organisation, 
(where subsidiaries are based in the same country).  
4. A final suggestion is to apply the research design developed for this thesis to medium-
sized (where company level bargaining is still likely to occur) companies but not 
multinational organisations, so as to observe which kind of firm-specific 
contingencies, if any, exert an influence on the agenda of local level negotiators 
concerning issues of flexibility and security, and if so, how. 
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